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Abstract 
The lack of regulatory oversight on Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) has for a long time been 
viewed as an anomaly, particularly as CRAs were perceived to wield unfettered power, 
sanctioning the flow of funds between investors and borrowers in global securities markets. 
The regulatory void was in contrast to the heavy reliance on credit ratings by regulators in 
determining minimum capital adequacy requirements for banks and other depository 
institutions. CRAs and other information intermediaries were said to have failed in their 
information intermediary roles, possibly causing various corporate collapses and 
exacerbating calls for regulation. Various scholars and practitioners argued that the lack of 
CRA regulation caused a number of legacy problems which allegedly compromised CRAs’ 
objectivity and independence in their information intermediation roles in the global 
securities market. The commonly touted legacy problems included lack of competition in 
the ratings market; conflicts of interest arising from the issuer-pays model; opaque rating 
methodologies as well as lack of accountability among CRAs. Following the 2007-8 global 
financial crisis where CRAs allegedly failed to provide timely rating adjustments to 
deteriorating securities, the European Commission (EC) gazetted the 2009 regulations to 
stem the legacy problems in CRA operations and prevent further crises in the European 
Union (EU).  Rather than quell concerns on the operations of CRAs, the new regulations 
triggered further academic debates regarding their motivations, purpose, impact, timing 
and effectiveness. It was not clear whether practitioners working with credit ratings shared 
the emerging concerns. This study was conducted to gauge the views of practitioners 
working with credit ratings on the perceived impact of the EC regulations. The study took 
an interpretivist approach, employing semi structured interviews. Study participants were 
initially selected purposively and subsequently snowballed from four groups comprising 
issuers, institutional investors, CRAs and Other Interested Parties. The study adopted a 
metaphorical data analysis approach, using the endogenous regulation theory to conclude 
that there was a disconnection between the regulators and those regulated. It was noted 
that some regulatory conceptions lacked practical relevance and could detrimentally affect 
market operations. The study made various contributions to practice, theory and literature. 
It recommended an endogenous and more inclusive regulatory approach, fostering closer 
cooperation between regulators and those regulated, particularly in a tightly-closed 
industry where those regulated possessed more information regarding the technical nature 
of the industry than regulators.     
Key words: 
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1.0 Introduction 
This chapter offers an introduction to the study and begins by giving an overview of 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) and their role in the global securities market. Despite 
CRAs being portrayed as the dealmakers in the global securities market, sanctioning 
the flow of investment capital (Mulligan, 2009; Nicholls, 2005), it was argued that 
CRAs traditionally operated in a loosely-regulated environment sparking calls for 
regulation to address legacy problems in the ratings industry (Sy, 2009). The legacy 
problems cited included allegations that CRAs lacked accountability and wielded 
unfettered power (Manns, 2009); that the issuer-pays model was conflicted and 
potentially compromised ratings quality (Lynch, 2009); that the CRA rating 
methodologies lacked transparency and thus made it difficult for different 
stakeholders to judge the quality of credit ratings (Calomiris, 2009; Mollers, 2009; Sy, 
2009); that the credit rating industry was dominated by the 3 big CRAs (Moody’s, 
S&P and Fitch), stifling competition and denying rating users a wide choice (Deb, 
Manning, Murphy, Penalver, & Toth, 2011). It was further argued that despite the 
above shortcomings, there was over-reliance on credit ratings by regulators raising 
concerns that such regulatory use of ratings led to misplaced confidence as the 
underlying ratings were not effectively regulated (Lynch, 2009). These legacy 
problems fuelled calls for the regulation of CRAs, particularly when they were cited 
as possible triggers for such crises as the 2007-8 global financial crisis.  
 
While the 2009 European Commission (EC) CRA regulations were initially heralded 
as a solution to the legacy problems in the rating of securities, they soon came under 
criticism, with suggestions that the regulatory approach taken by the European 
Commission (EC) may not have been appropriate in addressing the problems 
identified as possible causes of the 2007-8 crisis (see for example Papaikonomou, 
2010; Utzig, 2010). There were suggestions that the scope and extent of the 2009 EC 
regulatory framework still needed further investigation (Becker, 2011). 
Notwithstanding the fact that most of the concerns cited above came from academics, 
there had not yet been any empirical studies validating the concerns from the 
perspective of the regulated market participants.   
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1.1 Rationale of the study    
Despite the increased role of credit rating agencies in sanctioning the flow of global 
securities, lack of regulatory oversight over CRA operations has been fiercely 
debated in academic, professional and political circles (Lynch, 2009; Manns, 2009; 
Partnoy, 2001, 2010). Notwithstanding the calls for regulation of CRAs, the 
introduction of the European Commission CRA regulations triggered yet more 
contentious debates over the appropriateness of the regulatory reforms, their scope, 
possible regulatory motives as well as the likely unintended consequences of the 
new regulations (Calomiris, 2009; Johansson, 2010; Mollers, 2009; Posner, 2010; Sy, 
2009; Tichy, 2011; White, 2010a). Consequently, this study sought to investigate 
whether those practitioners working with credit ratings shared the concerns cited 
above. The study elicited views of UK-based market participants on the perceived 
impact of the EC regulations on securities market operations in the UK. The study’s 
focus on UK-based market participants was largely hinged on limited resources and 
the researcher’s time restrictions for undertaking the study. The sections below 
open the thesis with an overview of the securities market, the role of information 
intermediaries such as CRAs as well as the CRA regulatory environment. A 
definition of CRAs is offered to set the scene and pave way for subsequent 
discussions. 
1.1.1 Background to the securities market 
Securities play a central role in facilitating the exchange of funds between investors 
and borrowers. The currency for the exchange and distribution of funds is 
information (Barker, 1997). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the onset of 
the separation of corporate ownership from control made it difficult for investors to 
access accurate and up-to-date information on investee companies, creating a market 
for information intermediaries such as credit rating agencies. CRAs went on to fill 
this information void, bridging the information asymmetry between investors and 
borrowers (Tang, 2006). Despite this prominent role, the operation of CRAs was 
traditionally unregulated (Levine, 2012), sparking calls for tighter regulatory 
oversight of the credit rating agencies. The calls for regulation became incessant, 
particularly in the wake of various corporate collapses where poor practices among 
information watchdogs such as CRAs were said to be a major cause (Partnoy, 2009). 
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1.1.2 Credit Rating Agencies defined 
Credit Rating Agencies act as intermediaries bridging information gaps between 
issuers / borrowers on one hand and investors / lenders on the other (Fennell & 
Medvedev, 2012). They offer judgements (ratings) on the likelihood of default for 
rated debt instruments or securities issued by corporations or governments. Credit 
ratings act as indicators of risk, denoting the probability of default of the rated 
entity. Consequently, ratings are crucial in guiding investment decisions in the 
global securities market. CRAs act as “the first line of defence for investors” (Davies 
& Green, 2008, p.68) by offering timely information on rating movements. The 
importance of CRAs in the global securities market was however questioned by 
Griffin & Sanvicente (1982) who argued that the informational advantages of CRAs 
were derived from the coercive quasi-regulatory incentives they offered to issuers, 
coaxing them to divulge non-public information in the hope of getting favourable 
ratings which in turn attracted favourable borrowing terms. This view depicted 
CRAs not as valuable information intermediaries, but as necessary market evils that 
market participants were compelled to use for both competitive and regulatory 
reasons (Kerwer, 2005a; 2005b).  
1.1.3 The CRA role of issuing and monitoring rating movements 
According to Altman (1998); Bannier & Hirsch (2010) CRAs perform two key 
functions around credit ratings. Firstly, they provide initial credit worthiness 
opinions (ratings) and secondly, they provide a monitoring role to detect and 
report on any migration in the initially issued rating. The rating migration is 
therefore an indication that the rated entity’s credit quality has either deteriorated 
(downgrade) or improved (upgrade). Various scholars have argued that CRAs failed 
to provide accurate and timely indications of rating changes (Frost, 2007; Lombard, 
2008; Pinto, 2006). Consequently, investors who relied on such indications may 
have suffered loss when rated entities deteriorated below investment grade rating 
levels. White (2010b)  however argued that the slow adjustments to credit ratings 
was not necessarily a fault of CRAs, but an inherent problem in the ‘through-the 
cycle’ approach taken by CRAs in an attempt to maintain rating stability (see also 
Altman & Rijken, 2005; Tsoukas, Mizen, & Tsoukalas, 2011). The approach to rating 
‘through-the-cycle’ and its effect on rating transitions is further discussed in 4.4.2.3. 
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The determination of a credit rating involves distilling complex information 
regarding a borrower’s credit worthiness into a simple, understandable code or 
rating based on probabilistic abilities to repay a debt. Each credit rating has 
implications for the borrower’s risk levels and thus attracts different levels of 
interest on the borrowed capital (Lamandini, 2008). Rated entities therefore prefer 
the highest ratings, which denote lower risk levels and attract more favourable 
borrowing terms leading to lower borrowing costs. 
The information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders saw an increasing 
reliance by lenders (investors) on CRAs to bridge the information gap, a feat that 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) attributed to dispersed ownership and separation of 
ownership from control. Challenging the argument that CRAs reduced information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, Partnoy (1999) argued that the 
continued use of rating agencies by market participants stemmed primarily from 
regulatory use of ratings which inadvertently endorsed or legitimised the quasi-
regulatory role of CRAs in securities markets. The suggestion here was that credit 
ratings were a necessary evil that issuers involuntarily used as a gateway to access 
funds. The use of ratings in this context was therefore derived from regulatory 
reliance on the credit ratings (Prasad, 2009).  
1.1.4 Origins of Credit Rating Agencies 
Credit Rating Agencies started in the US as a direct consequence of the ballooning 
railroads businesses in the late 19th century (Rousseau, 2006). The need for 
additional capital required to fund the expanding networks of railroads soon 
surpassed the capacity of local banks who initially offered loans to the private rail 
corporations. The railroad firms started issuing bonds to attract a wider investment 
base. As most of these new lenders or investors were not local to the railroads 
businesses, they lacked detailed knowledge of how well these businesses 
performed (Langohr & Langohr, 2008). Consequently, there was need for the 
assistance of information intermediaries who could screen such investments and 
provide some synthesised information on their performance and risk. Credit Rating 
agencies fulfilled this role by offering initial ratings, subsequently monitoring them 
and issuing updates on any rating migrations (Alcubilla and Pozo, 2012).  
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To date, there are more than 150 CRAs in operation around the world although only 
a few big ones (notably, the big 3; Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) operate on a global scale 
(Harper, 2011). The big 3 tend to offer a broad array of services covering larger 
geographical areas while the smaller CRAs tend to operate on a niche basis, often in 
localised areas. At the time of writing this thesis, the big three agencies had a 
combined market share of over 95% (Alessi & Wolverson, 2012). The dominance 
by the big three was said to be a barrier to new competition, severely limiting 
choice in the industry. Table 1 gives a snapshot of ratings issued by top CRAs as at 
the end of 2011. It is evident from the table that the majority of issuances were 
concentrated around the big three agencies. 
 
Table 1: Number of ratings per NRSRO as at the end of 2011   
NRSRO 
Financial 
Institutions 
Insurance 
Companies 
Corporate 
Issuers 
Asset-
backed 
Securities 
Government, 
Municipal & 
Sovereign 
TOTAL 
RATINGS 
AM Best 3 5,364 2,246 54 0 7,667 
DBRS 16,630 120 5,350 8,430 12,400 42,930 
EJR 82 45 853 14 13 1,007 
Fitch 72,311 4,599 12,613 69,515 352,697 511,735 
JCR 156 31 518 64 53 822 
LACE 17,263 60 1,000 0 61 18,384 
Moody’s 76,801 5,455 31,008 106,337 862,240 1,081,841 
R&I 100 30 543 186 123 982 
Realpoint 0 0 0 8,856 0 8,856 
S&P 52,500 8,600 41,400 124,600 1,004,500 1,231,600 
TOTAL 235,846 24,304 95,531 318,056 2,232,087 2,905,824 
 
 
Source: Alcubilla and Pozzo (2012, p.8) 
In Table 1, the total distribution of issued ratings is shown as being largely skewed 
in favour of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, while DBRS and other smaller CRAs trailed far 
behind. All the big three CRAs had the majority of their ratings in sovereigns, local 
and national governments where they accounted for over 80% of total ratings for 
S&P; 69% for Fitch and 80% for Moody’s respectively. The next highest focal area 
according to Table 1 was asset-backed securities, making up 10% of total ratings 
for both S&P and Moody’s. Fitch’s second most popular focus was evenly-spread 
between financial institutions and asset-backed securities all making up 14% of the 
company’s ratings. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-8, securities 
ratings were weakened, resulting in a shift of CRA focus towards sovereigns as 
evidenced by the EU sovereign crisis which made headlines and further cast doubt 
on CRAs and their ratings (Gärtner, Griesbach, & Jung, 2011). 
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The role of credit rating agencies as arbiters and gatekeepers of securities 
information saw them gain a prominent, yet contentious role in global securities 
markets (Hunt, 2009a). The contentions arose from several tenets of the credit 
rating agency operating model and will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 
and 4 of this thesis. While credit ratings were (and continue to be) used not just by 
market participants, but also by regulators for capital market legislative purposes, 
(heightened particularly under Basel II)1 CRAs themselves traditionally operated in 
an unregulated market, particularly in Europe2 (Sy, 2009; Utzig, 2010). This was 
despite their increasingly entrenched role as arbiters of investment information in 
the securities market. When CRAs were linked to corporate collapses, accused of 
failing to proactively provide informative ratings to forewarn investors of 
deteriorating invested stock, their lack of regulation was flagged up as a possible 
cause of poor standards in the securities market (Levitin, 2009). In particular, it 
was argued that the lack of regulation left CRAs unaccountable (Manns, 2009); 
resulted in disparate and opaque rating approaches and could possibly have been a 
catalyst for further market problems (Elkhoury, 2008).  
These concerns led to calls for CRAs to be regulated as a way to usher in stricter 
standards and ensure that CRAs were accountable in their rating activities. Despite 
increasing concerns and calls for CRA regulation, there were no active regulatory 
efforts made in this regard in Europe (Humphreys & Jaffe, 2012). In its 2005 report, 
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) concluded that CRA 
regulation was not necessary to address alleged rating failures associated with the 
fall of Enron. Instead, CSER recommended continued reliance on the voluntary 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Code (Rousseau, 
2009). It was also felt at the time that the activities of CRAs were covered through 
three EU Directives namely; the Market Abuse Directive (MAD), the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD) as well as the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) and that between these directives, the IOSCO Code (monitored by 
                                                     
1 The Basel Committee established standards on international adequacy and further entrenched the role of 
CRAs in determining minimum capital requirements for depository institutions. Despite the 2004 version 
coming in to correct seeming loopholes in its 1998 predecessor, the Basel II accord also suffered from 
criticisms related to its complex nature and the burdens that it imposed, potentially raising borrowing costs 
and compromising its effectiveness. 
2 Except in the USA where the Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC) established the Nationally Recognised 
Statistical Rating Organisation, (NRSRO) designation in 1975 as an attempt to enforce standards by 
regulating the rating agencies. 
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CESR) and individual country regulators, there was ample scope for oversight of 
CRAs across the European market. Calls for regulation thus failed to yield any 
meaningful results. 
1.1.5 The international aspects of credit ratings  
Despite the US origins of CRAs, their reach became global as they became the 
defacto global arbiters controlling the flow of securities. Consequently, attempts to 
regulate CRAs in the USA were relevant to the rest of the world owing to the global 
nature of CRA operations. An analysis of CRA operations, their methodologies and 
market participants’ perceptions cannot therefore ignore the US origins of CRAs 
and how they have evolved to what they are to date. This thesis therefore makes 
linkages between the US regulatory attempts to curtail the operations of CRAs and 
how such attempts may have influenced later moves by the European Union and its 
regulatory arm, the European Commission. Further links are made between 
attempts to guard against corporate collapses where CRAs were blamed for having 
played a part. The thesis therefore discusses such regulatory attempts as the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (CRARA) of 2006, the Dodd 
Frank Act, (all from the US) together with other global attempts aimed at regulating 
CRAs such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and 
Basel. The thesis links the US and global CRA regulatory efforts to the EU attempts 
such as the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) which were all 
precursors to the 2009 European Commission Credit Rating Agency regulations 
which are the subject of this study. 
1.1.6 CRAs and regulation 
The apparent regulatory void in the operations of CRAs, particularly in the 
European Union was allegedly linked to possible poor practices and low standards 
in the industry (Justensen, 2009). This attracted calls for regulatory intervention as 
it was felt that regulation could address the lack of accountability and foster higher 
standards (Hunt, 2009a; Lynch, 2009; Papaikonomou, 2010). Such calls were 
fuelled by a fear that CRAs wielded too much power as arbiters of global securities, 
sanctioning the flow of funds and were consequently perceived to be ‘a law unto 
themselves’ (Partnoy, 2009; White, 2009) as they were not accountable to any 
regulatory authorities, particularly outside the USA.  
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In the USA, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) kept vigil over the 
operations of CRAs through its Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating 
Organisation (NRSRO) designation. Other markets outside the USA subsequently 
took the NRSRO status as a hint that because the CRAs operating in their markets 
had an NRSRO status in the USA, the CRAs were seemingly competent enough to 
work within foreign jurisdictions as well (Davies & Green, 2008). Despite the calls 
for regulation of credit rating agencies, no real regulation came into force in the EU 
until after the 2007-8 financial crisis (Justensen, 2009).   
The ability of credit rating agencies to provide timely market information was 
severely criticised particularly leading up to the 2007-8 crisis (Shipman 2007). 
Previously, credit rating agencies had been blamed for failure to detect the 1997 
Asian financial crisis (Othman, Aziz, & Ibrahim, 2010). Shortly afterwards, they 
were criticised again for being too slow in providing timely rating adjustments 
ahead of the corporate collapses of Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat among others 
(Healy, 2003; Lynch, 2009). These incidents severely dented the reputation of CRAs 
and raised questions on the reliability and timeliness of credit rating adjustments 
and CRAs’ abilities to act as able watchmen, providing proactive rating information 
to investors (Paudyn, 2011). Some scholars attributed the alleged CRA failures to a 
number of perceived shortfalls in the rating industry including; opaque rating 
methodologies used in the rating of securities (Iyengar, 2012); the conflicted 
position of CRAs particularly as they were commissioned and paid by the same 
organisations that they rated (Lynch, 2009); the lack of competition in the ratings 
market (Deb et al., 2011), as well as the lack of regulatory oversight of rating firms 
(Lynch, 2009) among other reasons. Because of the alleged lack of competition, 
CRAs were said to have possibly been complacent, limiting choice among rating 
agencies and possibly causing a lapse in rating standards. These were seemingly 
justifiable drivers for regulatory intervention according to the proponents of 
regulation (Lynch, 2009). 
Notwithstanding the above concerns, credit ratings played a key role as they were 
mandatory requirements for some regulated broker dealers and had increasingly 
become embedded in key investment decisions even outside regulated areas 
(Mulligan, 2009; Nicholls, 2005).  
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Rating users had little choice therefore on whether to continue to use ratings or not 
as there was an implicit regulatory endorsement of ratings on one hand and a 
market increasingly relying on ratings on the other. Further, there was no viable 
alternative proffered to replace credit ratings. Sy (2009) highlighted three key 
benefits of credit rating agencies for the international financial system; (i) bridging 
information asymmetry gaps, (ii) mitigating principal-agent problems as well as (iii) 
acting as the eyes and ears of dispersed investors who were potentially divorced 
from their stocks. It is therefore not surprising that CRAs continued unabated 
despite growing concerns about their role in the market. 
1.1.7 The conflicted CRA revenue model 
The issuer-pays model which saw CRAs being commissioned and paid by the 
issuers that they rated, combined with the fact that CRAs offered ancillary services 
to issuers alongside their rating services, allegedly placed them in conflicted 
positions which could have compromised their independence and objectivity when 
providing ratings (Bolton, Freixas, & Shapiro, 2012). These inherent issues in the 
ratings market gained prominence particularly after the 2007-8 crisis and led to 
more calls for CRAs to be urgently regulated. The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 
report of 2008 highlighted several weaknesses in the CRA methodologies and 
recommended greater transparency in CRA operations. Later in 2008, José Manuel 
Barroso, the European Commission president tasked Jacques de Larosière to 
institute detailed investigations into the regulation of CRAs in the EU. The results of 
the investigation largely echoed those of the FSF but further made 
recommendations outlined in Section 1.1.8 of this thesis. Calls for CRA regulation 
largely  came from academics (Crotty, 2009; Gupta, Mittal, & Bhalla, 2010; Pettit, 
Fitt, Orlov, & Kalsekar, 2004; Sy, 2009) primarily to address perceived market 
deficiencies. The exact nature of regulation being advocated was however not clear 
and sentiments were often divided on the exact role and extent of such regulation.  
 
Following the 2007-8 global financial crisis, the European Commission (EC) 
initiated consultations on the regulation of credit rating agencies operating within 
the European Union. On 16 September 2009, Regulation No. 1060/2009 was 
gazetted by the European Commission and subsequently took effect from 7 
December 2010 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2009).  
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The new regulations replaced the previous Commission Communication of 20053 
and sought to; (i) set up an EU-wide oversight system for CRA registration; (ii) 
enact some requirements on CRA governance; (iii) restrict CRA operational 
activities to ensure conflicts of interest were managed as well as (iv) set standards 
for enhanced disclosure and transparency on CRA methodologies and performance.  
The 2009 EC regulations however subsequently attracted criticisms from the 
regulated entities as well as academics and other stakeholders who had previously 
called for them. There were arguments that the regulatory approach would not 
work (Staikouras, 2012); that the regulatory scope was too narrow (Utzig, 2010); 
that the regulatory approach was a kneejerk reaction and not well-thought through 
(Fisch, 2010), and that the new regulations could have adverse unintended effects 
on market operations (Avgouleas, 2009; White, 2010a). Following concerns from 
various stakeholders, the UK House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 
convened hearings on 29 February and subsequently on 7 March 2012 for various 
securities market experts to give evidence on the role of credit rating agencies in 
the 2007-8 financial crisis and reflections on efforts taken to mitigate the impact of 
the debacle. Further, the committee enquired as to whether the EC regulatory 
approach was perceived to be an appropriate response in addressing the identified 
market failures leading to the crisis. From the evidence presented to the committee, 
witnesses felt that the failure leading to the 2007-8 crisis was systemic and not just 
confined to credit rating agencies. Several concerns were raised on the current 
regulatory attempts aimed at credit rating agencies in the EU. The overall reaction 
towards the EC regulations suggested that there was need for more empirical 
evidence on the perceived impact of the new EC regulatory approach, which is what 
this study aims to address. Questions on the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
the EC regulations were also raised by academic scholars (Staikouras, 2012) 
suggesting that the regulations were not perceived to be effective.  
 
                                                     
3
 Upon the publication of CESR’s first compliance report at the end of 2005 stating that CRAs had generally 
complied with the ISOSCO Code, the European Commission subsequently issued a communicae in 2006 to the 
effect that regulation of CRAs in Europe was not necessary as there were no grounds for this based on CESR’s 
report (ESME, 2008). 
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As CRAs provided ratings used by regulators to enforce minimum capital 
requirements under BASEL II, CRAs became viewed as quasi regulatory agents or 
proxies. In particular they were viewed as coercive regulators since such capital 
requirements were mandatory for depository institutions (Kerwer, 2005b). This 
emanated from the fact that some ratings users (broker dealers and depository 
institutions) were compelled to use ratings. Meanwhile, credit ratings were 
perceived to be hardcoded into major investment decisions (Deb et al., 2011), 
giving CRAs an entrenched position in this area as well. This sparked many 
contentious debates about the mandates of CRAs (Rousseau, 2006). Their pervasive 
impact also raised questions of accountability and how CRAs were traditionally left 
to their own devices despite controlling the flow of global securities investments 
amounting to trillions of dollars. CRAs played (and continue to play) a key role for 
both borrowers and lenders (Kerwer, 2005b) and the impact of regulation on them 
will likely affect both sides of the relationships (i.e. borrowing and lending). There 
were concerns therefore that if the EC CRA regulations were misaligned as 
suggested by the various concerns raised above, the regulations could have adverse 
effects on the functioning of securities markets, not just in the EU, but globally as 
well (Darbellay & Partnoy, 2012).  
Further, perceived disproportionate regulatory pressures in the EU could lead to 
regulatory arbitrage and portray the EU as an unattractive securities market (Opp 
& Opp, 2011) when compared to other loosely-regulated markets outside the EU. In 
all the above concerns regarding CRAs and their operations, there were no studies 
presenting market participants’ views towards the EC regulations. As market 
participants work directly with CRAs and would be affected by the EC regulations, 
an empirical study capturing their views would be important in validating concerns 
raised by academics and others outside the industry. This study therefore sought to 
investigate UK-based market participants’ perceptions of the impact of the EC 
regulations on the operations of the UK securities market. It is of significance not 
only to CRAs, but market participants who work closely with CRAs as well as 
regulators and policy makers currently pondering over the EU credit rating crisis 
and possible future courses of action. 
 
13  
Tabani Ndlovu 
1.1.8 Overview of the European Commission Credit Rating Agency regulations 
Causes of the 2007-8 global financial crisis were blamed on a number of parties, 
chief among which were credit rating agencies (Utzig, 2010; White, 2010a). Further 
blame was levelled against the non-existent EU-wide regulations to provide 
oversight on CRA operations in the region. In their February 2009 report, the 
Larosière Expert Group4 proposed a significant overhaul of regulatory measures in 
the EU financial system to guard against fissures that could cause and exacerbate 
market destabilizations.  
Consequently, on 16 September 2009, the European Commission gazetted 
Regulation No.1060/2009 with the aim of fostering among rating agencies, 
accountability and transparency through enhanced disclosure; protecting investors; 
enhancing competition among CRAs as well as addressing other legacy issues 
centred around conflicts of interest within the CRA rating business model. The 
European Commission took the steps to regulate CRAs in recognition of their 
crucial role in global securities and banking markets against alleged weaknesses in 
their operations. Credit ratings were acknowledged to be crucial to securities and 
financial markets, particularly as investors, issuers, borrowers, as well as sovereign 
governments relied on credit ratings when making financing and investment 
decisions (Grunert, Norden, & Weber, 2005). It was felt that there was need to 
ensure that credit ratings used across the EU demonstrated independence, 
objectivity and were of good quality, having been produced in environments that 
demonstrated “principles of integrity, transparency, responsibility and good 
governance” (The European Parliament & The Council of The European Union, 
2009, p.1). As a primary requirement, the EC regulations required all CRAs wishing 
to issue ratings in any of the EU member states to register with the European 
Securities and Markets Authority, (ESMA), providing such details as their legal 
status, internal arrangements for handling conflicts of interest as well as provide 
details of registered offices. This requirement to register in the EU was a proactive 
step by regulators to prevent the passporting into the EU of ratings generated in 
third countries outside the EU (Masera, 2010). 
                                                     
4 The Larosière Expert Group was an independent advisory panel on European financial supervision set up by 
José Manuel Barroso (President of the European Commission) to advise the  Commission on ways to 
strengthen oversight systems for the European Financial sector in an efficient and coordinated way utilising 
the expertise resident in disparate supervisors in different market states. The Group was chaired by Jacques de 
Larosière which is where it derived its name. One of its recommendations was a stronger regulatory system 
for the European financial sector. 
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Upon receipt of a CRA application, ESMA would respond within 45 days either 
granting the CRA permission or rejecting the application for the CRA to work in the 
EU. If the CRA was successfully registered, it would then be subject to ESMA’s on-
going surveillance monitoring, particularly focusing on rating methodologies. 
The EC regulations were also aimed at eliminating conflicts of interests by 
engendering organisational and operational independence to ensure that CRAs 
offered unbiased and independent rating opinions. One of the criticisms against 
CRAs was that their methodologies of generating ratings were unclear and made it 
difficult for market participants to judge ratings quality (Partnoy, 2006). To that 
effect, the new EC CRA regulations required transparent CRA methodologies 
together with enhanced disclosures by CRAs with guarantees of ratings quality 
underpinned by performance data which was to be sent periodically to the 
regulator, ESMA. In the first round of CRA regulations, (CRA1) the primary 
regulators were the relevant market supervisors such as the FSA in the UK, working 
alongside the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) who were 
replaced by ESMA in later regulatory revisions. The regulators were to work in a 
college-type arrangement with Competent Authorities in each market. The 
regulations came into force on 7 December 2010 with a clear stipulation that any 
ratings used for regulatory purposes in the EU had to come from registered CRAs. 
Following the downgrading of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland by the top three 
CRAs in 2010, the European Parliament and the European Council (the policy 
making body of the EU) tasked the European Commission to look into further 
measures of providing a more coordinated regulatory oversight on CRAs. This led 
to the revised CRA regulations, (CRA2) on 2 June 2010, under the auspices of a 
single European regulator, ESMA with powers to: initiate investigations; carry out 
requisite inspections as well as impose penalties to any errant CRAs. There were 
criticisms that, despite the revisions, CRA regulations neither addressed issues such 
as the conflicts of interest in CRA models nor tackled the opaque CRA 
methodologies (Calomiris, 2009; Mollers, 2009; Sy, 2009). In response to these 
concerns, the EU CRA regulations were further revised with strict requirements for 
additional disclosures; stricter measures to address conflicts of interest; mandatory 
requirements for analyst rotations; introduction of civil liability among CRAs; 
competition and market concentration levels among other requirements.  
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Responses to the regulations and the associated raft of amendments discussed 
above generated strong reactions in the market. Major concerns cited were that 
regulations were kneejerk (Sy, 2009; Tichy, 2011); narrow in scope 
(Papaikonomou, 2010; Utzig, 2010); politically-motivated (Calomiris, 2010); that 
they would fail to address the legacy problems in the market (Posner, 2010) and 
that they were likely to have adverse unintended consequences in the market 
(Lynch, 2009). Most of the reservations about the EC CRA regulations came from 
academic scholars and were largely theoretical in nature.5 As most concerns did not 
have empirical support, this raised the question on whether market participants 
would share the same sentiments since they would be affected by the regulations. 
Consequently, this study sought to empirically investigate the validity of these 
concerns from the viewpoint of market participants working with credit ratings. 
The study objectives are discussed in section 1.2.  
1.2 Research aim and objectives 
While there were strong calls for CRAs to be regulated, it would appear that the 
introduction of the EC regulations in the EU may not have completely addressed 
concerns around credit ratings. On the contrary, there were further fears that the 
regulations could have unintended consequences on market operations as 
regulators may not have fully understood the market context. This was said to 
emanate from the fact that the regulations were distant from market operations, 
suggesting a need for the views of those closer to the operations of CRAs. This study 
elicited the views of UK-based market participants working in or around credit 
ratings on their perceptions of the impact of the new EC regulations on the 
operations of the UK securities market. The aim of the study was therefore to: 
 
Investigate the UK-based market participants’ perceived impact of the 
European Commission Credit Rating Agency regulations on the UK  
securities market / UK ratings market   
 
The study sought to achieve the above aim by eliciting and analysing the 
perceptions of three key groups of market participants: issuers, institutional 
investors and other interested parties, (OIPs).  
                                                     
5 See for example Opp, Opp and Harris (2012); Rousseau (2009); Partnoy (2009); Maris (2009); Utzig (2010); 
Darbellay & Partnoy (2012); Buckley & Arner (2012) 
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To offer a more balanced perspective, the study also sought the views of 
representatives from the top credit rating agencies as a way of triangulating the 
views obtained from the other groups of market participants named above.    
1.2.1 Research questions 
To achieve the aim stated above, the study sought answers to the following 
research questions: 
a) How do market participants perceive the EC regulations to be addressing legacy 
problems identified in the UK ratings industry? 
b) What do UK market participants perceive to be the impact of the EC regulatory 
changes on the UK securities market/UK Credit Ratings market?  
c) With CRA funding models alleged to be central to problems in the ratings 
industry, what are the perceived alternative approaches that could equally 
address the problems identified in the UK ratings market; which ones are most 
preferred by the UK-based market participants? 
1.3 Overview of the Study participants 
The study participants were drawn from professionals working in or closely with 
credit ratings and credit rating agencies. The first group of participants comprised 
institutional investors who are the primary consumers of credit ratings. The second 
group was made up of issuers who issue debt instruments and commission as well 
as pay credit rating agencies. A broad-based third group of Other Interested Parties, 
(OIPs) pooled together diverse participants with an interest in credit ratings. Lastly, 
views were also sought from representatives of Credit Rating Agencies themselves 
as they are the primary target of the EC regulations. At the conclusion of the study, a 
total of 30 participants had been interviewed. A detailed breakdown of the makeup 
of the participants will be discussed in Section 5.4 of this thesis. 
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1.4 Contribution of the study 
This study aims to make a number of contributions to theory and practice in the 
literature on credit rating agencies as well as securities regulation in the EU. 
Firstly, the study expands literature on credit rating agencies as well as 
regulation by employing a behavioural perspective to examine the motivations 
and influences at play between individuals and institutions in the credit ratings 
market. Previous studies on credit ratings have largely taken economic 
theoretical perspectives, investigating the technical and functional aspects of 
credit ratings. In so doing, they potentially downplayed behavioural and 
sociological factors as well as the role of individual and institutional drivers 
shaping behaviours and actions in credit rating circles.  
 
The traditional depiction of regulation in extant literature tends to treat 
regulation as being externally imposed down on regulated entities6. This view 
suggests that regulation is exogenous and treats the regulated entities as passive 
victims of the regulatory process. Contrary to the exogenous view above, this 
study places regulated entities at the centre of the regulation formulation 
process (see for example Ellig (1991); Becker (1983; 1985)). It treats regulated 
entities as key in internally driving the regulatory process. The view therefore 
endogenously affirms the crucial role of regulated entities in informing the 
regulation formulation process as a way to maximise their own payoffs, while 
minimising regulatory burdens for mutual benefits (Reiter 1996). The role of 
regulated entities playing a crucial part in regulation formulation is particularly 
important in specialist areas where regulators may not know as much as those 
they seek to regulate. This was found to be particularly so in the complex, 
dynamic and rather closed credit ratings market. This study therefore offers a 
new perspective of the relationships between the regulator and those regulated 
using the endogenous theory of regulation as a theoretical lens. 
  
                                                     
6  See for example Baldwin et al (2012); Baldwin & Cave (1999); Ayres & Braithwaite (1992) 
 
18  
Tabani Ndlovu 
According to Oswick & Grant (1996) and Cornelissen et al. (2008) the use of 
metaphor in organisational studies is rather limited and the authors encourage 
more studies in this area. This study responds to that call by employing the use 
of inductive analysis of metaphors so that the study innovatively captures 
market participants’ portrayal of their perceptions of the impact of the EC 
regulations, enabling richer insights into regulation issues.  
At a theoretical level, the study brings together economic regulation, behavioural 
and sociological perspectives to better understand the dynamics of the 
regulation of credit rating agencies in the EU as perceived by UK-based market 
participants. This approach employed the endogenous regulation theory (Becker 
1985; Ellig, 1991) to illuminate the behavioural intents and impact thereof on 
the relationships between the regulators and their subjects. This therefore 
extends literature in this area by offering a new theoretical perspective.  
At a practical level, the study offers insights into market participants’ reactions 
to the EC regulations post the 2007-8 crisis and seeks to demonstrate how the 
regulations are seen to work (or not to work) by those working in the industry as 
well as the perceived impact (both intended and unintended) of the regulations 
on the surveyed participants. This contributes to an enhanced understanding of 
the relationships between regulatory initiatives at policy level and the practical 
understanding of market participants on the ground.  
A further practical level contribution of the study emanates from the fact that as 
the current EC regulations are perceived to be inefficient (see for example 
Nichols et al. (2011); Papaikonomou (2010); Utzig (2010), this calls for a rethink 
of enacting additional legislation or revising existing ones. The implication is that 
regulators and politicians ought to take stock of what has gone well or not gone 
well with previous and current regulatory initiatives before making any further 
regulatory attempts. Recent reversals and changes of regulations from CRA1 
through to CRA3 suggest that the initial regulatory proposals may not have been 
thought-through enough and do not inspire confidence among regulated 
communities particularly with forthcoming regulatory amendments. This 
therefore informs further regulatory revisions. 
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Following this introduction, the next chapter (Chapter 2) offers a historical account 
of credit rating agencies, highlighting their importance in the global securities 
market. Thereafter, Chapter 3 offers a critical review of extant literature in the 
regulation area, focusing largely on economic regulation theory and using this to 
identify tenets of good regulation. Chapter 4 reviews extant literature on credit 
rating agencies, highlighting the focus of previous research studies in the area as 
well as the literature gaps of interest to this study. Chapter 5 discusses the 
theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the study together with the adopted 
study design. Chapter 6 outlines the data analysis approach adopted in the study, 
comprising the analysis of metaphor and non-metaphor data. Chapter 7 presents 
and discusses the findings, making connections with relevant extant literature 
drawing from various theoretical perspectives to better explain the study findings. 
The closing chapter (Chapter 8) sums up the thesis and offers conclusions together 
with reflections on the study contribution to knowledge as well as 
recommendations for further research. 
1.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter gave an overview of the thesis, beginning with a brief introduction and 
background on credit rating agencies, (CRAs). The alleged contribution of CRAs to 
failures that led to the 2007-8 global financial crisis was presented as the precursor 
to regulation No.1060/2009 of the European Commission. The EC regulations were 
aimed at addressing the failings that allegedly triggered the 2007-8 global financial 
crisis, targeting legacy problems said to be inherent in CRA revenue models. 
Despite the introduction of the EC regulations, it was highlighted that there were 
still concerns on whether regulation was the appropriate remedy to address issues 
identified in the operations of CRAs within the EU. Further, it was highlighted that 
although the form, scope and scale of the proposed regulation had come under 
scrutiny by scholars and others interested in the area, there had not been any 
studies empirically investigating the views of market participants working directly 
with CRAs. This study therefore investigated the views of UK-based market 
participants likely to be significantly affected by the new regulations due to their 
close proximity to credit rating agencies.   
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A brief overview of the research objectives was presented, together with an outline 
of the different market participants involved in the study. An outline of the thesis 
was presented to enable easier navigation through this document. The next chapter 
offers an overview of credit rating agencies, giving a historical account that 
chronicles the evolution of the rating agencies from their inception around the late 
19th century to the present day.   
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Chapter Two: 
Background on Credit Rating Agencies 
(CRAs) 
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2.0 Introduction 
This chapter gives a historical background of credit rating agencies, delineating 
their functions, ownership structures as well as track record, dating back to their 
inception in the late 19th century. The chapter then traces changes in the CRA 
revenue models, setting a platform for later discussions that consider the 
contentious issues allegedly said to be linked to the conflicted issuer-pays CRA 
revenue model. The section below opens the discussion by revisiting the definition 
of credit rating agencies and placing their role within a broader global securities 
market context. 
2.1 Overview of Credit Rating Agencies 
Credit Rating Agencies, (CRAs) are independent finance market gatekeepers who 
provide credit worthiness opinions on identified borrower entities (De Haan & 
Amtenbrink, 2011; Katz, Salinas, & Stephanou, 2009; LaFrance, 2009). Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) attributed the information asymmetry prevalent in securities 
markets to the agency issues emanating from separation of ownership from control. 
Consequently, dispersed investors may not have detailed insights into the 
companies they want to invest in. This information asymmetry is said to have seen 
investors increasingly rely on CRAs and other information intermediaries to 
provide insights on targeted investee companies. This view therefore legitimised 
CRAs as bridging the information asymmetry through their ratings (Tang, 2006). 
Partnoy (1999), however argued that the entrenchment of rating agencies in 
securities markets was largely correlated to the regulatory use of ratings which 
coercively legitimised the CRA role of information intermediation. This view was 
not so straightforward, owing to the paradoxical regulatory reliance on ratings on 
one hand, (Papaikonomou, 2010; White, 2010a) contrasted with the highly 
disclaimed nature of ratings as ‘mere opinions’ on the other (White, 2001).  
A parallel can be drawn between Partnoy (1999)’s view above and Spira (2000)’s 
study of audit committees where the latter questioned their effectiveness as 
corporate governance mechanisms, concluding that the increased role and 
popularity of audit committees was better explained by their ceremonial role which 
acted as a reassurance to resource providers (in this case, investors).  
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The same can be said of CRAs particularly when viewed as certification agents and 
gatekeepers, sanctioning the flow of resource information between investors and 
borrowers (Stover, 1996). Despite increasing questions on their real contribution 
to investor protection, CRAs legitimise borrowers and at the same time, entrench 
their own role as arbiters of information between lenders and borrowers (Hill, 
2009).   
As briefly highlighted in Chapter 1, CRAs historically offered free ratings to issuers, 
deriving their revenue through the sale of ratings-related publications (Cantor & 
Packer, 1995). Since the 1970s, the CRA revenue model changed to the current 
issuer-pays model. This arose as a result of threats to the then investor-pays model 
owing to increased information sharing through the use of new copying 
technologies, fuelling a free-rider problem (White, 2010a). In the new model, CRAs 
were (and still are) commissioned and paid by the issuers (borrowers), who 
wanted to raise capital. Such issuers wanted as high a rating as possible, so as to 
attract favourable borrowing terms to avert regulatory pressure and / or reduce 
the cost of capital (Kuhner, 2001).  
Rating agencies on the other hand seek to maximise their earnings by winning 
rating business from as many issuers as possible and if possible, retain issuers for 
continued patronage to guarantee future revenue streams (Darcy, 2009). The 
relationship between issuers and CRAs is thus mutually beneficial, raising 
questions of potential conflicts of interest, which can undermine the objectivity and 
independence of CRAs in evaluating the creditworthiness of issuers (Darcy, 2009; 
Sy, 2009; Hill, 2009). Their ability to provide investors with accurate, objective, 
independent and timely market information is therefore said to be in potential 
jeopardy as CRAs have to ensure that they provide good customer service that 
should see their issuer clients coming back (Lowenstein, 2008; Cinquegrana, 2009; 
Lynch, 2008). It is argued that such good customer service may have seriously 
compromised the objectivity of ratings in the past. The allegedly conflicted 
relationships between CRAs and issuers were identified as being significant 
contributors to the causes of the 2007-8 global financial crisis (Rotheli, 2010).  
 
24  
Tabani Ndlovu 
Concerns about possible conflicts of interest in the CRA-issuer relationships were 
further exacerbated by the alleged lack of competition in the CRA market. There 
were allegations of unfair competition in favour of the big three dominant CRAs 
(Nazareth, 2003). The current state of the Credit Rating Agency market was said to 
be a direct product of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), who came up 
with the NRSRO designation in 1975 (Mainelli, 2008). This came in the wake of the 
high profile corporate collapses of Penn Central and prompted the US Government, 
through the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to promulgate the designation of 
the Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisation designation (Rosner, 
2009). The move was meant to ensure that commercial papers being traded in the 
US market were appropriately vetted by reputable rating organisations who were 
credible enough for regulatory authorities to rely on their ratings (Dittrich, 2007). 
The SEC therefore exclusively granted the NRSRO status and in the 1970s, only 
three CRAs had this status (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch).  
This state of affairs meant that smaller CRAs who wanted to access the industry 
found it difficult to do so owing to the lack of credibility and market experience 
which were prerequisites to attain the NRSRO status (Ely, 2009). Through the 
NRSRO designation, the SEC therefore inadvertently created a barrier to entry that 
limited competition among CRAs (Jones, 2004). To get NRSRO status, new CRA 
entrants had to demonstrate extensive market experience, yet on the other hand, in 
choosing a CRA, issuers tended to favour only those CRAs with the NRSRO 
designation. This effectively acted as a barrier to entry for new and relatively 
unknown CRAs, protecting the incumbent top 3 CRAs, (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) 
who between themselves controlled more than 95% of the market (Dittrich, 2007; 
LaFrance, 2009).  
At the time of writing this thesis, there were 9 NRSROs. There are however more 
than 150 rating agencies globally who operate without the NRSRO designation, 
usually in specialised niche areas where their ratings are not used for regulatory 
purposes (Frost, 2006; White, 2010a). Before delving deeper into the anatomy of 
credit rating agencies, the section below briefly gives an overview of credit ratings. 
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2.2 Credit ratings defined    
A credit rating is described as a “judgement” (Deb et al., 2011, p11) or opinion 
(Partnoy, 2001) offered to denote an issuer or borrower’s ability to make full and 
timely repayments to meet their debt obligations. The Oxford Dictionary of English 
defines an opinion as “a view or judgment formed about something, not necessarily 
based on fact or knowledge; an estimation of the quality of worth of someone or 
something, or a statement of advice by an expert on a professional matter” estimation, 
evaluation or a formal expert judgment” (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010, p.1245). 
The same dictionary further defines a ‘judgment’ as “an opinion or conclusion” (p.947). 
These definitions are important as they depict a credit rating as an estimate, not an 
absolute. From the definitions above, ratings are portrayed not as the categorical, 
objective, absolute calculations that they are sometimes made out to be (Iyengar, 
2012). Rather, they are portrayed as having subjective elements that lend themselves 
open to possible different interpretations because of their subjective (interpretive) 
construction. This definition of credit ratings has significant implications when 
discussing the understanding of and use of ratings in global securities markets by 
market participants and regulators alike. 
According to Sinclair, (1994), a credit rating incorporates publicly-available 
quantitative financial information and qualitative media coverage, issuer-provided 
internal information describing the position of the company both in competitive 
and competence terms, together with other externally provided information by 
interested parties such as competitors, former employees among others. Such 
information is subjective and so is its interpretation. CRA analysts and issuer 
personnel deliberate on the above to arrive at indicative ratings and “..accordingly, 
such judgements are highly subjective” (Sinclair, 1994, p.140).  Issuers generally 
have a right to appeal against a rating if they believe it does not accurately reflect 
the state of their issue or firm. This further evidences the subjectivity of ratings. It is 
not uncommon for credit ratings to be revised after appeals by issuers. According to 
Partnoy (1999; 2001), ratings are devoid of any informational value, owing largely 
to their lagging nature and predictive inabilities, yet paradoxically, CRAs have 
entrenched themselves and their ratings at the heart of global capital markets by 
peddling nothing other than highly disclaimed opinions supposedly taken and used 
at users’ risk.  
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The subjective nature of ratings as judgements and opinions was corroborated by 
the disclaimers from CRAs emphasising that their ratings were mere opinions 
(White, 2010), that did not constitute a recommendation “to buy, sell or hold a 
security”, (Elkhoury, 2008, p.2). In addition, CRAs asserted that their ratings in no 
way indicated the long term creditworthiness of the rated stock, but merely offered 
a snapshot opinion at a point in time (Katz et al., 2009). This raised poignant 
questions on the value of ratings as guides that investors could use for gauging and 
predicting default risk, particularly considering the monitoring role of CRAs. Of 
notable concern was the seeming over-reliance on these ratings by market 
participants and regulators despite this rather shaky post mortem presented above. 
According to Deb et al., (2011), credit ratings in the UK and the world over were 
now ‘hardcoded’ into investment decisions, major financial arrangements as well as 
regulatory determinations of net capital reserves.  
Table 2 shows examples of investment decisions and other contractual 
arrangements with ratings ‘hardwired’ into them. Words like ‘hard-wired and 
hardcoded’ connoted some routinized, inflexible programming, rendering human 
judgements redundant. Hardcoded investment decisions suggest the railroading of 
investment practitioners into choosing pre-set options. It is easy to see why there 
could have been blind use of ratings by some investors particularly if they were 
operating on prescriptive investment guidelines tailored on particular CRAs.  
 Table 2: Examples of Ratings hardcoded into investment decisions 
 
 
Source: Deb et al, (2011, p6) 
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Duan & Van Laere (2012) categorised credit ratings into buy-side and sell-side 
ratings. The buy-side ratings are provided by CRAs at the instigation of investors on 
an ‘as-and-when-necessary’ basis and therefore do not tend to be publicly shared. 
The sell-side ratings on the other hand are initiated by issuers who commission 
CRAs to rate specific securities issuances so as to use the resultant ratings when 
marketing such securities issues. As issuers commissioning the CRA are interested 
in a positive investment grade rating, this raises questions of possible conflicts of 
interest where the CRA could be influenced by the issuer to issue unduly favourable 
ratings (Cantor & Packer, 1995). Much of the debates and concerns on credit rating 
agencies and credit ratings have previously centred on sell-side ratings. Similarly, 
this study focused on sell-side rating activities and contentious issues around 
regulatory proposals introduced in the area.  
The sell-side rating opinions are aimed at reducing information asymmetry 
between lenders or investors on one side, and borrowers or issuers on the other 
side (White, 2001). The assigned credit ratings denote the creditworthiness of 
borrowing companies or countries (Elkhoury, 2008) denoting their assets, 
liabilities and payment histories together with projected abilities to meet future 
debt obligations among other things. While regulators and other participants 
heavily relied on credit ratings, it was paradoxical to note that the same ratings 
were highly disclaimed by the institutions that issued them, relegating them to 
mere ‘opinions’ (White, 2001). 
2.2.1 The ratings process 
Typically, rating decisions involve credit rating analysts going through publicly 
available information from the issuer, covering financial and non-financial 
information (Sinclair, 1994). More detailed information is obtained in company 
visits for meetings with the concerned issuing company management personnel to 
discuss company prospects and management projections. Thereafter, analysts 
review the financial and non-financial information in light of the management 
comments and subsequently make recommendations to a ratings committee. The 
committee considers such recommendations before making final rating decisions. 
Prior to ratings being published by the CRA, issuers are notified of the provisional 
rating to allow them to make representations in case there are omissions by CRA 
analysis (Krahnen & Weber, 2001; Lehmann, 2003).  
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Issuers therefore have an opportunity to respond and present to the CRA any 
material information that could change the rating outcome but may not have been 
considered by the rating agency in making the initial rating recommendation (Frost, 
2007). Figure 1 summarises the credit rating process. 
 
Figure 1: The Credit Rating Process 
 
Source: (CI, 2011, p.1) 
Credit ratings consider both the quantitative and qualitative attributes of borrowers. 
The qualitative attributes would include such issues as market prospects, stability, 
diversity, competitiveness as well as broader external government and regulatory 
factors which could alter the company’s prospects and affect its earnings (Partnoy, 
2002). The quantitative or financial attributes include such factors as the balance sheet 
strength, the borrower’s cash generating ability, their gearing as well as interest 
coverage ratios (Piazolo, 2006). The qualitative and quantitative rating information 
is distilled into coded ratings in the format shown in Table 3 using the conventions 
from the respective CRA.  
From Table 3, it can be noted that S&P and Fitch use largely similar rating scales, 
with Moody’s using slightly different but related scales. On 26 April 1982, Moody’s 
rating gradations changed from their initial 9-category scheme comprising the 
letter-based ratings to the current 19 categories with numerical signifiers (Tang, 
2006). The change offered Moody’s more flexibility to issue broader ratings within 
each category and allowed for further qualification of different positions within 
respective categories (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1986; Tang, 2006).  
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Table 3 summarises the different rating conventions used by the 3 main rating 
agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch).  
Table 3: Credit Rating Scales used by the top 3 CRAs 
Moody’s S & P Fitch  
Long 
term 
Short 
term 
Long 
term 
Short 
term 
Long 
term 
Short 
term 
 
Aaa 
P-1 
AAA 
A-1+ 
AAA 
F1+ 
Prime 
Aa1 AA+ AA+ 
High grade Aa2 AA AA 
Aa3 AA- AA- 
A1 A+ A-1 A+ F1 
Upper medium grade A2 A A 
A3 P-2 A- A-2 A- F2 Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
Lower medium grade Baa2 P-3 BBB A-3 BBB F3 Baa3 BBB- BBB- 
Ba1 
Not 
prime 
BB+ 
B 
BB+ 
B 
Non-investment grade 
speculative 
Ba2 BB BB 
Ba3 BB- BB- 
B1 B+ B+ 
Highly speculative B2 B B 
B3 B- B- 
Caa1 CCC+ 
C CCC C 
Substantial risks 
Caa2 CCC Extremely speculative 
Caa3 CCC- 
In default with little prospects 
for recovery Ca CC C 
C D / 
DDD 
/ In default / DD 
/ D 
 
 
Source: Adapted from the 3 CRAs’ websites 
 
CRAs’ positions as gatekeepers in the global securities market are well entrenched 
and have been growing over time (Mulligan, 2009). By 2005 Moody’s and S&P had 
each issued active credit rating opinions on approximately US$30 trillion worth of 
securities, (Sinclair, 1994). In other words, US$30 trillion worth of investments 
were dependent on whether Moody’s and S&P maintained their ratings, 
downgraded or upgraded them. A downgrade, especially if it crossed from 
investment grade to speculative grade would have significant interest rate 
implications for the borrower. It was therefore in the issuer’s interests that their 
rated entities remained above the investment grade tier and many authors 
questioned the extent to which issuers could go in protecting this position, 
particularly if they had leverage over the CRAs providing such ratings (Bai, 2010). 
 
30  
Tabani Ndlovu 
Despite being arbiters of such significant values of global securities, CRAs’ internal 
governance structures were and continue to be questioned (Sinclair, 1994). Further, 
the limited number of CRAs controlling global securities suggested lack of 
competition and a stranglehold on the market by the incumbent top 3 CRAs. This 
could potentially cause complacency and possible adverse effects on ratings quality 
in the market. The entrenchment of CRAs in US financial securities and later, in the 
global securities markets can be traced back to the Federal Code of Regulations 
(cited in White, 2010) which stipulated that “insured stage savings associations and 
others may not acquire or retain debt that is not of investment grade” (White, 2010, 
p.2). Further, the BASEL II capital adequacy requirement bolstered the role of CRAs 
by making further requirements that could only be certified by CRAs with a NRSRO 
designation (Claessens, 2003). The bulk of issues discussed by various scholars in 
connection with the contentions arising out of the above are covered under the 
section on previous research on CRAs. The next section revisits the definition of 
ratings. 
 
2.2.2 Regulatory use of credit ratings 
According to West (1973), the US Banking Act of 1936 was perhaps the first 
regulatory endorsement of credit ratings with the US Comptroller’s office 
prohibiting all national banks from investing in speculative bonds. Later, various 
regulatory requirements entrenched CRAs and their ratings into the global financial 
system. Whereas Hunt (2008) asserted the regulatory use of credit ratings to 
determine minimum capital requirements for depository institutions as well as for 
the BASEL II accord, Partnoy (2001) termed this “the paradox of ratings” and found 
it difficult to justify the heavy reliance on credit ratings particularly as ratings came 
with such significant disclaimers warning users not to rely on them for investment 
purposes. White (2010, p.2) further gave an example of a typical disclaimer that 
was found at the bottom of S&P ratings:  
" …any user of the information contained herein should not rely on any 
credit rating or other opinion contained herein in making any 
investment decision."  
Such a disclaimer was, and is not uncommon with the other credit rating agencies. 
This further adds weight to the ideas advanced below suggesting that credit ratings 
are not scientific, objective calculations and therefore should be used with care. 
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Credit ratings therefore appear to be interpretive constructions that are contextual 
and should be used diligently to complement other detailed decision-making 
approaches. If that thought holds true, the value of credit ratings in the flow of 
securities is slightly weakened, threatening the core business model for credit 
rating agencies. The use of credit ratings for regulatory purposes may have 
inadvertently endorsed CRA ratings to investors who blindly and unquestioningly 
relied on them for investment decisions, (Rousseau, 2009). In a way, the troubled 
state of CRA affairs could be connoted as a self-made problem attributable directly 
to both the SEC and Basel II. The irony here was that while there was such emphasis 
on the use of ratings for regulatory purposes, there had been little oversight on the 
governance of CRAs or how their ratings were generated (Partnoy, 2001). This 
placed at risk, the resultant regulatory decisions that seemed to be so heavily 
hinged on such ratings. 
The role of credit ratings discussed above has significant systemic ramifications for 
global securities markets. Whatever happens in credit ratings could have direct 
consequences on investments, financial contracts and regulatory decisions that are 
linked to credit ratings. It is therefore a paradox that investors and regulators 
embedded ratings into their decision-making processes despite the fluid nature of 
ratings methodologies and credit ratings as discussed above (White, 2001). What is 
in question here is the use of ostensibly judgmental opinions as if they were ‘the’ 
true, objective and unquestionable reflection of reality. The nature of ratings and 
their origin suggests that they should be treated as guidelines not “the guideline” 
hence the calls for tighter regulation to reduce this over-reliance (FSB, 2010). 
2.2.3 Over-reliance on credit ratings 
While credit ratings were (and still are) crucial indicators that aid investors in 
making decisions, it is alleged that for some unsophisticated investors, there was 
perhaps too much reliance on ratings at the expense of other means of due diligence, 
(Cantor & Packer, 1995; Coffee, 2008). The alleged blind use of ratings by some 
investors as if they were concrete guarantees and accurate reflections of market 
conditions flies in the face of both the regulatory endorsement of ratings and the 
dismissive attitude of CRAs as portrayed in their disclaimers (Tichy, 2011).  
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The reliance on ratings for regulatory purposes, when CRAs advise not to rely on 
them raises significant questions that suggest misplaced confidence in both the 
investing community and regulators alike. In an earlier critique of the credit rating 
system, Partnoy (2001) questioned the paradoxical increasing reliance by regulators 
on credit ratings as these were generated in an opaque way that was not overseen by 
any regulatory authorities, thus posing a danger for the regulators and the markets. 
A second paradox was the increasing reliance on ratings while the information 
quality of such ratings was perceived to be declining over time (Papaikonomou, 
2010). Against this background, many issuers found themselves compelled to seek 
ratings and gain favourable reputations despite being allegedly free not to do so 
(Kerwer, 2005a; 2005b). The regulatory endorsement of credit ratings portrayed 
CRAs as coercive quasi-regulators, perceived to be playing the role of regulatory 
agents (Kerwer, 2005a; 2005b).   
The above line of thought questions the governance arrangements of the regulators, 
the robustness of their assumptions, decision-making frameworks and the 
soundness of their decisions on the regulated entities. The sections below consider 
the nature of credit ratings and further question the ostensible treatment of ratings 
as guaranteed objective calculations of credit worthiness, when in reality these 
were subjective interpretations that were so readily dismissed even by the very 
institutions that generated them (White, 2010b). 
The dilemma that some investors faced and perhaps continue to face is 
understandable if one takes the subtle regulatory endorsements of ratings to be the 
official signpost of their importance in securities markets (Partnoy, 2001). From 
that perspective, investors who relied on ratings may have derived some sense of 
reassurance from the fact that regulators would not endorse credit ratings if they 
were fallible. This may have promoted a herding culture of blind group behaviour 
which was alleged to be one of the underlying causes of the 2007-8 global financial 
crisis, (Deb et al., 2011). This will be explored in more detail in the ensuing sections. 
Having defined credit rating agencies and their ratings, section 2.3 gives a historical 
account of credit rating agencies and their credit ratings.   
 
33  
Tabani Ndlovu 
2.3 Historical account of credit ratings   
The history of rating agencies can be traced as far back as 1841 when Louis Tappan 
founded the first rating agency to rate merchants following the financial crisis of 
1837 in the US (Cantor & Packer, 1995). About two decades later,  Henry Varnum 
Poor published the “Manual of the Railroads of the United States”  (Wolfson & 
Crawford, 2010; Setty & Dodd, 2003). Later, around 1909, Moody’s came to the 
scene with the publication of “Analyses of Railroad Investments”. By 1922, Moody’s 
had expanded their analyses to include industrials and public utility ratings  (West, 
1973). Poor’s and Moody’s were the dominant forces in the early twentieth century 
until they started encountering competition from the Standard Statistics Company 
between 1922 and 1941. The Standards Statistics Company subsequently merged 
with Poor’s to form Standards and Poor’s, (S&P) (West, 1973).  It was not until the 
1970S that credit ratings began to be officially recognised and endorsed by the US 
government. This recognition came in the form of the 1975 Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)’s Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations 
(NRSRO) rule 15c3-1.  
Despite issuing ratings that were used for regulatory and other purposes, CRAs 
were traditionally protected by the First Amendment in the USA. This treated their 
ratings as opinions equivalent to those of any other private citizens recognised and 
protected under the freedom of speech in the USA (Nagy, Epstein, Martin, Magliocca, 
& Zinsmaster, 2009). Despite the commercial nature of their rating opinions, under 
the First Amendment protection, CRAs hid behind journalistic privileges, protecting 
them from any litigious actions that could potentially arise out of possible 
inaccurate ratings. Consequently, ratings came with heavy disclaimers that 
absolved CRAs of any blame whatsoever should users of such ratings suffer any 
negative consequences following their use (Partnoy, 2001).  
The reliance on credit ratings had received a major boost when bank regulators 
mandated US banks to invest only in bonds that were deemed safe. Safe bonds in 
this case were those with ratings of BBB or better using the S&P rating scale (refer 
to Table 3 for details on rating scales). The safety measure was an investment grade 
rating (White, 2008) as opposed to risky, speculative ratings. At the time, the 
recognised rating agencies were S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. 
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2.3.1 Expanded role of credit ratings into regulatory areas 
In subsequent years, the role of credit ratings extended to cover the determination 
of minimum capital requirements for insurance companies as well as stipulations 
on the minimum safety levels for bonds that insurance companies could invest in 
(Cantor & Packer, 1995). A similar move was adopted by regulators of the US 
federal pension schemes in the 1970s. These moves effectively cemented the 
regulatory role of credit ratings in the oversight of securities markets in the US. 
This entrenchment of CRAs as quasi-regulatory agents was despite the fact that 
CRAs themselves operated in a loose regulatory environment with only the SEC 
providing tokenistic oversight in the USA and no oversight in the EU or other parts 
of the world (Partnoy, 2006). This drew criticisms and calls for regulation, 
particularly with the 1970s move from the user-pays model to the issuer-pays 
model (Strobl & Xia, 2012). The fact that under the issuer-pays model, rating 
agencies were commissioned and paid by the issuers presented potential conflicts 
of interest. The incentives for issuers to get high ratings and the need for CRAs to 
maximise their revenues and earnings from issuers were said to have the potential 
to compromise CRA independence, allegedly weakening the objectivity of the issued 
ratings.  
 
The fact that CRAs were not seen to be accountable to anyone raised further fears 
around their unfettered power in the market (Freeman, 2007; Pinto, 2006). The 
ratings model incorporating private, profit-seeking businesses (CRAs) offering 
ratings to issuers, whose interests lay in getting the highest possible rating so as to 
minimise borrowing costs raised possible conflicts in the relationships of the two 
entities (Strier, 2008). This fear was further compounded by the fact that CRAs 
offered ancillary advisory services such as consultancy services which could have 
seen them rate the same entities they would have helped put together, particularly 
in structured securities. Despite incessant criticisms of this approach over the years, 
the issuer-pays model survived to the present day (Kuhner, 2001).  
Various scholars over time advocated the regulation of credit rating agencies as a 
way of addressing some of the concerns raised above (Crotty, 2009; Gupta, Mittal, & 
Bhalla, 2010; Pettit, Fitt, Orlov, & Kalsekar, 2004).  
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Despite these calls for regulation, evidence suggests that previous regulatory efforts 
in the ratings market were seemingly triggered by, and reacted to various crises 
and were never proactively planned (Helleiner & Pagliari, 2009). The following 
sections briefly discuss the alleged role of credit rating agencies in previous 
corporate collapses and financial crises. 
2.4 The alleged role of CRAs in financial crises and corporate collapses   
Credit rating agencies were identified as culpable in a series of high profile 
corporate collapses spanning a number of decades (Utzig, 2010). This sparked calls 
for CRAs to be tightly regulated to prevent possible future crises (Pettit et al., 2004). 
As an example, the collapse of Enron back in 2001, and the role of rating agencies in 
the debacle, attracted significant scrutiny and further fuelled calls for regulation of 
credit rating agencies (Hill, 2002). The Enron debacle in particular was centred on 
the failure by CRAs to respond in a timely manner by adjusting the company’s 
rating ahead of the collapse. Table 4 gives a snapshot timeline view of Enron’s 
rating leading to its collapse in 2001. 
 
Table 4: Enron's rating leading up to its collapse 
 
 Source: Piazolo, (2006, p.8) 
 
As shown in Table 4, Enron was highly rated until shortly before its collapse, raising 
questions on CRAs’ abilities to accurately track ratings and forewarn investors in a 
proactive manner. Enron’s rating adjustment on 28 November appeared to be 
market-led as opposed to being proactive. Criticisms on rating agencies following 
this collapse were largely centred on the role, competence and effectiveness of 
credit rating agencies (Hill, 2004). Later, the subsequent 2007-8 financial crisis 
further exacerbated calls for regulation of rating agencies with views that the global 
financial crisis was partly attributable to failures in the rating agencies themselves 
(Howard & Green, 2008).  
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With the rating agency regulations now in place in the EU, one would have thought 
that the issue of regulating credit rating agencies had finally been put to rest. On the 
contrary, new concerns arose suggesting that the regulations were not finely-tuned 
enough to address the problems that had led to the crisis in the first place 
(Staikouras, 2012). This raises questions on what form of regulation would be 
deemed appropriate for the market, a subject that the next chapter attempts to 
conceptualise by reviewing regulation literature in search of relevant frameworks. 
The section below briefly traces the regulatory arrangements around credit rating 
agencies. 
2.5 Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies 
Since the inception of the NRSRO designation by the SEC in 1975, several guises of 
regulatory attempts to regulate credit rating agencies were made, largely in 
response to various crises. Arguably, one of the defining tenets of the modern 
financial architecture is its propensity to collapse. Dymski (2003) highlighted nine 
major economic crises that acted as precursors to the current global financial 
architecture. A closer analysis of Dymski (2003)’s line of thought posits financial 
crises as inherent and inevitable features of the modern financial architecture and 
cannot be wished away even by regulation. Nonetheless, debates about improving 
the financial model of the global financial system continue to unfold and regulation 
seems to be a key tool proposed to achieve this. Table 5 summarises Dymski 
(2003)’s highlights of the most recent economic collapses.  
Following several high profile corporate failures, there was a compelling need for 
regulators, (particularly US regulators) to devise a more reliable mechanism of 
ensuring investor protection and fostering market stability. The introduction of the 
Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisation (NRSRO) designation by the 
SEC in 1975 came in to address growing concerns around the oversight of CRAs. 
The NRSRO role became embedded into rule 15c3-1 in 1975 as an attempt by the 
SEC to regulate broker-dealers and ensure that they held adequate capital reserves 
to act as a fall-back measure in case of liquidity problems. This move also served to 
distinguish between CRAs that could be relied upon to produce ratings for 
regulatory purposes (Wolfson & Crawford, 2010). Rule 15c3-1 positioned ratings as 
official regulatory measures of determining compliance with broker-dealers’ 
minimum capital requirements.  
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Table 5: List of economic collapses and crises in recent years 
 
 Adapted from (Dymski, 2003; Eatwell & Taylor, 2000) 
 
From Table 5 above, the frequency of corporate collapses and crises suggests that 
perhaps these are an inherent feature of the modern financial construct. Rather 
than be managed away, regulation may only reduce their impact and frequency. It is 
hoped that each successive financial crisis provides useful lessons that if taken 
onboard, can help reduce the intensity, duration and frequency of future crises. 
Section 2.5.1 gives a detailed overview of the US NRSRO designation. 
2.5.1 The Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisation, (NRSRO) 
The 1970 Penn Central collapse7 triggered calls for more systematic and credible 
rating of commercial papers as a way of reassuring investors of the papers’ 
commercial viability. Following the collapse, the SEC introduced the NRSRO 
designation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a move aimed at regulating 
the rating of commercial papers issued by regulated entities. The SEC allowed 
broker-dealers to hold lower capital reserves provided they had a high rating from 
a NRSRO (Fennell & Medvedev, 2012).  
                                                     
7  Penn Central collapsed in June 1970 after its formation two years earlier from a merger between 
Pennsylvania Railroad and the New York Central Railroad Company. At the time, the collapse was said to be 
the largest in US history, leaving creditors and stockholders penniless. Because of the central role of railroads 
at the time, the failure, which was attributed to mismanagement, had a devastating impact on the economy.  
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Control of the US Credit Rating Agency market lay in the conferment of the NRSRO 
status which was the preserve of the SEC. Upon receipt of the applicant CRA’s 
NRSRO application, SEC officials would research the CRA’s market experience, 
reliability and credibility. If they were satisfied that such a CRA could be relied 
upon to issue ratings to be used for regulatory purposes, the SEC would then issue a 
“no action letter” (Coskun, 2008, p.265). This was a seal of approval from the SEC 
guaranteeing that if the applicant CRA’s issued ratings were used for regulatory 
purposes by a regulated broker-dealer, the SEC would not take any action (legal 
enforcement) towards the rated entity. The NRSRO designation therefore gave 
CRAs some quasi-regulatory powers, acting as watchdogs responsible for 
determining net capital reserves for regulated entities (Sinclair, 1994). This role led 
to the coercive use of ratings by broker-dealers who wanted to meet regulatory 
requirements. Other than the application vetting process and the conferment of the 
NRSRO designation, there was little else that the SEC seemingly did in practice to 
regulate credit rating agencies and monitor their performance on an on-going basis 
(Wolfson & Crawford, 2010). There was no clear definition of the NRSRO 
designation and the conferment criteria remained hazy and lacked transparency 
(Manns, 2009).  
Despite their new quasi-regulatory role, CRA methodologies and general operations 
remained unregulated. The endorsement of NRSROs and their quasi-regulatory role 
signalled to the market that regulators were comfortable with the oversight of such 
NRSROs. In reality, once admitted to the NRSRO club, CRAs were left to their own 
devices and even the SEC did not have any idea of what was involved in their 
operational activities and ratings quality levels (Fisch, 2009). The NRSRO status 
required rating agencies to be vetted by the SEC, ostensibly meeting stringent but 
undefined criteria. This became a barrier to entry, limiting new and smaller CRAs 
from attaining the NRSRO designation. Only three rating agencies attained the 
NRSRO status between 1975 and 2003, (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch), effectively 
restricting the choice available to issuers. The three leading NRSROs dominated the 
market and collectively commanded up to 98% of the global ratings market 
between them (Wolfson & Crawford, 2010).  
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Despite attempts to enhance competition, to date, there are only 9 NRSROs (from 
the previous ten, after the withdrawal and de-registration of Ratings and 
Investment (R&I), the Japanese rating firm). The global total number of rating 
agencies is said to be between 50 (Dittrich, 2007; LaFrance, 2009) and above 150 
CRAs operating outside of the NRSRO designation, usually in specialised niche areas 
(Frost, 2007).  
From the above discussion, it is not inconceivable to conclude that the lack of 
competition among CRAs arose from the SEC’s NRSRO stranglehold of the market, 
particularly in the USA. Although the NRSRO designation was a SEC invention in the 
US, as there was no equivalent standard in Europe or indeed anywhere else in the 
world, hence other markets defaulted to the same standard. The acceptance of the 
NRSRO status in other jurisdictions outside the USA further legitimised and 
entrenched incumbent CRAs in the global securities market. Therefore, the NRSRO 
designation gave markets a false sense of comfort in the role of CRAs as quasi-
regulatory agents. Some blame for the current ills of the ratings industry can 
therefore be apportioned to the SEC as the architect and guarantor of the NRSRO 
system. This is because only CRAs with the NRSRO status could generate ratings 
used for regulatory purposes, (Dittrich, 2007). At the same time, regulatory reliance 
on ratings signified to the market (somewhat coercively) a need to get rated or use 
a rating from a NRSRO, thus further endorsing NRSROs.   
1975 marked a turning point for the rating agencies who had previously earned 
their keep by selling ratings to users under the ‘investor-pays’ model (Mullard, 
2012). Becker, (2011) attributed the move away from the investor-pays model to 
the proliferation of technologies that made information exchange easier, making it 
difficult for ratings to be copyrighted. This allegedly made ratings widely available 
even to those investors who had not paid for them, thus compromising the earning 
potential of the respective CRAs. These developments turned ratings into public 
goods and rendered the investor-pays model unattractive. Thereafter, CRAs 
switched to the current issuer-pays model which was said to be ‘deeply conflicted’ 
(Lynch, 2009) and a possible cause of the ratings debacle that led to the 2007-8 
financial crisis.   
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Following the corporate collapses of Enron and others, the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act (CRARA) of 2006 was passed by Congress in the USA. The act required 
the SEC to set up a formal CRA registration process with clear guidelines on the 
transition into a NRSRO. After the CRARA in 2006, the number of NRSROs went up 
to ten, including such new players as A.M. Best, Egan Jones, DBRS, Japan Credit 
Rating Agency, Ltd, Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc., Rating & Investment 
Information, Inc. as well as Realpoint LLC. Despite the increased number of CRAs 
following the CRARA of 2006, the three dominant CRAs, (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) 
still held over 94% share of the global ratings market by 2008 (Hunt, 2008; Fennell 
& Medvedev, 2012). In choosing a CRA, issuers tended to favour only those CRAs 
with the NRSRO designation. Further, reputation and market history seemed to 
favour incumbent CRAs as users did not want to risk their issuances with new 
untried rating players. This catch-22 situation effectively acted as a barrier to entry 
for new and relatively unknown CRAs, inadvertently protecting incumbent CRAs, 
particularly the top three, (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) (Dittrich, 2007; LaFrance, 
2009). Other regulatory attempts were made in the credit ratings market including 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Code, which is 
discussed in 2.5.2 below.  
2.5.2 The International Organisation of Securities and Exchange Organisations (IOSCO) 
IOSCO was formed in 1983 to be the standards body with oversight of the securities 
market worldwide. It evolved from the inter-American regional association which 
came into being in 1974 but with a remit limited only to North and South America. 
After its inception, there was not much activity from IOSCO. In 1998, the IOSCO 
principles were published and adopted. The principles comprised a set of objectives 
and standards for securities regulation aimed at improving auditor independence, 
disclosure and transparency, identification as well as management of conflicts of 
interest. It was not until a number of high profile corporate failures such as Enron 
and WorldCom in the early 2000s that IOSCO started visibly pushing for standards 
for CRAs. The corporate failures saw IOSCO later adopting a memorandum of 
understanding that sought more coordinated international cooperation and free, 
timely exchange of information on securities matters globally (IOSCO Technical 
Committee, 2004). Thereafter, IOSCO published the Code of Conduct Fundamentals 
for Credit Rating Agencies in 2004.  
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The Code of Conduct stipulated guidelines for the quality and integrity of securities 
ratings, together with the monitoring of ratings, CRA independence, as well as 
recommendations regarding robust internal procedures aimed at addressing CRA 
conflicts of interest. The code also emphasised the need for timely rating 
adjustments, transparency as well as disclosure by CRAs on the extent to which 
they complied with the code (IOSCO Technical Committee, 2004).  
Despite the IOSCO code being a positive cross-border move to provide oversight on 
securities ratings, the initiative suffered from a number of key weaknesses. Firstly, 
the IOSCO code was voluntary and carried no legal force to enforce compliance 
(Brummer, 2010). Secondly, the guidelines were so general as to leave the specifics 
of the ratings process open to CRA interpretation (Cinquegrana, 2009). These and 
other loopholes severely weakened the IOSCO code and rendered it ineffective in 
addressing the concerns raised about credit rating agencies (Maris, 2009). The 
intention behind the IOSCO code was for CRAs to adopt and embed principles of the 
IOSCO guidelines into their own internal policies and then work towards 
demonstrating their compliance thereto. Where CRAs did not comply with the code, 
they were to explain clearly why they had not done so as well as outline what 
measures they had taken to ensure compliance. The expectation was that consistent 
non-compliance would be picked up by the market which would respond 
appropriately, otherwise there were no enforceable sanctions by IOSCO 
(Cinquegrana, 2009). This approach leaned towards the reputational capital theory 
which will be discussed in section 4.1.2 of this thesis. Cognisant of the weaknesses 
of the IOSCO code, the US government enacted the Credit Rating Agency Reform 
Act, (CRARA) in 2006. This is discussed below. 
2.5.3 The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (CRARA) of 2006 
Following various corporate collapses in the United States, there was a perception 
that the lack of regulatory oversight on credit ratings among other things posed a 
significant threat to the viability of securities markets, not just in the USA, but 
globally. This was due to the central role that credit ratings were deemed to play in 
the “financial reputation of rated companies” (Seitzinger, 2006, p.3). The concern 
was that despite the heavy reliance on ratings for regulatory and other purposes, 
there was lack of transparency on the CRA rating methodologies. 
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It was not clear how CRAs were internally governed to safeguard against such 
issues as conflicts of interest. Attempts to rally behind the IOSCO code had left the 
market exposed as the code was voluntary and not legally enforceable. The Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was therefore promulgated to restore market 
confidence through fostering improved quality of ratings and enhanced 
transparency and disclosure (Sy, 2009). The Act also sought to protect investors as 
well as encourage more competition among rating agencies and consequently, 
eliminate complacency in what was viewed as a cosy oligopolistic credit rating 
market. Despite its noble intentions, the CRARA did not prevent the 2007-8 global 
financial crisis. Consequently, following the 2007-8 global financial crisis, the US 
government introduced the Dodd-Frank Act primarily to identify and address 
threats to the US’ financial stability (Johnson, 2011). The Dodd-Frank Act will be 
discussed in more detail after a brief overview of the Basel accord, which came into 
force much earlier than the Dodd-Frank Act.  
2.5.4 The Basel II Accord   
The Basel II accord came into force in 2004 under the auspices of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, (a committee set up in 1974 comprising central 
bank governors from the Group of ten8 aimed at establishing sound global banking 
supervision practices). The Basel II accord was brought in to offer a clearer 
measurement of risk in a more systematic and transparent way (Saidenberg & 
Schuermann, 2003). The Basel Committee established standards on international 
adequacy, which further entrenched the role of CRAs in determining minimum 
capital requirements for depository institutions. This in a way indirectly endorsed 
the role of CRAs and may have induced relaxation on due diligence (Partnoy, 2006). 
Despite the 2004 version coming in to correct seeming loopholes in its 1998 
predecessor, the Basel II accord was said to be equally burdensome and rather 
complex, potentially raising borrowing costs. The argument that CRAs were quasi-
regulatory agents was to a large part based on the Basel II capital adequacy 
requirements that further entrenched the role of CRAs as watchdogs for compliance 
levels by depository institutions and other financial companies (Kerwer, 2005b). 
                                                     
8 The Group of Ten comprised members from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Japan, Italy, UK, 
US, Sweden and Switzerland. The G10 countries signed an accord to be part of the General Arrangements to 
Borrow (GAB) back in 1962 and subsequently went on to set up and fund the IMF as a lender to 
participating member states. 
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2.5.5 The Dodd Frank Act 
The early 21st century financial crises in the USA cast a lasting impact on the 
financial landscape globally. In an attempt to stem further escalation of the 2007-8 
financial crisis, the Obama administration signed into law the Dodd-Frank Act on 21 
July 2010. The Act gave regulators powers to monitor and manage capital market 
risks.  Primarily, the Dodd-Frank Act sought to foster a new era of accountability 
through enhanced disclosure and transparency. Specifically, the Act made a direct 
call for regulatory oversight of CRAs with the SEC mandated to fully acquaint itself 
with the workings of this industry (Walker, 2010). Regulators were keen to ensure 
that there were adequate controls to prevent possible bail-outs that characterised 
the aftermath of the 2007-8 corporate failures. The Act therefore sought to promote 
sound corporate governance practices and restore market stability in the US 
financial sector. Like some of its predecessors, the Dodd-Frank Act faced criticisms 
that it was bureaucratic, complex (the Act was over 1000 pages long); that it was 
costly and created a complex web of reporting requirements which were 
potentially burdensome to businesses (Grinshteyn, 2009).  
Some of these criticisms questioned the regulatory approach and scope of the Act 
and will be discussed further in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. As an example, 
Figure 2 below depicts some of the complexities inherent in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 Figure 2: The Complex Web of the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
 
Source: Dodd-Frank Summary (2012)  
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To stem further collapses and curb the escalation of the 2007-8 financial crisis, the 
US government paid out in excess of US$29.5 trillion (Felkerson, 2011), while the 
UK government funded its failing banks to the tune of over £1.162 trillion 
(Guardian, 2011). The criticism levelled against credit rating agencies as always 
was that they were too slow to act and were reactive rather than proactive (Coffee, 
2010). The section below discusses the regulatory attempts to curb the 2007-8 
financial crisis by the European Commission. 
2.5.6 The European Commission Credit Rating Agency Regulations  
As discussed in 1.1.6, in the aftermath of the 2007-8 global financial crisis, CESR 
published its second compliance report on 2 July 2008. CESR’s report was followed 
by two consultations from the EC, the first seeking responses from interested 
parties on the proposed regulatory oversight of CRAs in the EU. CESR’s second 
report sought views on the perceived over-reliance on credit ratings in the EU. On 
12 November 2008, the European Parliament and the European Commission 
formally adopted a proposal to regulate CRAs operating in the EU. Consequently 
this led to the gazetting of EC regulation No. 1060/2009 on 16 September 2009.  
Section 2.5.6.1 discusses some of the implications of the EC credit rating agency 
regulations. 
2.5.6.1 Overview of the EC CRA Regulation implications 
While the adoption of the EC regulations was the first binding regulatory initiative 
of its kind in the EU aimed at credit rating agencies, there were insinuations that 
the original regulatory agenda may have later been hijacked by other political 
interests (Manaigo-vekil, 2011; Posner, 2010). The regulations were said to be an 
inappropriate vehicle to address the problems identified in the rating industry 
(Nichols et al., 2011; Utzig, 2010; White, 2010a). Further, it was alleged that the 
regulations appeared to take an indiscriminate blanket approach which was 
reactive and could not prevent further possible crises (Becker, 2011). While there 
was a widely-held view that CRAs had played a significant role in the causes of the 
2007-8 financial crisis as well as previous crises (Coffee, 2010), there did not seem 
to be a consensus on how the identified problems could be resolved. Further, as the 
regulation of CRAs in the EU was a new phenomenon, it was perhaps still too early 
to determine whether the regulatory approach taken would work effectively or not. 
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Meanwhile, insights can be drawn from other parallel fields such as audit regulation. 
The section below discusses some of the parallel insights that can help shed light on 
regulatory initiatives around areas similar to those of credit rating agencies. 
2.6 Parallels with audit literature 
CRAs and auditors have a shared history, based on the development of the global 
capital markets with the need for increased investor protection enhanced by the 
provision of independent opinions on the worth or risk of investee companies 
(Neuman, 2010). As in the situation with CRAs, the US Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1933 mandatorily required firms to get independent audits from independent 
accountants (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). This fuelled the demand for audit 
services and led to a proliferation of audit firms. Both CRAs and audit firms operate 
on a profit basis and are selected and paid by the same organisations they rate or 
audit, raising concerns of possible bias (Partnoy, 2010; Strier, 2008). The role that 
CRAs and auditors play versus the exact value they are perceived to deliver through 
their financial mediation has been subject to debate, leading to what scholars term 
the audit expectation gap (Humphrey, 1997; Koh & Woo, 1998; Okafor & Otalor, 
2013). The role of detecting errors and fraud in both the rating process and audit 
has been subject to interpretation, making it difficult to apply an objective approach 
to both auditing and rating practices (Humphrey, Moizer, & Turley, 1993). In a 
similar notion to the audit expectation gap, section 4.2.3 discusses the contested 
nature and role of CRAs, arguing that the way CRAs see themselves and their role is 
different from what their stakeholders perceive and expect. This fundamental 
difference of interpretation possibly lies at the heart of the diverging views on CRAs 
and their role. This thesis argues that like audit opinions, ratings are themselves 
subjective (White, 2001, 2010b), giving rise to a rating expectation gap.  
 
Until such a gap is narrowed through more calibrated definitions of ratings and the 
role of CRAs, it will be difficult to reconcile the conception and appreciation of CRAs 
and their role. The subjective nature of ratings and associated implications is 
discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.3. Like CRAs, despite their questionable role 
and legitimacy, auditors and audits became mainstreamed into corporate life. To 
this end, Power (1996, p.1) raised a pertinent question “how can a practice whose 
benefits are being privately questioned as never before nevertheless come to 
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occupy such an important role in public policy?” This question could well be asked 
of CRAs and their credit ratings. The answer lies largely with the regulatory 
endorsement of the two professions and regulatory use of both ratings and audits 
in what Shore & Wright (2000) termed ‘coercive accountability.’ This coercive use of 
ratings and audits led to the conception of credit rating agencies and auditors as 
‘quasi regulatory agents as they were perceived to be playing a regulatory role 
(Dewing & Russell, 2012; Partnoy, 2006). This is further discussed in 4.3.2.   
 
As with CRAs, auditors suffered from allegations of conflicts of interest, particularly 
as they also offered ancillary non audit advisory services which were perceived to 
potentially compromise the independence of their audit services (Campbell & 
Houghton, 2005). The consolidation of the industry led to the dominance of the big 
five audit firms9, forming an oligopolistic situation not dissimilar to that of CRAs 
(Moizer & S. Turley, 1989). So like rating agencies, audit firms suffered from 
criticisms on the lack of competition in the industry (Humphrey, Kausar, Loft, & 
Woods, 2011; Numan & Willekens, 2012). This was said to have possibly led to 
complacency and lower quality audit opinions (Neuman, 2010). High profile 
corporate collapses of companies such as Enron led to calls for the audit industry to 
be tightly regulated, as there were claims that auditors (like CRAs) lacked 
independence and objectivity; that their audit opinions (like ratings) were 
inaccurate and possibly over optimistic (Healy & Palepu, 2003) and that there was 
need for increased competition among audit firms. Audit methodologies, like 
ratings methodologies were said to be unclear and difficult to pin down. Humphrey 
& Moizer (1990) used the metaphor of ‘black box’ when referring to audit 
methodologies, suggesting that they were difficult to understand.  
 
Across the divide, rating methodologies were similarly questioned and said to be 
opaque (Elkhoury, 2008). Various remedies were proffered in both ratings and 
audit fields. Among the proposed solutions were increased competition (Pearson & 
Trompeter, 1994) and mandatory rotation (for publicly-listed companies in audit) 
(Arrunada & Paz-Ares, 1997). Mandatory rotation in particular featured 
significantly in both industries and received mixed reactions from the market.  
                                                     
9  The big five accounting firms comprised Arthur Anderson, Deloitte and Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
Price Waterhouse Coopers 
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In a study on audit rotation Daniels & Booker (2011) found a positive correlation 
between auditor rotation and perceived auditor independence. While this could be 
welcomed as a possible remedy for both the ratings and audit markets, it raises 
pertinent questions about the possible impact on the need for increased 
competition in both industries. Mandatory rotation could either focus on the 
rotation of key personnel involved in doing the audits or ratings or alternatively, 
after defined terms, audited / rated companies would have to seek new auditors or 
rating agencies. Either way, rotation would impose additional costs to the industry 
(Bates, Waldrup, Jaeger, & Shea, 2012). Arguably, mandatory rotation could in 
theory open up opportunities for new entrants. In practice however, new entrants 
could still struggle to make inroads into a market that uses reputation and track 
record as a key determinant on the choice of which Audit Company or rating agency 
to use. If the regulatory objective of attracting more players into both industries 
was to work, it is difficult to envisage how smaller new players without a lot of 
resources could afford to rotate analysts or auditors to meet regulatory 
requirements. 
 
Beyond Enron, the 2007-8 global financial crisis saw criticisms against CRAs and 
auditors in almost similar measures (see for example DeMaria, 2012; Partnoy, 
2010). Their role as intermediaries placed them in similar positions. Since the audit 
industry has been slightly ahead in attracting regulation, insights from that practice 
can help shed more light on the regulation of CRAs and possible future regulation 
prospects. Following Enron’s collapse, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 was brought 
in to strengthen independence of accounting firms thereby enhancing the quality of 
audit opinions. The Sarbanes Oxley Act brought about changes in reporting and 
corporate governance arrangements for audit firms (Beattie, 2012). These moves 
set the audit firms along the regulatory path much earlier than their credit rating 
counterparts. It is however arguable whether the quality of audit opinions has 
improved significantly as a result of the regulatory measures.  
Commenting on the regulatory initiatives proposed to improve corporate 
governance practices after the collapses of Enron, WorldCom and other high profile 
corporations, Romano, (2005) argued that some of the regulatory initiatives such as 
banning ancillary non-audit services by auditors in a bid to reduce conflicts of 
interest were not justifiable.  
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This argument was grounded on the fact that previous empirical studies seeking to 
test the relationship between provision of additional services by auditors and audit 
quality had not found a convincing causal link. In drawing parallels between 
auditors and rating agencies, questions emerge on whether similar findings may be 
possible across the two professions, considering the similar roles that auditors and 
rating agencies play. Further, Romano, (2005) argued that a lot of the regulatory 
initiatives in SOX were rooted not in the corporate failures highlighted above, but 
had political and entrepreneurial motivations, outside the regularly-cited corporate 
failures. This view was consistent with Khademian, (1992) who acknowledged the 
power of electorates in forcing politicians to formulate regulatory initiatives as a 
way of appeasing growing discontent from their respective constituents.  
Looking at credit rating agencies, questions may be raised on whether the EC 
regulatory initiatives were solely motivated by the often-quoted 2007-8 global 
crisis or whether there were other hidden drivers elsewhere. Drawing parallels 
again with the audit practice, it was noted that the regulatory requirement ‘for all 
listed companies to be audited’ (Beattie, 2012, p.3) created an inelastic demand for 
audit services, inadvertently endorsing the role of auditors within regulatory fields. 
This requirement equated to the 1975 Rule 15c3-1 requiring broker-dealers to get 
ratings from NRSROs (Wolfson & Crawford, 2010). So just like in the audit 
profession, despite their weakening reputations, CRAs’ roles remained pervasive, 
hence their conception as coercive quasi-regulatory agents.  
Regulatory efforts in audit have seen twists and turns. The wave of deregulation in 
the 1980’s brought about an influx of business risk audit approaches which were 
said to have commoditised audit (Giroux & Cassell, 2011; W. R. Kinney, 2005). This 
spell was cut short by corporate collapses that were later partly blamed on audit, 
prompting a drive for re-regulation. The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, (SOX) in the 
USA was a reaction to such corporate collapses as the Enron, WorldCom and 
Parmalat among other companies. Alongside this, other parts of the world 
developed similar regulatory initiatives (Kinney, 2005). Following regulatory 
changes in the USA, the audit industry was impacted particularly relating to: the 
review of the provision of audit, restricting non-audit services to clients; 
involvement of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in 
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providing independent inspection of listed company audits;  independent setting of 
auditing standards; together with a mandate for more closer cooperation between 
the internal audit committee and auditors (Beattie, 2012; Lennox, 2009). The 
verdict on whether regulations in the audit profession achieved what they set out to 
achieve remains open. On a competitive level, the industry still remains dominated 
by a few big players with smaller ones operating in limited jurisdictions but largely 
in niche areas. Conflict of interest allegations have died down, probably until the 
next corporate scandal. Regulatory pressures tend to come in cycles, triggered by 
each corporate collapse where auditors are involved. The biggest question perhaps 
is whether all the previously cited issues in the audit industry can be regulated 
away or whether each crisis or corporate collapse will be unique with lessons to be 
learned from each successive cycle of regulatory issues. The outcome of the 
regulatory changes in the audit literature suggests that there is a maturity stage 
where things quieten down but that allegations may resurface in the event of 
another corporate collapse or scandal. Perhaps the rating industry will be no 
different. It remains to be seen whether the current frenzied efforts will eventually 
die down, only to resurface after the next crisis. 
2.7 Credit Rating Agencies post the 2007-8 financial crises 
Despite the enactment of the EC credit rating agency regulations, there has not been 
much observable change among credit rating agency operations. Notable changes 
have been around the implementation of measures to separate analysis from 
commercial teams to address conflict of interest issues. In terms of competition, 
there has been no change, prompting some scholars to argue that the current EC 
regulations cannot deliver a competitive rating market and that more competition 
may in fact fuel ratings inflation as CRAs scramble for business (Becker, 2011).  
The conflicts of interest around the issuer-pays model still persist. Proposed 
possible alternatives appear to be equally conflicted. The regulatory reliance on 
credit ratings has not subsided, despite indications that this needed to be addressed. 
Overall, it would appear that on paper, the EC regulations have not yet made much 
difference on the ground in terms of addressing some of the major legacy issues in 
the ratings market.  
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After the enactment of the EC regulations, concerns were raised arguing that the EC 
regulations may not be an adequate response to address the legacy problems 
identified in the industry (Nichols et al., 2011; Papaikonomou, 2010; Utzig, 2010). 
While these concerns are noteworthy, they came from scholars and others outside 
the industry. It was deemed important to gauge whether those practitioners and 
other market participants working with credit ratings shared these concerns. It was 
on this basis that this study sought to find out from market participants who work 
with rating agencies, what their perceptions were with regards to the impact of the 
EC credit rating agency regulations. 
2.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter chronicled the evolution of credit rating agencies from their inception 
in the late 19th century to date, highlighting changes, particularly in the CRA 
revenue model, examining motivations and possible impact of the changes. The 
historical account of credit rating agencies was shown as punctuated by various 
corporate collapses and financial crises triggering a wave of regulatory 
interventions in the USA. Evidence evaluated suggested that despite regulation 
being brought in to strengthen economic systems, different initiatives did not seem 
to have successfully prevented crises in the past. In all the regulatory initiatives 
chronicled in this chapter, financial regulators seemed to have been on the back 
foot, reacting to impending crises. Parallels between auditors and CRAs allowed for 
comparisons to be made across the two fields with inferences drawn to help inform 
the CRA regulatory process, which arguably lags behind its audit counterpart.  
There seems to have been waves depicting upsurges in regulatory pressures which 
eventually quieten down with time, only to resurface in response to the next 
corporate failure, raising questions on whether crises can be regulated away and 
whether the latest EC regulatory initiatives will bring any meaningful and lasting 
respite to the market; whether the EC CRA regulations were an appropriate 
response to the 2007-8 crisis; what the possible impact of the regulations will be as 
well as whether the regulations will be effective in addressing the issues identified 
in the ratings market. The next chapter explores regulation literature in an attempt 
to find out whether this study can be situated within broader economic regulation 
realms and if so, to set parameters for guiding this study and focusing it on 
appropriate frameworks. 
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Chapter Three: 
Literature Review – Regulation 
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3.0 Introduction  
Following on from the previous chapter giving a historical and evolutionary 
account of credit rating agencies, the conclusion was that despite several financial 
regulatory initiatives over the years, subsequent crises triggered questions on 
whether such regulatory attempts were appropriate, timely or focused enough and 
whether crises can be prevented through regulatory means. This chapter reviews 
extant economic regulation literature, giving an overview of previous studies in the 
area to explore the nature and rationale for state intervention. Different strands of 
economic regulation and requisite theoretical conceptions are discussed, including 
public interest theory, regulatory capture and the theory of just regulation. The 
Baldwin & Cave (1999) taxonomy is reviewed to determine its suitability as a 
framework for judging the effectiveness of the EC regulatory proposals. Merits and 
demerits of regulatory intervention are critically examined with the intention to 
apply them to this study in later chapters. On the degree of state intervention, the 
Ayres & Braithwaite (1992) pyramidal approach is used as a visual framework to  
pick out the varying levels of state intervention, ranging from persuasion through 
to licence revocation.  Self-regulation is presented as an alternative to state 
regulation, together with use of voluntary codes, whose alleged failure is said to 
trigger state intervention. A typology of the different regulatory players considered 
different orientations and expected behaviours to offer a critique of their possible 
motives and efficacy.   
3.1 Context and background 
As the motive of capitalism is to generate or increase wealth, wealth accumulation 
sits at the hub of economic regulation theory (Boyer, 2000). The accumulation 
regime encompasses social and economic processes of production and 
consumption together with the integration of the different classes into coherent 
systems of production and consumption systems, efficiently directing the flow of 
goods from production to consumption in the classical economic realm of supply 
and demand. Unfortunately the capitalist motive of wealth accumulation results in 
different classes of people depending on who owns the means of production. 
Ownership of the means of production (other than just labour) brings with it, 
power and influence and ultimately, inequalities which can cause disharmony.  
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The danger is that those with resources (and power) may abuse those without, 
triggering disequilibrium which may be corrected through regulatory intervention. 
Wealth accumulation therefore has to be kept in check through modes of regulation, 
otherwise those with power may usurp resources from those without, externalising 
costs, meanwhile internalising benefits as they continue to amass wealth. Modes of 
regulation explain the institutional systems and structures that shape people’s 
behaviours both culturally and professionally to align these to the accumulation 
regime as a way of promoting some semblance of economic and social order. The 
broader institutions responsible for regulating or shaping people’s behaviours 
include such structures as the church, political parties, trade unions and any other 
social structures. Inadvertently, some of these institutions organise and shape 
people’s behaviours within, and in line with the wealth accumulation regimes that 
they exist in.  
There is an intricate linkage between the wealth / capital accumulation regimes 
and the mode of regulation although the relationship cannot be said to be exactly 
causal (Hirsch, 1995). Despite the interdependence of global capitalist systems, 
regulation or oversight of the global financial system has largely been fragmented, 
leaving possible loopholes that offer fertile grounds for fissures and possible crises. 
Following this logic, the 2007-2008 global financial crisis could be seen as an 
example of a failure cutting across industries in different national jurisdictions. To 
correct the crisis, there were proposals that an internationally-coordinated 
regulatory approach could have been better placed to restore and reinforce the 
global capitalist hegemony (Zaman, 2009).  
The interconnected design of the global capitalist system is such that market 
failures in one area may have far-reaching ramifications in other areas as evidenced 
by the 2007-8 global financial crisis. The EC CRA regulatory response however took 
a Euro-centric regional focus. This raises questions on whether the EC regulations 
could have been more global to facilitate coordination across different jurisdictions. 
This point is important owing to the risk of contagion embedded in inter-
jurisdiction linkages (Longstaff, 2010). For regulations to be effective, they need the 
global reach to allow for a coordinated approach to tackle regulatory issues at 
source.  
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The EC regional regulatory approach could therefore leave potential gaps which 
could be sources of future crises due to the global nature of the securities market 
and business interrelationships generally. On the other hand, a Eurocentric regional 
approach realistically offers an opportunity to speedily respond to the crisis 
without international bureaucratic delays. The approach further exploits 
similarities and synergies of a relatively self-contained region bound by common 
interests as manifested through the objectives of the EU as a collective. 
One of the aims of the EC regulations was purportedly to encourage more players to 
enter the ratings market and diffuse the current oligopolistic stranglehold of the big 
three rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch). While this may be a noble objective, 
Regulation Theory suggests that fixed costs must be low for competition to set in, 
i.e. barriers to entry must be low to facilitate new entrants who may not have big 
resource capabilities. A quick analysis of the CRA market, particularly the perceived 
potentially high compliance costs brought about by the new EC CRA regulations 
indicates that the opposite may result. This view is corroborated by a DBRS (2010) 
response to the EC consultation on the regulations, which highlighted the 
difficulties that the regulations could impose on smaller rating agencies and 
potential new entrants. It is thus questionable whether the EC CRA regulations will 
effectively address legacy problems around competition in the rating market, given 
the prohibitive compliance burdens embedded in the new EC regulations. The 
practicality of delivering increased competition, increased investor protection and 
enhanced ratings quality is therefore questionable (Bondarouk, 2010; 
Papaikonomou, 2010). 
The intricately interconnected global economy suggests that the rationale for 
regulation be examined from a broader global context as opposed to focusing just 
on the EU. Whereas the traditional perspectives of a global world order may have 
seen the world parcelled out into neat categories and packages dominated by the 
hegemonic capitalist systems of the USA, Hirsch (1995) argues that the traditional 
powers of the past have ceased to exist as we knew them. A new world order is said 
to have set in. The new global order is characterised by blurred lines, shifting 
relationships and interactions which are in a state of constant flux, having to be 
constantly renegotiated.  
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The consequence of the new world order is that economic systems have to be 
continually reshaped to respond to new and emergent challenges and constructs. 
The shifting global power bases have seen the interchange of ideas where dominant 
rules-based systems previously gave way to self-regulation and voluntary codes. 
Whereas scholars previously sold the idea of self-regulation (Bartle & Vass, 2005), 
evidence suggests that this may not have worked as well as it ought to have and 
now regulators are having to step in and curb escalation of corporate collapses 
arising from alleged regulatory and governance failures. A case in point is the 2007-
8 global financial crisis that saw regulators stepping up the pressure for active 
regulatory oversight where previously, self-regulation was preferred (see for 
example the voluntary IOSCO 2004 code in the global securities market). Regulatory 
intervention however triggered fresh questions on whether regulation was the 
appropriate response (Hunt, 2009a); what the impact would be and how far 
regulation can go before its benefits begin to diminish. To make an attempt to 
explore these questions further, section 3.2 below begins by defining regulation in 
its different guises, relating regulation to the focus of this study. 
3.2 Regulation defined 
Regulation is a multi-dimensional concept whose understanding requires an 
examination of its impact from a number of broad perspectives including economic, 
political and even social spheres (Baldwin et al., 2012). Elsewhere, Selznick (1985), 
in (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p.42) defined regulation as “sustained and focused control 
exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community.” 
Regulation can be carried out by state agencies, voluntary organisations, private 
entities, corporations or self-regulators among others (Baldwin et al., 2012). The 
term, ‘regulation’ is sometimes used in various guises to encompass formulating 
rules, supervising the enforcement of those rules and / or monitoring outcomes. 
Llewellyn (1999) made a distinction between the above three and treated 
regulation as the rules or codes governing conduct. He delineated monitoring as 
keeping an eye on compliance to the set codes of conduct. Supervision was less 
clearly defined but was treated loosely as ensuring that set codes of conduct are 
complied with, together with the implementation of corrective measures where 
necessary. Regulation is presented as a process with stages to enforce adherence to 
stipulated standards, ostensibly to correct some disequilibria in a system.  
 
56  
Tabani Ndlovu 
The stages are all integral to the overall success and effectiveness of the regulatory 
process. By implication, well-crafted rules on their own may not deliver successful 
outcomes if poorly implemented. Similarly, lack of monitoring or oversight to gauge 
the level of compliance and note any deviations and impact thereof may render the 
regulatory process ineffective. Regulatory actions are designed to deliver set 
objectives. Such objectives should be clearly spelt out at the onset of the regulatory 
process as a way to guide the form, extent, scope of regulation as well as the 
identification of players best placed to drive the process. As regulation is a broad 
area, this study focuses solely on economic regulation. This is discussed in more 
detail in section 3.3 below. 
3.3 The economic regulation theory 
Economic regulation theory concerns itself with two systems; (i) accumulation 
regime systems (AR) and (ii) modes of regulation systems (MR). The first relates to 
the evolving nature of economic systems of wealth creation, ownership of the 
means of production and allocation of resources. The later supports the wealth 
accumulation systems, by ensuring that there is an optimum enabling environment 
for maximum wealth creation enhanced through requisite norms, rules and 
regulations. Following on from the above, if the behaviours of individuals or 
systems are such that there is disequilibria in the accumulation regime, modes of 
regulation have to usher in a new order to restore stability.   
3.4 Different strands of economic regulation 
Since its inception, Economic Regulation Theory has seen different postulations all  
attempting to better capture the hegemonic shift of regulatory powers as well as the 
changing role of the regulatory state in a capitalist world. The different conceptions 
of regulation are best examined through the different theoretical perspectives used 
to investigate the subject. Some of the key theoretical perspectives in regulation 
include Pigou (1938)’s public interest theory of regulation; the Stigler (1971) 
regulatory capture theory, as well as the contracting theory (usually attributed to 
Coase (1960)). Besides these main ones, there are other theoretical conceptions that 
have emerged, such as the Just Theory of Regulation, (Lee, 1980) among others.  
Selected key theoretical perspectives within the realm of economic regulation are 
discussed in the ensuing sections.    
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3.4.1 The public interest view of regulation 
The essence of this strand of regulation theory is the intervention by government 
seeking to promote public interests, ostensibly against powerful, wealth-amassing 
private entities seeking to usurp public benefits for their private purposes. Various 
controlling mechanisms are used by the state to align private business interests to 
those of the public. While this strand of regulation seeks to promote public interests, 
questions tend to centre on whether regulators’ motives are primarily driven by a 
desire to protect the public or their own self-maximising agendas (Peltzman, 1976).  
A case in point is when politicians use regulation for political mileage, amassing 
votes by appearing to be addressing issues of public concern meanwhile doing a 
tokenistic job, leaving real issues untouched. This sceptical view of the regulatory 
role of governments and other public regulators purporting to promote public 
interests was propounded by Stigler (1971) who argued that politicians, like other 
human beings seek to maximise their self-interests and sometimes such interests 
may seem to override the promotion of public interests. Stigler (1971)’s view 
resonated with later views by Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1985) who both 
recognised the tendency of private interest groups to exert pressure on the 
regulatory system in ways that generated and privatised benefits for themselves. 
This was tantamount to regulatory capture. The argument here is that regulation 
can be used as a vote-seeking proxy by politicians or those in public office who 
either want to enhance their political prowess or use regulation as a tool to sway 
voter allegiance.  
Government regulatory interventions tend to be scrutinised for hidden political 
agendas and the EC regulations which are the subject of this study are no exception. 
Questions were previously raised on how genuine the regulatory aims of protecting 
investors and the public were (Shleifer, 2005). Similarly, this study raised questions 
on whether the objectives set for the EC regulatory interventions were consistent 
with the regulatory approach and whether the motives were aligned to the stated 
objectives. Economic Regulation Theory is hinged on how a capitalist system can 
continue to sustain itself despite its conflicted nature emanating from class, wealth 
and other inherent disparities embedded in its construct.  
 
58  
Tabani Ndlovu 
The constant tugs posed by the divides between members of society due to such 
factors as class, wealth levels and diverging political interests among others, 
threaten the very foundations of the capitalist system (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008). 
Faced with similar divisions, any system would probably implode. The capitalist 
system seems to have endured and has successfully sustained and reinvented itself 
in the face of the challenges named above. Part of the capitalist system’s ability to 
reinvent and sustain itself has perhaps emanated from the discerning role of 
respective governments who have stepped in to quell any public disquiet when 
disequilibria set in. In rebalancing the interests of the few vs. those of many, 
regulators need to be careful not to overburden the tax payers through 
cumbersome, bureaucratic and costly regulations. Regulation theory therefore 
seeks to “explain who will receive the benefits or burdens of regulation, what form 
regulation will take, and the effects of regulation upon the allocation of resources” 
(Stigler, 1971, p.3).  
The relevance of the above to this study on EC CRA regulations stems from the fact 
that for a long time, there were incessant calls for external regulation to rebalance 
the dynamics of the securities markets where CRAs were seen to be wielding 
unfettered power but without any form of regulatory oversight or accountability on 
their own operations (Partnoy, 2001). Other concerns centred on the overreliance 
on ratings by regulators (Coffee, 2009); the unclear role of CRAs as both market 
players (gatekeepers) and contracted regulatory agents whose rating opinions 
drove regulatory decisions and thus influenced markets (Verschoor, 2007). All 
these concerns yielded no external regulatory intervention in the EU until after the 
2007-8 global financial crisis. From a regulation theory viewpoint, the previous 
external regulatory inertia by those responsible could be explained by the strong 
CRAs who may have wielded enough influence to convince regulators that they 
were capable of self-regulating through voluntary codes, thus keeping external 
regulation at bay (Peltzman, 1976). At the same time, the incumbent CRAs managed 
to raise entry barriers, restricting new competition in the industry. The inability of 
regulators to assert themselves in the period prior to the 2007-8 crisis could 
arguably be attributed to regulatory capture which is discussed in the ensuing 
section. 
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3.4.2 The capture theory of regulation 
In the capitalist system discussed in 3.4.1 above, private actors prefer to be left 
alone to manage their affairs without the perceived burden of regulatory oversight. 
Where possible, such actors may seek to usurp regulatory processes to suit their 
private pursuits, actively lobbying and influencing regulators to seek outcomes that 
favour their private interests as opposed to public interests (Olson, 1965). In 
response to such lobbying pressure, lawmakers may be swayed and coin 
regulations that are aligned to the powerful private actors. Consequently, 
government regulators across different jurisdictions may themselves compete to 
appear more lenient to the cause of these private actors in a bid to competitively 
attract interest returns (Tollison, 1988). Where central governments provide the 
regulatory oversight, increased centralisation may ensue, with the central 
government growing phenomenally as measured by budgets and size of the public 
service. Pursuit of revenue maximisation may see the social objectives take a 
slightly secondary position (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980) as regulators are captured 
by those they seek to regulate. Diversion of regulatory benefits for private gain is a 
central feature of the capture theory of regulation. 
The capture theory of regulation posits a possibility of social losses arising from the 
expropriation of regulatory benefits as the regulator becomes naturalised into the 
environment of the regulated entities (Stigler, 1971). The exact nature of regulatory 
capture may see the regulator becoming too involved with, or too dependent on the 
regulated entities to the extent that the regulator eventually ‘sees regulatory issues 
from the perspective of the regulated entities’ (Thompson, 2003, p.22) and begins 
to sympathise with the regulated subjects to the extent of possibly lowering 
regulatory standards or turning a blind eye to some issues that would otherwise 
attract regulatory penalties. Consequently, regulators in such circumstances fail to 
fulfil their mandate of stabilising or correcting markets for public benefit. 
According to Stigler (1971), wealth-maximising interest groups such as industrial 
organisations can deliberately capture their regulators if the accruing benefits of 
such capture exceed benefits to the outside public. This suggests deliberate acts by 
industrial or other regulated interest groups to usurp the power of politicians (who 
direct regulatory efforts) for private gain.  
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The implication is that benefits are internalised by the captors, possibly leading to 
society paying for any resultant externalities. Regulators then become conflicted as 
they serve the interests of their captors or their own at the expense of the rest of 
society where they may draw their electoral mandate from (Kalt & Zupan, 1984).  
Notwithstanding the above, Peltzman (1976) argued that in reality, the potential 
loss to politicians and regulators resulting from being captured greatly outweighed 
any potential benefits. His argument was that based on that logic, it was 
inconceivable that regulators could willingly risk their reputations for what he 
perceived to be little short term incentives. These views pose topical questions on 
whether the regulatory vacuum in the ratings market leading up to the 2007-8 
crisis was an act of omission or commission by the regulators and politicians alike. 
The former would connote incompetence on the part of the regulators, while the 
later could suggest possible complicity by the regulators leading to their capture by 
the CRAs or other as yet unclear players.  
The act of regulatory capture in modern day capitalist economies is perhaps not too 
distant from possibilities of sleaze and self-aggrandizement that manifest 
themselves in the corporate world right under the oversight of the regulators. If 
indeed regulatory capture occurred in the regulation of CRAs, it would be key to 
find out who the beneficiaries of any such capture were; how the capture affected 
and / or continues to affect the market as well as the nature of benefits that accrued 
to the captors. One of the weaknesses of the capture theory of regulation is that it 
views regulations as exogenous, i.e. externally imposed on regulatory victims. The 
voice of the regulated seems to be silent in the regulation formulation process. This 
was opposed by  Becker (1983; 1985) who argued in favour of an endogenous 
theory of regulation. The endogenous view posited regulation as co-determined, 
with the regulated entities actively engaging in shaping the regulatory process. The 
implication then was that regulators and their regulated entities were partners in a 
way, co-creating a regulatory environment that offered mutual benefits. 
Endogenous regulation is explored in more detail in section 3.4.3 below. 
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3.4.3 The endogenous theory of regulation 
Ellig (1991) concurred with Becker (1983; 1985) arguing that the regulatory 
process is not a straightforward top-down process where the regulators force down 
regulations onto a passive community. On the contrary, they posited a framework 
where the regulated community actively and proactively engaged the regulators to 
co-determine the resultant regulations. They argued that this led to a socially-
constituted regulatory outcome shaped as much by the interests of those regulated 
as by the regulators (Malloy, 2010). The downsides of this argument may manifest 
themselves in politically-sensitive situations where regulators wanting to win 
campaigns, may yield to unrelenting pressure from powerful private interest 
groups, at the detriment of the public. Nevertheless, this theoretical framework 
attempts to capture some power and interest issues at play in regulatory 
environments. This theoretical conception provides a useful backdrop against 
which to evaluate the EC regulations, particularly noting the absence of the voice of 
regulated entities in seminal literature such as Baldwin et al., (2012); Baldwin, 
(2008)  
3.4.4 Just regulation 
Lee (1980) offered a critique of economic regulation theory, asserting that different 
forms of regulation resulted in winners and losers, a scenario that conjured 
unattractive connotations in modern day economies emphasizing fairness and 
justice. As an example, by suppressing producer or supplier practices, there was an 
implicit benefit transfer to consumers through lower prices which could derive 
from increased competition and increased drivers for efficiency which in turn could 
lead to lower production costs. This however does not equitably serve the interests 
of all concerned (Lee, 1980), suggesting that the process had winners and losers, 
polarising the concerned parties. Consequently, the author proffered an alternative 
regulatory conceptual framework, addressing three requirements as follows:  
 
(i) Making both the regulated and their consumers better off,  
(ii) Equalising the playing field so that there was no benefit or cash transfer 
between the regulated and their consumers and,  
(iii) Fairness of the regulator in adjudicating over prices.  
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The last point suggests an impartial and objective approach to regulation which is 
not only non-partisan, but is utilitarian in nature, attempting maximum benefits to 
all concerned. Applying this logic to the EC CRA regulations, it can be noted that 
some of the intentions of the regulations were aimed at increasing CRA competition, 
restoring market confidence through protection of investors (consumers of ratings), 
as well as offering a consistent regulatory approach across the EU. The first element 
of a just regulatory approach from Lee (1980) above would fall away as by their 
nature, the EC regulations are curtailing what was perceived to be runaway 
practices of CRAs. The regulation therefore takes away some freedoms from CRAs, 
questioning the fairness and justice in the EC regulations when viewed using Lee 
(1980)’s lenses.   
Further scrutiny of the new EC CRA regulations suggests that the impact on some 
existing CRAs may be detrimental. The regulations may impose compliance costs 
which may act as barriers to entry (DeBellis, 2011). The barriers to entry therefore 
potentially negate Lee (1980)’s first key requirement above. On the second point 
above, the backdrop of the EC regulations was a period of deregulation where CRAs 
seemed to have previously wielded power and appropriated disproportionate 
advantages over their customers and other participants in general. It is therefore 
not clear whether the playing field will be levelled equitably for all players or if 
some powers will be taken away from CRAs thus equating to some transfer of 
benefits between CRAs and their customers, negating the second key requirement 
from Lee's (1980) key points above.  
On Lee's (1980) third point above, the author makes a sound but idealistic 
assumption. As discussed earlier, in reality, regulators are themselves potentially 
self-interested players with economic or political agendas and hence their 
motivations may not always align well or serve the interests of all concerned. 
Extant literature reviewed so far (see for example Manaigo-vekil, 2011; Posner, 
2010) suggested that there was a view that the EC CRA regulations were seemingly 
politically-motivated and therefore not equitable or just as Lee (1980) proposed. 
Consequently, the Just Theory of regulation seems idealistic and may not fit the EC 
CRA regulatory landscape.  
 
63  
Tabani Ndlovu 
This may be due to the traditional imbalances that the regulations aim to address, 
the self-interests of the different players (including the regulators) or indeed other 
reasons not discussed herein. An analysis of data obtained from interviews in this 
study will provide scope for further exploration of these concepts. The above 
discussions have focused on regulation in generic terms. Section 3.5 specifically 
considers securities market regulation, reviewing extant literature and drawing 
implications for this study. 
3.5 Securities regulation 
Following the corporate collapses of the 1930s in the US, new securities 
regulations were ushered in to restore market confidence and stem further crises. 
Several decades later, the global financial markets found themselves faced with 
similar predicaments, if not worse. The striking similarity was that the early 21st 
century failures were based on similar issues as the 1930s debacles (Zingales, 
2009). This raised questions on whether regulation could in fact prevent 
economic collapses and market failures. There have not been many studies 
focusing specifically on securities regulation, particularly in the EU as regulations 
are a new phenomenon.  
 
Recent developments surrounding the downgrading of sovereign ratings from a 
number of European Union members, coming shortly after the 2007-8 global 
financial crisis raised further concerns on credit rating agencies and their 
regulation (Eijffinger, 2012). This triggered more debates and studies 
investigating the workings of credit rating agencies in the EU. Table 6 summarises 
a selection of studies carried out before and after the 2007-8 global financial crisis. 
The selected studies highlight a number of key issues around securities regulation 
and will be discussed in more detail in the ensuing sections.  
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Table 6: Previous studies investigating securities regulation 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
A number of themes emerge from the studies in Table 6 above. The themes centre 
on: 
(i) Studies calling for securities regulation in general (Goshen, 2006; Colombo, 
2010; Brummer, 2010) 
(ii) Studies questioning the rules-based approach as manifested in the US 
regulatory approach (see for example Romano, 1998; Ford, 2008 / 2010)  
(iii) Studies calling for a more globally-coordinated regulatory approach (Zingales, 
2009; Langevoort, 2008) 
(iv) Studies favouring a rules-based regulatory approach (see for example Park, 
2007)  
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While previous studies (prior to the crisis) were largely calling for regulation of the 
securities market, studies post the crisis seemed to have changed focus, instead 
scrutinising the effect of regulation and calling for a more considered regulatory 
approach. Romano (1998) questioned the stringent rules-based US approach to 
securities regulation, arguing that this could hamper market competitiveness by 
imposing burdensome compliance costs. In a later study, Ford (2010) argued 
strongly against the new EU rules-based approach to regulating the securities 
industry, citing possible detrimental unintended consequences on innovation, 
timeliness of rules and regulatory competence among others. Regulation was 
portrayed as a process which had to be kept up to date rather than a destination 
with a finite ending.  
Notwithstanding the critique of the rules-based approach, Ford (2010) also 
highlighted the weaknesses that characterised the principles-based regulatory 
approach prior to the 2007-8 financial crisis. The weaknesses allegedly emanated 
from the regulatory vacuum that meant that adherence to the stated principles was 
not effectively monitored or any deviations actively challenged. The proposal was 
for a cautious and balanced regulatory approach.  
Separately, Langevoort (2008) analysed the precarious situation that US securities 
regulators found themselves in post the 2007-8 crisis. While on one hand the public 
demanded increasingly tighter regulatory oversight of the securities market, 
regulators themselves came under intense fire for having failed to be proactive in 
closing regulatory gaps in the period leading up to the 2007-8 crisis. The global 
nature of the securities market required a global approach and localised regulatory 
efforts could only achieve so much.  
Zingales (2009) acknowledged the agency problems inherent in the ratings market 
and advocated corporate governance reforms to address the weaknesses identified 
in the securities market at both local and global levels. The two studies under this 
theme recognised the importance of a coordinated regulatory approach, 
particularly in a globalised world. Separately, Park (2007) posited two competing 
paradigms in securities regulation; the rules-based vs. the principles-based 
paradigm. In his evaluation, he concluded that market participants preferred a clear, 
predictable approach that offered understandable guidelines of expected standards.  
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Such a framework, the author argued was offered by the rules-based approach with 
prescriptive guidelines of what was expected. The challenge with Park (2007)’s 
conclusion was that the rules-based approach could foster the adoption of 
minimalist standards which could see market participants doing just enough to get 
above the regulatory threshold.  
In a study, carried out after the 2007-8 crisis, Colombo (2010) welcomed regulation 
arguing that  regulation could restore the trust that investors previously had in the 
securities market prior to the 2007-8 crisis. The conception of trust and its role in 
securities market relationships was perhaps overstated in this paper. Market 
participants need to be wary of blindingly trusting their counterparts. Instead they 
needed to be inquisitive and critically review any information presented to them by 
CRAs. In a tone similar to Colombo (2010), Brummer (2010) also welcomed the 
new securities regulations but lamented the absence of truly global and cohesive 
approaches to securities regulation. 
From the above, arguably, the principles-based regulatory approach offers scope 
for innovation and flexibility, avoiding a “one-size-fits-all” approach. The principles-
based approach is itself however susceptible to lack of legal enforceability leaving 
regulatory loopholes. Consistent with the above study, Goshen (2006) offered a 
critique of the role of securities regulation in financial markets and concluded that 
regulation was pivotal in evening out the playing field, creating conducive 
conditions for different players to participate. The author made a compelling case 
for information trading, calling for disclosure and transparency. This study, while 
offering a plausible call for regulatory intervention, fell short of clearly articulating 
the exact form and extent of regulatory interventions, a subject that has been 
picked up in studies post the 2007-8 crisis. 
In a study post the 2007-8 crisis, Black, (2010) carried out an analysis of previous 
empirical regulation studies looking at 4 main areas:  
1. Regulatory impacts on financial markets,  
2. Financial market impacts on regulation, 
3. Impact of market participants’ contextual interpretation of different market 
players using regulation as well as 
4. The dynamics of the regulatory regimes in operation across different 
financial jurisdictions. 
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The four areas above intersect although each gives a unique focus when analysed in 
more depth. One major omission from the above study was the fact that there was 
no focus on variations from the norm as driven by such things as corruption or 
regulatory capture together with requisite impacts.  
Aside from the above selected studies, the 1980s saw the vast majority of studies 
seeking to measure the regulatory effects on individual firm behaviours. In 
investigating the impact of regulation, the dominant methodologies tended to be: 
(i) Comparative studies looking at the regulated vs. unregulated markets and 
making judgements on the difference (time series analyses etc.) 
(ii) Carrying out comparative studies in different political contexts or nations to 
look at variations 
(iii) Employing use of experimental data for computations of regulatory effects. 
 
The challenge with these approaches tended to be controlling for other variables so 
that the comparative studies considered like-for-like variables to be able to explain 
causality in regulatory phenomena. Also, there seems to have been inherent 
assumptions in these comparative approaches that considered the environmental 
regulatory effect as exogenous, when in fact regulatory initiatives may have been 
co-determined and endogenous. Further, contrary to inherent assumptions in the 
studies, regulations could have been lagging rather than leading the market. The 
next session considers regulation post the 2007-8 crisis. 
3.5.1 Regulation after the crisis 
Following corporate collapses and market failures, reformists tend to rush and 
implement new laws under the assumption that laws shape markets by channelling 
property rights, governing exchange relationships and covering resolution of 
commercial disputes. Alternative views however argue that markets drive laws and 
therefore laws simply rubber stamp what is already at play (Black, 2010). Shamir 
(2008); Garsten & Jacobsson (2007) expressed scepticism over regulatory intents, 
arguing that there were often covert regulatory motives bent on achieving private 
regulators’ interests, with any public benefits being meagre offshoots of otherwise 
private agendas. This view is consistent with some theoretical conceptions of the 
public interest theory of regulation discussed in section 3.4.1.  
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Questions from this line of thought centre on whether regulators can be trusted to 
champion public interests or should there be further checks on regulatory players. 
This raises questions on what measures are taken by regulators to minimise 
regulatory burdens and maximise payoffs, issues explored in the next section.   
3.5.2 Regulatory interventions and evaluation of regulatory impact 
Depending on the form of regulatory interventions, the response from the regulated 
entities may be different. Consequently, effective regulation must balance between 
a number of often competing considerations to induce an appropriate, optimal 
regulatory response from the regulated entities. Regulators can choose between 
administrative and or criminal penalties in managing the behaviour of regulated 
entities. Administrative sanctions tend to be grounded in statutes and offer 
regulators flexibility to revoke contracts, cancel franchises and /or ask for the 
discontinuation of the undesirable practices, without having to rely on the courts 
for recourse or enforcement. This approach is therefore more conciliatory, 
empowering parties to engage in a more collegial relationship, emphasising 
equitable distribution of benefits. 
The alternative criminal option may involve the levying of fines as a way of holding 
company directors responsible for the conduct of their companies or employees 
(Baldwin et al., 2012). Compliance may require regulated firms to address any 
identified misdemeanours within prescribed time frames, to certain stated levels; 
use of contractually-based measures such as suspensions, fines, and licence 
revocations among other penalties. Because firms are inanimate personae, use of 
imprisonment as a deterrent is not often effective (even though firm directors or 
proprietors can be held liable for their companies’ misdeeds). Fines tend to be a 
much more widely used punitive method. The determination of the levels of fines 
has to consider the possibility of such fines being treated as normal business 
expenses and possibly being passed on to clients or even employees. Also, too hefty 
fines may disproportionately distort compliance costs and possibly drive some 
regulated firms insolvent. Equity fines are known to have been previously proposed 
as an alternative form of penalty for firms. This involves the firm or its shareholders 
being forced to give up (to the regulators) shares equivalent to the value of the 
penalty.  
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The advantage is that this approach does not see money removed from the 
corporation, with shareholding value being transferred instead. The approach may 
induce fear of possible takeover and compel good behaviour. The approach sees 
ownership becoming diluted as the state progressively owns more and more shares 
in the offending institutions with more fines being levied. The issues of conflicts of 
interest and participation in the regulated firm become prevalent as the state now 
gets involved in the governance of the regulated businesses. Other forms of 
punishment may include injunctions mandating firms to put right what they have 
done wrong as well as accountability orders where firms have to disclose their 
activities for the public to hold them to account. The issues with some of these 
approaches is that they assume that the market can distinguish good reporting 
from bad and that the market will self-correct based on disclosed information. The 
market tends to be fraught with information asymmetry. Even where firms have 
disclosed, consumers and other stakeholders may not understand the disclosed 
information to be able to make informed decisions about good or bad outcomes.  
This questions the soundness of disclosure-based remedies which are often touted 
as a solution. Perhaps one of the most feared penalties for businesses is adverse 
disclosure (Van Erp, 2010). This may require errant firms to publicly acknowledge 
their misdeeds and state what they are doing to remedy them. It does not come 
without its weaknesses though. Firms can be creative in how they disclose so that 
the cost of doing so may still be below the benefits of their errant behaviours. In 
considering regulation and the different forms that best address market issues, it is 
important to always relate back to the rationale for regulation, an issue which is 
explored below. 
3.5.3 Rationale for regulatory intervention 
In discussing regulation, it is imperative that the objective of regulation is 
distinguished from its rationale. Regulation objectives look at what the regulation 
seeks to achieve, while the rationale focuses on the reasons for regulation. Financial 
and capital market regulation needs to be geared towards clearly articulated 
regulatory objectives, with clearly defined deliverables so that its implementation 
can be measured against such. The reasons for regulation need to be convincingly 
articulated.  
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Baldwin et al., (2012) identified eleven market failure rationales for regulation. 
Four of these have been identified as relevant to this study and are visualised in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Rationale for regulatory intervention 
 
Adapted from Baldwin et al, (2012, p15-21) 
 
Ideally, market competition should corral market players towards well-functioning, 
equitable market systems where inefficient players are driven out and standards 
raised. This assumption is largely hinged on the market being knowledgeable and 
information being symmetrical. Often, this is not the case, the forces of supply and 
demand do not always work (or may not always work well and / or quick enough), 
leading to market failures that in turn necessitate government intervention as a 
way of enhancing prudential risk management (Crockett, 2003).  In discussing the 
role of regulation, Professor Gower once wrote “regulation should not seek to 
achieve the impossible task of protecting fools from their folly, but instead, should 
aim to be no greater than is necessary to protect reasonable people from being 
made fools of”(Gower, 1984 cited in Lightfoot, 2003, p. 88).  
There are connotations in Gower’s statement about the potential danger of 
regulation being too cumbersome and unreasonable, potentially leaning towards a 
nanny regulatory state. Commenting on financial market regulation well before the 
2007-8 crisis, Goodhart, Kay, Mortimer, & Duguid (1988, p.7) emphasized that 
financial market transactions were the key ingredients of making profits or 
acquiring capital and therefore: 
Regulation to address 
monopolies and natural 
monopolies 
Regulation to address windfall 
profits 
Regulation to address 
externalities 
Regulation to address 
information inadequacies 
Market Failure 
Regulation rationales 
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 “…it follows that in order to devise an efficient system of regulation, it 
would be necessary first to obtain a thorough knowledge of these 
markets and their economic purpose and effects. It may however come 
as little surprise to the reader that this was not the approach adopted”  
 
This statement was written with particular reference to the 1980s regulatory 
reforms but it still strikes a familiar tone when considering several misgivings on 
the heated debates around the subject of regulation in general (Becker, 2011); the 
recent European Regulations on Credit Rating Agencies in particular, and regulators’ 
perceived competences in fashioning the EC regulations post the 2007-8 global 
financial crisis. When enacting regulatory frameworks, it is futile and self-defeating 
to set regulations whose impact outweigh perceived benefits (Gower, 1982).  This 
calls for concerted efforts prior to enacting any regulations to assess the possible 
benefits and possible costs that may result from the regulatory initiatives (Lightfoot, 
2003).   
If regulations are not well-thought through, they may have adverse effects on the 
market. Lightfoot, (2003) cited the US Glass-Steagall Act of 1934 as one example of 
a kneejerk reactive regulatory initiative that was “ill-conceived and potentially 
costly” (p.91), crafted as an immediate impulse reaction just after a financial crisis. 
Despite its weaknesses, there are others however who argue that the repeal of the 
Act led to “the development of a shadow banking system” (Sy, 2012, p.76) and the 
subsequent financial crisis, asserting that despite its weaknesses, the Glass-Steagall 
Act served as a deterrent while it was in force. The conclusion from the above 
arguments is that despite the fact that some regulations may not have been well-
crafted, they may still act as deterrents and go some way in changing market 
relationships. 
Regulators cannot completely remove financial risks, but rather, they can “attempt 
to reduce their number, duration and spread, mitigating their immediate 
consequences, particularly for innocent bystanders” (Davies, 2003, p.29). While in 
theory, regulation can be said to benefit the market, reality has often seen political 
and government interests driving regulation, (Benston, 1998). To legitimise their 
regulatory and political pursuits, politicians often cite such problems as lack of 
competition to justify the need to regulate (Brand, 2005).  
 
72  
Tabani Ndlovu 
Despite the political nature of some regulatory pursuits, grounding them in market-
related problems legitimises and justifies the regulatory activities. Singer (2007) 
reiterated the fact that financial regulators’ motivation to regulate largely stemmed 
from their positional power and the need to be seen to be in control, particularly 
when there was a perceived market failure requiring intervention. This was said to 
have the tendency to be reactive, sometimes falling short of accurately scoping the 
full impact of resultant regulatory initiatives.  
Notwithstanding the above, the link between politics, finance and regulation is not 
far-fetched (Helleiner, Pagliari, & Zimmermann, 2010). Such a link is critical in the 
design, implementation and review of securities regulation. Alternative regulatory 
approaches include those that advocate common interest regulation (Mattli & 
Woods, 2009). This approach advocates an inclusive orientation to negotiating 
regulatory reforms, freely disseminating information for equitable access to all 
concerned stakeholders and embracing their input. This culminates in a shared 
construction of regulatory reforms. This approach would balance the needs of 
different stakeholders. It is not without its weaknesses though. For a start, it 
assumes sufficient levels of interest and understanding of regulatory issues by 
different stakeholders, which in reality is rarely the case. Secondly, it is difficult to 
imagine how the model could be deployed in practice: who would the stakeholders 
be? What criteria would be used to delineate who is in and who is out? How would 
conflicting interests be managed for example? Such questions put a damper on this 
approach and challenge its sole adoption, relegating it to be perhaps only a part of 
whatever solution is proposed. The purpose of regulation is to alter the behaviour 
of targeted players, although this is a contentious issue centred on how far 
behaviour can be regulated.  
There are two types of regulatory approaches in the financial sector, namely 
structural / prudential regulation and conduct of business regulation (Llewellyn, 
1999). The first looks at the viability, solvency and general soundness of financial 
institutions and markets, while the latter focuses on how financial institutions 
transact with their clients. This study primarily focused on the first. Prudential or 
structural regulation is necessary owing to inherent information asymmetry issues, 
agency problems and conflicts of interest issues among other challenges.  
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Writing specifically about the regulation of Credit Rating Agencies, (CRAs), 
Langhohr & Langhohr (2008) acknowledged the pivotal role of CRAs in distributing 
and sanctioning information which forms the cog that drives global securities 
markets, as well as the regulatory reliance on credit ratings by state regulatory 
institutions. This, they juxtaposed to the risk of private shareholder-driven rating 
agencies whose revenue models ostensibly motivated them to internalise benefits 
derived from their role, while externalising any resultant negative costs. Regulation 
in the context of CRAs and other similarly-positioned entities therefore was aimed 
at imposing “regulatory constraints on behaviour aimed at maximising private 
value in order to reconcile this with the public interest,” (Langhohr & Langhohr, 
2008, p.429).  
There are two camps typically either pro or anti-regulation. On one hand, 
regulation is often perceived as playing an enabling / facilitating role (green light 
regulation). On the other hand, regulation also plays a curbing / restricting role, 
aimed at inhibiting certain behaviours (red light regulation). The role of regulation 
particularly in financial markets is said to be largely anchored on the four tenets 
espoused by Llewellyn, (1999) and shown below: 
1. The workings of financial markets and institutions, 
2. Incentive arrangements driving behaviour among financial players 
3. The level of market imperfections and mandate of regulators to tackle these 
4. The uniqueness of financial arrangements (i.e. not the same as other goods 
and services which enjoy less regulatory oversight) 
 
Well-designed regulatory incentives “will induce appropriate behaviour and 
workings of regulated firms. Conversely, if the incentives are badly constructed and 
inappropriately applied, they might fail to reduce systemic risk, potentially leading 
to undesirable side-effects such as unnecessarily raising the price of financial 
services” (Llewellyn, 1999, p.7). The question of appropriateness is very 
contentious and requires careful evaluation, considering the needs of all 
stakeholders, consequences of regulation (both intended and unintended) as well 
as the cost or impact of regulation.  
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According to Hutter (1997) the regulatory process seeks to change behaviours 
through three interlinked stages of formulating the requisite regulatory rules, 
establishing the regulatory administrative functions as well as enforcing and 
monitoring the formulated regulations. This is a cyclical process which is iterative 
in nature, allowing for regulators to keep revising and refining each stage 
iteratively. The cyclical and iterative nature of the process acknowledges the 
dynamic nature of the regulatory climate, allowing for regulators to respond to 
regulatory demands in a timely fashion. The next section discusses different 
approaches to regulation.  
3.6 Regulation approaches 
A number of regulatory approaches have emerged over the years. These are risk-
based, responsive and smart regulatory approaches. The approaches though 
different, overlap in a number of areas (Baldwin et al., 2012). A brief synopsis of 
each of the approaches is given below.  
3.6.1 Risk-based regulatory approaches 
Risk-based regulation emphasises the avoidance or minimisation of risk through 
requisite regulatory intervention and is often regarded as the backbone of modern 
regulation theory. Risk-based regulation uses risk analysis and comprises three 
elements namely; risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. The 
element of risk management is further broken down into standard setting or the 
formulation of requisite codes on one hand and control on the other. The control 
element focuses on the enforcement of the set rules.  
 
The challenge with risk-based regulation is that it is as comprehensive as the 
information available for the risk analysis. Looking at the EC regulations, an 
attempt seems to have been made to follow a risk-based approach, albeit 
retrospectively. The challenge with a retrospective application is that the regulation 
blueprint is based on the previous crisis and may not help identify and prevent 
subsequent crises in a proactive manner.   
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3.6.2 Responsive regulation 
This regulatory approach responds to the behaviour of the regulated entities (Ayres 
& Braithwaite, 1992). It follows a pyramid structure with soft, persuasive 
regulation at the bottom of the pyramid, gradually toughening as one goes up the 
pyramid, responding to escalating cases of non-compliance, culminating in licence 
revocations at the pinnacle of the pyramid.  
The approach allows for tailoring of regulatory approaches to respond to each 
regulatory situation, allowing for flexible movement up or down the pyramid to 
avoid heavy-handed regulation.  
3.6.3 Smart regulation 
Referring to environmental regulation, (Gunningham & Grabosky, 1998) asserted 
that both responsive regulation and risk-based regulation fall short of desired 
levels when a multiplicity of actors are considered, requiring not only different 
approaches, but a variety of regulatory instruments as well as the need to avoid a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Smart regulation largely hinges on active 
communication and participation between parties concerned to encourage 
involvement even at the lowest levels as opposed to imposing regulations from the 
top. By co-opting and involving all stakeholders, smart regulators foster a sense of 
shared responsibility and ownership thus improving compliance by utilising 
existing structures rather than reinventing the wheel. Active consultation ahead of 
the regulatory initiatives as well as during implementation becomes key, to gauge 
participants’ moods and make necessary adjustments where necessary. This 
approach will be applied to the EC regulations to determine if there is a fit between 
the EC regulations and the conception of smart regulations. 
3.6.4 Rationale and focus of this study 
This study focused on securities regulation, concerning itself with “securities, debt, 
and derivative instruments, and the markets” (Black, 2010, p.3). Kay & Vickers, 
(1990) distinguished between structural regulation (i.e. regulation aimed at 
aligning the structure of the market) as opposed to conduct regulation, which 
comprises regulatory efforts aimed at regulating market behavioural issues such as 
pricing, quality among other things.  
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Because of their broad objectives, the EC regulations seem to have straddled both 
these areas owing to their multiple aims of addressing competition issues by 
eliminating entry barriers (structural regulation) but also focusing on enhancing 
transparency through disclosure; promoting timely issuance of quality ratings etc, 
which would fall under conduct regulations. These multi-facetted objectives pose 
challenges for the EC regulations, raising questions on their effectiveness as well as 
the possible impact on market participants and market operations. The next section 
looks at the different regulatory players and considers what role they play in 
regulatory enforcement. 
3.7 Regulatory players 
As discussed above, the regulatory role can be performed by many different  
players including but not limited to central government departments, regulatory 
agencies (government-sponsored or private), parliament, local government, self-
regulators (voluntary or coerced), directors general as well as courts and tribunals 
(Baldwin et al., 2012). Globalisation has seen a proliferation of new forms of 
intergovernmental regulatory structures, drawing mandates from different 
subscribing governments to ensure international coordination of regulatory efforts. 
This renders the regulatory field complex as new forms keep emerging and need to 
be carefully evaluated. The different regulatory players are discussed below. 
3.7.1 Central government departments as regulators 
Ministerial departments accountable to parliament are often used as regulators. 
They however suffer criticism owing to their allegiance to the political 
establishment that nurtures them and the fact that their lifespan may be limited to 
that of the parent parliament thus affecting continuity. Bureaucratic tendencies and 
levels of expertise together with efficiency in regulating market issues by central 
government agencies are often questioned. Further, the public may not see such 
regulatory structures as independent enough to effectively address issues arising 
from what the public may see as failure by the same government sponsoring the 
regulatory entities. Such concerns have encouraged the consideration of alternative 
regulatory agencies discussed in the ensuing sections.  
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3.7.2 Regulatory agencies 
Regulatory agencies act on behalf of government to regulate specific sectors such as 
OFGEM in the UK electricity and gas markets; FSA in the UK financial services 
among others. Through the mandate given to them by central government, these 
regulatory agents become the supposed specialist overseers of the allocated sector, 
devising and enforcing rules as necessary (Baldwin & McCrudden, 1987). Perhaps 
their greatest strength is said to be the independence from government and the 
relevant ministry that sets them up. Regulatory agencies are duly constituted with 
independent governance structures ensuring that they are impartial in adjudicating 
on matters in their watch. Unlike ministries, they are more enduring as their life can 
span across different governments or parliamentary administrations. 
3.7.3 Parliament as a regulator 
Parliament can pass bills specifically aimed at regulating allowable conduct in 
particular industries. In the UK, parliamentary involvement in regulation dates back 
to the Gladstone regulations on Railways in 1844 (Baldwin & Cave, 1999). 
Parliamentarians form specific committees tasked with regulating identified areas. 
The challenge with this approach is that parliamentarians may ignore advice by 
industry practitioners, resulting in a gap of understanding between regulators and 
industry. Such a situation may lend itself to regulatory capture, particularly where 
there are conflicting interests between parliamentarians and the regulated area.  
It is not uncommon for parliamentarians to be found straddling personal, political, 
and financial interests on one hand and regulatory interests on the other. A good 
example of this may be the conflicting role of peers in shaping legislation on one 
hand but also serving the interests of paymasters or sponsors in the regulated areas 
on the other (Shell, 2008; Strauss, 1964). Because of these and other problems, 
parliamentarians seemingly play less regulatory roles, devolving such to others 
such as local authorities. 
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3.7.4 Local authorities as regulators 
Structures such as municipalities, police and other local bodies sometimes carry 
regulatory powers. In the past, this was prevalent in the UK. Local authorities tend 
to be best positioned to play a regulatory role on issues requiring local 
participation or input and their knowledge of local issues, enabling them to connect 
with local constituencies easily compared to central governments. Challenges arise 
however where such regulations have to be coordinated nationally or where there 
are conflicts of interest which may give rise to regulatory capture because of the 
close relationships between regulators and other regulated interests at a local level. 
3.7.5 Self-regulators 
A major observation from the historical account of credit rating agencies presented 
in chapter 2 was the absence of, or ineffectiveness of a self-regulating market 
mechanism within the credit ratings market. Such a void coupled with various 
crises can be a recipe for regulatory intervention which seeks to address market 
failures. Such failures would have arisen from imperfections in the market linked to 
information asymmetry (Laffont, 1994). This involves organisations setting 
regulatory parameters and behavioural codes for their members, (Black, 1996; 
Gunningham & Rees, 1997), often at voluntary or informal local levels. It is not 
uncommon though for such self-drawn regulations to be overseen or enforced by 
governments, thus raising the questions of the accuracy of the concept of the ‘self’ 
when it is government that regulates (BRTF, 1998).  
Self-regulators still play active roles in regulating entry into professional and 
industry fields, setting codes of conduct and enforcing compliance thereto, among 
other things. Self-regulators may draw their mandate from relevant government 
statutes, giving them even more power. Their proximity to industry issues gives 
them a clearer view of the major regulatory issues involved at local operational 
levels. They tend to be innovative and adaptive and can speedily come up with rules 
or codes to respond to topical issues in the area in question. Considering the fact 
that in the majority of cases, regulation is used to try and balance private firm 
interests with public interests, there is a question around the legitimacy of self-
regulators in representing the views of others outside the industry.  
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This is particularly because such self-regulators do not have a mandate to represent 
interests outside their organisations, questioning their commitment to public 
interests. Further, it is questionable how the public can be assured that broader 
public interests are served by self-regulators whose interests may be narrowly-
defined. Lastly, there may be questions of independence of a regulator set up by 
members of the regulated community and how such a regulator can be effectively 
monitored or held to account by government or the public. Black (1996) divided 
self-regulators into four groups, demonstrating the state’s involvement at varying 
levels across the four groups. The groups included sanctioned, coerced, mandated 
and voluntary self-regulators. This categorisation was further developed by (Bartle 
& Vas, 2007) into two broad groups; mandated and non-mandated self-regulation.  
Mandated regulation incorporates 3 further categories; cooperative regulation – 
where the regulated entities and the regulator jointly develop and implement 
statutory regulation; Delegated regulation – where public authority regulatory 
bodies delegate the implementation of regulation to self-regulatory bodies, and 
finally, devolved regulation – where the government and / or parliament crafts 
regulation but pass it down to self-regulatory bodies for implementation. 
The second category by Bartle & Vass (2007) was that of non-mandated self-
regulation, which also comprised three forms: Facilitated regulation – where the 
regulatory scheme is not statutory but is actively supported by the government; 
Tacitly-supported regulation – where the state is not involved in self-regulation but 
tacitly encourages it; and finally, voluntary self-regulation where seemingly self-
regulatory bodies act independently and out of their own volition but in reality are 
constrained by the state in some form. The bottom line from the above regulatory 
guises is that the self-regulatory landscape is not straightforward, but may involve 
various forms and players, all interacting for different outcomes. Self-regulation is 
thus not as straightforward as organisations voluntarily coining and enforcing their 
own codes to regulate members. Neither is it a clear dictatorial coalition where the 
state plays big brother on self-regulators. Rather, it tends to be a blend of the two 
with different positions along a continuum depending on what the regulatory issues 
are, the organisations involved, political agendas, public appetite and levels of 
involvement (Gunningham & Rees, 1997). 
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3.7.6 Co-regulators 
Ayres & Braithwaite (1992) referred to co-regulation as an arrangement where 
industry self-regulated but within a framework negotiated and attested to by 
relevant state regulatory agencies. This view was further developed by Pattberg  
(2005) who noted an increasing trend of the privatisation of world politics and with 
it, the shift from public regulatory institutions towards negotiated regulatory 
settlements between profit and non-profit players, particularly at an international 
level. This view is significant particularly when taking into consideration the role 
and power of private institutions in today’s globalised markets and their propensity 
to privatise profits, while externalising negative externalities (Hertz, 2001).  
The aforementioned view therefore regards co-regulation as suspect, while other 
views (see Pattberg, 2005) are more positive, seeing co-regulation as tapping into 
regulatory capital of the different players to minimise regulatory collateral. There 
are useful possibilities of this approach in reducing regulatory information gaps 
and reducing regulatory oversight costs, particularly in a market characterised by 
complexity where regulators struggle to keep up with the innovative dynamism of 
the regulated market (Winn & Jondet, 2008). Further, this concept is extended to 
include other participants who may contribute from a consumer or service user 
perspective, ensuring that the resultant regulation does not ostracise the very 
people it is meant to protect. 
3.7.7 Courts and tribunals as regulators 
The use of courts and tribunals adopts a judicial approach to regulation and follows 
legalistic proceedings such as hearings and trial-type representations in dealing 
with market issues. Courts are effective as enforcers and interpreters of regulation 
but still rely on other players to craft the relevant regulations (Crawford, 2010). 
Such regulatory approaches are often criticised for lacking adequate knowledge 
particularly in dynamic, information-based and politically-sensitive environments 
where things constantly change. They are said to lack connection with issues on the 
ground, using legalistic approaches in often fluid situations that are probably best 
tackled using other more conciliatory means. Further, courts and tribunals are said 
to be largely reactive, managing the aftermaths of regulatory failures rather than 
preventing failures before they happen (Pistor & Xu, 2005).  
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Notwithstanding the above limitations, perhaps courts are a necessary partner in 
enforcing regulation, particularly where there has been errant behaviour, to bring 
culprits to book as a deterrent for future would-be offenders.  
3.7.8 Directors general as regulators 
These are single individual regulators appointed by the Secretary of State (in the 
case of the UK) to regulate particular industries, assisted by dedicated offices such 
as the Office of Water Services (OFWAT) or the Office of Telecommunications 
(OFTEL) among others  (Baldwin et al., 2012). The Director General is accountable 
to the government through such structures as the Comptroller General or the Public 
Accounts Committee among others.  
In exercising their regulatory role, directors are mandated to consult on issues that 
may result in significant changes to their regulated entities. Director Generals were 
said to be advantageous as the public had a single named individual tasked with 
protecting their interests. Such an individual was said to operate relatively flexibly, 
without much bureaucratic hindrance as would be found in more complex 
government regulatory structures. In many instances, Director Generals tended to 
be superseded by commissions, broadening the responsibility beyond a single 
individual (Baldwin et al., 2012). 
Despite the above different forms, the globalised world today is encountering a 
different form of regulator, one that straddles national political boundaries, the 
international regulator. This poses new challenges of coordination, legitimacy, 
power bases, conflicts of interest as well as regulatory responsiveness to local and 
or international issues (Klöhn, 2010).  
Challenges besetting the European credit rating industry have been attempted at 
national levels but without much success (Langohr & Langohr, 2008). The 
globalised nature of the financial markets makes it difficult to isolate a particular 
country or player and contain the targeted phenomenon within fenced financial or 
securities markets. Business deals are contagious due to the nature of global trade. 
Effective solutions need to be end-to-end, i.e. from the origin countries right up to 
the destination countries.  
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Such a role can only be performed by a legitimate and properly mandated 
international / global regulator. This new regulatory player is discussed briefly in 
the following section. 
3.7.9 International regulators 
With many businesses operating across multiple nations, there is need for a 
regulatory approach that coordinates activities beyond country level to keep up 
with the new forms of multinational and global corporations (Farrell & Newman, 
2010; Jackson, 2010; Lipuma & Koelble, 2006; Nielo & Peñalosa, 2004). This calls 
for collaboration at inter-governmental levels as well as organisations themselves 
understanding the impact they can potentially have on different stakeholders and 
taking proactive steps to address these.  
The challenge with this new regulatory order though is the coordination and 
synchronisation of national political and economic agendas (Helleiner, 2009; Klöhn, 
2010) which may be competing against each other both politically and 
economically, making collaboration difficult. Further, international regulators tend 
to suffer from legitimacy problems (Picciotto & Haines, 1999), particularly as they 
are not directly elected by the different state constituents that they preside over. 
International regulators also suffer from lack of detailed local market knowledge 
which compromises their effectiveness to preside over detailed local country issues. 
Consequently, they may just be responsible for crafting and coordinating the 
requisite regulations but leaving the enforcement and monitoring regulatory 
functions to locally-based regulatory agents who may be more attuned to local 
issues (Acharya, Wachtel, & Walter, 2009). 
To their advantage, international regulators can perhaps exhibit better 
independence and objectivity in aligning the often diverse interests of different 
local and international stakeholders, (assuming they do not have any allegiances to 
individual stakeholder entities or countries). Also, their broader remit may allow 
them more scope to tackle issues that are widespread across the regulated 
landscape, giving them the advantage of tracking and tackling issues at source 
without any jurisdiction challenges. International regulators however suffer from 
the lack of local reach, making them ineffective at local market levels.  
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Further, their mandates may be questioned as these tend not to be grounded on 
local electorates. While there has been a move towards international regulation, 
there are still questions about the sectoral nature of some regulatory initiatives 
such as the European Commission Credit Rating Agency Regulations. The concern is 
that such a localised regulatory approach further fragments the global market and 
hinders global coordination, at a time when perhaps the trend should be going the 
other way  (Davies & Green, 2008). Viewed from a different angle, regional 
regulation may form building blocks towards a global regulatory coalition and 
depending on the regulators, may allow for both a local focus as well as an 
international and global reach.  
The UK regulatory landscape is in transition. With the impending dissolution of the 
FSA, a three-pronged regulatory approach has replaced the FSA. Potentially, this 
may further alienate regulators and leave gaps in the system. On the other hand, 
perhaps this approach will ensure each regulatory arm is focused and competently 
equipped to deal with issues within its jurisdiction. The sheer number of 
international regulatory players in financial markets and the touch points in the 
exchange of information represent significant challenges of coordination, 
assimilation and translation to ensure common understanding. With ESMA now 
regulating the activities of CRAs in the UK, IOSCO seems to have lost its grip on the 
European continent. Further, the EC regulations seem to have gone further than 
their US counterparts, raising questions on how this can be harmonised to prevent 
unintended consequences in the European Union.   
3.8 Measuring the impact of regulation 
Perhaps one of the most important tests for any regulatory initiative is whether the 
regulations achieve their originally-stated purpose. Regulatory effectiveness looks 
at the extent to which regulations deliver their stated objectives. As there are 
different stakeholders with potentially diverging interests and expectations, it is 
crucial that from the onset, regulatory objectives are clearly stated so as not to 
cloud implementation later on. The notion of regulatory effectiveness raises 
questions about what can be considered good regulation. Section 3.8.1 below 
discusses theoretical concepts surrounding regulatory proposals to derive a 
conceptual template of what can be considered to be good regulation. 
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3.8.1 What is good regulation? 
The notion of what constitutes good regulation is a contested one and should be 
examined in conjunction with how well the regulations achieve what they were set 
to achieve (Baldwin et al., 2012). According to Kling, (1988), a successful theory of 
regulation needs to balance between requisite regulatory costs and benefits, as well 
as recognise the political system which ushers in such regulations. This helps to 
balance potentially competing interests that shape policy and the resultant 
regulation. In her 1988 paper, Kate Mortimer argued that the often blanket nature 
of regulation, affected even the good market players and imposed unwarranted 
costs on the good ones, when it was the bad ones that regulation should have been 
aimed at, (Goodhart et al., 1988).  
Davies and Green (2008, p.14) argued that “regulatory intervention should only be 
justified where the benefits clearly exceed the costs imposed.” To determine what 
good regulation is, costs and benefits of the new regulatory reforms need to be 
computed and compared. Regulators also need to aim to reduce regulatory burdens 
and be cognisant that no regulatory form will work perfectly without some 
problems. This poses significant challenges for regulators who have to quickly react 
to situations, often in very unclear environments where there could be unintended 
consequences, whichever move they take. There is often a tension between the 
ethical schools of thought (Dworkin, 1980) and the efficiency view of regulation 
(Posner & Scott, 1980). The former was said to be aligned to the allocation of rights 
and considered judgmental issues of justice and fairness, while the latter simply 
concerned itself with economic efficiency and distributional wealth maximisation.  
The two positions seemingly cannot stand when viewed in isolation and treated as 
mutually-exclusive considerations; rather a balance of the two may present a 
workable compromise. This means that in addressing economic wealth 
maximisation issues, market participants are often being called to address broader, 
softer issues related to what is commonly known as the triple bottom line (Pava, 
2007). The triple bottom line principle asserts that businesses need not only 
concern themselves with profits or wealth maximisation, but should balance this 
objective against broader social sustainability considerations on one hand, and 
environmental sustainability on the other.  
A sustainable organisation from this definition would be scoring well on Profits 
(economic wealth maximisation); Planet – environmental sustainability as well as 
People – social sustainability, hence the triple bottom line. Seemingly, good 
regulation must recognise and address the complex and interdependent nature of 
market issues. For example, capital adequacy becomes weakened if accounting 
standards and auditing norms are flawed (Crockett, 2003).  
This calls for a systemic approach by regulators to ensure that regulation does not 
just displace risk, but mitigates it on the whole. The Better Regulation Taskforce 
(BRTF, 1998) identified 5 key principles of good regulation. These are summarised 
in the first left half of Figure 4. Good regulation according to the above principles 
must be proportional to the market problems that the regulations seek to address; 
regulations must not be an overkill or be burdensome. Regulatory objectives and 
requirements must be clear and the regulatory efforts must be clearly targeted at 
those areas requiring attention rather than take a blanket approach. There must be 
clear lines of accountability with a consistent approach to the application of the 
regulatory regime. Figure 4 shows tenets of what is considered to be good 
regulation (BRTF, 1998; Baldwin et al, 2012). 
 
 
 
Adapted from (BRTF, 1998; Baldwin et al., 2012) 
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According to Baldwin et al., (2012, p.32) good regulations must meet 5 criteria set 
out in the second right hand side half of  the figure above. The authors concluded 
that the above five “are the rationales that are employed and have currency in real-
life debates on regulation and its form. Arguments in support of (or arguments 
criticising) regulators that do not fall under these five headings will be deemed 
irrelevant by most members of the public” (p.32). Justifications based on evidence 
drawn from across the five headings discussed above give a useful framework for 
evaluating regulatory proposals. Most regulatory debates tend to focus on whether 
any trade-offs can be managed between the five criteria espoused by Baldwin et al., 
(2012). The adoption of an evaluation criteria based on the five tenets of good 
regulation avoids issues of moral correctness or legality of regulation to 
concentrate on the merits and demerits of such regulation based on the worthiness 
of public or stakeholder support. 
3.8.2 Regulatory quality  
Regulatory quality is dependent on how well the regulation delivers on policy 
objectives as well as on the specific benchmarks that have been set (Weatherill, 
2007). Measuring regulatory quality can be contentious and subjective, with 
different jurisdictions focusing on different regulatory aspects such as outcomes 
and net benefits to citizens (USA and Canada); focus on regulatory complexity and 
regulatory burdens (Belgium) among others. Each jurisdiction needs to determine 
beforehand what quality would mean and thus set appropriate measures for 
requisite regulations against whose set quality parameters the new regulations 
would be judged. 
Within the context of the EC CRA regulations, there is need to view rating agencies 
within a broader systemic field occupied by multiple players influencing each other. 
It is also key to understand who the key drivers are in the field and how these can 
be leveraged upon for maximum regulatory impact. For regulations to take effect 
and bear fruit, they must be given ample time to do so. The rapid amendments of 
the EC regulations, (from CRA1, CRA2 through to CRA3) have been too quick and 
drastic. Regulators may need to take a step back and review the impact of their 
recent actions before rushing through the next raft of changes. The next section 
discusses the balance between regulatory costs and benefits. 
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3.8.3 Calculating the costs and benefits of regulation 
There is a tension on how best to evaluate the true benefits of regulation. Proposed 
approaches range from Cost Benefit Analysis, (CBA), Compliance Cost Assessment, 
(CCA) or Regulatory appraisal. CBA considers the total costs and benefits of 
regulation and demands that there should be a surplus of benefits over costs to 
justify regulation.  
The CCA outlines costs to be incurred in complying with regulation and is aimed at 
informing regulators of the impact of different regulatory options on the regulated 
entities. This helps in justifying the chosen alternative by outlining benefits on one 
hand, versus compliance burdens on the other (Baldwin et al., 2012). Appraisal 
approaches emphasize holding up regulatory options against the tenets of good 
regulation discussed earlier, ensuring that regulatory proposals are measured 
against clearly set criteria as a way of building an objective business case. The 
challenge behind economically impact-testing any regulation is the quantification of 
costs or benefits. How do the positives or negatives of any regulation fit into a 
monetary value for objective assessment? Some regulatory impacts / costs may be 
hidden and not so obvious, making it difficult to quantify them. Further, in 
quantifying regulatory impacts and giving out a monetary value, are we not 
debasing moral and ethical values and reducing them to monetary denominators? 
Does this suggest that unless benefits or costs are expressed in monetary terms, 
they may not be understood or valued? 
The appreciation of regulatory impacts may be different between professionals and 
lay people and this sometimes causes tension on which regulatory approaches get 
pushed through (Pildes & Sunstein, 1995). Sometimes the very process of 
measuring regulatory impact becomes so cumbersome and costly that it poses 
bureaucratic and cost challenges to fully appraise regulatory proposals. Even when 
regulations have been implemented, accurately measuring the true impact of 
regulation may be difficult or impossible owing to creative compliance or 
inclusiveness. These ideas are explored briefly in the ensuing sections. 
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3.8.4 Creative compliance 
At times regulation fails to achieve the desired regulatory objectives because the 
regulated entities begin to circumvent the regulations, avoiding to break the law 
but still not fully complying with the regulations (McBarnet, 2006).  Regulated 
entities may change form or processes and appear to have complied when in reality 
they have not. In this case, regulatory costs may go up as regulators attempt to 
reassert themselves in the market. A typical example would be the requirement for 
regulated entities to pay their corporation tax. To avoid paying too much tax, they 
may beef up their expenses thus making it difficult for the taxman to pin down any 
wrongdoing.  
Creative compliance takes a great deal of effort, resources and attention to detail on 
the part of the regulator. Where the regulator’s knowledge of the regulated market 
is limited, they may struggle to identify any non-compliance and the negative 
effects of errant behaviour can continue to manifest themselves despite the 
presence of regulators. 
3.8.5 Regulatory inclusiveness 
In designing regulations, legislators have to balance between coining rules that are 
either under-inclusive or over-inclusive, i.e. some regulations can be either so 
general as to be ineffective and not targeted at any specific issues on one hand or be 
too detailed, nit-picky, cumbersome and over-prescriptive on the other hand 
(Baldwin & McCrudden, 1987). In the former, rules or regulations are loosely 
designed and may miss out key issues. In the latter, regulations are drawn up to try 
and cover different possibilities as much as possible but without being specific on 
any particular issues, possibly owing to regulators’ lack of detailed understanding of 
the real issues and how to address them. This may be an attempt to appease political 
agendas or to avoid discretions and be seen as applying similar standards to all 
situations (Baldwin & McCrudden, 1987). These two scenarios are often a result of 
high information costs, meaning that it would cost more to gather tailored 
information that allows for the specific identification and targeting of the problem. 
Consequently, general or too detailed rules may be applied and in both cases, this 
may not achieve the desired regulatory objectives. Rule-makers in both instances 
above shift costs to enforcers as they now grapple with issues arising from ill-drawn 
regulations.  
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Regulation positioned on either of the two extremes (over-inclusiveness and under 
inclusiveness respectively) may lead to what Shrader-Frechette (1991) described as 
Type I and Type II risks. Type I risks are producer risks, while Type II are consumer 
risks. In coining and enforcing regulations, regulators may either emphasize the 
protection of consumers or producers. If in doubt, Shrader-Frechette (1991) argued, 
regulators would fare better if they protected consumer rights as opposed to aligning 
themselves with producers and safeguarding producer rights, after all the bulk of 
political electorates are consumers.  
There is also the issue of regulators being divorced from market issues which may 
impair their ability to regulate effectively. Commenting on this, Armstrong and 
Sappington (2007) asserted that:  
“... In particular, the regulator typically has less information about such 
key industry data than does the regulated firm(s). Thus, a critical issue is 
how, if at all, the regulator can best induce the regulated firm to employ 
its privileged information to further the broad interests of society, rather 
than to pursue its own interests” (Armstrong & Sappington, 2007, pp.3) 
 
This idea was echoed by Alan Greenspan (cited in Davies and Green, 2008, p.20) 
who reiterated that “regulators can still pretend to provide oversight, but their 
capabilities are much diminished and declining..” he went on to concede that he and 
his colleagues “increasingly judged that we would have to rely on counterparty 
surveillance to do the heavy lifting.” 
One would hope that the above sentiments represent more exceptional and rare 
regulatory situations than the norm. The assumption that counterparty surveillance 
can work is perhaps hinged on the notion of such counterparties being themselves 
knowledgeable and being able to acquire and process market information 
competently. It goes back to the issues of supply and demand where the invisible 
hand of the market guides prices in the market. As has been highlighted, this often 
fails, particularly where there is information asymmetry which seems to persist in 
the ratings industry. Greenspan’s assumptions thus give a very grave reassurance of 
where regulators take their comfort. 
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3.8.6 Regulatory subversion 
Regulatory effects often cause some market players to devise ways of subverting 
the regulatory process for private gain (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003). Each regulatory 
framework with time may succumb to subversion as economies continue to 
innovate and market participants devise new ways of dealing with regulatory 
constraints. Regulatory subversion suggests that alternative frameworks need to be 
constantly evaluated to adapt regulatory arrangements and ensure that they 
remain fit for purpose. Further, subversion may come in the form of powerful 
corporations manipulating regulation and regulatory agents to suit their own 
internal purposes (Koenig, 2004).  
 
Regulatory subversion may be tantamount to regulatory capture, where regulators 
eventually begin to sympathise with the regulated entities and fail to represent 
public interest issues (Laffont, 1999). Effective regulation must therefore be 
constantly scrutinised for its vulnerability to the above challenges to ensure that 
the process remains viable, delivering to its originally-stated objectives. There are 
therefore many questions that need to be teased out on the EC CRA regulations to 
determine how well the regulations deliver on the stated objectives. The fact that 
the regulatory initiatives are new does not give ample time for a comprehensive 
evaluation of their impact. A snapshot of market participants’ initial reactions forms 
a good basis of evaluating their perceptions at this early stage of the regulatory 
process. It would be ideal for a later review to be conducted to track market 
participants’ reactions and gauge whether the on-going changes would have 
delivered any meaningful change in participants’ views.  
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, there are various conceptions that can be 
taken to appraise the perceived effectiveness of the EC CRA regulations. So far, this 
study has highlighted pertinent issues with regards to tenets of good regulation as 
espoused by Baldwin & Cave (1999) as well as BRTF (1998). There is therefore a 
need to appraise the EC CRA regulations on these tenets. Further, a theoretical 
anomaly of regulations being exogenously imposed on regulated entities was 
highlighted (see for example (Baldwin et al., 2012). This approach, while it may 
have worked in the past, may encounter resistance among more informed and 
devolved communities of practice.  
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This is exacerbated by the fact that industries such as credit ratings are specialist, 
characterised by high levels of innovation which often mean that regulators may 
find it difficult to keep abreast of developments in the industry (Armstrong & 
Sappington, 2007, 2006). In such situations, regulators could fare better if they 
involve / consult regulated entities and work with them in formulating new 
regulations. This culminates in a social constitution of regulation, closely aligned to 
the endogenous regulation theory (see for example Becker, 1985; Ellig, 1991). This 
study therefore employs the endogenous regulation theory to explore market 
participants’ perceptions of the impact of the EC regulations on the operations of 
the UK securities market. 
3.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter offered a review of extant literature in economic regulation, focusing 
on securities regulation. The review allowed for an evaluation of previous studies 
that have been conducted in the area, the approaches taken and rationale thereof. 
Approaches to investigating regulation phenomena were reviewed, ranging from 
simulated environments holding certain market conditions constant through to 
comparative studies that look at differences between regulated vs. unregulated 
environments or pre and post regulation phenomena. State regulation was pitted 
against its opposite, self-regulation or the use of voluntary codes. Failures in self-
regulation or use of voluntary codes were cited as possible triggers for state 
intervention. Other different drivers of state intervention were evaluated and the 
possible impact on the resultant regulation discussed. At the core of the chapter 
were questions on the role of regulation, the type and scope of optimum regulatory 
approaches as well as how regulations could be judged to be good or not. To that 
end, Baldwin & Cave (2012)’s tenets of good regulation as well as the BRTF (1998) 
framework offered a template with five key tenets that could be used to analyse the 
EC regulations. 
At a general level, the economic theory of regulation offers a useful economic 
perspective of the securities market. It however fails to delve deeper into the 
behavioural and sociological interplays of the parties involved. This necessitates the 
employment of an additional theoretical lens to evaluate the issues in this study.  
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The study notes that despite increasing interest in the broad area of regulation, 
there have not been many studies investigating the regulation of credit rating 
agencies in the EU. The recent introduction of the regulations in this area is a 
developing phenomenon with an agenda that continues to evolve. There is 
therefore need for better understanding of the regulatory process and the impact 
on different stakeholders. The next chapter critically reviews extant literature on 
credit ratings, looking closely at previous studies in the area, theoretical and 
methodological approaches adopted as well as conclusions drawn. This is meant to 
help shed light on what has been covered as a way of situating the current 
regulatory efforts within existing literary conceptions.  
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Chapter Four: 
Literature Review - Credit Rating Agencies 
(CRAs) 
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4.0 Introduction  
This chapter reviews extant literature on credit rating agencies and credit ratings. 
Previous studies investigating different aspects of credit rating agencies and credit 
ratings are reviewed to identify theoretical approaches previously adopted, topical 
and contentious issues covered as well as gaps requiring further investigation 
identified. The debate on credit rating agencies dating back to their inception in the 
late 19th century in the United States of America is chronicled to get an 
understanding of how the current form, focus and revenue model of rating agencies 
came to be. The next section opens the chapter by giving an overview of previous 
theoretical approaches taken to investigate credit rating agencies. 
4.1 Previous theoretical perspectives on credit rating agencies 
Studies carried out in the area of credit ratings previously adopted various 
approaches in an attempt to better explain dynamics in the credit rating market. 
Among the most common views were the agency theory view and the reputational 
capital view (Bunjevac, 2009; Mathis, McAndrews, & Rochet, 2009). The agency and 
reputational views focused primarily on the conflicts of interests in the relationship 
between CRAs (as agents) and their principals such as issuers. The sections below 
discuss some of the topical views explored in previous CRA studies under these two 
theoretical perspectives. 
4.1.1 The agency view of credit rating agencies 
The principal agency theory seeks to explain “social relationships of acting for” 
(Mitnick, 1982, p.442). Specifically, it models the relationships between principals 
and those contracted to act on their behalf, arguing that the diverging motives and 
interests result in misalignment of goals between the two groups. At the core of 
relationships between players in the credit rating market, CRAs were identified as 
agents acting not in the interests of their principals, but their own (Kerwer, 2005a). 
This, it was argued, emanated from the conflicted role of rating the organisations 
that paid them, for the benefit of investors who had no contractual relationship 
with CRAs (Dorn, 2011; Ponce, 2011). While this view added credence to the 
diverse motives of players seeking different outcomes in the credit ratings market, 
it was rather simplistic, ignoring other fundamental considerations of influences 
broader than just agency motives (Smith & Walter, 2001).  
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Despite the weaknesses of the principal-agency theory, recent debacles in the EU 
sovereign debt crisis have helped add weight to this point (Hill & Faff, 2010). It 
would appear though that the furore over the downgrading of various European 
countries’ ratings no longer centred on agency relationships per se, but also looked 
at much deeper constructs of the global credit ratings architecture (Mink & De Haan, 
2012; Yang & Lei, 2012). 
To address the agency problems, regulators proposed additional disclosure and 
monitoring mechanisms by external entities (Darbellay & Partnoy, 2012). The 
agents possessed more detailed knowledge than their minders and thus made it 
difficult for regulators to grasp fully what was happening in the market (Ho, 
Palacios, & Stoll, 2012). This became dangerous as it could lead to regulatory 
capture, where the regulators could be subsumed by the regulated entities as they 
lacked the competence to critically challenge them (Dorn, 2010). So any additional 
disclosure demanded by regulators would not have served the intended purpose if 
no one among the regulators competently scrutinised the disclosed information to 
pick out any irregularities. Further, there was a risk of too much disclosure which 
could overwhelm regulators possibly already faced with resource constraints 
(Heflin, Shaw, & Wild, 2011). In the above context, the agency view is therefore 
simplistic and does not help adequately tease out the complex relationships and 
influences in the credit rating market. 
4.1.2 The reputational capital view of credit rating agencies 
This view asserted that based on consistently delivering reliable rating services, 
CRAs got to be relied upon and eventually gained the trust of various credit rating 
users thus building a credible reputation (Covitz & Harrison, 2003; Partnoy, 1999). 
Consequently, the reputational capital view argued that it was in the rating agencies’ 
interest to maintain highly professional and high quality rating services in order to 
retain the trust of ratings users. Such a view therefore dismissed the prevalence 
and significance of conflicts of interest within CRA models, arguing that CRAs’ 
reputations in the industry were far more valuable than winning short-term 
favours from one issuer (Diamond, 1989). Continued success of a rating agency was 
therefore closely linked to its reputation and credibility in the market.  
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The reputational capital view was however contested by Hunt (2009) who argued 
that CRAs only had reputational capital in old issuances where they had a track 
record of previous performance. Consequently, when they rated new issuances, 
they had neither experience nor previous credit ratings in these new products to 
compare against and therefore would tend to rate regardless of the possible 
outcomes. Commenting on the same subject in Australia, Bunjevac (2009) 
concluded that the reputational capital was not a sufficient incentive to address the 
operational deficiencies inherent in CRA business models, necessitating regulatory 
intervention. The agency view and the reputational capital perspectives dominated 
most investigations around credit ratings. As discussed, they both have loopholes, 
necessitating consideration of alternative views. 
4.2 Related previous research on credit rating agencies 
As a way of providing a structured critique of the arguments in the extant credit 
rating literature, the following sections provide a review of previous studies in the 
area of credit ratings, focusing particularly on topical themes that have been the 
centre of academic debates. Figure 5 below offers a brickwork visualisation 
summarising a selection of the main empirical studies investigating credit rating 
issues, together with the key themes therein. The brickwork shows that the debates 
on CRAs have come in bursts of themes such as the role of credit ratings on capital 
structuring; credit ratings and structured finance; the contested nature and 
conception of credit rating agencies; the informational value of credit ratings 
(Amato & Furfine, 2004; Cantor & Mann, 2007; Hilscher & Wilson, 2009); CRA 
funding models and inherent conflicts of interest (Deb & Murphy, 2009; Fennell & 
Medvedev, 2012; Griffin & Tang, 2009); ratings quality and rating transitions (Duff 
& Einig, 2009a; Ponce, 2011); legacy problems in the credit rating industry (Posner, 
2010), as well as issues around the regulation of credit rating agencies (Avgouleas, 
2009; Nichols et al., 2011). The ensuing sections therefore unpick each of these 
themes, critically evaluating implications for the regulation of credit rating agencies 
in the European Union. Despite the above varied debates, the role of credit ratings, 
particularly in capital structuring became even more entrenched (see for example 
Byoun, 2008; Graham & Harvey, 2001; West, 1973). Figure 5 summarises the 
differently themed debates on CRAs and their ratings. 
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 Figure 5: Overview of selected previous empirical studies in the credit ratings area 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
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4.2.1 The role of credit ratings in capital structuring decisions 
One area that most scholars seemingly agreed on was the fact that credit ratings 
have been embedded into the global capital market architecture (see Table 2 for 
examples of hard coding of ratings into investment decision-making). Table 7 below 
summarises some selected studies which empirically investigated the importance 
of credit ratings in global capital markets. The studies highlighted the fact that 
despite increasing concerns on the role of credit ratings and their efficacy in global 
securities (see for example Hill, 2002, 2010), they nevertheless remained the cog 
that drove the functioning of investment decision-making. 
Table 7: Empirical studies investigating the importance of credit ratings in capital structuring 
Author(s) Study Main Findings 
West (1973) 
Analysed regression data originally 
produced by Fisher (1959) to 
investigate the relationship 
between ratings and yields 
Concluded from empirical findings that bond 
ratings were correlated to yields but largely 
attributed the relationship to financial regulation 
Graham and 
Harvey 
(2001) 
Used a survey to gauge the 
perceptions of 392 US-based CFOs 
on the importance of credit ratings.  
When making capital structuring decisions, credit 
ratings were ranked as the second most important 
consideration after financial stability  
Bancel and 
Mittoo 
(2004) 
In a study covering 87 companies 
across 16 countries in Europe, the 
study sought to investigate the 
importance of ratings 
Their study ranked financial stability as the first 
most important consideration, followed by credit 
ratings. Results thus corroborated those of 
Graham and Harvey (2001) 
Kisgen 
(2006) 
Reviewed literary evidence to 
determine the role of credit ratings 
in capital markets 
Concluded that credit ratings were central to the 
functioning of capital structuring decisions. The 
study only looked at firms with ratings, so the 
reverse may not hold true. 
Servaes and 
Tufano 
(2006) 
Surveyed executives from 344 
firms across the globe to determine 
the significance of ratings in capital 
structuring decisions 
57% of the respondents ranked credit ratings as 
the most important determinant of debt levels 
thus corroborating findings discussed in the 
studies above 
Faulkender 
and Peterson 
(2006) 
Carried out a comparative study of 
US-based non-financial firms with 
ratings, vs. those without ratings 
between 1986 to 2000 
The study results indicated a 35% leveraging 
head-start for rated firms compared to their 
counterparts without ratings  
Byoun 
(2008) 
Investigated the effect of ratings on 
leverage for different sized firms 
Concluded that leveraging and ratings followed a 
U-relationship with unrated firms having low 
leveraging which grew as they accessed the 
ratings market. At maturity, firms with good 
ratings tended to be choosy about leveraging, 
relying more on internal financing and only 
accessing favourable debt. 
Source: compiled by author 
West (1973) sought to find out whether bond ratings influenced yields and if so, 
why. The study concluded that ratings were key in predicting yield and maturity in 
a much more informative way compared to any other publicly available information 
at the time.  
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Further, the study concluded that credit ratings directly influenced yields and this 
was hypothesised to be a likely result of financial regulation entrenching CRAs as a 
yardstick for viability. There was lack of clarity though on what this supposed 
causal link was specifically based on. This suggested that perhaps the study could 
have shed more light on the study parameters. This study was carried out prior to 
the SEC’s 1975 NRSRO designation which further cemented ratings as part of 
regulatory guidelines on investments and minimum capital requirements and 
demonstrated that even before the regulatory endorsement of CRAs, ratings were 
already a key measure of viability in securities issues. 
In their study Graham & Harvey (2001) concluded that credit ratings were ranked 
by the surveyed CFOs as the second most influential variable to be considered when 
structuring capital deals. This view was held by well over 57% of those surveyed. In 
comparison to other theoretical variables such as tax advantage, credit ratings 
received the highest acclaim of factors driving structuring decisions, a testimony to 
the reliance placed on credit ratings by the surveyed company CFOs.  
Bancel & Mittoo (2004) surveyed 87 firms across 16 European countries seeking to 
establish the importance of credit ratings in financial markets. Their findings placed 
credit ratings as the second most important factor, after financial stability with over 
73% of surveyed participants ranking credit ratings either as very important or 
important. The study corroborated the earlier findings of Graham & Harvey (2001), 
demonstrating the perceived universal role of credit ratings in global securities 
markets.  
Kisgen (2006) further corroborated the view above, affirming the entrenched role 
that credit ratings played in capital structuring decisions in US companies. Kisgen 
(2006) went further to argue that perhaps the powerful role of CRAs in capital 
structuring was driven by managerial fears of regulatory pressures that were 
themselves hinged on credit ratings. In a further study, Servaes & Tufano (2006) 
carried out a survey on 344 global executives, seeking to determine the significance 
of ratings on debt capital structures, 57% of the respondents agreed that credit 
ratings  were the most important consideration when deciding debt levels.  
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On the question why some firms did not use debt, again about 60% of the 
respondents highlighted the effect of credit ratings. One criticism of this study 
though was the synonymous use of credit ratings for the level of credit ratings 
which can confuse interpretation of the study findings.  
Faulkender & Petersen (2006) compared firms with rated bonds against those 
without ratings between 1986 and 2000. They concluded that firms with access to 
publicly rated bonds had a 35% leverage in comparison to their unrated 
counterparts. The comparative nature of the study gave it a slightly more balanced 
view compared to Kisgen (2006)’s earlier study discussed above. The study 
therefore further underscored the importance of ratings by linking them to firm 
performance. One slight oversight in the study was that there were no control 
environments to ensure that the results were not prone to other influences. 
Finally, Byoun (2008) investigated the effect of ratings on leverage and found an 
inverted U-relationship between the two. His conclusion was that smaller unrated 
firms tended to be lowly-leveraged, as their access to debt markets was restricted. 
As they grew and slowly got into the credit ratings game, their leveraging grew as 
they issued debt, accessing more widespread sources of debt funding. Large 
corporations with good credit ratings tended to have more leverage, choosing more 
favourable debt as a way of enhancing their financial stability. Access to debt (and 
consequently, credit ratings) therefore has implications for firms’ abilities to secure 
funding for expansion and other purposes, impacting competitiveness.  
The conclusion from the above studies is that credit ratings act as the gateway into 
accessing debt financing for corporate borrowers. Smaller firms that are relatively 
new and unknown may not have access to broader debt financing sources and may 
be lowly-leveraged. There seems to be a strong symbiotic relationship between 
credit ratings and capital structuring decisions. The inclusion of regulation into the 
relationship between credit ratings and capital markets would later be one of the 
key criticism regarding causes of the 2007-8 global financial crisis. The modern 
financial architecture has evolved around credit ratings and the current regulatory 
initiatives pose a big change to the way markets have worked for a long time, 
calling for due process in carrying out impact analyses and evaluating the potential 
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regulatory impact (Hunt, 2009a). One of the key objectives of the EC regulations 
was to reduce regulatory over-reliance on credit ratings. If the above studies still 
hold true, it is difficult to envisage what CFOs, regulators and others will use in 
place of credit ratings. The objective of reducing reliance on ratings therefore needs 
to take into consideration practical alternatives that can replace ratings, otherwise 
the objective may need to be refined in view of the entrenched position of credit 
ratings in the modern securities architecture (Langohr & Langohr, 2008). Reducing 
regulatory reliance on credit ratings may not be as simple as it sounds, but may 
require a significant overhaul of the modern day financial architecture, with far-
reaching implications. 
4.2.2 Credit rating agencies and structured finance 
Arguably, CRAs previously performed consistently well in traditional corporate and 
bond ratings (Scalet & Kelly, 2012). Evidence suggests that by venturing into the 
less-well known area of structured financial products, CRAs may have 
overstretched their resources and went beyond their expertise, resulting in their 
dismal performance in this area (Rosner, 2009). From the similar symbols and 
approaches used in rating both structured and unstructured securities products, it 
can be inferred that there was comparability in risk levels.  In reality, nothing could 
be further from the truth. The vastly different underlying asset structures meant 
that these were very different areas that needed close scrutiny. Table 8 below 
highlights some of the pertinent studies investigating ratings in structured 
securities.  
 
Table 8: Credit ratings and structured finance 
Author Study Main Findings 
Ranieri 
(1996) 
Sought to explain the origins of 
structured finance products 
Concluded that questions around thrift and mortgage 
provisions in the 1980s were instrumental in fuelling the 
growth of structuring 
Benmelech 
and Dlugosz 
(2009) 
Sought to explain the role of 
structured finance in the 2007-8 
crisis by making a comparative 
study of Moody’s structured finance 
ratings vs. corporate bond ratings 
since 1983 
Using findings from 3912 tranches of Collateral Loan 
Obligations (CLOs), the authors investigated the rating 
practices in this area. Conclusions highlighted the 
innovative nature of structuring which brought about in 
new clientele and additional revenue streams 
Rosner, 
(2009) 
Conceptual paper tracing the 
history of structuring to locate the 
origins and impact. 
Concluded that the nature of structuring incorporated 
what would otherwise be termed risky asset classes but 
used similar rating symbols thereby confusing 
comparability of risk assessments across structured and 
unstructured products. 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
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By 2008, there were in excess of 111,988 structured tranches, making this the 
world’s biggest market in the global financial sector (Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2009). 
The burgeoning growth of structured finance products without the corresponding 
investment in resourcing and skills may have overtaken the market and resulted in 
the catastrophic failures that led to the 2007-8 crisis. Ironically, regulators were 
complicit in the growth of this shaky business model as there is no evidence that 
they did anything to stop it or question the underlying models (Engel & McCoy, 
2011). Instead, touting the age old agency model, focus was still on the agency role 
of credit rating agencies. 
4.2.3 The contested nature of credit rating agencies and their role 
To evaluate the perceived impact of CRAs, it is important to define their functional 
role and examine the implications of their role as well as underlying expectations 
that come with the role. While there is a common view on the role of credit ratings 
in global securities markets (CESR, 2008; Heflin, Shaw, & Wild, 2011; Opp, Opp, & 
Harris, 2012; Richardson & White, 2009; Smith & Walter, 2001), the role and 
mandate of credit rating agencies is contested with various conceptions of their role 
being debated. This has ramifications on how the CRAs see themselves and their 
role versus what the market views them as. The definition of CRAs thus embodies 
expectations that various stakeholders carry and any conflicts therein may denote 
polarised real life views on CRAs and may not be helpful for the industry. A 
different understanding of the role of CRAs by different parties suggests that 
different stakeholders may have conflicting expectations of CRAs which may need 
to be reconciled if an objective assessment of their function in the market is to be 
made.  
 
CRAs have been labelled as gate keepers (Coffee, 2006; Fennell & Medvedev, 2012); 
proxies for other agencies (Liu & Thakor, 1984); information intermediaries 
(Fennell & Medvedev, 2012); risk brokers (Walker, 2010); certifiers of credit 
quality in financial contracts (Deb et al., 2011);  and non-Majoritarian Regulators 
(Kerwer, 2005b) among other labels. These different conceptions of the same entity 
suggest that there is no consistent acceptable understanding of the role of CRAs. 
This is an issue that needs to be clarified if the contribution of CRAs to the 2007-8 
crisis is to be objectively evaluated.  
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A selection of studies on the varied conception of CRA roles is presented on Table 9 
and discussed in more detail in the ensuing sections.  
 Table 9: Studies investigating the nature, role and mandate of credit rating agencies 
Author Study Main Findings 
Coffee 
(2002) 
Reviewed empirical evidence 
defining CRAs as gatekeepers 
following the collapse of Enron 
As gatekeepers, CRAs were said to have had a responsibility 
to sanction the flow of information and stop wrongdoing. On 
the contrary, evidence suggested that they failed to do this. 
Questions arose on possible causes of the failure. 
Kerwer 
(2005) 
Conceptualised CRAs as Non-
Majoritarian Regulators, 
empowered with regulatory 
authority for efficacy reasons 
The study concluded that there was an increasing shift of 
regulatory power from elected institutions to private, profit-
oriented Non-Majoritarian actors such as CRAs who however 
posed challenges on maintaining the democracy-efficacy 
balance since they themselves were not elected. 
Partnoy 
(2009) 
Noted the paradox of increased 
ratings use on one hand and the 
declining informational value of 
such ratings on the other hand 
Concluded that CRAs had successfully entrenched themselves 
as certification agents in a market fraught with information 
asymmetries and disintermediation. 
Walker 
(2010) 
Investigated the CRA role of 
broking information between 
different parties and argued that 
as brokers, they had a duty to 
make sense of what they were 
broking 
After examining how CRAs operated broking information 
between issuers and investors, he concluded that CRAs failed 
their information broking role by not exercising enough due 
diligence on information being passed to them by issuers. 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
The above studies conceptualised CRAs in metaphoric terms, connoting very vivid 
images of CRAs in their various guises. Of particular note was the conception of 
CRAs as gatekeepers which appears in this thesis under several sections and was 
later picked up in more depth in the data analysis and findings section of this thesis. 
In interviews carried out as part of this study, CRAs argued that they were not 
gatekeepers, while the rest of the market thought they were. This raised questions 
on whether the disputed role definition was just a semantic issue or if it symbolised 
something much more enduring. Coffee (2002) argued that as an example of CRAs 
as gatekeepers, they failed to play their role leading to the collapse of Enron and 
should have accepted the blame. The argument was that CRAs held information (or 
should have) that would have signified to investors the impending changes in 
Enron’s ability to meet its debt obligations. If the alarm had been sounded early 
enough as was expected, this would have given investors ample time to make 
decisions about their investments. On the contrary, CRAs were too slow to act, 
resulting in investors losing their money when Enron collapsed. 
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Kerwer (2005a) made a compelling argument of private, unelected actors 
increasingly playing regulatory roles, raising questions of their legitimacy and 
mandate. He termed these ‘Non-Majoritarian Regulators’, owing to the lack of 
backing from the electorates. Despite this lack of electoral legitimacy, he observed 
that such Non-Majoritarian regulators increasingly became more entrenched in 
remits that had previously been the preserve of elected governments.  Quasi-
regulators such as CRAs who operated on a “for-profit” basis posed challenges of 
balancing democratic issues and efficacy, combined with concerns of possible 
conflicts of interest where profit was concerned. Further, CRAs lacked the coercive 
power to compel market participants to comply, yet their ratings carried that 
compelling force bestowed on them by regulatory formations such as the SEC, 
BASEL II among others (Carruthers, 2013). CRAs thus presented a shifting form of 
quasi-regulators which was difficult to pin down as they were not accountable to 
the electorates. They did not have power directly, yet by virtue of their ratings 
which were used by regulators worldwide, they had derived power. This ambiguity 
made it rather difficult for blame on the inappropriate reliance on ratings to be 
levelled against CRAs themselves, yet they played a key part in this. Walker (2010, 
p.18) posited that CRAs were an “independent, intermediate, third-party, risk 
information communicator” opening trade channels by availing risk information to 
concerned parties. Naturally, if this information was to be of any value, it ought to 
have been verified to ensure it enhanced the decision-making of the recipients. 
CRAs therefore failed to verify the information they communicated.  
The alleged CRA failures here related to failure to communicate accurate rating 
updates to investors and regulators as well as failing to verify some of the 
information CRAs received from issuers resulting in inaccurate ratings and / or 
rating adjustments. Further, there was a failure to carry out this task in a timely 
manner. It was alleged that the failure by CRAs to play their risk-broking role could 
be due to their conflicted interests as they were paid by the same issuers that they 
were supposed to rate (Pagano, 2010). The role of CRAs as brokers therefore 
suggests that they were, and are culpable for their part in contributing to the 2007-
8 financial crisis and should be held liable for the failures to perform fully as was 
expected.  
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The above view is in contrast to how CRAs regard themselves as selling journalistic 
opinions protected by the First Amendment in the USA (Nagy et al., 2009). This 
view absolves CRAs of any wrongdoing and unsurprisingly seemed to be their 
favourite view as it suggested minimal liability for their alleged failures. The 
conclusion from the analysis of the various conceptions of the role of CRAs and 
their mandates suggests that there are various possible stances that can be taken in 
analysing the function of CRAs. This is partly because of the lack of a clearly 
articulated calibration of the NRSRO role and its key tenets (White, 2001). With 
new regulations coming in, it may well be that very clear demarcations will need to 
be drawn making it easier to neatly define and calibrate the continued role of CRAs 
in securities markets at least in the EU.  
Until then, there is need to do further research to scope out the exact role of CRAs 
and what they should be held accountable for. For CRAs themselves, it is very 
convenient to be perceived as innocent information conduits that perceivably did 
not change the contents of their ratings and therefore simply played a messenger 
role (Darbellay & Partnoy, 2012). Investors and issuers however saw and continue 
to see CRAs as playing an information broking role which involves transforming the 
input, synthesising and distilling it to give out modified, updated interpretations of 
default risk (White, 2010a). Logic would suggest that this was what the market 
rewarded CRAs for, as opposed to merely posing as empty information vessels. 
There was and still is a skill required to issue ratings and it is this skill that CRAs 
claimed to provide and should take responsibility for. The argument here is that 
CRAs failed to provide a service that they were being paid for. They did not deliver 
to the expected standard.  
4.3 Implications of the definition and role of credit rating agencies 
As discussed above, the label that CRAs go by defines their roles and has 
implications for the responsibilities, accountability, obligations as well as 
expectations of CRAs by their different stakeholders. This has connotations of 
relationships between CRAs and other market participants. The sections below 
briefly explore some of these implications. 
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4.3.1 CRAs as suppliers of journalistic opinions 
Traditionally, CRAs were protected in the US under the First Amendment (Nagy et 
al., 2009). This protection granted them a journalistic status, allowing them to issue 
opinions on matters of public interest without any litigation implications if the 
opinions turned out to be inaccurate. This view of CRAs granted them freedom of 
speech like any other US citizen and implied that regulation in their activities would 
be tantamount to interference (Joynt, 2002). It was ironic that such an argument 
could even be entertained, considering that unlike ordinary opinions, CRAs’ 
opinions were commercial in nature, paid for and should have been governed by 
laws applicable to commercial contracts not private citizens’ first amendment 
rights (Nagy et al., 2009). Nonetheless, CRAs managed to evade any form of litigious 
action in respect of their ratings. Regulation 1060/2009 sought to overturn this, in 
the EU at least and engender an accountability approach in the issuance of ratings 
(Amtenbrink & De Haan, 2011). It is possible that the lack of legal accountability for 
their ratings may have caused complacency among CRAs (Partnoy, 2010).  
The above argument has to be balanced with the reputational risk view of issuing 
inaccurate ratings in such an oligopolistic market where reputational damage could 
ensue resulting in the loss of further rating business (Hunt, 2009a). It is 
understandable that CRAs argued (and continue to) that their reputations far 
outweighed any possible litigation risks.   
4.3.2 CRAs as quasi regulatory agents 
CRAs give opinions which act as licences, granting issuers access to some regulatory 
privileges (Partnoy, 2006). The strict NRSRO designation by the SEC meant that 
only the approved rating agencies could issue ratings used for regulatory purposes. 
This imposed barriers to entry for any would-be new credit rating agencies and 
entrenched the positions of the incumbent top three CRAs within the regulation of 
the securities system (Fennell & Medvedev, 2012; White, 2010b). This was 
particularly so in the 1933 Securities Act, a year later, the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act and subsequently, the 1940 Investment Company Act.  
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The global market has seen increasing dependence by both corporations and 
governments on foreign debt (Staikouras, 2012). Alongside debt, comes credit 
ratings, which act as the conduit through which the cost of debt is calculated 
(Elyasiani, Jia, & Mao, 2010). This places both corporations and governments at the 
mercy of CRAs and gives the latter significant powers to make recommendations for 
possible policy or governance changes (Datz, 2004). Various sovereign and 
corporate bond rating debacles in this area could be viewed as evidence of 
problems that needed to be addressed, particularly as CRAs were (and still are) 
privately-run corporate entities seeking profits and yet their ratings have the 
impact to destroy nations and corporations alike (Scalet & Kelly, 2012). To change 
this, regulators have to make fundamental changes to the global financial 
architecture, a feat that will need a gradual shift rather than a ‘big bang’ approach. 
4.3.3 CRAs as gatekeepers  
CRAs like auditors, investment analysts and proxy advisors act as gatekeepers by 
collecting and processing information, playing analysis, verification and 
interpretation roles (Coffee, 2002). By acting as arbiters in securities markets, CRAs 
fit the profile of a gatekeeper, defined as a “professional who is positioned so as to 
be able to prevent wrongdoing by withholding necessary cooperation or consent”  
(Lombard, 2008, p.2).  
Auditors verify disclosures and ascertain whether disclosed information is true and 
fair (Colbert & Jahera, 2011). CRAs on the other hand make a judgement on the 
probability of default but like auditors, have to verify and challenge the given 
information to ensure that the resultant opinion is sound (Fennell & Medvedev, 
2012). Auditors, CRAs and analysts tend to be paid by issuers, while proxy advisors 
are commissioned and paid by the investors. Proxy advisors are therefore slightly 
different in the sense that they deal with public information which may already 
have been verified (Löhn & Schwarz, 2013). The target market for proxy advisors is 
limited to investors while the others tend to have a broader market. While there are 
minor differences between the above, there is a large area of commonality, 
suggesting that CRAs like auditors and analysts, have an obligation to verify the 
information passed on to them before they give out an opinion.  
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This is contrary to the argument that their opinions are similar to those of any 
private citizens (in the US), expressing their freedom of speech as citizens do not 
tend to be required to verify their opinions and neither do they get paid for such 
opinions (see for example Nagy, Epstein, Martin, Magliocca, & Zinsmaster, 2009). 
The CRA opinion is therefore not a private citizen’s freedom of speech, but rather, a 
solicited and paid for commercial service that should be covered by commercial 
contracts. To that end, evidence suggests that CRAs failed to play their role 
effectively and that regulatory attempts in this regard may be justifiable. 
Coffee (2002, 2006) argued that CRAs played a gate-keeping role which was not 
dissimilar to that of analysts. While CRAs provided debt certification services 
(Kuhner, 2001), equities analysts focused on equity. As issuers sought higher 
ratings in order to attract investors, it was not inconceivable that they would 
present their issues in an inflated way, maybe overstating the attractiveness of their 
issues. Investors on the other hand (particularly smaller, unsophisticated ones) 
often did not have sufficient skills and resources to carry out detailed internal due 
diligence and differentiate between overstated issuer claims vs. genuine ones 
(Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Kane, 2010; Fennell & Medvedev, 2012). Investors 
therefore relied on CRAs to provide unbiased information on issues so as to 
enhance their investment decisions. CRAs thus provided a cost-effective service 
(Fennell & Medvedev, 2012) to this end. Failure to provide investors with timely 
and accurate ratings in this regard then seriously undermined the role of CRAs as 
gatekeepers. 
A gatekeeper according to Kraakman (1986) is a professional whose role enables 
them to prevent wrongdoing by sanctioning the flow of information, sounding an 
alarm or withholding necessary cooperation or consent to the offending party. 
From this viewpoint, investors and the market at large expected CRAs to issue 
timely initial ratings and subsequently follow them up by providing a monitoring 
function, issuing upgrades and downgrades where this was necessary. By being 
slow to perform this function, CRAs failed investors and the market.  
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Partnoy (2006) argued that the reliance on ratings by regulators made CRAs 
different from other gatekeepers as this placed them in a quasi-regulatory role, 
claiming a much higher profile in the securities realm than mere gatekeepers. 
Further, while other gatekeepers faced civil liability against malfeasance, CRAs 
were traditionally immune to any form of liability arising out of incorrect rating 
opinions due to their First Amendment protection (Nagy et al., 2009; Partnoy, 
2006).  CRAs as gatekeepers therefore failed to prevent wrongdoing by being slow 
to provide rating transitions and by failing to indicate accurately where there were 
potential problems (Lombard, 2008). This rendered them significantly culpable for 
the crisis in 2007-8 among other corporate collapses. Questions still remain on 
whether this was incompetence or complicity. To help shed light on these questions, 
it is helpful to consider the other labels that have been bestowed on CRAs as 
discussed below. 
4.3.4 CRAs as information intermediaries 
Various authors (see for example Nagano, 2008; Stiglitz, 2009) suggested that as 
information intermediaries, CRAs were, and should not be held liable for the 
information they transmitted. This view implied that CRAs simply relayed messages 
to investors and the market in general on behalf of issuers. Rather, this view placed 
blame on issuers (for possibly giving out inaccurate information to CRAs) and 
investors for failing to sense-check the information received in the form of ratings. 
Unsurprisingly, CRAs themselves favoured this view as it absolved them of any 
responsibility on ratings quality and accuracy. As if in direct opposition to the 
above view, Desai, Rajgopal, & Yu (2012) classed CRAs (alongside short sellers, sell-
side equity analysts and auditors) as information intermediaries who were all 
positioned to spot the warning signals in financial statements of leading banks and 
sound the alarm, a task which they all allegedly failed to perform. Judging from the 
role that CRAs are paid to perform, the title of information intermediaries seems to 
fit although this is disputed by CRAs. CRAs were paid to provide expert opinions 
and marketed themselves on previous track record and skilled analysts, thereby 
insinuating that they were competent in providing rating services. If this turned out 
to be untrue, then they should be held liable.   
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4.4 Financial disintermediation as a catalyst for CRA prominence 
As capital markets became more complex, traditional intermediaries were 
seemingly replaced (Steeman, 2002). This disintermediation caused information 
asymmetries which further entrenched CRAs as the new cost-effective 
intermediaries (Cantor & Packer, 1995). The same process that had catapulted 
CRAs into prominence through disintermediation would arguably later be a catalyst 
for their downfall as well. The replacement of traditional intermediaries meant that 
when the system creaked, there was not enough support to stabilise it, leading to 
numerous concerns of a  weakening modern capital market structures (Sinclair & 
Rethel, 2008). Another hotly debated issue concerning ratings is the contribution of 
the issuer-pays business model to ratings inflation and the associated conflicts of 
interest that arise from the supposedly compromised position of rating agencies 
(Covitz & Harrison, 2003; Strier, 2008). Ratings inflation refers to over-optimistic 
or inflated ratings which do not accurately reflect the rated entities in reality 
(Strobl & Xia, 2012). The next set of studies sought to establish if there was a 
correlation between the issuer-pays model and ratings inflation, an issue that was 
said to be grounded on the tenets of the agency theory as highlighted in the work of  
Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
4.4.1 Correlation between the issuer-pays business model and ratings inflation 
Despite claims that the reputational value and integrity of CRAs engendered 
objectivity and rating independence (House, 1995), there were incessant criticisms 
against CRAs regarding the fallibility of the issuer-pays model and its effect on 
possibly fuelling ratings inflation (Cinquegrana, 2009; Darcy, 2009). This was said 
to have had the potential to bias rating outcomes due to incentives therein. Several 
studies have investigated this and a selection of those carried out after the 2007-8 
financial crisis is given in Table 10 below and subsequently discussed in the 
ensuing sections.   
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 Table 10: Empirical studies - correlation between the issuer-pays model and ratings inflation 
Author(s) Study Main Findings 
Griffin and Tang 
(2009) 
Studied CDO issuances between 
1997 and 2007 to determine the 
level of subjectivity in ratings 
methodologies 
Observed an average increase of 12% on AAA 
tranches. The authors noted a 25% correlation in 
judgements between the model and the AAA 
outcomes, suggesting that the rest of the attributes 
were subjective 
Deb and 
Murphy (2009) 
Empirically reviewed evidence on 
the prevalence of conflict of 
interest issues in the issuer-pays 
model 
Concluded that the issuer-pays model can never be 
made to work without conflicts and inherent risks. 
Proposed rather a return to the investor-pays 
model to align the interests of CRAs with 
consumers of ratings 
Ashcraft, 
Goldsmith-
Pinkham, 
and Vickery 
(2010) 
Using time series trends, studied 
subprime and Alt-A residential 
MBS issuances between 2001 and 
2007 representing 90% issues in 
this period comprising (60,000 
securities and 12.1million loans)  
 
Noted a decline in the standard of rating in the 
MBOs between 2005 and 2007, particularly leading 
up to the crisis. They concluded that as volumes of 
MBS issuances rose, the quality of ratings fell, 
possibly owing to higher risks of possible default 
but also because there were more issuances 
competing for the few agencies 
Strobl & Xia 
(2011) 
Compared ratings between 1999-
2009 issued under the issuer-
pays model vs. the investor-pays 
model and ruled that the issuer-
pays model led to inflated ratings 
The exclusive comparison of issuer-pays vs. 
investor-pays model eliminated other noises such 
as market influences to be able to conclude that 
indeed, the issuer-pays model tended to favour 
issuer desires for higher ratings 
Jiang, Stanford, 
and Xie (2011) 
Investigated S&P  rating changes 
around the adoption of the issuer-
pays model by analysing 
historical rating data from 1971 
to 1978 
By using Moody’s data as a benchmark for the same 
period, the study concluded that indeed after the 
adoption of the issuer-pays model, S&P ratings 
became more optimistic, possibly as a competitive 
attempt to win more issuing business.    
Strahan (2011) 
Carried out a comparative study 
of S&P vs. Moody’s ratings funded 
using different models. 
Observed unduly high ratings by Moody’s and S&P 
when rating large MBS issuers between 2004 and 
2006. This suggested that the two CRAs were more 
optimistic when rating bigger issuers who 
promised higher potential revenue streams. 
Fennell and 
Medvedev 
(2011) 
Empirically reviewed literature 
on CRA business models as well 
as interviewed 14 participants 
drawn from CRAs, investors, 
academics and other trade 
associations 
While concurring that the issuer-pays model was 
fraught with conflicts, they argued that the 
investor-pays model on its own would succumb to 
free rider problems and not survive. They proposed 
a platform model where CRAs would be centrally 
allocated ratings via a central public body 
(platform). They further acknowledged that the 
regulatory use of ratings exacerbated problems in 
the market leading to the crisis. 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
Griffin & Tang (2009) analysed 916 CDOs from a leading CRA between 1997 and 
2007 to try and understand the consistency of the CRA’s rating adjustments. Their 
findings corroborated views on the lack of clarity in the ratings models used in CDO 
ratings. They highlighted the element of subjectivity inherent in ratings, making it 
difficult for the market to critique the accuracy of ratings. The authors noted the 
existence of a deeper correlation between the sophistications in the rating models 
(contributing to the mystical view of the credit rating process which meant that 
apart from rating analysts, very few others understood or dared critique the rating 
methodologies) and the propensity for higher proportions of AAA rated tranches. 
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While there was no evidence of a direct link between the issuer-pays model and 
ratings inflation in Griffin and Tang (2009)’s study, the lack of transparency on the 
rating methodologies suggested that this was not dissimilar to a blank cheque 
should CRAs want to exploit this rather hazy conceptualisation of credit ratings. 
In a later study, Strobl & Xia (2012) compared ratings from S&P issued under the 
issuer-pays model vs. those issued under the investor-pays model followed by Egan 
Jones and concluded that when conflicts of interests were heightened at S&P, 
evidence of ratings inflation was prevalent. In particular, they observed that S&P 
was more likely to issue a higher rating when the issuer had “a new CEO or CFO; 
had more short term debts or had a lower percentage of ratings from S&P” (Strobl 
& Xia 2012, p.1). In any of those highlighted events, stakes would have been high for 
the rating agency to favourably position itself and win the favour of the issuer, 
particularly to attract the attention of the new CEO/CFOs. While the findings were 
localised to S&P versus Egan Jones and could have been influenced by specific 
contexts surrounding those ratings at the time, this suggested that competitiveness 
issues potentially played an influencing role on rating decisions.   
Jiang, Stanford, & Xie (2012) carried out a study to test whether S&P’s ratings 
changed after they adopted the issuer-pays model. To get a comparative view, the 
study chose ratings covered by both Moody’s and S&P but where Moody’s was paid 
by investors and S&P by issuers. Initially, before the switch to the current issuer-
pays model, S&P ratings were generally lower than those of Moody’s. After the 
switch to the issuer-pays model, evidence presented indicated that S&P’s ratings 
crept up to be comparable to those of Moody’s. Moreover, the study revealed that 
S&P’s ratings were most likely to be higher where there were greater conflicts of 
interest as denoted by higher anticipated rating fees and lower rating quality. This 
finding, although localised to S&P and Moody’s was the second confirmation that 
S&P ratings were amenable to conflicts of interests and that competition may have 
had a direct link to the quality of ratings. 
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He, Qian, & Strahan (2011) studied MBO ratings from both S&P and Moody’s 
between 2004 and 2006. They observed that the two CRAs were more inclined to 
issue higher ratings to larger issuers (who ostensibly represented more significant 
potential future revenues and higher fees). This finding further confirmed the 
findings discussed above (Strobl & Xia, 2012; Jiang, Stanford, & Xie, 2012) and 
suggested that despite attempts to be objective and independent, the nature of 
CRAs as private, profit-seeking businesses significantly compromised their role as 
public information arbiters providing objective rating opinions since they had 
profitability issues to contend with (see also Kerwer, 2005; Lynch, 2008). 
It was not inconceivable to see CRAs playing to the tune of the paying issuers 
particularly in light of the above evidence. This was despite the fact that there were 
a few players competing in the ratings market. With proposals to increase 
competition, if the above observations hold true across other CRAs following the 
issuer-pays model, then competition may not address the identified problems. 
Instead, it may likely fuel ratings inflation as CRAs seek to competitively attract 
ratings business. One of the key questions posed to participants in this study 
therefore sought to gauge their views on how increased competition among CRAs 
could impact the ratings quality in the ratings industry. 
The role of CRAs has largely been viewed from an agency perspective with CRAs’ 
own self-interests perceived to be compromising an objective rating service (Lewis, 
1996). While various schools of thought previously considered the implications of 
the issuer-pays model, the model is still pervasive (Darcy, 2009; Hunt, 2008; White, 
2010b). One prominent argument asserted that CRAs are reputational 
intermediaries (Bonewitz, 2010) and as such, they would strive to maintain 
accurate ratings (despite the inherent conflicts) if they were monitored through 
appropriate, enhanced disclosure mechanisms (Horner, 2002; Klein & Leffler, 
1981). The inference here is that with dented reputations, CRAs would not be able 
to survive hence the inherent conflicts of interest would be outweighed by the 
reputational drive. The argument was therefore that it was in CRAs’ own interests 
to provide an objective, quality rating service, downplaying allegations of conflicted 
ratings in the market (Hunt, 2009a; Partnoy, 1999). 
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The reputational argument was however downplayed by (Mathis & McAndrews 
(2009) and  Covitz & Harrison (2003) who made a comparative assessment of the 
reputational trade-offs and concluded that when the benefits outweighed the costs, 
reputation would not be a significant enough deterrent. This point was further 
underscored by Bonewitz (2010) who argued that the fact that CRAs thrived even 
when their reputations were dented suggested that reputation was not as key to 
their survival. Fennell & Medvedev (2012) highlighted the effect of the conflicts of 
interest in compromising trust and credibility of CRAs. They proposed a number of 
alternative models and in particular, the platform model which proposed the 
establishment of a central, public body that would act as a reservoir for all rating 
requests. The central platform would then be responsible for allocating the rating 
requests (as they came in) to bidding CRAs. The proposal sounded attractive 
although it still needed certain aspects of it fleshed out in more detail. More details 
on the platform model are given in section 4.4.1.3. The sections below briefly 
explore various business models proposed in light of the above studies and 
comments. 
 
4.4.1.1 The issuer-pays model 
The issuer pays model was (and still is) conflicted, with CRAs being paid by the very 
organisations they rated (Fennell & Medvedev, 2012). This was said to open up 
possibilities of rate shopping, bias and possible inflated ratings (Skreta & Veldkamp, 
2008). In their study of Moody’s structured ratings, Benmelech & Dlugosz (2009) 
concluded that in the majority of cases, structured tranches rated by one CRA were 
most likely to be subsequently downgraded by a different CRA, suggesting evidence 
of rate shopping as issuers sought to get the most competitive rating and playing 
CRAs off each other.  
Further, because CRAs often provided other ancillary services such as advisory 
services, there was an argument that CRAs could in effect be rating the same 
entities they would have previously helped to structure while providing advisory 
services (Crockett, 2003). In such cases, it would be difficult for a CRA to put 
together a structure, then rate it lowly later. Others also argued that CRAs could 
provide favourable ratings as a way of inducing issuers to do business with them 
(Pagano & Volpin, 2010).  
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Despite these shortcomings, the issuer-pays model is still pervasive as it largely 
works, is viable for CRAs and allows for ratings to be available publicly (Ponce, 
2011). So far, this has been touted as the most practical model allowing for an 
efficient process despite its limitations around issues of conflict of interest. 
4.4.1.2 The investor-pays model 
Under this model, investors would be paying CRAs for credit ratings. The exact 
format of the transactions could either be in the form of ad-hoc transactions as and 
when ratings are required or it could take a subscriptions-based approach (Fennell 
& Medvedev, 2012). This model suffers from potential free riding, which could 
potentially be exacerbated by rating leakages. It is not inconceivable that issuers 
might try and publicise their ratings in a promotional attempt, thus making them 
available to investors who may not have paid for them. This could dampen 
investors’ appetite to pay for ratings if alternative ratings were freely available. 
Further, the model does not allow for ratings to be accessible to non-paying 
subscribers, a feat which may further exacerbate information asymmetry in the 
market (Schroeter, 2011). 
Arguments against this model posit that this is equally prone to conflicts of interest 
that can potentially arise from investors (Altman, Oncu, Richardson, Schmeits, & 
White, 2010). This view was disputed by Pagano & Volpin (2008) who asserted that 
it was unlikely that a diverse group of investors would exert uniform pressure on 
CRAs. Where ratings were used for regulatory purposes, this model would make it 
difficult since such ratings would be private. Another challenge was that this model 
was not practical for new and unknown issuers that investors did not yet know 
about (Papaikonomou, 2010). New and unknown issuers would find it difficult to 
have ratings commissioned on them, creating entry barriers for any such new 
issuers (Bruno, Cornaggia, & Cornaggia, 2011; Cornaggia, 2010). 
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4.4.1.3 The platform model 
The platform model would see CRAs selected through a central and independent 
vetting process to respond to specific rating bids (Fennell & Medvedev, 2012). The 
platform model would effectively sever the direct relationship between issuers and 
CRAs as a way of eliminating the conflicts of interest which potentially distort 
ratings (Mathis et al., 2009; Pagano & Volpin, 2010).  
The platform or central body would charge issuers and use some of the proceeds to 
commission and pay CRAs, independent of the rating outcome (Mathis et al., 2009). 
This would ensure an objective process for allocating rating tasks to CRAs. As CRAs 
would be commissioned by a central public body, there would be no need for them 
to market themselves directly to issuers thus eliminating the conflicts of interest 
currently prevalent in the issuer-pays model (Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, & 
Vickery, 2010). The criteria for selecting CRAs could be random, on a rotation basis 
or even based on track record to encourage competition and drive rating accuracy 
levels up. While such a form would provide independence of those providing the 
ratings from the rated, its conception is still embryonic and its viability susceptible 
to a lot of practicality questions which as yet have not been clarified. Had the 
Franken Amendment10 been implemented in the US, it would have seen a platform 
model being established.  
One of the concerns with this model is that there would be yet another new body to 
be managed, raising questions on who would be best placed to provide that 
oversight. Further, the proposal makes a simplistic assumption that all CRAs would 
possess the same skills, competences and jurisdictional presence for a random 
allocation of rating bids to be possible. In reality, this is not so. CRAs may operate in 
particular niche areas or geographic locations. This model therefore needs more 
clarity to address the finer details around its practicality. 
  
                                                     
10  The Franken Amendment (Section 939F) was a proposal to eradicate rate shopping by establishing a 
central function that would allocate rating requests to CRAs, accepting fees from issuers. While in principle 
it sounded good, it was fraught with several irregularities with regards to implementation. 
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4.4.1.4 The public model 
This model was promoted by scholars like Lynch (2009) and is premised on ratings 
as public goods and would constitute a publicly-funded rating entity which would 
make its ratings available publicly (including to investors). Its funding could be 
drawn from taxpayers, levies on issuers or any other suitable funding mechanism.  
As the entity would be free from competitive pressures, it is envisaged that this 
could boost its independence and improve the quality of its ratings. In reality the 
public model could still be prone to political and other pressures particularly when 
it comes to sovereign ratings (Fennell & Medvedev, 2012). Its state funding could 
also pose unfair competition to smaller independent CRAs. Other scholars (see for 
example Lynch, (2009)) have expressed concern over potential bureaucracies that 
could impede its ability to attract talent and weaken its effectiveness. Further, 
budgetary limitations, innovation and other bottlenecks could affect its 
responsiveness to dynamic rating needs. Despite the above proposal, regulatory 
coordination remains a problem particularly for issuers issuing across different 
markets, unless such a CRA was regional e.g. funded by the EU or similar regional or 
global bodies. While this could alleviate coordination problems, it does not address 
the issue of allegiance and potential biases (Klöhn, 2010). From this, it would 
appear that a fee-based approach would offer more promise. The next section goes 
back to the basics and highlights the problems said to be inherent in the current 
CRA revenue model. 
4.4.2 Alleged problems in the CRA revenue model 
For several decades now, scholars and practitioners have been debating various 
issues inherent in the CRA issuer-pays revenue model (Strobl & Xia, 2012; Kuhner, 
2001; Lynch, 2009). The sections below briefly discuss some of the topical legacy 
problems that prompted calls for regulation. 
4.4.2.1 Conflicts of interest 
Conflicts of interest exist at multiple levels in the rating industry. The most obvious 
and commonly cited conflicts were those manifested in the issuer-pays model 
(Egan, 2009). Whereas the commonly touted agency view posited that because 
issuers paid CRAs, they could influence the CRAs to issue inflated ratings in a bid for 
issuers to attract favourable borrowing terms (Darcy, 2009).  
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On the contrary, the reputational capital view suggested that it was not in the best 
interests of any CRA to play along to issuer’s demands as this would compromise 
CRAs’ long term reputation and ruin future prospects of getting continued ratings 
business (Covitz & Harrison, 2003). The reputational capital view was premised on 
the argument that CRAs thrived on their reputation and the more accurate ratings 
they issued over time, the stronger their reputation among market participants 
would be, thus increasing future business prospects (Hunt, 2009). It was further 
argued that to suggest that such a reputation could easily be sacrificed to serve 
issuers’ short-term desires for inflated ratings would be naive (Goodhart, 2009). 
Further, the choice of which CRA to use was said to be driven largely by regulatory 
pressures as well as investment mandates / guidelines (Partnoy, 1999). 
Consequently, Fennell & Medvedev (2012) argued that the management of such 
conflicts was hinged on competition and reputation.  
 
Reviewing empirical evidence on conflicts of interest, Frost (2007) concluded that 
CRAs were indeed compromised by their conflicted positions but added that the 
issuer-pays model was the least costly option when compared to other available 
alternatives. Whereas Radley & Marrison (2003) argued that CRAs were 
compromised by virtue of designing different models subsequently used by their 
rated banks and could not downgrade their own work, Veverka (2003)  refuted this 
claim, arguing that commercial arms of CRAs were heavily insulated and firewalled 
from the analysis activities. These varied views demonstrate just a few of the 
polarised arguments regarding the issuer-pays model and its implications for the 
ratings industry. 
Notwithstanding the polarised views regarding the CRA conflicts of interest, it was 
not inconceivable that CRAs could be swayed by their paymasters. The lack of 
competition among CRAs suggested that perhaps the issuer-CRA relationship was 
skewed in favour of CRAs whose reputation was their backbone in this industry. 
Evidence from empirical studies investigating this suggests that indeed 
competitiveness issues did affect ratings thus lending validity to claims of conflicts 
of interest (Jiang et al., 2012; Strobl & Xia, 2012) and impact on ratings quality.   
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4.4.2.2 Credit rating transitions 
Another key area covered in previous studies was that of credit rating changes or 
rating transitions from one rating category to another (see for example Altman, 
1998; Altman and Rijken, 2005). Such changes either signified deterioration in the 
prospects of the rated entity (downgrade) or an upgrade denoting improved 
outlooks (Altman, 1998). Rating transitions have a significant impact on investment 
decisions associated with tolerance levels for credit quality, particularly as they 
also send signals to the market and thus affect share prices (Altman, 1998). At the 
heart of previous debates involving rating transitions were issues to do with the 
CRAs’ through-the-cycle11 rating methodologies and implications thereof (Altman & 
Rijken, 2005). A selection of some of the main empirical studies in this area are 
summarised in Table 11 and discussed in the ensuing sections.  
  
 Table 11: Empirical studies investigating credit rating transitions 
Author Study Main Findings 
Altman (1997) 
Compared bond ratings 
from Moody’s and S&P 
between 1970 and 1996 
Concluded that there were differences in 
methodologies between the two organisations, 
making direct, ‘like-for-like’ comparisons difficult 
Blume, Lim and 
MacKinlay 
(1998) 
Investigated rating 
transitions between 1978 
and 2006 
Concluded that CRAs had generally become more 
conservative and issued slightly tampered ratings 
and that transitions tended to be more forthcoming 
in the case of upgrades than downgrades 
Klinger and 
Sarig (2000) 
Studied market security 
responses to Moody’s rating 
system refinement in 1982 
As Moody’s refinement changes only related to 
methodological alterations of the rating approach, 
the study concluded that firm value was not driven 
by rating information, rather, debt value rose or fell 
whenever Moody’s made a rating announcement 
Amato and 
Furfine (2004) 
Analysed ratings data 
between 1984 and 2001 
Established strong correlations between credit 
rating transitions and business / financial risks as 
opposed to cycle-related issues. 
Tang (2006) 
Examined Moody’s credit 
rating transitions in 1982 
seeking to determine the 
effect of rating changes 
Concluded that rating upgrades generally resulted 
in lower movements compared to rating 
downgrades. On average, rating upgrades resulted 
in a 7 point (0.5%) reduction in costs of debt, while 
downgrades led to a 13 point (0.7%) increase in the 
cost of debt. 
Bacon, Grout 
and O’Donovan 
(2009) 
Interviewed 43 UK-based 
corporate treasurers to 
gauge views on the effect of 
the crisis on corporate 
capitalisation 
Results indicated significantly reduced confidence in 
corporate debt sources. Leverage levels were 
anticipated to fall significantly as banks further 
tightened on lending 
Baghai, 
Servaes, & 
Tamayo, 
(2011) 
Investigated rating 
transitions between 2005 
and 2009 to determine 
whether CRAs had become 
more conservative or not 
Studied and documented rating transitions and 
concluded that generally, CRAs had continued to be 
conservative, issuing tampered ratings that saw A+ 
dropping by an average 3 notches to BBB+ 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
                                                     
11  Rating through-the-cycle looks at the performance of a rated entity in the long term, ignoring short-term 
volatility. This is opposed to a point-in-time rating approach that takes a snapshot of a particular point. 
 
120 
 
Tabani Ndlovu  
Blume, Lim, & Mackinlay (1998) argued that generally, the rating regimes across 
the industry became tougher between the 1980s and early 1990s, suggesting that 
ratings became stricter as CRAs became more cautious. This finding was in contrast 
to earlier conclusions by Cantor & Packer (1995) who had observed deteriorating 
ratings and increased default rates within rating categories. This contradiction was 
somewhat explained by later studies (Zhou, 2001) as emanating from a slight bias 
in the Blume et al., (1998) model used to generate the data. In a later study post the 
financial crisis, Baghai, Servaes, & Tamayo (2011) reported a further escalation of 
the tightened rating regime, further asserting that A+ ratings had seen an average 
drop of 3 notches to BBB in observations made in ratings between 1985 and 2009.  
Kliger & Sarig (2000) carried out a study around the time Moody’s changed their 
gradation system from the original 9-letter-based rating scheme to the current 
letter plus numeric qualifier categories with 19 different options. As the change was 
simply a methodological adjustment to rating category labels, they concluded 
(unsurprisingly) that there were no changes to firm values. They however went on 
to observe that whenever Moody’s made a rating announcement, issuers’ debt 
values changed up or down. This depended on whether the announcement was 
positive or negative and raised questions on whether ratings drove the market or 
vice versa. This study, while significant, did not consider future informational 
contents of ratings (Gonzalez et al., 2004), and was rather short-term oriented, 
failing to project the study findings beyond the local context at the time. 
Tang (2006) argued that information asymmetry contributed greatly to rating 
transitions. The study of Moody’s credit ratings indicated that third party rating 
agencies contributed significantly to rating movements as they provided new 
information which in some cases prompted revisions to existing ratings. This 
however suggested a potential by CRAs to use such unsolicited ratings to coerce 
issuers into seeking ratings with them to avoid adverse publicity (Poon, 2003).  
Meanwhile, Bacon, Grout, & O’Donovan (2009) observed continued tightening of 
ratings in UK corporate and bond ratings, a trend that detrimentally impacted 
access to favourable borrowing terms and restricted borrowing options for some 
firms.  
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This finding suggested that despite claims of objectivity and rating accuracy, CRA 
ratings generally migrated based on market confidence and perceived levels of 
exposure to risk by CRAs. Questions arose over recent proposals to hold CRAs liable 
for inaccurate ratings, a move that could further constrain ratings as CRAs would 
fear reprisals for any inaccurate ratings and become more conservative, sparking a 
vicious cycle (Partnoy, 2001). Further, the conservative approach to ratings that is 
reported in the studies above could hamper market operations by tightening the 
availability of credit and potentially weakening market confidence overall. This 
further raised questions about the exact nature of ratings, particularly whether the 
subjective component of the rating was being over-emphasised (Iyengar, 2012; 
Sinclair, 1994; Partnoy 1999; 2001). While the subjective element allowed for the 
capturing of incidental environmental factors alongside ratings, its rather hazy 
nature may be its undoing (White, 2010b). This thread of inquiry therefore raised 
pertinent questions about both the rating process, the methodologies, accuracy and 
questions whether CRAs could use ratings as levers projecting their own internal 
insecurities potentially holding the market at ransom. 
4.4.2.3 Informational content of credit ratings 
Another key area covered in previous studies concerned the informational content 
of credit ratings. Table 12 below gives a selection of some of the main empirical 
studies reviewed in this area:   
 Table 12: Studies investigating the informational content of credit ratings 
Author Study Main Findings 
Cantor and 
Mann (2007) 
Evaluated the conflicting 
need for stable ratings on 
one hand and the need for 
timely ratings on the other 
The study concluded that market requirements of 
ratings were themselves conflicted in the sense 
that on one hand, stability was favoured, while on 
the other, CRAs had to report timely movements, 
which if they did, would cause market volatility. 
CRAs could thus take a middle ground approach in 
determining rating contents. This would be 
subjective. 
Chan, Walters 
and Edwards 
(2009) 
Carried out a comparative 
study of information 
content of subscribing vs. 
non subscribing CRAs in 
Australia 
Concluded that ratings released by subscription-
only CRAs carried value of up to 8 months after 
the rating compared to those ratings based on 
publicly available information 
Tsoukas, Mizen 
and Tsoukas 
(2011) 
Analysed US bond ratings 
issued by Fitch between the 
periods of 2000 - 2007 
Study results questioned the ability of credit 
ratings to see “through-the-cycle”, and concluded 
that there was strong correlation in ratings with 
previous and initial firm states, influencing the 
rating. 
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Author Study Main Findings 
Bruno, 
Cornaggia, & 
Cornaggia 
(2011) 
Investigated informational 
content of ratings from a CRA 
pre and post its designation as 
an NRSRO and the impact of the 
subsequent business model 
change 
Concluded that the investor-pays model 
yielded better informational value of ratings 
compared to the model adopted later (issuer-
pays) 
Hilscher and 
Wilson (2012) 
Investigated the extent to which 
credit ratings measured the raw 
probability of default as 
opposed to systematic risk of 
default 
Their study concluded that credit ratings were 
poor measures of raw probability of default 
while on the other hand the same ratings were 
strong indicators of systematic risk 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
Cantor & Mann (2007) explored the tension between the need for timely ratings 
that were responsive to market changes on one hand and the need to maintain 
rating stability on the other. They concluded that this conflicted demand tore CRAs 
apart and forced them to strike a compromise by taking a middle ground approach 
and rating ‘through-the-cycle’ rather than responding to flimsy short-term market 
movements. While this was a plausible compromise, it raised questions on the 
objectivity of the compromised middle-ground approach (Altman & Rijken, 2005; 
Mizen & Tsoukas, 2009). For example, this raised such questions as the consistency 
across CRAs; the level of exposure to investors e.g. in a bid to maintain stability, 
were CRAs waiting until it was too late before effecting a rating change? This was 
not a fault on the part of CRAs but was an issue that was imposed by the market on 
them. 
Chan, Walter, & Edwards (2009) attempted to demystify the age-old question 
around unsolicited ratings based only on publicly available information and 
concluded that the fact that the alternative gave CRAs access to company 
management made a huge difference in the informational value of the resultant 
ratings. Therefore, according to their study, ratings carried crucial informational 
content (see also Kliger & Sarig, 2000; Krahnen & Weber, 2001).  
  
 
123 
 
Tabani Ndlovu  
In a later study, Tsoukas, Mizen, & Tsoukalas (2011) investigated the determinants 
of credit ratings and their role in ‘through-the-cycle’ forecasting. They concluded 
that ratings were enduring and indeed saw through-the-cycle, rather than taking a 
short-term volatile approach. The study sought to restore confidence in an area that 
was at the time being severely criticized following the crisis and the authors 
concurred that ratings still held informational value and did show some consistency 
even during deeps and peaks.  
Bruno, Cornaggia & Cornaggia (2011) investigated ratings from a CRA pre and post 
its NRSRO designation in 2007 and concluded that while the CRA in question 
operated under an investor-pays model, the informational content and timeliness of 
its ratings were higher and fell soon after it adopted an issuer-pays model. This may 
explain potential effects of incentive mechanisms at play as well as possible 
conflicts of interest said to be inherent in the issuer-pays model (see also Darcy, 
2009).  
Hilscher & Wilson (2009)’s investigation on the predictive abilities of credit ratings 
revealed a puzzling aspect of credit ratings. Despite their dominance as predictive 
instruments for default, their study revealed inherent weaknesses of failing to 
distinguish between firms (by assigning them a similar risk score when in fact they 
bore different underlying asset structures). Further, ratings were shown to be 
closely correlated to publicly available information, a characteristic that questioned 
their predictive ability and portrayed them as lagging. The study also revealed that 
credit ratings were not good indicators of default variability over time (Atiya, 2001; 
Elkhoury, 2008).  
4.4.2.4 The effect of competition on ratings 
Whereas regulators claimed that lack of competition in the ratings market 
hampered ratings quality and limited choice (see for example Hill, 2004; Hunt, 
2009a; Pinto, 2006; Utzig, 2010), some studies carried out to review the effect of 
competition on ratings suggested otherwise. The following are a selection of some 
of the studies in question. 
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Table 13: Studies investigating the effect of competition on ratings 
Author Study Main Findings 
Becker and 
Milbourn 
(2008) 
Sought to investigate the impact 
of increased competition on 
ratings and CRA behaviour, using 
Fitch’s entry into the market 
Concluded that with Fitch’s entry into the 
market, S&P ratings rose; correlation between 
ratings and bond yield deteriorated as ratings 
peaked as well as equity price volatility in 
response to downgrades  
Bolton Freixas 
and Shapiro 
(2010) 
Carried out an empirical review 
of evidence on competition and 
ratings 
Concluded that despite claims by regulators that 
increased competition would serve the market 
positively, on the contrary, their study revealed 
that increased competition would fuel ratings 
inflation and erode market efficiency 
Becker and 
Milbourn 
(2010) 
In a follow up to their 2008 
paper, the authors revisited the 
topic after the crisis and arrived 
at similar conclusions as in their 
previous study. 
Concluded that more competition had a 
detrimental effect on ratings quality. They 
particularly noted that the entry of Fitch 
resulted in inflated ratings from Moody’s and 
S&P. There were concerns that the EC 
regulations could deliver undesirable 
competitive effects in the market and further 
fuel ratings inflation. 
Camanho, Deb 
and Liu (2010) 
Compared duopolistic and 
monopolist scenarios to 
investigate the trade-off between 
reputation and fees in increased 
competition contexts 
Concluded that CRAs succumbed to competitive 
pressures and that this was reflected in ratings 
inflation. 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
Scholars have argued that increasing competition among rating agencies may not 
address market ills but instead fuel rating inflation as CRAs rate favourably to win 
business against their competitive rivals (Becker & Milbourn, 2009; Bolton, Freixas, 
& Shapiro, 2012). This view was consistent with Camanho, Deb, & Liu (2010)’s 
findings. They argued that with increased competition, CRAs tended to rate more 
favourably compared to less competitive situations. In their study, Bongaerts, 
Cremers, & Goetzmann (2012) compared ratings across the three CRAs using 
similar issues in the same quarter. They concluded that on average, Fitch’s ratings 
were more optimistic compared to those from Moody’s or S&P. This was consistent 
with Cantor & Packer (1997)’s findings in an earlier study. As the smallest of the 
three CRAs fighting to assert itself in a competitive market where it held a smaller 
share, Fitch was deemed to be the most positive, out of the three. This raised a 
question on whether favourable ratings could be used for competitiveness and if so, 
what the effect of more competition would be if the EC regulations managed to 
increase competition among CRAs.  
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The implication of these findings is significant for the EC regulations and suggests 
that regulatory aims of increasing competition may be sound when viewed from a 
general marketing competition point of view, but that the credit rating industry is a 
peculiar one where general laws of competition may not work well. The regulatory 
objectives with regards to competition therefore need reviewing to ensure that the 
correlations between competition and ratings inflation are carefully measured and 
results incorporated into regulatory objectives. This would ensure that unintended 
consequences are minimised in relation to ratings inflation emanating from an 
influx of competitors. 
4.4.3 Legacy issues in credit ratings 
The alleged causes of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis in general, and the 
subsequent contagious turmoil among some European Union member states in 
particular were said to have been multifaceted, encompassing regulatory shortfalls 
(Langohr & Langohr, 2008; Tropeano, 2011); perceived governance failures 
(Johansson, 2010); greed and general moral decay (Dhiman, 2008; Lewis, Kay, 
Kelso, & Larson, 2010; Othman et al., 2010). A lot of these issues related to 
allegations of enduring legacy problems in the credit rating agency operating model, 
which attracted calls for the tighter regulation of credit rating agencies.  
In justifying regulatory initiatives, the EC regulators highlighted a number of 
inherent legacy problems in the CRA revenue model. The sections below briefly 
discuss some of the individual legacy problems, drawing implications of such 
problems on the ratings market and how these were linked both to the financial 
crisis and the calls for regulation of CRAs, particularly in the EU.     
4.4.3.1 Conflicts of interest 
The issue of CRA conflicts of interest typically arose where CRAs had financial 
interests in their contractual rating relationships (Frost, 2007). Arguably, it was 
three-pronged, incorporating firstly, conflicts arising from the issuer-pays model 
where CRAs got paid not by investors and other consumers of the ratings they 
produced, but by the very organisations that they rated (Elkhoury, 2008; Tarr, 
2009). This may have led to issuers wielding leverage on the agencies and possibly 
influencing them to produce more favourable ratings.  
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Where this was not so, it was not inconceivable that issuers could shop around for 
the agencies that gave them higher ratings thus fuelling rate shopping and 
consequently, ratings inflation among CRAs as they competed for business (US 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2011). With ratings inflation, ratings 
provided became meaningless in so far as their use for timely and proactive 
investment decisions were concerned, (Hunt, 2009a). As discussed above, this 
raised contentious questions on whether the EC regulatory aim of increasing 
competition among CRAs could help curb some of the problems identified in the 
industry if increased competition potentially induced ratings inflation. If the market 
became a ‘buyers’ market’ it is possible that rating agencies could start aggressively 
competing on the basis of issuing favourable ratings to win business, thus fuelling 
rate shopping which could ultimately lead to ratings inflation.  
 
The second source of conflicts arose from the issuing of unsolicited ratings which 
could have unduly pressured issuers to resort to engaging and paying the agencies 
in the hope of getting better ratings and thus suggesting that unsolicited ratings 
may have been used as a lever to coercively corral issuers into doing business with 
CRAs issuing such unsolicited ratings (Poon, 2003). This view was discounted by 
scholars who emphasised the reputational capital view of credit rating agencies 
(see for example Bonewitz, 2010; House, 1995; Mathis et al., 2009).  
Viewed from a different angle, unsolicited ratings may actually be a positive, 
objective opinion by an agency that does not have the alleged blinkers of being 
commissioned and paid by the rated issuer. One of their downsides was perhaps 
the lack of detailed inside information and the possible trigger of herding behaviour 
if the other commissioned agencies tended towards the unsolicited rate to err on 
the safe side. This could however be addressed through transparent rating 
methodologies that would clearly outline the assumptions considered in making a 
rating. The last source of conflicts allegedly arose from CRA advisory roles in 
helping to structure Collaterized Debt Obligations (CDOs) which they may have 
later rated (Strobl & Xia, 2012). In such cases, CRAs combined the player / referee 
roles, raising questions about their objectivity in rating structures they may have 
earlier helped to create (Hassan & Kalhoefer, 2011; Verschoor, 2001).  
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Linked to this was the supposedly limited number of sponsors in the structured 
finance industry, with overall responsibility for a huge number of structured issues 
in the market. This may have entrenched the power of the limited number of CRAs 
who may have had to deal with a limited number of sponsors, making it an almost 
closed market. 
The 2003 IOSCO Report of ‘Analyst Conflicts of Interest’ singled out issues affecting 
analysts’ independence and objectivity emanating from agencies providing 
ancillary services to the same issuers they rated (Elkhoury, 2008; Tarr, 2009). 
Other anomalies included notching, which suggested deliberate lowering of rates 
on those issuers not rated by a particular agency, possibly an arm-twisting nudge to 
get them to seek ratings from the particular agency. Although the IOSCO code 
offered some guidelines to mitigate the potential conflicts of interest, these 
continued to be pervasive as they were said to be ingrained in the issuer-pays 
rating business model. Until the revenue model changes, CRA conflicts of interests 
may possibly remain an inherent feature of the CRA revenue model.  
One previous suggestion was to change the CRA revenue model to an ‘investor-pays’ 
model. As discussed previously, this however would result in a public goods / free 
rider problem where other non-paying third parties would freely access the ratings, 
rendering it difficult to corral the benefits and confine them solely to those who pay 
(Fons, 2008; Rousseau, 2009). If on the other hand, credit ratings were restricted 
only to those who pay, the market would be starved of ratings information and 
therefore fail to self-regulate. This would leave a catch-22 situation, suggesting that 
perhaps for now, the status quo may be the best unless a more viable alternative 
was found.  
A dissenting view was presented in 2008, citing a balance between the issuer-pays 
and investor-pays models (SIFMA, 2008). The SIFMA Task force concluded that 
ancillary services themselves were not a bad thing as long as CRAs put in place 
robust governance structures to mitigate the effects of conflicts of interest within 
their operations. To corroborate this view, a number of studies asserted that the 
stringent separation of commercial from rating teams could address this particular 
conflict of interest. How effective this would be, remains to be seen (Bai, 2010). 
 
128 
 
Tabani Ndlovu  
Notwithstanding the above views on conflicts of interest, Covitz & Harrison (2003) 
argued that reputational drivers significantly outweighed any potential conflicts in 
CRA operations and thus discounted the largely held agency view of inflated credit 
ratings. To this end, studies which empirically test the validity of conflicts of 
interest claims help to shed better light on the extent of problems emanating from 
conflicted positions of CRAs. It may well be that the problem is not as significant as 
some scholars claim. 
4.4.3.2 Lack of competition in the ratings market 
Before and up to the enactment of the US Credit Ratings Agency Reform Act (CRARA) 
in 2006, there were only 5 CRAs registered as NRSROs by the SEC. These were 
Moody's; S&P; A.M. Best.; Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) and Fitch. Out of 
these 5, DBRS was the only non-US based NRSRO. The rest were all US-
headquartered, with two (Moody’s and S&P) jointly controlling over 80% of the 
global ratings market between them (Mahlmann, 2007). The SEC relied heavily on 
NRSRO ratings, with at least 44 SEC “rules and forms” specifically hinged on ratings 
(Hunt, 2009b). The NRSRO designation by the SEC acted as a double-edged barrier 
to entry for would-be CRA entrants. While a new CRA could not get a “NRSRO status 
without national recognition, they could not get national recognition without the 
NRSRO status,” (Elkhoury, 2008, p.13). The playing field was thus skewed in favour 
of the incumbent NRSRO CRAs until the 2006 CRARA, which saw the NRSRO total 
rise to 10 by January 2009.  
The oligopolistic nature of the CRA market played a role in limiting competition, 
restricting issuer choices for alternative rating agencies and possibly lowering 
rating competitive standards (Johansson, 2010). Those new agencies that managed 
to make it into the market still faced insurmountable challenges as issuers 
preferred dealing with the bigger, more established and reputable CRAs who were 
favoured and trusted by investors (Deb et al., 2011). The CESR recommendations 
did not address this issue, but skirted around it. No direct proposals were made to 
address this seemingly important aspect of the ratings market. The limited 
oligopolistic market may have acted as a disincentive to competition based on 
rating accuracy and quality (Lamandini, 2008).  
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For now, attempts to remove entry barriers may have been made but it remains to 
be seen whether any new CRAs can operate sustainably in light of their perceived 
lack of clout. The issue of competition therefore needs further investigation to 
determine the correlation between ratings inflation and competition together with 
potential impacts on the operations of the rating markets. 
4.4.3.3 Lack of transparency 
One of the challenges with the way CRAs work is the opaque environment within 
which they generate ratings. The lack of clear processes and rating procedures, 
together with the technically complex information (LaFrance, 2009; Rousseau, 
2009) make it difficult for rating users to use market information and judge CRA 
performance (Elkhoury, 2008). In mitigation, the IOSCO code of conduct, originally 
published in December 2004 (revised in May 2008) required CRAs to: 
1. disclose how their own internal code of conduct complied with each 
provision of the IOSCO Code Fundamentals,  
2. explain any deviations of their own Code of Conduct from the provisions of  
the IOSCO Code Fundamentals together with how it impacted on the 
objectives laid out in the Code Fundamentals and the IOSCO-CRA principles 
3. Publish their methodologies to enhance transparency 
 
Despite all this, the lack of transparency continued to be highlighted by different 
commentators (Sy, 2004). Among the criticisms was the fact that CRAs hid behind 
the veil of secrecy to mask their often misinformed and out-dated analyses 
(Delamaide, 2008).  Proposals to regulate the rating industry thus included 
remedies for transparency through additional disclosures by CRAs (Hill, 2004; Sy, 
2009). A pertinent question remained though; who would monitor the additional 
disclosure and what impact might that additional disclosure have on other 
objectives such as increasing competition by breaking down entry barriers? There 
was no evidence that additional disclosure would address the problems highlighted 
above. If anything, there was a risk that additional disclosures could impose 
additional costs through resource requirements for handling such additional 
disclosures, thereby further hindering entry by smaller players in the industry. This 
would consequently have an adverse impact on competition. 
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4.4.3.4 Lack of accountability 
While ratings were so disclaimed as to question their validity (Partnoy, 2001), 
investors and regulators were said to have heavily relied on them, (SIFMA, 2008), 
almost defaulting to ratings as opposed to relying on internal due diligence (Davies, 
2008). This anomaly was in stark contrast to the lack of accountability in the CRA 
business model. The fact that CRAs’ ratings were consumed by investors who did 
not pay for or influence the generation of such ratings further absolved CRAs of any 
direct accountability to their consumers. The endorsement of CRA operations in 
Basel II further saw their ratings incorporated into the regulatory rules for 
monitoring global risk, (Elkhoury, 2008). This may have further entrenched CRAs 
as almost a law unto themselves, echoing sentiments by Friedman, (1996), cited in 
(Partnoy, 2001, p.2) 
 “There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the 
United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States 
can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by 
downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it's not clear sometimes who's 
more powerful.” 
 
Despite their expanded role, there has so far been no mechanism to safeguard both 
issuers and investors from potential mistakes made by the powerful CRAs (LaFrance, 
2009). This lack of recourse raised questions firstly about the governance / 
regulation around CRAs, and their own proactive initiatives to address such concerns 
in the market. There was seemingly blind faith in the use of ratings, yet there were no 
assurance mechanisms behind the generation of such ratings (Papaikonomou, 2010; 
White, 2010b). While the new regulatory initiatives broadly covered all the above 
issues, there has not yet been any change demonstrating that the regulations are 
taking the desired effect. This raises further questions about how well-thought-out 
the regulations were and whether they have a compelling enough force to ensure 
compliance. 
4.4.3.5 Ratings Quality  
The quality of ratings has been subject to scrutiny by a number of researchers 
(Cantor & Mann, 2007; Duff & Einig, 2009a; Krahnen & Weber, 2001), owing to 
concerns that as the asset-backed securities market grew between 2002 and 2006, 
so did the complexity of the market.  
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Notwithstanding this growth, it did not appear that the quality issues of ratings 
were addressed in a commensurate way. The following are some of the selected 
previous studies carried out in the area of ratings quality: 
Table 14: Selection of studies investigating rating quality 
Author Study Main Findings 
Czarnitzki and 
Kraft (2007) 
Carried out an empirical 
investigation of loan defaults 
among Western German 
manufacturing firms   
Concluded that ratings were indeed efficient 
predictors of default. As they used comparative 
studies of ratings plus publicly available 
information without the rating, the conclusion 
was that the combined approach offered more 
mileage than the separate approach 
Duff and Einig 
(2009) 
Surveyed 4 UK-based stakeholder 
groups (comprising 121 issuers, 
75 non debt issuing financial 
managers, 90 investors and 120 
other interested parties) to 
construct a ratings quality 
measurement instrument. 
Came up with a two-pronged approach to 
measuring ratings quality; Technical Qualities 
and Relationship Qualities broken down into sub 
components which were empirically tested and 
validated in the market. 
Pagano and 
Volpin (2009) 
Investigated the contribution of 
coarse information and disclosure 
as well as ratings inflation to the 
2007 crisis 
Concluded that there was need for greater 
disclosure and that the issuer-pays model was 
fundamental to the challenges leading to the 
crisis. 
Ponce (2011) 
Empirically studied the shift from 
investor to issuer-pays to 
determine the effect on ratings 
quality using Moody’s rating data 
Concluded that the switch in models resulted in 
deterioration of ratings quality 
Source: Compiled by author 
According to Frost (2007) rating accuracy (and hence ratings quality) is derived 
from the information usefulness and timeliness of ratings, enabling users to make 
informed decisions. Despite the increased reliance on ratings by both regulators 
and market participants, ratings quality allegedly remained hazy, without any 
specific metrics (Rousseau, 2009). In a separate study, Pagano & Volpin (2008) 
carried out an investigation that concluded that ratings quality remained an issue, 
with the quality of ratings compromised by the conflicts of interest embedded in 
the issuer-pays model. This view was echoed by Ponce (2011) whose study 
concluded that the switch from the investor-pays to the issuer-pays model had a 
detrimental effect on ratings quality. From the above studies, there is a positive 
correlation between ratings quality and market confidence.  
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Ratings quality is therefore essential for well-functioning securities markets, 
particularly as there is no alternative to the regulatory use of ratings as yet. Any 
meaningful regulatory proposals need to address the issue of ratings quality and 
ensure that this is defined in objective, measurable terms for transparency. As if in 
response to this gap, Duff & Einig (2009a) carried out an empirical study that 
resulted in the construction of a ratings quality model. Notwithstanding their 
proposed model, there was no evidence as yet that CRAs had adopted any visible 
common methodologies evidencing ratings quality.  
Enron is commonly cited as an example of a rating that was maintained at above 
investment grade levels until a few days before the company filed for bankruptcy 
on 28 November 2001, (Hunt, 2009a; Rousseau, 2009). This is in contrast to a 
downgrade of Enron by Egan Jones more than a month before the collapse 
(LaFrance, 2009), a downgrade that seems to have been somewhat side-lined by 
the market. The Enron rating raises questions that touch on the business models of 
CRAs, particularly considering that Egan Jones used an investor-pays approach and 
seems to have been ahead of the curve in noticing Enron’s deteriorating asset base. 
It may be just coincidence that the issuer-pays model was on the back foot, while 
Egan Jones and the investor-pays model were ahead of the market in anticipating 
Enron’s impending default. This however raises interesting questions all the same, 
particularly in view of the criticisms levelled against the model as discussed earlier. 
The quality of ratings may have a direct link to the quality of information that CRAs 
receive from issuers and subsequently base their ratings on.  
Notwithstanding that, one would expect CRAs to at least verify any information 
received or carry out their own due diligence to protect their own reputations. 
Evidence of the Enron and other debacles suggests that this was not always the case 
(Walker, 2010). As the area of asset-backed securities was relatively new to CRAs, 
questions are being asked about CRAs competences, governance structures and the 
robustness of their methods in this area (Crouhy, Jarrow, & Turnbull, 2008). There 
is perhaps an underlying issue of trust in the relationships involved (for example, 
did CRAs trust issuers too much, thereby compromising their ability to be critical?). 
If the different entities defaulted to relying on trust, this may have had a 
detrimental effect on the ability to question and challenge.  
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The above and other issues have prompted an evolving debate touching on the 
need for CRAs to be regulated (Pettit et al., 2004; Crotty, 2009; Gupta, Mittal, & 
Bhalla, 2010; Pettit, Fitt, Orlov, & Kalsekar, 2004; Sy, 2009). A brief overview is 
given below. 
4.4.4 Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies 
The following are a selection of some of the studies contributing to the debate on 
the regulation of Credit Rating Agencies.  
Table 15: Studies debating the role of regulation in credit ratings 
Author Study Main Findings 
Avgouleas 
(2008) 
Concept work advancing proposals to 
overhaul the regulatory approach and 
usher in a new regime incorporating 
registration supervision and 
monitoring of CRAs 
Concluded that most regulatory attempts focused on 
containing the current crisis rather than preventing 
future ones; ignore behavioural issues in the crisis. 
Proposed a transnational regulatory body to supervise 
financial institutions globally 
Sy (2009) 
Concept paper focusing on the 
contribution of CRAs to the 2007-8 
crisis 
Argued that while regulation proposals focused on 
micro-prudential regulation, the focus should be on 
macro-prudential regulation 
White (2010a) 
Concept paper chronicling the 
background to the CRA debacle and 
calls for regulation 
Argued that more regulation would impede market 
efficiency and not deliver the desired effects. Proposed a 
reduction in regulatory reliance on ratings as opposed to 
increased regulation per se. 
Nichols et al 
(2011) 
Provided an empirical test on the 
contribution of poor government 
policy choices to the financial crisis 
Concluded that rather than prevent the next crisis, 
current regulatory efforts could fuel the decline towards 
a crisis due to lack of understanding of finer market 
operational details. Evidence showed that previous 
regulatory attempts never worked, raising questions on 
whether latest EC regulatory attempts would work. 
Utzig (2010) 
Reviewed drivers for and possible 
implications of the EC regulations 
Argued that while the regulations could improve 
corporate governance of CRAs, the regulatory scope was 
too narrow and failed to address some fundamental 
issues such as competition in the industry 
Papaikonomou 
(2010) 
Sought to identify areas for further 
inquiry with regards to the regulation 
of credit rating agencies as well as 
gather evidence of the need for a 
paradigm shift 
Proposed a global approach to regulating CRAs as a way 
of addressing systemic risks. Questioned whether 
current regulatory conceptions were adequate 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
Perhaps one of the most enduring debates on credit rating agencies relates to calls 
for credit rating agency regulation (Forster, 2008; Papaikonomou, 2010). Views in 
this area have been polarised, with the pro-regulation advocates citing legacy 
problems inherent in CRA business models as well as lack of competition as reasons 
justifying external intervention (Partnoy, 2001). The opposing view has argued that 
the securities market is not amenable to regulation and that any attempt to regulate 
may have adverse unintended consequences on market operations (Theis & 
Wolgast, 2012; White, 2010a).  
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Despite the alleged CRA failures leading up to the 2007-8 crisis, there were divided 
views on whether to regulate them or not (Naude, 2011; Nichols et al., 2011); what 
form of regulation could be pursued (Gaffeo & Tamborini, 2011; Pacces, 2010); the 
extent of regulation (Pavlat, 2009); as well as the appropriate regulatory 
authorities to provide effective oversight (Baldwin et al., 2012). Other views raised 
concerns on the possible unintended consequences of the EC regulations and the 
possible debilitating effect these could possibly have on the market (Avgouleas, 
2010). Yet other views condemned the latest regulatory reforms as reactive, and 
not well-thought through (Fisch, 2010).  
Such diverse views raised questions about whether regulation was the answer to 
the problems besetting the rating industry, if so, which form of regulation would 
pacify all the stakeholders (if possible); how such regulation could best be 
implemented, by whom and to what effect? Also, specific questions were raised 
about the effectiveness of the EC regulatory reforms in addressing legacy issues in 
the ratings market. Nichols, Hendrickson, & Griffith (2011) argued that rather than 
prevent the next crisis, current (and previous) regulatory efforts could fuel the 
decline towards a crisis due to lack of understanding of the intricate workings of 
the market. Judging by the history of previous crises and subsequent regulatory 
efforts meant to stem subsequent crises, it is difficult to dismiss this fact altogether. 
Sy (2012b, p.75) argued that  
“Each crisis has something sufficiently novel to capture public imagination: in 
1987, it was junk bonds and portfolio insurance; in 1998, it was fixed income 
arbitrage and LTCM; in 2000, it was the information technology boom and 
Enron; in 2007, it was sub-prime mortgage securities, and so on. All these 
crises may be considered to have originated from the economic paradigm, 
which provided the moral umbrella to pursue self-interest by whatever 
inventive scheme, so long as no laws were seen to be broken.”  
 
From this perspective, market participants seem to have a way of innovating 
beyond regulatory confines such that the next crisis manifests itself in a unique 
form, not succinctly captured by previous regulatory conceptions. Throughout the 
history of credit ratings and in particular, when ratings became embedded in 
regulatory frameworks, there were calls for rating agencies to be regulated (Crotty, 
2009; Gupta, Mittal, & Bhalla, 2010; Pettit, Fitt, Orlov, & Kalsekar, 2004; Sy, 2009).  
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Such calls increased particularly in response to crises. After the inception of the EC 
regulations, there emerged a new view that argued that regulation may not be the 
way to address the problems in the ratings market after all (White, 2010b); that 
current regulatory proposals were not sufficiently forward-looking and therefore 
may not prevent the next crisis, (Nichols et al., 2011) and that the regulatory focus 
was too narrow (Papaikonomou, 2010; Utzig, 2010). At a time when regulators may 
have thought the problem was under control, these new views regarding the 
possible inappropriateness of regulation mean that the search should continue for 
an evolving but appropriate framework. As discussed earlier, literary evidence 
suggests that key questions regarding the EC regulatory proposals could centre 
around:  
(i) possible negative effects of increasing competition which could fuel rate 
shopping and exacerbate ratings inflation; 
(ii) increasing compliance costs particularly for new smaller entrants thus acting 
as a barrier to entry; 
(iii) Bombarding the market with unwieldy additional disclosures without anyone 
necessarily equipped to deal with the additional disclosure 
(iv) Possibly causing regulation arbitrage 
(v) Possibly fuelling regulatory tourism and 
(vi) From studies of previous regulatory attempts, there is no evidence that 
regulation can prevent future crises as it is modelled on past crises, there are 
questions on whether these latest EC regulatory attempts will be any different 
(Davies, 2003). 
It is important to review the alleged CRA contributions to the crisis which acted as a 
trigger for the EC regulations. The following section briefly reviews the alleged CRA 
contributions to the 2007-8 crisis.   
4.5 How CRAs allegedly contributed to the global financial crisis 
While blame for causing the crisis cannot justifiably be laid solely on any single 
entity, CRAs have been singled out as having contributed significantly to causes of 
the 2007-8 financial crisis (Deb et al., 2011; Johansson, 2010; Richardson & White, 
2009; Sinclair, 2010). This, it is argued was because CRAs encouraged the growth of 
the structured products which played a leading role in fuelling the crisis (Katz, 
2002).  
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The opaque pooled assets appeared relatively risk-free to many investors owing to 
the structuring process and the ratings given by CRAs which effectively masked the 
underlying risks. When the underlying assets deteriorated, CRAs were not quick 
enough to downgrade the pooled securities and alert investors on time. The charge 
in this area is therefore failure to adjust their ratings in a timely manner (Strier, 
2008; White, 2010b). Briefly, the role of CRAs in the crisis can be summarised as 
follows:  
4.5.1 CRAs underestimated structured product risks 
CRAs are said to have underestimated structured product risks and failed to 
respond in a timely manner to adjust their ratings to reflect the degenerating 
conditions in the structured products (Johansson, 2010; Utzig, 2010). Analysed 
closely, this constitutes a failure on the part of CRAs as gatekeepers / information 
intermediaries whose timely opinions would have alerted investors to possible 
corporate collapses, allowing them to restructure their investments decisively. 
There is a possible counter-argument which asserts that considering the 
relationship between CRAs and investors, CRAs were not accountable to investors 
and therefore did not owe investors any duty to report any rating (opinions) 
movements. This owes to the fact that they did not have a contractual relationship 
with investors. Such an argument would discredit the value of ratings and the role 
of CRAs as information intermediaries in financial markets.  
The conclusion is that if CRAs are to be taken seriously as holders of key market 
information to be valued by investors, regulators and the public, then such 
information should be credible and worth the attention that it gets. On this account, 
CRAs indeed failed rating users who relied on their information. Further, as 
gatekeepers, they failed to stop wrongdoing through sanctioning information 
within their domains. 
4.5.2 CRAs failed to provide timely monitoring of rate transitions 
CRAs failed to monitor deteriorating rate movements in such corporates as Enron, 
WorldCom, Parmalat and more recently, Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, AIG among 
others. At the centre of the accusations against CRAs, is a charge of flawed rating 
methodologies (Coffee, 2009; Shorter & Seitzinger, 2009).  
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CRAs’ methodologies were said to be opaque (LaFrance, 2009), meaning that other 
market participants found it difficult to judge for themselves whether CRAs were 
doing a good job or not. The lack of CRA accountability to consumers of their 
information and the absence of robust regulatory oversight could have meant that 
CRAs became complacent and standards may have fallen.  
A counter-argument could posit CRAs as self-interested entities that would have 
been driven to do well in monitoring ratings but when possible conflicts of interest 
were brought into the mix, it may have been easy to conclude that because of their 
role as advisers of issuers in the structured process, CRAs may have found 
themselves in a compromised position of whether to go against their clients and 
issue negative advisories to the market about the very products that they helped to 
structure. Either way, CRAs faced harsh repercussions (Gupta et al., 2010). If 
issuers paid for the structuring advice given by CRAs on how to structure their 
securities for better ratings, possible downgrades would have dented the quality of 
structuring advice, potentially damaging the relationships between issuers and 
CRAs. This would be hurting CRAs’ potential future sources of revenue. The reverse 
side would have been delayed issuance of ratings, risking CRAs’ reputations in the 
market.  
Whatever choice the CRAs opted for, whether this was a deliberate act of 
commission or omission, they did not issue warnings in time and their failure to do 
so raised many questions about their competence as well as their objectivity in 
playing the role of financial market gatekeepers.  
4.5.3 CRA models and rating regimes gave false impressions of underlying asset risk 
There are pervasive questions around the comparability of ratings in sovereign, 
bond and structured finance products. Ratings for sovereigns, corporate bonds and 
structured products all use the same rating symbols, suggesting to lay-people that 
the process and underlying asset structures may be comparable albeit different 
factors going into each rating type. This raises questions on the assumptions 
underlying the rating processes for sovereign, corporate and structured products.  
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The asset structures underpinning each of the 3 rated areas are vastly different, yet 
the use of similar rating symbols connotes some uniformity in the rating approach 
and significance of such ratings. Different symbols would give each of the rating 
types their deserved uniqueness and would conjure differences in the underlying 
asset structures and processes. 
4.5.4 Possible inadequate governance arrangements to mitigate conflicts of interest 
There are allegations of possible inadequate checks within CRA governance 
systems leading to problems associated with conflicts of interests and analytical 
independence. This alluded to the fact that commercial interests could have 
possibly overtaken analytical independence and subsequently compromised rating 
quality, (Johansson, 2010). As discussed above, the role of CRAs as advisers to 
issuers, particularly advising on structured products placed them in a compromised 
position of possibly having to align themselves with the issuing institutions that 
they rated. It would be inconceivable for CRAs to turn against the advice they would 
have given earlier and subsequently rate it as poor. With this background in mind, 
it would appear there were governance lapses in CRAs which positioned them more 
as advisers rather than as raters.  
Their allegiance to market participants such as investors who did not pay for their 
services is therefore questionable, particularly if it meant they had to stand aloof 
and denigrate their paying clients (issuers). Facts on the ground may be different 
but analysis of the relationship dynamics suggests that CRAs indeed failed to 
demonstrate independence in this regard.  
4.5.5 Possible competitive behaviour leading to ratings inflation 
Possibly compromised rating standards emanating from rate-shopping by issuers 
could have possibly contributed to competitive and inflated ratings among CRAs. 
This alludes to the fact that issuers could downplay unattractive ratings and 
inadvertently pressure agencies to provide more positive ratings, (Utzig, 2010). 
Bearing in mind that issuers preferred higher ratings, it is logical to assume that 
they would select an agency with prospects of higher ratings. Normal competitive 
dynamics would suggest that if a CRA found that its ratings were competitively 
disadvantaging it, it would logically seek to adapt its processes and marketing to 
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suit client requirements. While this is a logical act for any marketing organisation, 
the role of CRAs means that going down this route could compromise ratings as 
CRAs would be seeking to issue ‘favourable’ ratings to please their paying clients 
rather than issue objective ratings. Based on these facts, it is logical to conclude that 
CRAs’ failures to provide accurate ratings on time could also have been influenced 
by the rate shopping behaviour of issuers.   
Underlying some of the above alleged failures by CRAs is the problem of 
securitisation, which involved the bundling of mortgages into Collaterized Debt 
Obligations, (CDOs) which were later pooled and sold as securities (Davies, 2008). 
Investors buying these securities relied on Credit Rating Agencies to act as the first 
line of defence as they themselves were divorced from the detailed risks embedded 
in the underlying pooled mortgages. It would appear though that rating agencies 
may have been used as the only line of defence, suggesting that investors 
themselves were also to blame for blindly using ratings and not doing enough of 
their own due diligence. The performance of CRAs in structured finance was found 
to be unsatisfactory by ESME, (ESME, 2008). In addition, investors themselves were 
found to have lacked adequate internal systems to conduct their own due diligence.  
Having discussed legacy issues in the credit rating industry and how CRAs are said 
to have contributed to the crisis, the next section briefly reviews the regulatory 
arrangements prior to, and leading up to the 2007-8 crisis. 
4.6 Regulatory initiatives prior to the 2007-8 crisis 
The publication of the IOSCO Code of conduct in 2004 was the first international 
collaborative attempt to rein in the operations of CRAs (Elkhoury, 2008). The code 
was to be monitored and enforced by CESR, and was specifically aimed at: 
 Establishing a governance framework that would bring consistency, quality 
and integrity to the ratings process internationally;  
 Ensuring an independent, unbiased ratings process 
 Instituting transparency as well as  
 Eliminating conflicts of interest inherent in the CRA business model. 
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Table 16 below summarises the regulatory arrangements in place both in the EU 
and the US, highlighting some of the regulatory implications.  
Table 16: Regulatory initiatives in the US and the EU prior to the 2009 EC Regulations 
 US EU 
Main 
regulator 
SEC Bank supervisors 
Regulatory 
tools 
No registration of CRAs, but 
recognition by SEC of NRSRO for 
regulatory purposes 
No registration of CRAs, but CRAs recognised 
by bank regulators for regulatory purposes 
IOSCO Code 
SEC did not recommend adoption of 
IOSCO code by CRAs but the NRSRO 
recognition criteria relating to conduct 
of business rules seemed likely to be 
achieved by implementing the Code. 
CESR recommended adoption of the IOSCO 
Code by the CRAs. 
There was no enforcement mechanism 
(CESR relied on voluntary market 
enforcement) 
Recognition 
criteria 
- Published ratings 
- Market acceptance of CRAs 
- Conduct of business rules 
 
- Integrity of methodologies 
- Credibility of ratings 
- Conduct of business rules 
 
Recognition 
goals 
Efficiency of securities markets 
- Efficiency of securities market (IOSCO 
Code) 
- Adequacy of capital requirements 
On-going 
supervision 
Limited (SEC reserved the right to re-
examine conditions on which the 
NRSRO status was granted) 
Permanent 
(as required by the CRD) 
Recognition 
procedure 
SEC discretion, although criteria were 
more precise under the Proposed Rule 
Bank regulators were bound by the CRD 
rules and further details 
Civil liability None, (First Amendment protection) Never established but possible 
Securities 
laws 
Exemption under Regulation FD 
No exemption under the Market Abuse 
Directive, (MAD) 
Competition 
The SEC believed that more precise 
NRSRO designation criteria would 
foster competition and that 
competition was a means of regulating 
CRA performance 
CESR believed that competition issues were 
not supposed to be taken into account in 
establishing CRA rules and should be left to 
antitrust authorities. 
 
 
Source: Champsaur (2005, p.46) 
 
As can be seen from Table 16 above, despite being a commendable start, the IOSCO 
code was voluntary, based on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, giving CRAs an escape 
route if they could explain any non-compliance. Neither CESR nor the IOSCO code 
had any compelling powers to clamp down on rogue CRA practices. Instead, CESR 
recommended the adoption of the Code and meanwhile took a ‘wait-and-see’ 
attitude (Champsaur, 2005; Elkhoury, 2008). Effectively, it was down to each 
country regulator to ensure that within their jurisdictions, CRAs complied with the 
code. Beyond that, there was no active international regulatory effort to coordinate 
reporting of performance against the code and bring erstwhile CRAs to book. The 
innovative nature of structured finance products and the dynamic nature of the 
industry raised pertinent questions on whether regulators could competently cope 
with the increasing complexity in the highly-dynamic industry.  
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Unlike the current registration requirements for CRAs operating in the EU (see for 
example Sy, 2009; Utzig, 2010), there were no registration requirements in the EU 
prior to the 2007-8 crisis and each market dealt with CRAs in isolation. Viewed 
from this perspective, CRAs were not strictly held accountable, particularly in the 
EU. Where they were, this was patchy and isolated; CESR seemed to be a tokenistic 
regulator without any powers to compel compliance with the IOSCO Code.   
There were no specific actionable steps to address competition-related problems in 
the EU. Prior to the EC CRA regulations, credit rating agencies were registered in 
the USA and regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission, (SEC), after the new 
Credit Ratings Reform Act of 2006 gave the SEC that mandate. There were no 
similar regulatory structures in Europe or anywhere else in the world prior to the 
2009 EC CRA regulations, (Davies, 2008; SIFMA, 2008). This created a regulatory 
void which fuelled calls for regulation, particularly in the EU (Choi, 2004; Partnoy, 
2001). 
4.6.1 Market directives governing CRA conducts in the EU 
In the absence of a singular regulator for CRAs in the EU, 3 directives broadly 
covered the activities of CRAs operating in the EU; the Market Abuse Directive, 
(MAD) targeting market manipulation and insider dealing through enhanced 
transparency; the Capital Requirements Directive, (CRD), looking at essential 
criteria for CRAs to be recognised as External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAI).  
The last directive was the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 
which only focused on those CRAs engaged in undertaking investment services over 
and above their conventional rating activities. The MiFID stipulated some 
requirements on the structure of CRAs as well as CRA business conduct, including a 
tight ruling for them to adopt the IOSCO Code and incorporate it in their internal 
policy procedures. At an operational level, it was loosely left to CRAs to comply with 
the IOSCO code of conduct or explain their non-compliance, (Rousseau, 2009). CESR 
had the mandate to monitor compliance with the IOSCO code, reporting annually to 
the European Commission. The first such report by CESR was in December 2006 
(ESME, 2008) and indicated that CRAs had generally complied with the IOSCO code, 
prompting the Commission to conclude that there were no grounds for proposing 
further regulation in the European CRA landscape.  
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By October 2008, following the 2007-8 global financial crisis, the above view had 
changed and the resolution was that CRA regulation was vital to restore market 
confidence and protect investors. This was further strengthened by the G20 
communiqué of April 2009. The initially proposed framework was not dissimilar to 
the previous arrangement and still had IOSCO as the standards body and CESR as 
the enforcer of the standards.  
Despite the IOSCO code having been positioned as the international framework to 
provide oversight on CRA activities, the end of 2009 paradoxically saw IOSCO 
waking up to the fact that “..neither IOSCO nor any other international body 
currently is in a position to determine whether or not a given [credit rating agency] 
in fact complies with its own code of conduct in the manner in which its public 
statements indicate” (IOSCO, 2009, p.3).  Bearing in mind that nothing had changed 
in the way CRAs operated and neither had CESR’s role changed, the above IOSCO 
view begs the question as to what compliance role CESR had previously played and 
how such a role was brought to bear. CESR had previously written compliance 
reports attesting to the fact that CRAs were generally complying with the code. This 
raises the question as to how such compliance would have been measured and the 
accuracy thereof verified. Section 4.8.2 briefly discusses the regulatory gaps that 
were perceived to exist leading up to the 2007-8 crisis.   
4.6.2 Perceived regulatory gaps prior to the 2007-8 crisis 
While the SEC had policing powers over CRAs in the USA, it lacked the authority to 
regulate the substance of ratings or the CRA processes and methods used to derive 
the ratings (ESME, 2008). This distant regulatory relationship was as good as no 
regulation because essentially, CRAs were not held to account in the specific ratings 
they dished out. Both the EU (CESR) role and the US (SEC) role left a gap at local 
and international levels in ensuring a coordinated regulatory approach to CRA 
activities. The patching up of the global regulatory approach was seemingly 
founded on a weak framework and called for a complete overhaul of the CRA 
business model. As CRAs operated in different global markets (CESR, 2009), the 
lack of a joined-up international regulatory framework left many governance 
loopholes in the global financial market in general and the CRA market in particular 
(Johansson, 2010).  
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The publication of the 2003 ‘IOSCO Statement of Principles’ on CRA operations and 
subsequently, the Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies one 
year later were attempts to provide a framework for holding CRAs to account, 
particularly in the EU. The major flaw of this approach was that it was based on the 
‘comply or explain’ self-regulation model (Katz et al., 2009), without any effective 
monitoring mechanism to hold non complying CRAs to account. The UK tends to 
adopt the common law approach not akin to comply or explain (see for example 
Brunnermeier, 2009). There have been pervasive debates on whether the more rules-
based approach would serve modern financial markets better (La-Porta, De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). The comply-or-explain approach cited above effectively 
meant that CRAs who failed to comply could possibly explain their way out of 
further scrutiny. Guidance documents and procedural proposals for reforms were 
forthcoming. While this indicated a level of interest and involvement by different 
parties, in the absence of an absolute singular authority, it caused confusion and left 
a regulatory void. While CRAs had to comply with stringent SEC requirements in 
the US, across the channel, they did not have much compliance requirements, a 
situation that could cause regulatory tourism and is said to have contributed to the 
2007-8 crisis discussed in the ensuing section.  
4.6.3 The 2007-8 global financial crisis 
A financial crisis is defined as a “situation in which confidence in financial 
institutions or markets generally is lost, or where there is an actual, or a serious 
risk of collapse in the whole financial system which would generate collateral 
damage even for savers and investors who are not directly linked to the institution 
or institutions that are the source of the crisis” (Davies, 2003, p.26). While a great 
deal of blame has been placed on CRAs, the crisis was largely a systemic one, with 
multi-faceted problems and contributing factors. Currie, (2006) asserted that a 
systemic financial crisis involved the following four phases: 
a. Stage I - begins with a sharp, sudden fall in the prices of securities and 
derivatives. 
b. Stage II - witnesses the spreading of price falls from one market to another. 
b. Stage III – sees the effect of the preceding stages on international financial 
intermediaries, leading to the failure of one or more, which could endanger 
the system through the effects on the liquidity and solvency of 
interdependent participants. 
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c. Stage IV—the effect Stage III has in generating a crisis in the core banking 
and payments system of the national economies, (Currie, 2006, p.50). 
The 2007-8 crisis saw the passing of all the above phases across the globe with 
catastrophic consequences. Financial crises can originate outside the banking 
system but eventually permeate different areas of the financial system with 
debilitating effects. To stem them, regulators tend to take “an integrated approach” 
(Davies, 2003, p.27), lest they risk tinkering around the edges and leaving the 
problem. An integrated approach requires looking at the relationships and 
exchanges between parties in financial and capital markets. Such exchanges may be 
domestic as well as international or global. This therefore means that effective 
financial and capital market regulation in a globalised market cannot be rooted 
domestically without inter-jurisdictional coordination. Such a localised approach 
may lack jurisdictional effect across borders and could lead to regulatory arbitrage 
(Lannoo, 2009). An integrated approach therefore means regulators have to seek 
international as well as a global approach to stem contagion which may originate in 
one market but have devastating effects on other connected markets. This 
challenges the EC regulations to seek possible collaborative approaches with other 
regulators so as to have seamless regulations capable of operating across different 
markets, particularly in an innovative, globalised world. 
4.7 Other significant catalysts that led to the 2007-8 financial crisis 
The following are other notable catalysts that are perceived to have had a 
significant contribution towards the 2007-8 crisis. Any meaningful remedies to 
stem the crisis would need to consider all the contributory factors to avoid a piece-
meal approach. 
4.7.1 Innovation as a catalyst for crises 
The innovative and complex securitized products that were churned out prior to 
the global financial meltdown revolutionised the face of global securities and 
capital markets (Davies, 2003). Innovation in the financial market was said to be 
directly attributable to regulation (Calomiris, 2009), which, while limiting allowable 
activities on one hand, inadvertently encouraged the “arbitraging of regulatory 
capital requirements by booking assets off the balance sheets of regulated banks...” 
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(Calomiris, 2009, p.66). The allowable off-balance sheeting of assets enabled the 
regulated institutions to remain seemingly compliant with the relevant regulations 
while behind the scenes, they had shed off significant liabilities to their off-balance 
sheet vehicles (Brunnermeier, 2008). This represented an innovative approach to 
dealing with what institutions at the time may have perceived as constraining. 
These acts however represented a form of regulatory arbitrage (Dothan, 2008) and 
have not been without their ills. The very fast pace of innovation may have resulted 
in information asymmetry and knowledge gaps, particularly on players such as 
regulators and investors who now may have had to rely on being brought up to date 
on the developments in the market (Crockett, 2003). With the regulations now in 
place, new questions have emerged, questioning whether crises can really be 
prevented and if so, what form of regulation would be appropriate for doing this 
effectively (Crockett, 1996). These questions are briefly discussed in the following 
sections. 
4.7.2 Can crises be prevented? 
International financial crises can never be completely eliminated (Davies, 2003), 
rather, their probability of occurrence and possible impact can be minimised. A 
study by Eichengreen & Bordo (2002) concluded that modern financial systems 
were twice as likely to fail compared to the pre-1914 era. This, they argued, 
emanated from globalisation, rapid innovation and liberalisation which made 
financial systems interdependent, dynamic and unstable. Davies (2003) 
acknowledged that one of the tenets of a progressive, innovative and dynamic 
international financial system, was its propensity to fail.  
So as humans progressively innovated, creating more wealth, the system 
increasingly became fragile and fraught with risks emanating from its various 
global roots. As new products are tried, there are immense risks but these have to 
be prudently taken if the market is to continually innovate. Each crisis tends to be 
triggered by different sets of events for example junk bonds led to the 1987 crisis 
(Wade, 1998); Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) and fixed income arbitrage 
in 2008 (Bianchi & Drew, 2010); the dot com bubble in 2000 (Carmassi, Gros, & 
Micossi, 2009); subprime mortgages in 2007 among others (Sy, 2012).  
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The implication is that the market seems to innovate ahead of regulation and that 
regulation can best seek to minimise the impact rather than design a fool-proof 
system as this may constrain innovation and stifle growth (Porter & Van der Linde, 
1995), thereby going against the economic paradigm driving wealth accumulation.  
Seemingly, a balance has to be struck between reckless risk-taking on one hand and 
the wellbeing of the global market on the other. There is an implicit assumption 
therefore that financial market innovation is welcome as long as it serves 
sustainable global financial markets well. Arguably, risks associated with this have 
to be borne by the global markets. Through effective and proactive oversight of 
financial players, crises can be stemmed, perhaps not entirely prevented. Davies 
(2003) referred to four tools that could be deployed to regulate financial markets 
and minimise risks. These are summarised in Figure 6 below. 
 
 Figure 6: Tools for managing financial crises 
 
Adapted from Davies (2003, p29) 
 
The implications of Davies, (2003)’ framework above are that an integrated 
regulatory approach incorporating governance structures at company level,  
transparency and disclosure as well as broader market oversight issues is required 
for financial discipline. This calls for competent regulators who are in touch with 
market issues; are dynamic and proactive to anticipate market developments and 
put in place requisite regulatory provisions (Alexander, Dhumale, & Eatwell, 2005).  
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The framework recognises the interconnectedness of the global market and calls 
for coordination and either harmonisation of regulatory systems or adaptations to 
cater for different systems with appropriate measures put in place to handle any 
differences. If different regional or national regulatory systems are handled 
separately, then the interfaces need to be coordinated for a seamless global or 
international system (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000). With the above background in 
mind, the EC regulations can now be put into perspective. The section below briefly 
discusses the European Commission Credit Rating Agency regulations. 
4.7.3 The European Commission Regulations on Credit Rating Agencies 
Already, the 2009 CRA regulations have been met with mixed responses (see for 
example Hassan & Kalhoefer, 2011; Johansson, 2010; Utzig, 2010). Opinions were 
(and still are) divided not only on whether the regulations will work, but also on 
whether regulation is the most appropriate response after all. Some commentators 
have argued that the regulations fail to address the legacy issues in the CRA 
business model and may instead have some unintended consequences in the 
market (Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, & Walter, 2010; Kravitt, 2012; Voorhees, 
2012). As if in response to these concerns, the EC issued some regulatory 
amendments to address various issues that had not been adequately covered in 
earlier regulatory versions. Table 17 offers a timeline of the EC regulatory 
initiatives to date.   
Table 17: The EC regulation timeline 
Time Action / Decision 
2001 
Following the collapse of Enron, CESR carried out a study for the European Commission and concluded 
that regulation of CRAs was not necessary. The EC instead placed reliance on the IOSCO code, designating 
CESR to ensure CRAs compliance by issuing annual compliance reports. 
2006 
After the first CESR annual report, the EC concluded that there was insufficient evidence justifying CRA 
regulation as CRAs largely complied with the IOSCO Code according to the CESR Compliance report. 
2009 
Following the 2007-8 financial crisis, the European Parliament adopted a “Proposal by the EC for  
Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies” Exact CRA supervision details remained sketchy 
June 
2010 
The EC proposed a revision to its 2009 regulation provisions by opting for the creation of a pan-European 
regulatory body – the European Security Markets Authority (ESMA) – that would be given exclusive 
supervisory authority over CRAs registered in the EU. ESMA was to have powers to investigate, impose 
fines, and suspend or terminate a CRA’s license in case of breaches or non-compliance. 
Dec 2010 EC rules became effective 
Jan 2011 
ESMA was established on 1 January 2011; ESMA consultation and guidelines on endorsement allowing 3 
month grace period 
June 
2011 
Klinz proposal for further amendments (CRA3).  
Klinz report approved in June 2011 by EU Parliament 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
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Close scrutiny of the timeline above reveals interesting about-turns by the EC on 
the regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the EU. Of further interest is the fact that 
despite being mandated to report annually on CRA compliance with the IOSCO code, 
the first report by CESR on CRA compliance to the IOSCO Code was 5 years after the 
2001 mandate to monitor CRAs was initially granted to ISOSCO (St. Charles, 2010). 
Details of what this monitoring involved and how compliance was verified remain 
sketchy. It is questionable that any strict adherence to the code was enforced as 
CESR subsequently admitted that there was no way to verify if CRAs had complied 
with the code as had previously been reported.  
This was despite the 2006 report to the EC confirming CRA compliance to the code. 
The conclusion drawn from the above is that regulating rating agencies is murky 
business that requires constant review to ensure that the regulations remain 
relevant and the regulatory instruments fit for purpose. Of particular note was the 
question on whether the European Commission got the problems right and whether 
the regulations are fit for purpose. Following the crisis, the regulations sought to re-
establish market confidence and restore some semblance of order in the market. 
Some broad aims of the EC credit rating agency regulations are summarised below.  
4.7.4 EC CRA regulations – broad aims 
Since the inception of the regulations in 2009, and their subsequent enforcement in 
2010, there have been several amendments. The original set of regulations (CRA1), 
encapsulated the harmonisation of CRA regulations across the EU. Subsequently, 
CRA2 transferred the regulatory powers from member states to ESMA and gave 
ESMA legal powers to enforce sanctions within member states, working with local 
supervisors. CRA3 further proposed a raft of changes, touching on such issues as 
changing the CRA business model from the issuer-pays model; the endorsement of 
ratings; civil liability of CRAs; reduction of overreliance on ratings among other 
proposals. While the latest round of proposed amendments cut deep and bravely 
attempted to address the fundamental issues at the heart of the rating agencies 
operating model, there are fears that they cut too deep, too soon and have not fully 
allowed for previous efforts to take root (Stolper, 2009).    
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4.7.5 Implications for the EC credit rating agency regulations 
Despite the various amendments to the regulations, there are still dissenting views 
calling for caution, arguing that regulation may not be the answer to the problems 
that triggered the 2007-8 crisis (Begg, 2009; Rodrik, 2011; White, 2010a). Other 
views offered theoretical arguments asserting that the underlying theoretical 
frameworks in use in the current regulatory regime (and perhaps those proposed) 
were inadequate and may need updating (Currie, 2006). The conflicted issuer-pays 
model is still in place and there does not seem to be any viable alternative yet 
(Johansson, 2010). Latest CRA3 proposals have since been updated and specifically 
seek to reduce regulatory reliance on ratings as well as find a viable alternative to 
the issuer-pays model. As yet, it is still unclear how regulators propose achieve the 
stated objectives of CRA3.  
Following the approval of the EU CRA regulations by the European Parliament in 
April 2009 and the subsequent enactment of the regulations on 7 December 2010, 
all CRAs wishing to have their ratings used in the EU had to apply for registration 
with the European Securities and Markets Authority, (ESMA) which was the 
designated supervisory authority for CRAs in the EU. In the initial proposals, 
supervision was to be split between CESR and the relevant member state 
Competent National Authorities (Katz et al., 2009).  These arrangements were later 
amended under CRA3 as the regulations evolved. The implications of these changes 
have far-reaching ramifications to both market participants as well as regulators. 
There are seemingly a lot of amendments in the air, which may cause uneasiness 
among the different participants who may not be sure what will stay and what will 
be further amended. This raises questions on whether the EC regulations can be 
considered to be good regulations. 
According to Baldwin et al (2012), good regulations need to address 5 key criteria 
summarised in Figure 7 below. Addressing all the criteria in the figure below 
ensures that the regulations in question are fit for purpose; do what they were set 
up to do and achieve this efficiently without wasting resources. The current study 
therefore sought to gauge market participants’ views regarding the perceived 
impact of the regulations, particularly looking at how well the regulations were 
perceived to be addressing the original legacy problems identified in the ratings 
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industry. Evaluating participants’ views against Baldwin et al. (2012)’s framework 
summarising the tenets of good regulations was intended to offer a structured 
critique of the EC regulations and provide a framework for modelling this study’s 
questions. As Figure 7 illustrates, regulations have to ensure that both micro and 
macro level prudential issues are addressed, targeting firm level as well as broader 
industry, national / international level coordination. A well-coordinated 
international regulatory approach would ensure that there is no regulatory 
arbitrage, preventing regulatory tourism and creating a balanced and seamless 
system in a connected world market. While the framework offers a guide on the 
topical issues to be investigated, the pertinent issues regarding market participants’ 
views, what they consider to be important as well as suggestions for further 
improvement will come from the participants during the data collection stage of 
this study.  
Figure 7: Tenets of good credit ratings regulation 
 
Adapted from (Baldwin et al, 2012; Davies 2003) 
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The view of regulated entities in seminal regulation literature is that of passive and 
silent observers operating in a system largely dominated by regulators (see for 
example Baldwin & Cave, 1999). This thought will be explored further in the study 
interviews. From the above sections, regulation of securities should focus on both 
micro level firm governance and supervision as well as macro level international 
surveillance. Further, effective regulation should meet the five tenets of good 
regulation summarised in Figure 7 above. This study will therefore seek 
participants’ views on whether the EC regulation addresses the issues espoused in 
Figure 7 above. The securities regulation arena is characterised by dynamism, 
complexity and typically has practitioners who possess more information about 
their industry than any outsiders attempting to understand the industry. 
Consequently, the researcher as an outsider will need to give leeway to study 
participants to steer the conversations towards areas deemed important in the area 
of securities regulation. It is therefore imperative that the data collection approach 
takes a naturalist, open approach that allows participants to freely air their views 
and highlight issues deemed pertinent. 
4.8 Previous theoretical frameworks employed in CRA studies 
The majority of previous studies investigating credit rating agencies and their 
ratings largely took economic theoretical perspectives (Cantor & Packer, 1996; 
Kerwer, 2002; Kisgen, 2006; Skreta & Veldkamp, 2008). The emphasis in these 
studies was largely on performance of, and the technical aspects of credit ratings; 
ratings accuracy; relationship between ratings and levels of competition; ratings 
quality among other attributes. Further, there seemed to be a distinct separation 
between organisations (conceptualised as actions of individual players) and 
institutions, (symbolising structures and rules guiding the behaviour of players) 
treating these two as separate (see for example North, 1990). While this approach 
advanced the fields of knowledge in understanding the role and efficacy of ratings, 
their impact on investment decisions among other areas, the behavioural influences 
of players involved in credit ratings were downplayed.  
As early as 1936, Keynes (1936) underscored the role of psychological drivers in 
economics, implying that a purely technical view of organisational activities may 
miss out on the human motivations and their influence in broader management and 
organisation studies.  
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Further, when applied to the current study, economic theoretical frameworks did 
not seem to add much in terms of new insights touching on human behavioural 
drivers that could have contributed to the 2007-8 crisis. This study therefore 
advances an argument proposing that to get a holistic understanding of the credit 
ratings market, organisations and institutions need to be treated as parts of a 
broader system so that they are understood in their contexts with influences on 
each other examined. It is therefore necessary to take slightly different theoretical 
perspectives to analyse the credit ratings market as a way of unpicking the 
behavioural influences at play. Of particular note, an investigation seeking to 
evaluate the behavioural influences on credit ratings needs to take a holistic view, 
considering social structures and their impact on the development of routines, rules, 
norms and how these come about. The logic behind this proposal is that credit 
ratings are not just technical, but incorporate subjective judgments and rules that 
are themselves shaped by (and also shape) the behavioural and sociological aspects 
of the rating institutions (see for example North, 1990). The section below offers an 
appraisal of some of the theories briefly discussed in this study, explaining why 
they were not deemed appropriate for further use in analysing phenomena in this 
study.   
4.8.1 Economic regulation   
The regulatory void that characterised the ratings market in the EU for many years, 
coupled with the alleged unfettered power of CRAs suggested the possibility of 
regulators being captured by CRAs resulting in regulatory inertia, restricting 
change within the ratings market. Regulation theory and in particular, the capture 
theory of regulation, was therefore useful in examining the possibility of regulatory 
capture among EC regulators and their relationships with credit rating agencies.   
While regulation capture sounds plausible, there was no evidence that the 
regulators of credit rating agencies may have been captured although there was a 
strong indication of heavy regulatory reliance on ratings. This owed to the fact that 
there was no comprehensive regulatory authority with a requisite legal mandate to 
oversee CRA operations across the EU (Donnelly, 2010). Instead, there was IOSCO, 
an international voluntary code based on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis. EU markets 
therefore relied on the US SEC system of NRSROs, IOSCO as well as isolated 
individual country-based regulators.  
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Consequently, there was no single competent, coordinated pool of knowledge to 
manage CRA activities across different jurisdictions within the EU. The seeming 
adoption of US regulatory norms outside the US may suggest possible regulatory 
herding where regulators took cues from those markets perceived to be stable or 
more legitimate and leading in securities. As this issue is outside the scope of this 
study, it cannot be covered in any more depth. 
Discussions in seminal literature by renowned authors (see for example Baldwin, 
2008; Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Baldwin et al., 2012; Stigler, 1971) do not emphasise 
the active participation of the regulated entities in the formulation of regulations. 
Involvement of regulated entities has largely been in the form of consultations, 
suggesting the possibility that input may have been sought on an already-
determined regulatory agenda. This has several effects; if regulated entities are not 
part of the determination of the broad pre-regulation agenda; identification and 
verification of market issues needing to be regulated away may be compromised; if 
regulated entities do not participate in generating and evaluating different 
regulatory options and if they generally feel that their voices do not count, 
implementation on the ground can be challenging due to non-cooperation. This is 
particularly so where the cooperation of regulated entities is essential to enhance 
regulatory effectiveness.  
In the absence of cooperation from regulated entities, the resulting power tensions 
where regulators seek to increase their mandate while the regulated entities resist 
the encroachment of regulatory efforts make it difficult to regulate. Good practice 
may see regulated entities proactively taking steps to go beyond regulatory 
requirements not just as a risk mitigating move, but because they genuinely want to 
advance accountability and transparency standards in their field. Ordinarily, it 
would be easy to conclude that naturally, markets do not generally welcome 
external regulations owing to the restrictive effects that it may have on market 
participants. The EU credit ratings market, was however unique in that calls for 
regulation and accusations of failings within the credit rating industry had long 
dented the market. Under the circumstances, it would be logical for market 
participants to want some kind of regulatory endorsement of their activities to rid 
themselves of the vilifying accusations in the market.  
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Following the above logic, regulation should have been welcomed as an external 
endorsement to restore some confidence in the industry. CRAs had previously been 
accused of being too powerful and lacking accountability (Partnoy, 2001; Zingales, 
2009); lacking competition, (Deb et al., 2011); lacking transparency (Delamaide, 
2008; IOSCO Technical Committee, 2004; LaFrance, 2009; Manns, 2009); as 
suffering from conflicts of interest and potentially biased (Jiang et al, 2012; Strobl & 
Xia, 2012) among other problems. Such labels evoked negative perceptions towards 
the ratings industry in general and CRAs in particular. Nothing short of external 
intervention could wipe away the negativity associated with credit ratings 
particularly as self-regulation efforts were perceived to have failed (Mulligan, 
2009).  
From the above, CRAs were not expected to react negatively to regulation overall as 
this was necessary for their own good as a way of restoring some confidence back 
into the rating process, provided such regulations were not overly cumbersome. 
When interviewed, CRA representatives expressed a concern that regulators had 
not sufficiently engaged market participants or that there had been tokenistic 
consultations prior to the enactment of the EC regulations. Participants indirectly 
pointed to the fact that if regulators had done enough engagement of market 
participants and other interested parties, some of the problems highlighted in this 
study would have been identified and addressed at the inception of the regulatory 
process. Such gestures by regulators would have also built rapport and buy-in from 
the regulated entities, avoiding the numerous amendments that have been made to 
the initial proposals as well as saving time and money (see revisions from CRA1, 
CRA2 through to CRA3).  
The traditional view of economic regulation theory as postulated by Stigler (1971) 
therefore did not lend itself well-suited to explaining developments in the EU credit 
ratings market. Participants’ expressions of being left out of the regulatory process 
suggested a desire for a more inclusive approach to regulation as espoused in 
Becker (1985; 1983)’s endogenous theory of regulation which is discussed below. 
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4.8.2 The endogenous regulation theory 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the theory of economic regulation provided a possible 
backdrop for the evaluation of the EC CRA regulations (Kerwer, 2002). This treated 
the 2007-8 crisis as a market failure that triggered external regulatory 
interventions (Crockett, 2003; Laffont, 1994). A typical view of this approach would 
characterise regulation as an exogenous employment of coercive tools (sanctions or 
incentives) to compel compliance towards the achievement of set policy objectives 
(Hertog, 2010).  
An opposite view would argue that when economic agents seek to influence and co-
determine regulatory outcomes, the resultant regulations are generated from 
within, and among such economic players (Sy, 2012). An endogenous approach 
sees economic agents actively shaping regulations to maximise economic payoffs. 
The approach tends to engender buy-in by such economic players as the 
regulations are co-determined. Reiter (1996) described two phases of the 
endogenous regulatory approach; the first phase involved the interaction of 
economic and regulatory agents seeking to craft rules of engagement to be used in 
the second phase, that is, to agree on regulations to be used in future engagements. 
The second phase was said to involve interaction between the agents for economic 
pay-offs, that is economic agents going about their business while regulators 
provided regulatory oversight under the terms agreed in the first phase.  
It is worth noting that market failures tend to trigger the interaction of the agents in 
the first place, hence regulation is meant to restore equilibrium in the market, 
following a market failure. Each group of players seeks to maximise payoffs and 
therefore may attempt to change the regulations in their favour. Sy (2012)’s views 
built on previous work by Bae-Geun, Kaserman & Melese (1989) who categorised 
regulators as producers and regulated entities as consumers of regulation, all 
attempting to “adopt a simultaneous equations approach that reflects both firm and 
regulatory commission behaviour” (p.375).  
In their work on endogenous regulation, Im et al. (1989) appraised the 
expenditures that firms incurred in attempting to influence regulatory outcomes, 
taking care to balance such expenditures against anticipated benefits or payoffs 
from the regulation to determine the optimal levels of expenditure and engagement 
with regulators.  
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The authors considered the interplay between the firm’s expenditure on 
influencing regulations vs. payoffs, using a regulatory frontier curve to demonstrate 
the differing levels of the variables until an optimum level was reached.  
Becker (1985) reiterated the concerted efforts and expenditure by firms on 
influencing the regulatory processes, arguing that there was a correlation between 
the expenditure and the payoffs, with firms constantly adjusting their expenditures 
in line with expected payoffs. 
From the above sections, a number of broad questions arise: 
a) Whether the use of alternative theoretical perspectives (aside from the 
commonly used economic perspectives) can shed new light in evaluating 
what market participants perceive to be the impact of the EC credit rating 
agency regulations on the UK securities market operations; 
b) What market participants perceive to have been the triggers of the global 
financial crisis and whether the EC regulations are appropriately positioned 
to address such causes; 
c) Whether the EC Credit Rating Agency regulations are perceived by market 
participants to effectively address the legacy problems discussed in 
previous sections and, 
d) Whether market participants perceive there to be other viable alternative 
funding models for possible use by CRAs. 
Questions to be explored in this study will therefore centre around the above broad 
areas which are in turn informed by the extant literature reviewed. Please see 
Appendix 3 for the interview questions derived from the broad guide topics. 
4.9 Chapter summary 
The continued growth of the railroads businesses in the 19th century USA fuelled 
the need for wider bases of investment funds. With more dispersed investors 
coming into the fold, information asymmetry arose between investors and 
borrowers. To address the increasing information shortages, CRAs promptly 
entrenched themselves as providers of information on the investee entities.  
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CRAs’ roles later broadened and became increasingly central to the functioning of 
global securities particularly with the SEC’s enactment of rule 15c3-1 in 1975 and 
the subsequent designation of the NRSRO status. Despite CRAs playing a pivotal 
role in bridging information disparities between investors and issuers, it was 
argued that lack of a commonly accepted conception of the exact role of CRAs led to 
difficulties in shaping and managing expectations regarding the exact role of CRAs. 
The contested role of credit rating agencies as information gatekeepers, verification 
agents, reputational intermediaries or quasi-regulatory intermediaries was 
analysed to understand the implications on CRA roles and responsibilities on one 
hand, and market expectations on the other. This analysis helped to address 
questions on whether CRAs failed in their role or not leading to the 2007-8 financial 
crisis.  
The heavy regulatory reliance on credit ratings was contrasted with the lack of 
regulation in the ratings market. This was offered as a backdrop against which to 
analyse legacy problems inherent in the operating model of credit rating agencies. 
Review of extant literature helped to critically evaluate the increasing unfettered 
power of credit rating agencies in driving global securities markets, acting as 
information arbiters that sanctioned the flow of financial information and capital. 
Despite the increased important role of CRAs in securities markets, there was no 
comprehensive regulatory oversight on the operations of CRAs, particularly in the 
EU. The shift from the investor-pays CRA business model to the current issuer-pays 
model was said to have raised several concerns about possible conflicts of interest, 
lack of accountability and prompted calls for tighter regulatory oversight of CRAs.  
Various debates ensued, focusing on the role and mandate of CRAs, the quality of 
their ratings, whether CRAs were be regulated, if so, by whom among other issues. 
The chapter reviewed various studies conducted to investigate the relationship 
between ratings and market stock prices; whether ratings led or lagged in the 
market; the quality of ratings; possible conflicts of interest in the issuer-pays model 
as well as the effect of rating transitions among other issues. Different regulatory 
conceptions attempting to provide oversight on the operations of CRAs were 
considered.  
 
158 
 
Tabani Ndlovu  
The role of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in regulating credit 
rating agencies in the USA was reviewed, together with its alleged unwitting 
endorsement of CRAs through the designation of the Nationally Recognised 
Statistical Rating Organisation (NRSRO) status. Regulatory approaches between the 
USA and the rest of the world were compared and insights drawn to inform this 
study. The role of the IOSCO code as an overarching international regulatory 
framework for CRAs was reviewed leading to the identification of regulatory gaps. 
The regulatory gaps on the oversight of CRAs, particularly in the EU were 
highlighted as a concern for academics and practitioners alike who called for active 
regulation of CRAs. Calls for regulation of CRAs were further heightened by the 
alleged role of CRAs in various corporate collapses and financial crises where CRAs 
allegedly failed to provide timely and accurate ratings. The 2007-8 global financial 
crisis was said to have triggered active regulatory initiatives by the European 
Commission, culminating in the promulgation of regulation No. 1060/2009.  
Despite the EC CRA regulations coming in to address previously identified market 
problems, it was noted that they were met with criticism from those who argued 
that the regulations would likely do more harm than good to the securities market; 
that the regulations had not been well thought-through and that the regulations 
were limited in scope. This raised questions on whether such concerns were shared 
by market participants working in or around credit ratings and if so, what they 
perceived to be the specific impacts of the EC regulations as well as what 
alternative approaches they envisaged could address the identified problems in the 
ratings market. As yet, there have not been any empirical studies investigating the 
perceived impact of the EC credit rating agency regulations on the operations of the 
UK securities market. This study therefore sought to contribute to on-going debates 
in the ratings market by eliciting the views of practitioners who work with or 
around credit ratings on the possible impact of the EC credit rating agency 
regulations. With on-going debates and continued efforts to streamline the 
regulations so that they are fit for purpose, this study provided useful insights to 
identify areas that practitioners considered to be problematic as well as possible 
remedies for the identified problems. The next chapter discusses the study design 
and the study’s methodological issues.   
 
159 
 
Tabani Ndlovu  
 
 
 
5 
 
  
Chapter Five: 
Methodology 
 
160 
 
Tabani Ndlovu  
5.0 Introduction  
This chapter outlines the research design employed in the study, linking the chosen 
design to previous studies carried out in the area of credit rating agencies, credit 
ratings and securities regulation in general. After setting out the study parameters 
and requisite rationale, the chapter then considers possible limitations of the 
chosen approach and implications for the study. The section below explores 
previous studies carried out to investigate different aspects of credit rating 
agencies and credit ratings, considering their methodological and theoretical 
approaches and how this study builds on them. 
5.1 Previous research approaches in credit rating studies 
The majority of previous studies investigating credit rating agencies and credit 
ratings have largely adopted an economic perspective, in particular, analysing the 
efficacy of ratings, focusing on agency relationships and regulatory implications for 
the ratings industry. Methods previously adopted have tended to take a statistical 
analysis approach employing such techniques as ordinary least squares (OLS) or 
regression (Fisher, 1959; Horrigan, 1966; West, 1970); artificial intelligence 
techniques for rating predictions (Ahn & Kim, 2011); probit models (Kaplan & 
Urwitz, 1979); time series forecasting employing neural networks (Atiya, 2001; 
Singleton & Surkan, 1995) and support vector machine techniques (Chen & Shih, 
2006; Huang, Chen, Hsu, Chen, & Wu, 2004) among others.  
Researchers in previous studies largely took deductivist, quantitative approaches in 
the majority of cases. However, considering the fact that ratings are not solely 
numerical hard data, but rather, comprise subjective analyst judgments as well 
(Lehmann, 2003), the softer, behavioural view of credit rating issues also deserves 
exploration. Indeed, Frost (2007) argued that most of the criticisms levelled against 
CRAs were based on subjective conjectures which were difficult to prove and 
suggested that researchers from the accounting domain could add more insights 
particularly on financial market intermediation, auditing and disclosure among 
other issues. Similarly, Lawson (2009) lamented the dearth of comprehensive, 
contextual methodological approaches in understanding the social origins of the 
global financial crisis.  
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He argued that most studies attempting to frame the crisis were previously more 
inclined to “mathematical deductivist models” (p.759) which unfortunately did not 
sufficiently delve deep enough into the more insightful descriptive and behavioural 
backgrounds of participants in the securities market. Consequently, attempts to 
succinctly capture the behavioural causes of the crisis were said to have been 
thwarted by somewhat narrow, deductivist conceptualisations of securities market 
relationships (Colander et al., 2009).  This posed a theoretical bottleneck because in 
an attempt to formulate conceptual solutions to the financial crisis, the origins, 
scope and dynamics of the crisis have to be accurately identified. This calls for 
comprehensive frameworks that simulate the inherent relationships and influences 
at play. So far, this has not been the case. There is an increasing number of authors 
who cite the 2007-8 crisis as a moral and ethical failure caused by greed (Dhiman, 
2008; Greycourt, 2008; Lewis et al., 2010; Othman et al., 2010) or as a governance 
failure (Johansson, 2010). It is therefore key to examine this topic from broader, 
alternative theoretical perspectives so as to get a richer alternative view.  There is 
therefore a compelling need for a social science approach to studying the financial 
crisis, its causes and possible solutions. In particular, rating agencies and their 
ratings present a worthy study area that needs to be looked at from all possible 
angles owing to their alleged contribution to the 2007-8 global financial crisis 
(Hunt, 2009a; Partnoy, 1999; White, 2009).  
Despite impact assessments and consultations carried out prior to the enactment of 
the European Commission regulations, there were fears that the resultant EC 
regulations were narrow in scope (Utzig, 2010); that they would likely have 
unintended consequences (Lynch, 2009); that they did not comprehensively 
address the problems inherent in the ratings industry (Calomiris, 2009); that they 
were politically-motivated (Posner, 2010) and that they were reactive (Sy, 2009; 
Tichy, 2011). This raised questions on whether regulations (in general) and the EC 
regulations (specifically) were an appropriate response to the issues facing the 
industry after all (Mollers, 2009). A social science investigation of market 
participants would therefore be helpful in several ways. Firstly, it would empirically 
evaluate market participants’ views on the impact of the regulations and contribute 
to previous consultation efforts in this area.  
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Secondly, the approach would consider more insightful behavioural issues 
surrounding the quantitative data and thus contribute to a more holistic appraisal 
of issues in credit ratings. As the regulations were still relatively new at the time of 
conducting this study, investigating market participants’ perspectives on the 
regulatory initiatives was a new study area suggesting an exploratory approach. 
Results from this study will therefore form an important benchmark against which 
further future studies can be carried out to investigate the shift of issues around 
credit ratings over time. Before discussing the approaches adopted in this study, 
section 5.2 gives an overview of typical methodological considerations in social 
research in general, together with implications on study design.   
 
5.2 Study design considerations in social research 
Methodology, as distinct from method, refers to broader considerations around the 
adopted study approaches, tools or techniques. This also covers the implications of 
the chosen approach and possible limitations in achieving the study aims. Methods 
on the other hand are the specific implements or tools employed to collect data 
(Barbour, 2008). According to Crotty (1998), there is a distinction between a 
theoretical perspective, methodology, epistemology and method. Despite the cited 
differences, all these are interlinked and inform each other. Typically, the idealised 
view is that the researcher’s philosophical position sets the context for the 
methodology, which in turn shapes the chosen research methods. In contrast to the 
above however, in reality, the tendency is to start with methods, leading to 
methodology and subsequently to the philosophical framework and finally to the 
epistemology underpinning the study, (Creswell, 1994; Crotty, 1998). Section 5.3 
below covers the philosophy of research and its influence on study design. 
 
5.3 Philosophy of research 
The philosophy of research encapsulates ways of knowing and assumptions made 
about the world together with knowledge creation, (Hughes, 1987). Philosophy 
underpins any research process or tools used to generate knowledge. It is a key 
consideration for clarifying parameters within which a study is conceived and 
carried out. According to Burrell & Morgan (1979) social science is viewed 
explicitly or implicitly through four sets of assumptions looking at ontology, 
epistemology, human nature and methodology.  
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On the same subject,  Hughes (1987) identified a number of different philosophical 
approaches to social research including realism, empiricism, positivism, idealism, 
rationalism, objectivism, subjectivism and interpretivism among others. Each 
philosophical position has implications on knowledge construction particularly 
with regards to each position’s corresponding assumptions of the relationships 
between the knower and the known (Hughes & Sharrock, 1990). Definitions of 
research issues within each philosophical position therefore have to be based on 
the tenets of that philosophical position. The implication of situating studies within 
the respective philosophical positions has an important role in determining the 
validity and consistency of the conclusions made (Hughes, 1987; Uddin & 
Hamiduzzaman, 2009). The section below discusses the role of ontology, 
epistemology and methodology in designing social research studies.   
 
5.3.1 The role of ontology, epistemology and methodology 
Ontology covers human assumptions about the reality of phenomena under 
investigation. This looks at whether the phenomena are objective, i.e. external and 
independent of the inquirer; or subjective, i.e. “a product of individual cognition” 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p.1). Epistemology on the other hand concerns itself with 
the nature of knowledge, its generation and how it can be shared as well as the 
grounds on which truth and falsehoods are constructed. Underlying ontological and 
epistemological views and assumptions is human nature. This underpins man’s 
relationship and role with / and in the environment, i.e. whether man is ‘the’ 
creator determining what happens around him, (determinism) and / or whether 
man is merely responding to what happens around him i.e. controlled by the 
external environment (Seale, 2004). In social science settings, the intricate blend of 
the above assumptions influence what methodology is adopted in the quest for 
knowledge. The result of each adopted option in turn gives a plethora of potential 
interpretations open to social scientists. 
From a deterministic perspective, methodology would concern itself with the 
articulation of concepts being investigated, how they are measured, and the 
assumptions underpinning them. From a voluntarism view of social reality, social 
inquiry focuses on the different human conceptions and the influences around 
people. This emphasises the interpretation of reality in context, acknowledging the 
relativistic orientation of social reality (Blaikie, 2000).  
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By virtue of its relativistic nature, this assumption falsifies the concept of falsity, i.e. 
there is no ‘wrong’ but there is ‘different’, depending on the viewer’s contextual 
view (Holden & Lynch, 2004). A deeper analysis of this view validates people’s 
subjective perspectives as contextually-legitimate in explaining social reality, i.e. 
reality is what makes sense as explained by one’s context and inclination at a point 
in time. The focus changes from a generalised view to a substantive one where 
context and setting influence the understanding when making sense of one’s reality. 
5.3.2 Validity in social research 
In determining the validity of knowledge generation in social science, the 
robustness or plausibility of the chosen methodology is considered in relation to 
the underpinning paradigms, ontological and epistemological traditions within 
which the methodology sits. This largely stems from the different possible 
approaches to studying social phenomena and the different interpretations that can 
be derived from studying the same phenomena but from different paradigms 
(Blaikie, 1993; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Hatch & Cunliffe, 1997). The understanding 
of the broader context of the study helps to expose the possible biases (James & 
Vinnicombe, 2002) as well as justify the methodological choices and preferences 
adopted in the approach of the study (Blaikie, 2000).   
5.3.3 Philosophical paradigm adopted in this study 
A paradigm can be viewed as a “basic belief system or world view that guides the 
investigation” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p.105). It consists of “..the general theoretical 
assumptions and laws, and techniques for their application that the members of a 
particular scientific community adopt” (Chalmers, 1982, p.90) and embodies the 
assumptions, concepts and frameworks used to construct knowledge as discussed 
above.  
This study is situated within a qualitative, naturalistic setting, (Hammersley, 1999) 
investigating UK-based market participants’ perceptions of the impact of the 
European Commission credit rating regulations on the UK credit rating and /or 
securities market. The adoption of an exploratory, qualitative approach was driven 
largely by the lack of existing studies investigating market participants’ reactions to 
the relatively new EC regulatory phenomenon.  
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The area is therefore new, with the regulations only having been gazetted in 2009 
for implementation by the end of 2010. In this respect, rather than pre-defining a 
prescribed detailed focus on the issues to be investigated, an exploratory 
qualitative approach allowed for “respondents to identify those issues which are 
salient for them and to explain how these impact on their daily lives,......”  (Barbour, 
2008, p.12). Initially, grounded theory was considered as both a theoretical 
framework and a methodology for guiding the design of the study. This approach 
was considered as it would allow for emergence of key themes from the collected 
data particularly as the study was exploratory in nature (Charmaz, 2006). On closer 
analysis, the prescriptive nature of grounded theory with regards to prior 
consultation of extant literature made it unsuitable for this study (Suddaby, 2006). 
This owed to the fact that in framing the questions, the study had to review extant 
literature as a way of identifying the topical issues relating to the regulation of CRAs 
in the EU. Further, the limited scope of this study made it difficult to develop new 
theory as is the aim of grounded theory.  
5.3.4 The role and place of theory in qualitative research 
It is not uncommon for studies of a qualitative nature to be exploratory, particularly 
in new research areas (Stebbins, 2001). In such cases, theory is brought in towards 
the end of the study to illuminate the findings. Theory therefore tends to be used 
“once we are in the business of attempting to shed light on the data we have 
generated” (Barbour, 2008, p.233). This view was endorsed by Creswell (1994, 
p.94-95) who postulated that: 
“..in a qualitative study, one does not begin with a theory to test or verify. 
Instead, consistent with the inductive model of thinking, a theory may 
emerge during the data collection and analysis phase,...or be used relatively 
late in the research process as a basis for comparison with other theories” 
In contrast to the above view, Patton (1990) argued that theory should precede 
methodology and methods as “how you study the world determines what you learn 
about the world” (p.67). Merriam (1998) concurred with Patton (1990) adding that 
theory is the backbone or pillar of the study, supporting the entire study from the 
conception of what data to look for, through to the interpretation of the findings. 
Viewed from Merriam (1998)’s standpoint, the theoretical frame stems from the 
extant literature surrounding the study.  
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It precedes the data collection and analysis stages to ensure that the study 
questions are guided by the relevant theoretical frame and extant literature in the 
relevant study area. The above view is consistent with the views of Miles & 
Huberman (1984) who acknowledged that researchers approach the field with 
some initial ideas that help delineate and scope the study. Pointedly though, Miles & 
Huberman (1994) referred to ‘ideas’ as opposed to ‘theory’ and the two clearly 
have different connotations.  Consequently, study findings need to be tested against 
the initial theory either to confirm or disprove it. This approach poses challenges in 
studies investigating new phenomena where there may be little prior research, 
requiring researchers to adopt other parallel approaches or break new ground.  
Although regulatory studies are not new per se, regulatory studies specifically 
investigating European CRA regulations are a new development. Exploratory 
studies therefore go against the views expressed above (Merriam, 1998; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1990) as they traverse virgin territory where there may 
be paucity of theory. Instead, theory in such studies tends to be employed to explain 
the findings towards the close of the study (Barbour, 2008; Creswell, 1994). 
5.3.5 The role and place of theory in this study 
This study investigated market participants’ views on the perceived impact of the 
CRA regulations on the UK credit ratings and / or securities market. The focus on 
the EC regulatory impact is a new area with not much previous empirical 
investigations of UK-based market participants’ perceptions of the impact of the EC 
CRA regulations on UK ratings market operations. Consequently, the adopted 
approach sought to use theory to interpret the findings as opposed to using theory 
as a philosophical frame to design the study. The researcher acknowledged the role 
of extant literature covering broader aspects of credit rating agencies and credit 
ratings. This literature though broad, helped to identify sound philosophical 
underpinnings which in turn enabled the framing of the study, conception of what 
questions to ask, choice of research methods as well as analysis and interpretation 
approaches adopted to manage the study findings (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998).   
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Pursuant to the Creswell (1994) and Barbour (2008)’s approaches discussed 
earlier, this study did not prescribe a theoretical stance in advance. Rather, once 
data had been generated and analysed, relevant theoretical frameworks were 
subsequently employed to better shed light on the resultant findings. Because of the 
exploratory nature of the study, a qualitative approach was deemed appropriate to 
elicit detailed views from study participants. 
5.3.6 Qualitative research approach 
A qualitative research approach allows for rich and holistic data capable of 
revealing complexity within the study area (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Further, this 
approach is “fundamentally well-suited for locating meanings people place on the 
events, processes and structures of their lives; their perceptions, assumptions, 
prejudgements, presuppositions”  (Van Manen, 1977, p.207).  
The study adopted a relativist ontological perspective (Tan, 2002), acknowledging 
the potentially varied perceptions of market participants with regards to the impact 
of the EC regulations on the operations of the UK securities market. The goal 
therefore was to investigate the contextual implications of the regulations to the 
different participant groups. Semi-structured interviews were selected as the most 
appropriate data collection tool as they offered a combination of flexibility allowing 
participants to bring out issues perceived to be important, but also offered the 
researcher an opportunity to steer the conversation while probing further for 
clarifications. 
5.4 Background on research participants 
Study participants were drawn from 4 groups comprising professionals who work 
closely with or around credit ratings. The first group of participants was made of 
issuers, representing the rated institutions that borrow money and pay for credit 
ratings. The second group of participants were drawn from institutional investors. 
Although they do not pay for ratings or influence their generation, institutional 
investors are the major consumers of credit ratings whose views on the new 
regulations will be key in this study. A further group of Other Interested Parties 
(OIPs) working closely with rating agencies was interviewed.  
 
168 
 
Tabani Ndlovu  
This category encompassed researchers, journalists and retirees from the 
investment, issuing or regulation communities with an interest in rating agencies. 
Lastly, although CRAs were at the centre of the regulations, they were themselves 
not market participants but their views were deemed important in understanding 
the impact of the regulations to their operations.  The following section gives more 
information on the study participant groups before discussing the sampling 
approach and how the participants were recruited.  
5.4.1 Issuers 
Issuers formed the largest group of respondents in the study and comprised senior 
treasury officials (ranging from senior analyst to director level) drawn from various 
industries as shown in the table below. Participants were largely male, with only 
three females, all drawn from British-based issuing organisations.  
Table 18: Breakdown of issuer participants 
Participant Code Industry / Sector Position in Company 
IS1 Gas / Electricity / Water Senior Analyst 
IS2 Construction / Building / Civil Engineering Head of Treasury 
IS3 Construction / Building / Civil Engineering Group Treasurer 
IS4 Engineering / Heavy Machinery Group Treasurer 
IS5 Financial Services Treasury Manager 
IS6 Food / Drink / Tobacco Senior Analyst 
IS7 Gas / Electricity / Water Deputy Treasurer 
IS8 Tobacco Group Treasurer / Retired 
IS9 Gas / Electricity / Water Deputy Treasurer 
IS10 Tobacco / Financial Services Treasury Consultant 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
5.4.2 Institutional investors 
Representatives from institutional investors consisted of a total of 9 participants, 
forming the second largest group of interviewees in the study. Participants were 
drawn from financial services, manufacturing, local government, pension funds and 
pharmaceutical industries. All participants were at director level in their respective 
organisations and had a good strategic view of issues involving ratings and the EC 
regulations. Seven participants were male, with only two females. A summary of 
participants’ profiles is given in the table below.   
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 Table 19: Breakdown of institutional investor participants 
Participant Code Industry / Sector Position in Company 
IN1 Financial Services / Pension Funds Director level 
IN2 Financial Services / Cash Management Director level 
IN3 Financial Services Director level 
IN4 Pharmaceuticals Director level 
IN5 Local Gvt / Gvt Agencies Director level 
IN6 Financial Services Assistant Director 
IN7 Manufacturing Director level 
IN8 Financial Services Director level 
IN9 Financial Services Director level 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
5.4.3 Other Interested Parties (OIPs) 
This group comprised 5 senior professionals either working largely in, or who had 
previously worked in professional services or in advisory functions, working 
closely with credit ratings and or credit rating agencies. This group also included 
any individuals who for whatever reason used credit ratings in making decisions 
(Duff & Einig, 2009b). Two of the participants had worked in regulatory capacities 
before and thus had good internal and external views of the securities in general 
and credit ratings regulatory issues. Of the 5 participants, 4 were male, with only 
one female. It was envisaged that the views from this group of participants would 
be key in offering an objective perspective as they were and are not directly 
involved in ratings themselves either in an issuing or investing capacity. The table 
below gives an overview of the participants in this category, together with the 
industry sectors represented.   
Table 20: Overview of OIP Participants 
Participant Code Industry / Sector Position in Company 
OP1 Financial Services Director level 
OP2 Advisory / Professional Services Director level 
OP3 Professional Services Director level 
OP4 Professional Services Director level 
OP5 Professional Services Director level 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
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5.4.4 Credit Rating Agencies, (CRAs) 
The rating agency sector is dominated by a few players in an oligopolistic fashion 
and it could be easy to identify individuals if detailed profiles were given. To protect 
the identity of the participants, their profiles and the details of their organisations 
were obscured. Out of the 6 participants in this category, the majority (4) were 
male, with only 2 females. The table below gives an overview of the participants.   
 Table 21: Overview of CRA participants 
Participant Code Industry / Sector Position in Company 
CR1 Credit Ratings Assistant Director 
CR2 Credit Ratings Director 
CR3 Credit Ratings Senior Analyst 
CR4 Credit Ratings Senior Analyst 
CR5 Credit Ratings 
Senior Executive 
CR6 Credit Ratings Senior Director 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
The following section discusses the sampling approach adopted to recruit 
participants for the study together with justifications for the chosen approach. 
5.5 Sampling approach adopted in this study 
The study initially used a purposive non-probability sampling approach (Roulston, 
2010). Participants were specifically selected for their involvement and knowledge 
of credit ratings, an area comprising a limited and specialised population. According 
to Miles & Huberman (1994) samples in qualitative research may not be predefined 
but instead, may change as the study evolves to reflect the emergent issues and 
further sources of relevant information.  
Because of the closed nature of the rating industry, a purposive approach was 
adopted for the initial stages of the study, using a list of participants drawn from 
members of the Association of Corporate Treasurers (ACT). During the interviews, 
each of the participants was asked for further relevant contacts in the industry, 
consistent with the snowball sampling approach (Biemacki & Waldorf, 1981; 
Goodman, 1961). This owed to the specialised nature of the credit rating subject, 
which has a limited network of professionals who have dealings with the credit 
rating industry. The purposive and snowballing approaches are discussed in more 
detail below.  
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5.5.1 Purposive and snowball sampling 
The initial list of study participants was provided courtesy of the Association of 
Corporate Treasurers who allowed access to their membership database. The ACT 
is a professional body representing treasury professionals. As the membership 
database contained thousands of entries, potential interviewees were purposively 
selected based on the following criteria: 
1. Only members of the ACT working group were considered. The ACT Working 
Group actively reviews the proposed European Commission credit rating 
regulatory reforms, recommending appropriate responses to and by the ACT. 
2. Only those members who had an expressed interest in the area of credit 
ratings were selected. Profiles of ACT Working Group members highlight 
members’ interests as well as their willingness to participate in studies 
involving credit ratings, making the members an ideal sample for this study. 
Invitation requests were sent via email to a total of 35 contacts. A total of 23 
participants responded positively and out of these, 19 were successfully 
interviewed. During the interviews, the researcher adopted a snowball sampling 
approach, requesting each interviewed participant to volunteer further potential 
interviewees who fit the criteria described in section 5.4 (Overview of research 
participants). This approach was taken particularly as some of the participants 
pointed out that there could be other good sources of information who did not 
necessarily subscribe to the ACT. Using the snowball approach, a further 21 
contacts were generated. Of the 21, 11 were subsequently interviewed, bringing the 
total interviewees to 30. 
Borrowing from some grounded theory sampling techniques, no sample size was 
defined beforehand. Instead, the ultimate sample size was a result of theoretical 
saturation (Charmaz, 2006; Riley, 1996). Issues brought up in interviews were 
explored in successive interviews using the constant comparative method (Barbour, 
2008) until they were exhausted. When no new issues came up in the last 
successive interviews, saturation was deemed to have been reached and the 
interviews were concluded. At the conclusion of the data collection exercise, a total 
of 30 participants had been interviewed broken down into the categories discussed 
in 5.4 above.    
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Notwithstanding the fact that participants volunteered to be contacted for further 
clarifications, out of a total of 15 email requests sent out as follow-up to the 
interviews, only two responses were received from the participants, despite earlier 
promises that they would respond to emerging questions. The next section briefly 
discusses the procedures taken to recruit study participants as well as send out 
interview requests. 
5.5.2 Recruitment of participants 
For the first batch of 19 interviewees provided courtesy of the ACT member 
directory, email addresses and telephone numbers were made available in 
members’ profiles alongside their interests and willingness to participate in studies 
involving credit rating agencies. The researcher was granted access to the online 
member directory and asked to contact only members of the Working Group who 
had expressed an interest in the study of rating agencies. Interview requests were 
emailed to participants together with a Participant Information sheet (see 
Appendix 1) detailing the research brief, interview details together with a request 
for an interview appointment.  
Potential participants were given an outline of their expected contribution and a 
rationale of why they were selected for the study. Contacts were given flexibility to 
nominate dates and times convenient to them (with some dates suggested by the 
researcher). An email reminder was subsequently sent out again 2 weeks after the 
initial email and again 2 weeks after the second email reminder. If there were no 
responses received after the second reminder, the relevant names were crossed out 
of the potential list. For the snowballed 11 participants, interview requests giving 
detailed information about the study were sent out using email addresses provided 
by their referees. Reminders were sent out as in the first batch of participants 
discussed above. In all cases, participants who volunteered to be interviewed 
mostly asked to be interviewed at their work premises either in their offices or in 
canteens or meeting rooms. In a few cases, interviews were held in public coffee 
houses or restaurants. During the interviews, the interviewer reassured all 
participants that results would be made anonymous to protect participants’ 
identities. Participants signed a consent form for the interviews to be recorded. 
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5.5.3 Rationale of the sampling approach 
In a study carried out prior to the 2007-8 global financial crisis and the subsequent 
regulations, Einig (2008) conducted semi-structured interviews of 16 participants 
drawn from institutional investors, issuers, OIPs and CRA representatives. As part 
of recommendations for further research, the author indicated that further studies, 
particularly after the 2007-8 crisis would be helpful in shedding light on evolving 
participant perceptions towards the regulations. This study follows on from the 
Einig (2008) study. Consequently, a similar participant sample was used for 
consistency. The advantage of the above sample is that it comprised people likely to 
be knowledgeable about ratings as well as interested in the issue of credit rating 
agency regulations owing to their proximity to the regulatory issues. 
5.5.4 Potential limitations of the sampling approach 
From a sampling viewpoint, the ACT Working group, by its very nature is self-
selected and may have a possible bias depending on their mandate in the ACT. 
There is also the limitation that participants who were not members of the ACT (or 
were not known to ACT members) were automatically excluded and may have had 
different contributions to make. Having worked on previous research studies 
involving credit ratings and possibly, the EC regulations, ACT Working group 
members may have been primed in the area with ready responses on rating agency 
subjects.    
Notwithstanding the above possible limitations, the diverse nature of the 
participant categories represented by the group (i.e. investors, issuers, CRAs, OIPs) 
suggested that any possible collective bias would have been diluted as each 
represented group was likely to interpret and be affected by the regulations 
differently. A unanimous collective view was therefore not expected from all the 
interviewed ACT Working Group members. Section 0 outlines the data collection 
process in more detail.  
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5.6 Data collection 
Once appointments were secured, actual interviews lasted on average, between 30 
minutes and 1 hour and were primarily held at participants’ places of work or 
public places such as restaurants agreed to by the interviewer and interviewee. A 
few interviews had to be conducted via the phone at the request of the interviewees. 
Interviews opened with introductions from the interviewer, thanking participants 
for their time and advising participants of the way their data would be handled, in 
line with the university’s Ethics Policies and in accordance with the Data Protection 
Act (1998). Permission was sought from participants to audio record the interviews 
and as proof of consent, participants were asked to sign a disclaimer consenting to 
participating in the interview and for the interview to be audio-recorded. A copy of 
the form is shown in Appendix 2. Interviews followed a semi-structured format as 
discussed in section 5.6.1. 
5.6.1 Semi-structured interviews 
The exploratory nature of the study required a flexible and open data collection 
technique that would allow for participants to guide the discussion towards issues 
deemed to be key in the study area (Stebbins, 2001). Semi-structured interviews 
were chosen ahead of other tools as they allowed for an insightful exploration of 
participants’ responses as well as uncovering their reasoning behind the expressed 
views on the perceived impact of the EC regulations (Kvale, 1983). Further, because 
of the participant groups’ diverse backgrounds, it was deemed important to adapt 
the interviews to respond to each group and individual needs.  
Structured interviews were deemed restrictive and inappropriate in a new area 
where the participants knew more about the research subject than the researcher 
and thus needed the flexibility to take the lead, with the researcher acting as a 
facilitator (Fontana & Frey, 2000). The researcher used an interview schedule with 
broad topics to steer the discussion. This is discussed in 5.6.2 below and presented 
in Appendix 3. During the interviews, participants had the leeway to emphasise on 
issues that they felt were pertinent to the discussion and in particular, to their own 
organisations and the industry. This owed to the exploratory nature of the study 
but posed challenges in the analysis stage as some of the emerging issues could not 
be checked back with previous participants.  
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5.6.2 Interview schedule 
An interview schedule with broad open-ended topics was designed to steer the 
discussion. The open-ended nature of the guide allowed for elucidation of issues by 
interviewees (Barbour, 2008). The guide was informed by extant literature in the 
area of credit ratings and regulation, covering broad topics such as: what 
participants perceived to be the key issues in the credit ratings market and whether 
such issues were receiving appropriate focus in the EC regulatory initiatives; 
perceived causes of the crisis; perceived regulation drivers; legacy problems in the 
credit ratings industry; perceived impact of the EC regulations (costs vs. benefits); 
perceived unintended consequences; regulators’ perceived competence; views 
towards the mooted EU-based CRA together with possible alternative CRA revenue 
models; the nature of the EC regulations and perceived changes in the ratings 
industry post the 2007-8 crisis and the enactment of the EC regulations. 
There were areas common across all participant groups, while others related 
exclusively to particular participant groups. The common focal areas allowed for 
comparability of views across the different participant groups but when it came to 
the specific issues, these could not be compared across the different groups. Einig 
(2008) employed a similar approach in designing interview questions posed to 16 
participants drawn from the same participant groups as above. The main advantage 
of using a similar approach is to make comparisons between the findings of the two 
studies. 
5.6.3 Interview format 
The interviews opened with “less threatening questions” (Barbour, 2008, p.115), 
asking participants to give their backgrounds and involvement with credit ratings. 
This included such things as an overview of their work, responsibilities and time in 
the company or industry. Once participants were settled and comfortable, 
subsequent questions focused on issues around the EC regulations as highlighted in 
section 5.6.2 above. The format and order of the questions was not strictly adhered 
to, allowing participants to steer the conversation towards what they deemed 
important within the broad research focus. Prompts were occasionally used to 
probe for deeper insights and steer the interviews to keep them in focus.  
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5.7 Limitations of the data collection approach 
According to Zikmund (2003) personal interviews can be influenced by 
interpersonal dynamics between the interviewer and interviewees. With the 
interviewer dealing with highly experienced senior executives considered to be 
experts in their field, it is possible that interviewees may have regarded some 
questions as naive, possibly clouding their responses. Further, with participants 
being experts who regularly engaged with the subject of credit ratings, their 
responses may have been mechanistic, rehearsed views that may indicate the 
official group line as opposed to genuine, spontaneous reactions shared by their 
respective industry groups. To mitigate the above limitations, selected participants 
were briefed on why they had been chosen together with the contribution expected 
from them, thereby acknowledging their expertise in the study.    
The nature of semi-structured interviews meant that the flow and format of the 
interviews was different with each participant owing to the open-ended 
questioning approach. This resulted in somewhat varied responses, with some 
participants generously volunteering lengthy answers and having to be nudged to 
maintain some focus, while others gave very minimal responses and had to be 
probed in an attempt to get more input as well as seek clarifications on some of 
their contributions. On three different occasions during the study, participants 
started volunteering data well before the interviews started (examples included 
conversations on the way from collecting the researcher at reception; while 
ordering coffee as well as while in the lift on the way to the interview venue). On all 
these occasions, the researcher had not yet had a chance to take out recording 
equipment or interview schedules. However, on each of these occasions, once the 
party had sat down, the researcher would request for participants to recap on some 
of the issues referred to earlier in the unrecorded conversations.  
It was noted that in all the three cases, participants were not as spontaneous and 
unrestrained as they had previously been. One participant was noted to say “As I 
mentioned while we were on our way....” refusing to give any further details of the 
previous unrecorded conversations. Some useful information was also proffered 
after the conclusion of the interviews while participants were accompanying the 
researcher to the lifts or escorting him out of the meeting venues.  
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These incidents raised questions on whether recording equipment ought to be left 
on until after the researcher had left the premises or whether such acts could have 
connotations on data confidentiality and wider ethical issues. 
5.8 Parallels drawn from other studies 
Due to the lack of literature around market participants’ perceptions of credit 
rating agency regulations, this study borrowed insights from the audit literature. As 
discussed in section 2.6, credit ratings and the audit profession share a common 
heritage. Both professions play a crucial yet contested financial intermediation role, 
(Opp et al., 2012) and both professions have been implicated in failing to avert 
corporate collapses leading to incessant calls for them to be regulated. As audit 
literature had more coverage in the area of participants’ perceptions towards 
regulation of the practice, insights from audit were drawn and inferences made to 
the credit rating area. Several studies were conducted, investigating the 
perceptions of different market players, (see for example Beattie, Brandt, & 
Fearnley, 1999; Dart, 2011; Houghton, Jubb, Kend, & Ng, 2011). Although these 
studies investigated investors’ perceptions towards auditor independence, the 
principle of studying perceptions and reactions to a phenomenon such as auditor 
independence or the perceived impact of the EC credit rating agency regulations is 
important as it helps to understand the concerned participants’ reactions towards 
the identified phenomena, giving indications of how such participants might 
cooperate with regulatory efforts. Dart (2011) surveyed UK-based investors to 
gauge their perceptions towards auditor independence. Auditors like rating 
agencies had issues of conflicts of interest and were also classed as information 
intermediaries or gatekeepers (Fleischer, 2010; Lombard, 2008).  Therefore, 
insights from developments in the audit literature acted as useful comparators 
when studying CRAs. 
5.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter gave an overview of the key philosophical considerations underpinning 
social research studies in general and the approaches specifically adopted in this 
study. Philosophical assumptions were shown to be key in shaping the design, 
methodologies and specific research techniques adopted in the study.  
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The paucity of theory and background studies around market participants’ 
perceptions of the relatively new EC regulations influenced the adoption of an 
exploratory study taking a qualitative approach. As the perceived impact of the EC 
regulations was likely to be contextually-framed, an interpretivist philosophical 
approach was deemed to be an ideal underpinning epistemological stance. As the 
area was specialist in nature, a qualitative approach was deemed necessary, 
employing semi-structured interviews to allow participants to steer the interview 
conversations towards issues perceived to be salient in the study area. A 
combination of purposive and snowballing sampling techniques was used to recruit 
study participants. Data collection techniques employed in the study were discussed 
and appraised. A rationale was given for adopting the selected methods. The next 
chapter offers an overview of data analysis in qualitative research before outlining 
the analysis approach adopted in this study.    
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6.0 Introduction  
This chapter outlines the data analysis approach adopted in this study, situating it 
within an interpretivist paradigm, taking a qualitative research approach. A 
rationale for the approach is given, highlighting the influences of the exploratory 
approach adopted in the methodology section. The chapter details the preparation 
of the data prior to analysis, covering the transcription of the audio-recordings into 
word documents to facilitate easier analysis. Due to the exploratory nature of the 
study, it was necessary that the analysis process involved deep immersion into the 
data to allow for insights to emerge directly from the data. In the process of 
analysing data, the researcher discovered a prevalent use of metaphors by study 
participants. Metaphor analysis was therefore adopted as a method of analysing 
and making sense of the data. To offer a holistic view of all the participants, non-
metaphor data was also analysed and the results thereof aligned to the emerging 
metaphor categories. Section 6.1 below discusses qualitative data analysis in 
general before the chapter goes on to focus specifically on the metaphor analysis 
approach adopted in this study.  
6.1 Background to data analysis in qualitative research 
Data analysis in qualitative studies is still regarded as one of the most challenging 
steps in qualitative research studies as acknowledged by Miles & Huberman (1994, 
p.2) 
 
“the most serious and central difficulty in the use of qualitative data is that 
methods of analysis are not well formulated...the analyst faced with a bank 
of qualitative data has very few guidelines for protection against self-
delusion, let alone the presentation of unreliable or invalid conclusions to 
scientific or policy-making audiences...”  
 
 
The open nature of qualitative studies makes it difficult to hone in on study findings 
particularly for inexperienced researchers. This makes judging validity and 
reliability equally difficult. There are diverse opinions on the conduct of qualitative 
data analysis with some scholars arguing that it is impossible to arrive at sound 
conclusions within the realms of qualitative studies (Bruyn, 1966; Wolcott, 1992). 
On the other hand, there is a growing body of research highlighting an increasing 
acceptance of qualitative data in explaining social phenomena (Dey, 1993; Fielding 
& Fielding, 1986).   
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While traditionally, some scholars have pitted qualitative approaches against their 
quantitative counterparts (see for example Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Reichardt & 
Rallis, 1994; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006), it is important to highlight the 
interdependence and complementarity between quantitative (enumeration) 
approaches and qualitative (conceptualisation) orientations (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
1998). A combination of the two approaches provides for richer and more balanced 
research outcomes (Dey, 1993). Previously, quantitative studies were touted as 
more credible and scientifically robust compared to their qualitative counterparts 
(Labuschagne, 2003). Notwithstanding such claims, quantitative studies have their 
own weaknesses, probably more aptly captured in Reason & Rowan (1981) who 
argued that: 
 
 “There is too much measurement going on. Some things which are 
numerically precise are not true; and some things which are not 
numerical are true. Orthodox research produces results which are 
statistically significant but humanly insignificant; in human inquiry it 
is much better to be deeply interesting than accurately boring” (Reason 
& Rowan, 1981, p.xv) 
The above argument underscores the dangers inherent in quantitative studies 
and the generalisations that can potentially emanate from too much focus on 
numerical data, ignoring the more descriptive and perhaps more informative 
data around the numbers. Such rigid numerical conceptions can mask finer 
behavioural details between the figures. The suggestion by the authors was 
that richer and more explanatory data could be obtained via qualitative 
studies, complementing results of quantitative numerical data, rather than 
nullifying them. 
6.1.1 Generic issues in qualitative data analysis 
Dey (1993, p.31) defined analysis as “.. a process of resolving data into its 
constituent components, to reveal its characteristic elements and structure.” In 
doing so, it is important to employ a rigorous procedure that gives a better 
understanding of the objects that the data refer to. Since the data is broken down 
and reconstituted into different forms through the sorting, coding and 
categorisation processes, the result may permit interpretations that were not 
immediately manifest in the original form of the data. Dey (1993) summarised the 
three iterative steps prevalent in the qualitative analysis of data (see Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Iterative Processes in Data Analysis 
  
Source: (Dey, 1993,p.32) 
Figure 8 summarises the interrelated actions of describing the data, classifying the 
data into relevant groups or categories and establishing connections within and 
between data categories as well as developing intuitions to better understand what 
is happening in and across the data sets. The process suggests going back and forth 
in the data (Baptiste, 2001). This iterative process may involve initial categories or 
descriptions being revised in subsequent steps. Although various scholars have 
proposed frameworks which take slightly different steps for analysing qualitative 
data (Barbour, 2008; Creswell, 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994), they all concur on the need to sort and code qualitative  data 
before analysis and interpretation can be effectively carried out. The section below 
gives an overview of the preparation of the data prior to the analysis. Thereafter, 
Section 6.1.3 outlines the coding process which is key in analysing data.  
6.1.2 Data preparation and sorting   
In preparation for the analysis process, data has to be converted into text. This may 
involve transcribing from audio formats into word text. Transcribing data takes 
time and researchers need to take this into consideration when deciding how much 
data to collect (Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 2005). While hiring out the data 
transcription process may seem economic and save time, some scholars advise 
researchers to do the transcription themselves so as to start developing a 
relationship with the data (see for example Merriam, 2009). Once data has been 
transcribed, researchers can then start breaking it down and identifying unique 
themes which are aptly labelled. This is achieved through the coding process which 
is discussed below.  
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6.1.3 Coding   
Coding is a key part in the data analysis process within qualitative environments. 
David & Sutton (2011, p.339) defined coding as “the process of applying codes to 
chunks of text so that those chunks can be interlinked to highlight similarities and 
differences within and between the texts.” Coding helps to flag emerging and 
pertinent issues from the transcripts and is instrumental in mapping and classifying 
relationships across identified issues from different participants.  
According to Dey (1993) data classification involves conceptually breaking the data 
into bits, grouping the bits together and rebuilding the bits into relevant categories 
which may throw up new meanings. The new bits of data are assigned codes to 
identify them. As David & Sutton (2011) suggest, codes can be words, phrases or 
sentences used by the interview participants, (manifest or in vivo codes) –or they 
may be generated by the researcher to succinctly capture the essence of the 
relevant chunks of data (latent codes). The authors further identify codes “drawn 
from the language of the researcher’s theoretical background” (David & Sutton, 
2011, p.343) and relating participants’ views to broader issues in the research 
realm. These codes, commonly known as sociological codes, are generated by  the 
researcher who compares participants’ views to issues raised in the broader 
subject literature in a way that narrows down and identifies commonalities (see for 
example Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). There is a danger though of rushing too quickly 
to conclusions without exploring issues to sufficiently critical depths, while the 
opposite is true of the researcher getting lost in myriads of multiple meanings 
(David & Sutton, 2011). Thorough, considered tests and comparisons of emerging 
themes have to be carried out to ensure a reliable study outcome. The coding 
process is a reductive process, allowing for the identifcation and testing of the 
strengths of emerging issues or themes.   
6.2 Data analysis approach adopted in this study 
The data for this study was gathered using audio-recorded interviews which were 
later transcribed by the researcher into word formats. Initially, a thematic 
qualitative data analysis approach was adopted to analyse data. The approach 
followed three concurrent stages identified by Miles & Huberman (1994) 
comprising data reduction, data display and conclusion-drawing.  
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Within the data reduction stage, the study followed the Creswell (2002) 5-step 
process covering (i) initially reading through the data, (ii) identifying segments of 
related data sets, (iii) labelling the identified segments to create categories, (iv) the 
reduction of overlaps and code redundancy as well as (v) the creation of a model 
incorporating the emerging categories. This analysis approach offered a framework 
for using participants’ data to generate codes.  
During the initial reading of the data and identification of segments, the researcher 
noticed a prevalence of metaphors used by participants. The rest of the data scripts 
were subsequently scanned to see if there was a consistent use of metaphors. Upon 
establishment of the consistent use of metaphors by the majority of participants, a 
decision was taken to adopt metaphor analysis as the method for analysing data in 
this study. The metaphors offered a more insightful perspective on participants’ 
perceptions embedded in their language. To ensure that those participants who did 
not use metaphors still had their views considered, data analysis was then designed 
to follow two approaches; the metaphor analysis approach as well as a generic 
qualitative data analysis approach to capture participants’ perceptions from the 
non-metaphor data. These two approaches were used to corroborate each other. 
The ensuing sections introduce metaphor analysis and explore its use in this study. 
6.3 Background to metaphor analysis 
While metaphor analysis is both a conceptual theory and a method (see for example 
Moser, 2000), this study adopted it as a method of analysing data. A metaphor can 
be defined as “a mapping of entities, structures and relations from one domain 
(called the ‘source’) onto a different domain (referred to as the ‘target’)”  
(Cornelissen & Kafouros, 2008, p.2). According to Llewelyn (2003), human 
conception of the world is encapsulated in metaphors, which are used as 
embodiments or visualisations of reality. They help human beings make sense of, 
and relate to abstract concepts. This view reaffirms Lakoff & Johnson (1980)’s 
seminal claim that metaphors are what “we live by.”   
Etymologically, the word ‘metaphor’ derives from the Greek “meta-pherein” 
translated as “to transfer” or bring over (McGlone, 2007). This suggests that 
meanings are transferred from source objects to explain target objects which in 
reality may be very different (Cornelissen & Kafouros, 2008).  
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This approach is helpful in explaining abstract phenomena. According to Aspin 
(1984) all languages have different metaphors embedded within their structure 
and in Lakoff & Johnson (1980; 1981)’s view, metaphors are the basic building 
blocks of interpreting and understanding abstract phenomena. Metaphors allow for 
meanings of obscure, abstract or unfamiliar phenomena to be explained using the 
analogy of other more familiar but different phenomena through imaging or 
picturing (Morgan, 1980). Morgan (1980; 1983) further highlighted the importance 
of metaphors in vividly explaining complex and abstract organisational phenomena 
which would ordinarily be difficult to understand. Use of metaphors in this instance 
induces new insights and inferences that may not have been imagined or envisaged 
before.  
Morgan (1980; 1983) further argued that metaphors employing images of 
machines, (see for example Baum & Rowley (2002)) human beings, evolution or 
even politics help us to understand abstract organisational issues more vividly, 
using domains that are closer to our day to day images. By visualising abstract 
phenomena as machines for example, we seek solutions to machine-related 
problems and ways of operating them to bring about efficiency. This parallel 
approach may induce useful insights which when extrapolated back to human fields, 
conjures solutions that would not have been imagined before. 
Metaphor analysis allows for the mirroring of reality through chosen metaphors 
(Wittink, 2011) and utilises “people’s words as a  source of data” (Billups, 2011, 
p.23). Metaphors allow for phenomena to be studied and understood from a 
number of different viewpoints. They help overcome the difficulties of explaining 
abstract phenomena (Ortony, 1975). They can be employed to signify underlying 
meanings of phenomena incorporating language and thought (Skorczynska, 2001). 
As metaphors can be understood differently by different people, their use in 
transposing meanings must allow for shared understanding (Inns & Jones, 1996). 
Metaphors are only as good as their ability to explain phenomena. Lakoff & Johnson 
(1980) asserted that metaphors are more cognitive than linguistic, meaning that 
language expressions in daily use embody much deeper conceptual frames 
embedded in metaphors. Metaphors therefore transcend linguistic depictions of 
reality and are a mode of thought (Mangham, 1996).  
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Metaphors symbolise the anchorage of human experiences of the world and “form 
the foundation of our conceptual systems” (Llewelyn, 2003, p.688). Consequently, 
metaphor analysis has the potential to provide new and deeper perspectives to data 
as will be seen through the analysis conducted in this study. 
6.4 Metaphor analysis in business and management 
Whereas Bourgeois & Pinder (1983) argued that metaphor use in management and 
organisational studies was inappropriate, there is evidence that metaphor use has 
gained steady recognition in this area  (see Table 22 for a selection of studies 
employing metaphors in management and organisational studies). Notwithstanding 
the above, there is need for more empirical studies employing use of metaphors in 
organisational and management settings (Cornelissen, Oswick, Christensen, & 
Phillips, 2008; Oswick & Grant, 1996). This owes to the power of metaphors in 
vividly depicting phenomena and invoking exploration of possible alternative, 
conceptualisations of solutions to organisational problems.  
The choice of metaphors used in management and organisational situations 
demonstrates the way participants conceptualise the situations and challenges 
facing them. An investigation of metaphor use therefore helps to shed more light on, 
and enhances the understanding of managerial and organisational issues from a 
slightly different angle when compared to traditional management and 
organisational studies. The adoption of metaphor analysis in this study therefore 
partly responds to, and contributes to the call for more studies to employ use of 
metaphors in management and organisation studies (Cornelissen et al., 2008; 
Oswick & Grant, 1996). 
The mapping of organisations into mechanistic images in the Taylorist era enabled 
conceptualisations of different approaches to organising work and ushered in new 
ways of driving efficiency never used or envisaged before. The depiction of 
organisations as machines conjured images of organisations as entities that could 
be primed, tuned and oiled to perform better. When translated back to work 
situations, it meant that staff could be organised through training programs to 
perform efficiently and consistently (perhaps an analogy to programming 
machines!).  
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In subsequent years, metaphors were used to better explain the mapping of 
organisational processes (Boland, 2001; Parker, Guthrie, & Gray, 1998); 
organisational culture (Borden et. al, 1998); the depiction of abstract organisational 
standards and practices (Page & Spira, 1999); personal attitudes towards given 
situations (Deacon, 2000); growth, dynamism and development (Mouritsen, Larsen, 
& Bukh, 2001) as well as organisational functions such as in Coffee (2006)’s 
conception of rating agencies as ‘gatekeepers.’  
In all the instances cited above, the metaphors were used to bring to the fore, new 
aspects of the projected phenomena, evoking new thoughts in understanding and 
dealing with such phenomena. The value of metaphors lies in their ability to go 
beneath the visible and the obvious, highlighting the underlying connections and 
contributing towards the generation of new inferences. Table 22 below summarises 
a selection of key studies employing metaphors in management and organisational 
studies.   
Table 22: Selected examples of metaphor use in management and organisational studies 
Author(s) Study details 
Boland & 
Greenberg (1988) 
Investigated the effect of using different metaphors in organisational problem-
solving situations. Concluded that when different metaphors were used in 
explaining organisation situations, study participants were able to 
conceptualise problems differently and propose varied requisite solutions. 
Dunford & Palmer 
(1996b) 
Investigated the use of metaphors in management literature on downsizing 
using data obtained from popular management journals over 3 years 
Parker, Guthrie, & 
Gray (1998) 
Used the ‘gate keeping’ metaphor to depict the stranglehold that senior 
academics had on decision-making processes pertaining to research quality in 
universities 
Jaeggi, Faas, & 
Mruck (1998) 
Adopted a framework which saw researchers firstly building a model then 
searching for metaphors which stood out in the research material and at odds 
with the developed framework 
Borden et al 
(1998) 
Employed the metaphor of ‘men in white coats’ vs. ‘men in grey suits’ when 
they studied scientists vs. management locked in warring contrasts of 
bureaucratic organisational processes. 
Fogarty & 
Radcliffe (1999) 
Used the metaphor of travel to capture the broad spreading of accountants’ 
jurisdictions as they sought to expand the market for the accounting 
profession. 
Page & Spira 
(1999) 
Used the underwear metaphor to shed light on frameworks in financial 
reporting and accounting standard-setting, cleverly employing the use of a 
dialogue between a standard-setter and an academic. 
Deacon (2000) 
Conducted a market research study where participants gave descriptions of 
themselves and/or products in vivid metaphors of showbiz, fairy tales, colours 
and even musical pieces.  
Mouritsen, Larsen  
& Bhuk (2001) 
Employed the use of the tree metaphor to symbolize green, growth, survival, 
fruition and the need for constant pruning at Skandia 
Christensen & 
Olson (2002) 
Asked participants to use metaphoric images that reflected their attitudes and 
feelings towards identified products. As participants explained their feelings, 
new metaphors emerged, vividly illuminating participants’ attitudes 
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Author(s) Study details 
Harvey (2002) 
Employed the metaphor of Alice in Wonderland when conceptualising HRM 
practices in Africa compared to those of the West. Western managers, like Alice 
in Wonderland, found themselves faced with new and unfamiliar territory 
when crafting HR policies for African contexts, having to navigate and 
familiarise themselves with new cultural approaches to work settings. 
Baum & Rowley 
(2002) 
Metaphorically depicted organisations as machines, linking back to the 
Taylorist era of scientific management and efficiency 
Skorczynska & 
Deignan (2006) 
Analysed two corpora spanning twelve business journals covering 90,207 
words between 1997 and 1998. Concluded that metaphor-use was different 
across the two domains 
Amernic, Craig, & 
Tourish (2007) 
Analysed the use of metaphors in letters written by the renowned CEO Jack 
Welch of General Electric to the company’s shareholders 
Cassell (2012) 
Interviewed 25 Hackney carriage drivers to elicit their views on customer 
service interactions. Resultant responses were summarised into five metaphor 
themes 
Cassese and 
Casini (2012) 
Portrayed credit rating agencies as ‘honey birds’ a metaphor based on an 
African bird that signals to bee hunters the location of honey bees’ nests. 
Source: Compiled by author 
The relevance of the above set of studies is that in each case of metaphor use, 
studied phenomena were depicted in unrelated conceptions, allowing for a fresh 
perspective when evaluating such phenomena. Similarly, an investigation of issues 
around the regulation of credit rating agencies using metaphors allows for this 
rather abstract subject to be depicted in images or conceptions that participants 
may find easier to relate to. Section 6.5 provides a more detailed discussion on 
metaphor analysis methods and approaches of analysing metaphors. 
6.5 Metaphor analysis approaches 
In analysing metaphors, Cassell & Lee (2012) identified two approaches. The first 
approach (the deductive approach) generates metaphors from outside the studied 
phenomena and imposes them on the studied organisational phenomena as a way 
of making sense thereof (see for example Huzzard, Gregory, & Scott, 2004; Marshak, 
1993). The second approach (the inductive approach) on the other hand “involves 
identifying metaphors in the context of people’s language-use and examining their 
uses, meanings and impacts” (Cornelissen, Oswick, Christensen, & Phillips, 2008, 
p.10). This study adopted the inductive approach, where metaphors were drawn 
directly from the study participants. According to Cassell & Lee (2012), an inductive 
metaphor analysis approach can take one of two options; (1) the researcher can 
purposefully elicit metaphors from the studied phenomena by directly inducing 
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participants to consciously give out the requisite metaphors or (2) metaphors can 
be gleaned from interview transcripts or other recorded excerpts containing 
participants’ language. This study used the second approach where participants’ 
interview transcripts were analysed and metaphors identified from the language 
used. This approach had an advantage in that the identified metaphors occurred 
naturally and were subconsciously volunteered by participants as opposed to being 
imposed on participants by the researcher. The identified metaphors were 
therefore participants’ own conceptualisations of the studied phenomena and thus 
represented participants’ own original visualisations of reality in relation to the 
credit rating agency regulations. They could therefore be said to accurately capture 
how such reality was internalised and communicated by the study participants.  
According to Llewelyn (2003) metaphors form the first of the five levels of 
theorising steps. This is because metaphors help to ‘ground’ experience, drawing 
parallels with other familiar phenomena. Metaphors offer a simpler abstraction of 
concepts, to allow people to make connections between different entities, making 
sense of one while using conceptions of the more familiar other. This suggests that 
metaphors have the power to bring closer to reality, phenomena that may appear 
remote and abstract. Table 23 summarises the five levels of theorising as 
propounded by Llewelyn (2003). 
Table 23: The place of metaphor in theorising 
Level 
Theory Empirical Issues 
One Metaphor ‘Micro’ reasons, actions; social production 
Two Differentiation Micro, social processes 
Three Concepts 
‘Meso’ agency - how individuals make things happen through 
resources 
Four Settings 
The social organisation of relationships between individuals, 
organisations and environments. 
Five Structures Class, gender, power relations and the distribution of resources 
 
Source: (Llewelyn, 2003, p.667) 
 
The relevance of the above levels of theorisation to the current study is that the 
nature of credit rating agencies and their regulation is a somewhat specialist and 
abstract subject. According to Llewelyn (2003), such abstract phenomena may not 
easily be conceived beyond Level 3 (see Table 23).  
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Consequently, study participants used level one (metaphors) to make meanings of 
their understanding of issues around the regulation of credit rating agencies. 
Metaphors offer such practitioners a platform to vividly depict the issues facing 
their organisations or industry. Consequently, metaphors, despite, their low level 
theoretical position, stand well positioned to clearly convey market participants’ 
perceptions towards regulatory changes emanating from the EC credit rating 
agency regulations. 
Morgan (1980, 2006) provided another useful classification of organisational 
metaphors categorising them into eight broad groups which helped to organise 
metaphors used in business contexts. In the classification, organisations were 
depicted as “machines, organisms, brains, cultures, political systems, psychic 
prisons, flux and transformation, as well as instruments of domination” (Wittink, 
2011, p.10). These conceptualisations help to view organisations in different 
contexts, invoking inferences that are relevant to each context and allowing for 
innovative approaches to generating various options to address organisational 
problems. This allows for organisational managers to step out of their traditional 
views and consider their realities in unfamiliar domains. 
6.5.1 Identifying metaphors for analysis 
According to Lakoff & Johnson (1980; 1999), the process of identifying metaphors 
encapsulates the search for words or phrases that meet the following three criteria: 
1. The word or phrase has connotations beyond its literal meaning, 
2. The literal meaning of the word or phrase is derived “from an area of sensoric 
or cultural experience (source area)” (Schmitt, 2005, p.371),  
3. The meaning is mapped or transferred to a different, often abstract, target 
domain.  
 
The identification of metaphors must be done in consideration of the metaphors’ 
contextual usage. As McCloskey (1964, p.217) acknowledged “metaphorical 
statements taken in isolation can neither be thoroughly understood nor judged 
valid or invalid.” This underscores the importance of relating metaphors to their 
contexts as a way of validating their use. Schmitt (2005) summarised the steps 
involved in identifying and analysing metaphors as follows: 
1. Scanning the text to identify words / phrases that meet set criteria (as outlined 
above). Once identified, the metaphors and immediate texts explaining the 
metaphors are noted and recorded, 
2. Identified metaphorical idioms are allocated to metaphorical concepts, 
3. Metaphors are then grouped according to collective references and inferences 
made from the categories. 
 
Further to the above, Cassell & Lee (2012) highlighted an 8-stage metaphorical 
analysis process as shown below: 
 
 Figure 9: Metaphor Analysis stages 
 
Adapted from Cassell and Lee (2012, p.256) 
 
Essentially, the above eight stages relate to reading the interview transcripts 
initially to make sense of the context of participants’ views; identification of 
metaphors; grouping of metaphors into related categories; re-reading the 
transcripts to place the identified categories into their contexts within the 
transcripts as well as drawing inferences from the results. Section 6.6 below 
discusses the specific approach adopted in this study.  
 
 
192 
 
Tabani Ndlovu  
6.6 Metaphor analysis procedure adopted in this study 
Pursuant to Lakoff (1993)’s definition of metaphors discussed above, and Schmitt 
(2005)’s steps of identifying metaphors, the use of metaphors in this study involved 
initially reading through participants’ transcripts to identify words or phrases used 
outside of their usual contexts to depict aspects of credit ratings or participants’ 
attitudes or reactions to the EC regulations. The aim was to see how participants 
interpreted and or made sense of the impact of regulations either to their own 
organisations or to the UK securities industry and EU economy at large. The 
conceptions sought herein were therefore interpretive in nature and were 
consistent with the interpretivist philosophical orientation of this study. The 
resultant metaphors identified were taken from participants’ own words (see for 
example Cornelissen, Oswick, Christensen, & Phillips, 2008). The analysis process 
involved the phases discussed below. 
6.6.1 Phase 1: Reading through the interview transcripts 
This phase involved the researcher initially reading through the interview 
transcripts to get a broad sense of participants’ meanings and the context of their 
utterances. Reading across all the interview scripts allowed for the development of 
a general sense of the prevalence and consistency of metaphor usage across 
different participants and across different groups of participants. 
6.6.2 Phase 2: Identifying and recording metaphors 
This phase saw the researcher reading through the transcripts again, this time 
more carefully, picking out and recording individual occurrences of metaphors 
from the transcripts. A total of 77 metaphors were identified from the interview 
transcripts. The metaphors were recorded on cue cards to facilitate easy sorting 
and re-sorting into different themes or categories later on.  
6.6.3 Phase 3: Sorting and grouping of metaphors into categories 
The 77 cards representing each of the individual metaphors identified in the stage 
above were examined closely and subsequently sorted and grouped into related 
themes. The sorting exercise resulted in the emergence of eight metaphor themes: 
(1) Positioning / structuring metaphors suggesting the possible manoeuvring for 
influence, power and hierarchical positions in the ratings market; 
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(2) Voice metaphors representing diverse and often conflicting opinions and 
perspectives of ratings, rating agencies, their roles and regulation thereof;  
(3) Power and influence metaphors representing contested spaces between the 
regulators and the regulated entities as well as power and competitive 
dynamics among market participants;  
(4) Movement metaphors depicting the dynamism, fluidity, uncertainty and self-
structuring in the regulation of rating agencies;  
(5) Dependence metaphors denoting linkages and inter-dependencies in the 
securities market resulting in difficulties to selectively deal with certain 
elements while leaving others;  
(6) Perimeter / Boundaries / Fences metaphors depicting containment on one 
hand and or fencing off undesirable phenomena using relevant barriers on the 
other. This category also possibly suggested contested regulatory boundaries;  
(7) Celebration and crisis metaphors depicting the blind and possibly careless 
exuberance that characterised the pre-crisis era, followed by the harsh crisis 
and its impact. The celebratory period equates to the exuberant years and their 
associated runaway practices, while the crisis equates to the economic 
meltdown that saw the collapse of a number of major corporations; 
(8) Masks and appearance metaphors that suggested that a lot of the perceived 
activity and changes in the credit rating market possibly masked deeper and 
different realities that were far from the images portrayed externally. 
6.6.4 Phase 4: Devising category descriptors 
The above latent and descriptive categories were formulated by the researcher to 
encapsulate the different elements within each category. In some cases, there were 
diverging, almost conflicting elements within each category offering interesting 
perspectives on the same issue. The classification of metaphors in this format 
helped to create a typology of participants’ contextual conceptions of issues in the 
regulation of credit rating agencies. The resultant typology is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 7 and is akin to Hemingway (1952)’s iceberg theory showing that 
there is a deeper and richer depiction of reality beneath surface language (see for 
example Giger, 1977). In this case, when examined closely, participant’s language 
conveyed deeper subconscious reactions to the research subject. The 77 metaphors 
drawn from interview transcripts are grouped into 8 themes shown on Table 24.  
 Table 24: Overview of metaphors identified in this study 
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In a study of taxi drivers’ perceptions of customer service, Cassell (2012) used a 
similar approach to the one adopted in this study. Metaphors were identified from the 
transcribed interview data, analysed, and subsequently grouped into 5 themed 
categories. In yet another study investigating the use of metaphors in trade union 
change agency initiatives, Cassell and Lee (2012) adopted an inductive analysis of 
metaphors and looked at the language used by trade unions in New Zealand and the 
UK to describe their change agency roles. Seven metaphors were identified giving 
inferences to trade union change agency roles, raising interesting comparisons 
between managerial conceptualisations of change agency juxtaposed to views of trade 
unions.  
6.7 Criticisms of metaphor analysis 
One of the criticisms levelled against the use of metaphor analysis in management 
studies has been around the procedure of identifying metaphors in previous studies. 
Vervaeke & Kennedy (1996) particularly highlighted the lack of formalised repeatable, 
scientific procedures in metaphor analysis studies which they claimed hampered 
validity. This was echoed by Ritchie (2003) who argued that the selection of 
conceptual domains lacked robust, justifiable procedures.  
The steps of analysing metaphors highlighted by Schmitt (2005), utilising the criteria 
set by Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999) provided a robust framework which when 
implemented carefully, played down the criticisms aired by Vervaeke & Kennedy 
(1996) and Ritchie (2003) above. In this study, the identified metaphors were 
robustly derived from participants’ language. The clearly articulated analysis steps 
highlighted in this study are repeatable and robust enough, giving confidence on the 
findings.  
While the steps outlined herein provide an audit trail for easy verification to ensure 
validity, this does not take away the essence of the subjective, interpretive perceptions 
of the different participants which provide rich and varied visualisations of reality. 
Further, the researcher’s interpretation of participants’ metaphors also throws in an 
element of subjectivity consistent with interpretive tenets of this study.  
To mitigate adverse effects of subjectivity in interpreting metaphors, the contextual 
utterances surrounding metaphors were clearly identified to ensure that contextual 
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meanings were objectively identified. To ensure that non-metaphor data was also 
used to enrich findings from the metaphor data, a second analysis approach was 
devised to focus specifically on non-metaphor data. Findings from this second analysis 
approach helped to validate the outcome of the metaphor analysis findings. The non-
metaphor data was analysed and coded, breaking it down into related data sets to 
identify emerging themes. The detailed process is discussed in Section 6.8 below.  
6.8 Overview of non-metaphoric data analysis 
The analysis of non-metaphor data followed Miles & Huberman (1994)’s three 
concurrent steps of data reduction, data display and conclusion-drawing (see Figure 
9). Data reduction was carried out using an adaptation of Creswell (2002)’s 5-step 
process presented in Table 25 below. 
Table 25: Creswell (2002)'s Five Step Data Reduction Process  
  Stage description  Comments /Adaptations 
1 
Initially reading through the data to make 
sense of the broader context of the 
utterances,  
Scanning through the data to get a 
contextual sense of broader meanings 
2  Identifying segments of related data sets  As 8 segments had been identified from 
the metaphor analysis phase, non-
metaphor data sets were grouped and 
aligned to the 8 categories 
3 
Labelling the identified segments to create 
categories 
4 
the reduction of overlaps and code 
redundancy  
Rearranging data sets to minimise 
repetition 
5 
The creation of a model incorporating the 
emerging categories. 
See chapter 7: sense-making of the 
data categories and drawing out 
inferences for this study. 
Adapted from Creswell (2002) 
This procedure allowed for a systematic approach to analysing non-metaphor data 
and ensured the capturing of participants’ responses relating to their perceptions of 
the impact of the EC CRA regulations on the operations of the UK securities market 
were identified, categorised and inferences drawn. Reading through the data resulted 
in related data sets being grouped together and codes assigned to them.   
  
197 
 Tabani Ndlovu  
Subsequent steps involved the amalgamation of related data sets into broader, more 
cohesive categories to build broader themes. The analysis of the non-metaphor data 
yielded 25 categories which upon further analysis, were aligned to the categories 
identified in the metaphor data analysis. The 25 categories were subsequently 
dovetailed into the 8 categories identified in the metaphor data section. Table 26 
below summarises the 25 categories and the related 8 broader categories. 
Table 26: Summary of non-metaphor data categories 
Non-metaphor data sets in category Broader Data Categories 
New CRAs vs. uneven competitive landscape  
Positioning / structuring 
Perceived EC regulatory motives (political/market driven?) 
Local vs. global - Coordination and scope of EC regulations 
Competitiveness vs. credibility - Catch-22 situation dilemma faced 
by new CRAs 
Subjective or objective - nature of credit ratings 
Voices 
The paradox of credit ratings – crucial yet disclaimed 
Perceived accuracy of regulators’ diagnosis of market problems 
Views on proposed EU-sponsored CRA 
Possible alternative CRA funding models 
Perceived responses to the 2007-8 crisis 
Movement 
Timing of the EC regulatory initiatives 
Perceived market changes post the crisis 
Proposals for possible future improvements 
Perceived EC regulatory benefits 
Masks, appearances and 
pretences 
Real or made up - perceived EC regulatory impact 
Perceived EC regulatory costs / burdens 
Perceived unintended consequences of EC regulatory initiatives 
Perceived effectiveness of EC regulatory initiatives 
Proportionality of EC regulatory initiatives 
Perimeter / fence, boundaries 
Perceived EC regulatory scope creep 
Perceived regulators’ competence Relationships, power and 
influence Relationships and network influences 
Rationale for CRA choice Dependences / interlinkages 
Perceived causes of the crisis Celebration / crisis 
Source: Compiled by author 
With all the data analysed, the stage was set for a detailed discussion of what insights 
could be gleaned from the data as well as what inferences could be made from the 
data to inform this study. The next section summarises the data analysis chapter, 
paving way for a detailed discussion of the study findings in Chapter 7.  
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6.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented an overview of the data analysis approach adopted in this 
study. The chapter began by broadly discussing qualitative data analysis issues before 
focusing on metaphor analysis and subsequently, the approach adopted to analyse 
interview transcripts in this study. It was acknowledged that the analysis of 
qualitative data was one of the most challenging steps in dealing with qualitative 
studies. Notwithstanding these challenges, various scholars’ work was used to offer 
guidance on some of the tried and tested methods involving the initial reading of data 
for sense making; identification of themes in the data; grouping of themes into related 
data sets; labelling or coding the themes as well as the amalgamation of related 
themes to form broader categories. Such steps prepared the data for more insightful 
analysis where closer scrutiny could be conducted both within the identified 
categories as well as across the categories. 
Data analysis followed two approaches. The first approach involved the use of the 
metaphor analysis method which involved inductively identifying metaphors used in 
participants’ interview transcripts. This resulted in the identification of 77 individual 
metaphors used by participants during the interviews. The 77 metaphors were 
subsequently grouped into 8 broad categories. The second analysis approach involved 
analysing the non-metaphor data, resulting in the data being grouped into 25 themed 
categories. The data categories were coded for easy identification and manipulation. 
The 25 categories were subsequently streamlined into the 8 previous metaphor 
categories as there were correlations between them. The amalgamated results were 
summarised in Table 26 and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
The next chapter begins by offering a broad overview of the 8 categories of data 
embodying participants’ conceptualisations of the impact of the EC regulatory 
initiatives on the UK securities market. Thereafter, a detailed discussion of each 
category is given, making linkages to extant literature in the area of credit ratings as 
well as drawing out inferences and implications for the study area.  
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7 
Chapter Seven: 
Findings and Discussion 
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7.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents the study findings, giving a précis of each of the emerging data 
categories incorporating both metaphor and non-metaphor data sets. To ensure 
deeper underlying insights embodied in participants’ language are brought to the fore, 
the analysis largely focused on embedded metaphors and subsequently mapped the 
related non-metaphor data categories to corroborate findings from the two data sets. 
The chapter offers an evaluation, interpretation and discussion of the findings. 
Inferences are drawn from the findings and related to extant literature in the areas of 
credit rating agencies and regulation. The endogenous regulation theory is invoked to 
help explain the emerging themes. Section 7.1 below gives an overview of the 8 broad 
categories incorporating both the 77 metaphors and the 25 non-metaphor data sets all 
derived from participants’ interview transcripts. Thereafter, inferences and 
interpretations are made from the findings discussion. The chapter then explores the 
implications of the findings to the regulation of credit rating agencies as perceived by 
UK-based market participants.    
 
7.1 Overview of the findings 
As highlighted above, the study findings comprising both metaphor and non-metaphor 
data sets grouped into the 8 categories summarised in Table 27. 
Table 27: Summary of data categories 
Category Metaphors in category Non-metaphor categories 
Po
si
tio
ni
ng
 
 m
et
ap
ho
rs
 
Rating only a starting point Passing the buck Coordination, nature  
and scope of EC 
regulations 
Rating a comparator Patchy 
Regulations founded on shaky ground Lack of joined-up thinking 
Level headedness Failure to join up the dots Competition, and 
reputation New CRA entrants to earn their spurs Missing the point 
Chicken and egg situation Regulators out of touch Catch-22 situation - 
dilemma faced by new 
CRAs, uneven market Catch-22 situation CRAs not at the top of the tree 
Only in the minds of politicians CRAs not at the top of the food chain 
Perceived EC regulatory 
drivers; suspicious 
motives Entirely for the birds Crisis bigger than just the CRAs 
V
oi
ce
 m
et
ap
ho
rs
 CRA analysts bamboozled Hard-wiring / hard-coding Nature of credit ratings 
Lack of transparency Mechanistic behaviour Role of credit ratings 
Rating process as a melting pot Production line behaviour Possible alternative CRA funding models  
Rating process as a black box Rating just one part of equation Views on proposed EU-sponsored CRA 
Rating a key part of communications 
channel Rating not the gospel truth Perceived accuracy of 
regulators’ diagnosis of 
market problems Ratings not forward-looking Regulation as sheer bloody bureaucracy 
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Category Metaphors in category Non-metaphor categories 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
, 
in
flu
en
ce
 &
 
po
w
er
 
Shooting the messenger CRAs as Gatekeepers 
Relationships and 
network influences CRAs as messengers CRAs as guard dogs 
CRAs as scapegoats CRAs as watch dogs 
CRAs as easy prey CRAs as eyes and ears 
Perceived regulators’ 
competence 
CRAs as usual suspects CRAs as fire alarms 
Sleeping on duty 
Davids and Goliaths 
Level playing field 
M
ov
em
en
t m
et
ap
ho
rs
 
After shocks Ratings tighter since the crisis 
Perceived responses to 
the 2007-8 crisis 
Knee-jerk reactions CRAs more uptight now 
Reactive ratings CRAs weren’t up to speed Perceived market changes post the crisis 
Closing the gate after horses have 
bolted 
Regulation as a pendulum 
Proposals for possible 
future improvements Regulatory environment a state of 
flux 
Regulators run off with headlines Regulations fluid Timing of the EC regulatory initiatives 
M
as
ks
, a
pp
ea
ra
nc
es
 
an
d 
pr
et
en
ce
s 
Regulators as toothless bulldogs Changes are lip-service Perceived effectiveness of EC regulatory initiatives 
Packaging of securities Back to business-as-usual Perceived EC regulatory impact 
Regulation as window-dressing Regulatory compliance gobbling up budgets 
Perceived EC regulatory 
costs / burdens 
Regulation as box-ticking 
Aim of increasing competition 
falls flat on its face 
Perceived unintended 
consequences of EC 
regulatory initiatives 
Perceived EC regulatory 
benefits 
Pe
ri
m
et
er
 
fe
nc
e 
/ 
bo
un
da
ry
 
m
et
ap
ho
rs
 
Bail-ins, not bail-outs Going overboard Perceived EC 
regulatory scope creep 
Rating only a screen One-size fits all 
Chinese walls Narrow regulatory focus 
Proportionality of EC 
regulatory initiatives 
D
ep
en
de
nc
e 
/ 
in
te
rl
in
ka
ge
s 
m
et
ap
ho
rs
 
Don’t throw away the baby with the 
bath water 
Symbiotic relationship 
Rationale for CRA 
choice 
Herd-like behaviour 
Free riding Blind use of ratings 
C
el
eb
ra
tio
n 
/ 
cr
is
is
 
m
et
ap
ho
rs
 
Got their fingers burnt None dared take away the punch bowl 
Perceived causes of 
the crisis 
Crisis as a panic Pre-crisis period as a party 
 Source: Compiled by author 
 
The categorisation of metaphor and non-metaphor data into the above eight groups 
was based on the researcher’s interpretation of their contextual meanings.  
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The categories are therefore subjective and consistent with the interpretivist tenets of 
this study. However, in coming up with the eight categories, the researcher took into 
consideration participants’ contextual utterances as a way of mapping and positioning 
such utterances to derive requisite meanings embodied in the metaphors. The 
sections below give an overview of how each of the category descriptors was 
developed together with details of the data sets contained within. 
The first category comprised 18 individual metaphors drawn from interview 
transcripts signifying some form of positioning across time, contextually, relationally 
and mentally. Consequently, positioning was used as the overarching category for this 
group of metaphors. Non-metaphor data was drawn from interview transcripts to 
corroborate metaphor findings, looking at positioning issues across the industry. 
Table 28 below summarises the percentage frequency of participants’ responses on 
positioning metaphors and related non-metaphor data. 
 
Table 28: Percentage responses on positioning metaphors 
Category Metaphor CRAs OIPs Investors Issuers 
 Positioning 
Catch-22 situation / chicken-egg 
situation 
83% 40% - 50% 
CRAs not at the top of the food chain / 
CRAs not at the top of the tree 
17% 60% - 10% 
Crisis bigger than just CRAs 50% 60% 11% - 
Entirely for the birds / unjustified 
regulations / Only in the minds of 
politicians 
- 20% 22% 50% 
Failure to join up the dots / Lack of 
joined up thinking / failure to see the big 
picture 
50% 60% 55% 70% 
Level-headedness / balanced, reasoned 
approach 
- 20% 22% - 
Missing the point 67% 60% 44% 30% 
New CRA entrants to ‘earn their spurs’ / 
build reputation / fight for recognition 
17% 40% 66% 50% 
Passing the buck 17%- 20% 11% - 
Patchy 17% 60% 55% - 
Rating a comparator/ Rating only a 
starting point  
67% 60% 33% 20% 
Regulations founded on shaky ground 67% 60% 11% 50% 
Regulators out of touch / mismatch with 
market expectations 
50% 40% 33% 30% 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
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From the above table, a significant number of participants felt that the justification for 
regulation was questionable; that regulators were missing the point; that there was a 
general failure to make strategic linkages in the market and that introduction of more 
CRAs would not necessarily enhance competition. These issues are further discussed 
in section 7.2.1. 
The second category of metaphors comprised 12 individual metaphors signifying 
points of view, opinions, scepticism and deeply-ingrained perspectives and 
behaviours. This was aptly-labelled the ‘voices’ category in recognition of the varied 
and often-conflicting views embodied in the metaphors and participants’ opinions. 
Non-metaphor data depicting varied perspectives and reactions towards regulatory 
issues and their impact were further appended to this category. Table 29 below 
captures the breakdown of participants’ responses against the different metaphors 
and associated non-metaphor responses in this category. 
 
 Table 29: Percentage responses on voice metaphors 
Category Metaphor CRAs OIPs Investors Issuers 
  Voice 
metaphors 
Black Box/mystique / mysterious / opaque - 40% 33% 40% 
CRA analysts bamboozled / comparatively 
inexperienced 
- 60% 11% - 
Hard-wiring / Hard coding 17% 40% 56% 20% 
Lack of transparency - 60% 44% 10% 
Melting pot - 40% - - 
Production line behaviour / Mechanistic 
behaviour 
17% 60% 11% 10% 
Rating just one part of the equation 83% 60% 44% 40% 
Rating not the gospel truth 83% 60% 44% 40% 
Ratings key part of comms channel 83% - 11% 60% 
Ratings not forward-looking - 20% - - 
Sheer bloody bureaucracy - 20% - - 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
Participants highlighted the lack of clarity on what ratings meant; the subjective 
nature of ratings on one hand, contrasted with the reliance on and entrenchment of 
ratings into investment decision-making processes. This is discussed in more detail in 
section 7.2.3. 
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The third group contained a total of 13 individual metaphors signifying agency 
relationships, custodianship, finger-pointing, blame, culpability and power. An 
overarching label of ‘power and influence’ was assigned to this category denoting the 
power relationships behind the different players in the CRA regulation debate. Table 
30 offers a summary of the percentage responses of participants’ reactions towards 
metaphors in this category. 
 
 Table 30: Percentage responses on relationship/power metaphors 
Category Metaphor CRAs OIPs Investors Issuers 
Relationship, 
power and 
influence 
metaphors 
Davids and Goliaths - 20% 11% 10% 
Easy prey 33% 40% - 40% 
Eyes and ears - 20% 33% - 
Fire alarms - 60% 22% 10% 
Gate keepers - 20% 33% 20% 
Guard dogs - 20% 11% - 
Level playing field 17% 20% - 40% 
Messengers / shooting the 
messenger 
83% 20% 11% 10% 
Scapegoats 33% 40% - 20% 
Slept on duty - 20% 56% 40% 
Usual suspects 17% 20% - - 
Watch dogs - 20% 33% 20% 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
Power and influence issues were identified as key in the repositioning effect of the 
new regulations and non-metaphor issues around this theme provided a useful 
background to depict the perceived competence and power of regulators, influence on 
relationships and network effects. There was a poignant contrast between 
participants’ conceptions of CRAs and the agency relationships in the ratings industry 
as opposed to how CRAs saw themselves, their role and influence in the relationships. 
A further analysis of data sets in this category is offered in 7.2.4. 
The fourth category contained 11 metaphors depicting physical movement, temporal, 
figurative and virtual movement and was assigned the label of ‘movement’ metaphors. 
Table 31 offers an overview of participants’ responses in this area.  
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Table 31: Percentage responses on movement metaphors  
Category Metaphor CRAs OIPs Investors Issuers 
Movement 
After shocks - 20% 11% 10% 
Closing the gate after horses have 
bolted 
33% 80% 44% 60% 
CRAs more uptight now / 
Conservative 
- 80% 44% 30% 
CRAs weren’t up to speed 17% 100% 56% 60% 
Fluid / flux 50% 40% 44% 60% 
Kneejerk reactions (regulation) 67% 40% 56% 30% 
Ratings tighter since the crisis / 
stringent 
17% 80% 44% 80% 
Reactive ratings / - 20% - - 
Regulation as a pendulum / swings 17% 40% 56% 40% 
Regulators have run off with the 
headlines 
17% 40% - 50% 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
 
Using non-metaphor data, the concept of time was key in evaluating changes in the 
credit rating market as well as the regulatory space. This related very well to the 
metaphor of movement depicting both changes as well as the shifting regulatory 
landscape. Participants noted a reactive approach both by rating agencies as well as 
by regulators in dealing with issues in this market. A more detailed discussion is 
offered in 7.2.5. 
 
The fifth category comprised 8 metaphors signifying perceived false realities, 
pretences and masks. Consequently, this was given the label of “masks, appearances 
and pretences” to capture the overarching theme of pretence deduced from 
participants’ utterances. The metaphors are summarised in Table 32. 
Table 32: Percentage responses on masks / appearance metaphors 
Category Metaphor CRAs OIPs Investors Issuers 
 Masks, 
appearances 
/ Pretences 
Aim of increasing competition falls 
flat on its face 
83% 80% 44% 60% 
Back to business-as-usual 17% 20% - 10% 
Box ticking (regulation) 33% 40% 33% 20% 
Changes are lip service -  40% 44% - 
Packaging  - - 44% - 
Regulation as window-dressing 33% 40% 44% 30% 
Regulators as toothless bull dogs / 
ineffective 
17% 40% 44% 20% 
Regulatory compliance gobbling up 
budgets 
100% - - - 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
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Non-metaphorically, this category focused on the aftermath of the regulation, 
highlighting both anticipated positive changes and what was made to look like real 
changes on the ground. This category also highlighted the concerns for possible 
unintended consequences of the regulations. Themes in this category are further 
followed up in 7.2.6 
 
The sixth category consisted of 6 metaphors indicating containment, limits and 
boundaries. “Perimeter fence and boundary” metaphors therefore seemed to be a 
fitting description for this category. Table 33 offers the frequency of responses against 
each of the metaphors in this category. 
Table 33: Percentage responses on perimeter / fence metaphors 
Category Metaphor CRAs OIPs Investors Issuers 
Perimeter 
Fence / 
Boundary 
metaphors  
Bail-ins, not bail-outs - 40% - - 
Chinese Walls (separation of 
analysis from business 
development within CRAs) 
50% 60% 67% 60% 
Going overboard / exceeding 
mandate 
17% 40% 11% 10% 
Narrow regulatory focus 17% 60% 11% 30% 
One size fits-all / blanket or broad-
brush approach 
83% 60% 67% 50% 
Ratings only a screen 67% 60% 33% 20% 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
Participants expressed strong views on the scope of the regulation, its reach as well as 
perceived proportionality of regulatory responses. Most reactions seemed to come 
from Other Interested Parties, denoting a concern on possible negative effects of the 
regulations to the broader securities market. This is further discussed in 7.2.7. 
The seventh category of 5 metaphors denoted connections, reliance and trust. The 
label of “dependencies and interlinkages” was therefore assigned to this category. 
Participants’ responses in this category are summarised in Table 34 below.  
 Table 34: Percentage responses on dependence metaphors 
Category Metaphor CRAs OIPs Investors Issuers 
Dependence 
and linkage 
metaphors 
Blind use of ratings 67% 100% 33% 50% 
Don’t throw away the baby with the 
bath water 
- 40% - 10% 
Free riding 17% 60% 67% 20% 
Herd-like behaviour - 60% 17% 30% 
Symbiotic relationship - 40% - - 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
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Participants highlighted the intricate issues behind the choice of CRAs in the market, 
painting a picture of closely intertwined relationships where it was not immediately 
clear how to isolate and separate players as was insinuated by the regulatory 
approach. The suggestion was for a more holistic approach as discussed in 7.2.8.   
The last group comprising four metaphors signifying initial extravagance and 
subsequent implosion of the global securities system was labelled “celebration and 
crisis” to denote the pre-crisis exuberant mood and the subsequent crisis that 
followed. Table 35 captures the frequency of participants’ responses in this category. 
 Table 35: Percentage responses on celebration / crisis metaphors 
Category Metaphor CRAs OIPs Investors Issuers 
 Celebration 
and crisis 
metaphors 
Crisis as a panic 17% 60% 11% 30% 
None dared take away the punch 
bowl 
- 40% - 50% 
Players got their fingers burnt / 
suffered the consequences 
17% 20% 33% 30% 
Pre-crisis period as a party - 20% - 20% 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
From both the metaphor and non-metaphor data, participants highlighted the 
perceived causes of the crisis and linked this to the debilitating effects of the crisis to 
the global market. This thought is further developed in 7.2.9. The ensuing sections 
offer an in-depth discussion of the metaphors to draw out participants’ implied 
meanings and what these may mean with regards to participants’ perceptions of the 
impact of the EC Credit Rating Agency regulations.  As participants were UK-based, 
implications drawn from this study apply to the UK ratings and securities market and 
where specified, the EU credit ratings market. 
7.2 Discussion and interpretation of the findings 
Following the descriptive outline of the emerging data categories extracted from the 
study participants’ transcripts, the sections below go on to analyse each data category 
to draw out inferences and implications for the regulation of credit rating agencies in 
the UK securities market, relating this to the broader EU context. Relevant extant 
literature is later drawn in to contextualise the findings within the focus of the study.  
The primary analysis focuses on the metaphors used by participants with non-
metaphor data (also drawn from the interview transcripts) used to corroborate and 
explain the findings in more detail.  
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Section 7.2.1 below opens the discussion by looking at the first category of positioning 
/ structuring metaphors and associated non-metaphor data. All metaphors are shown 
in italics and in quotation marks.  
7.2.1 Positioning and structuring metaphors 
Participants felt that the disputed nature and role of credit ratings lay at the centre of 
issues affecting the credit rating industry. Credit ratings were depicted as 
“comparators” suggesting that their use should have been in relation to other forms of 
due diligence as opposed to credit ratings being used as an end in themselves. Ratings 
were therefore said to be “a starting point” on which users had to add further 
evaluations or views, prior to making investment decisions. It was felt that on the 
contrary, evidence suggested that market participants and regulators had relied too 
much on credit ratings in the period leading up to the 2007-8 crisis, failing to validate 
the credit ratings with their own additional due diligence measures.    
The overarching metaphor of positioning was suggestive of deeper underlying 
competition for power, influence and control. The very nature of the regulations was 
perceived as an attempt by the European Commission to curb the powers of credit 
rating agencies and assert the authority of the EC (and behind it, the EU) across all 
member states. There was therefore a clear tension between the expanded EC 
regulatory role and the impending limits on CRAs’ and other market participants’ 
freedoms. This will be further highlighted under the discussion of the ‘boundaries and 
fences’ metaphors in section 7.2.7. The proposed regulations did not spell out what the 
future role of CRAs and other market participants would be in the new dispensation, 
an issue which perhaps evoked stronger reactions as CRAs and others sought to make 
their representations in an attempt to guarantee their continued survival. 
At a local level, participants ranked different players based on their perceived 
contribution to the crisis as a way of inferring levels of culpability. This was 
manifested through metaphoric references to rank, pecking order, hierarchy and 
sequential order positions. Specifically, participants argued that CRAs were “not at the 
top of the food chain / not at the top of the tree” inferring that if blame were to be 
apportioned, CRAs were not perceived to be the highest-ranked culprits among those 
alleged to have caused the crisis.  
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Positioning “at the top of the tree” or on a “food chain” has connotations of the 
perceived importance of CRAs in fuelling the crisis or feeding the rest of the system. 
The fact that CRAs were said to be lower down in the chain suggests that they should 
not be singled out as primary regulatory targets. This implies that participants 
perceived that there were (and still are) others of more significance that ought to have 
been considered alongside or ahead of CRAs. Alternatively, all elements of the chain 
could be considered relationally so that their positions in the system could be 
analysed and decisions made not just on one; but rather, on the whole system and its 
members. The implication therefore is that isolated application of regulatory remedies 
to one entity in an integrated system may suggest a narrow focus which is likely to 
miss out on some key issues, possibly causing further system imbalances.  
The above point was further strengthened by the notion of regulations “missing the 
point,” implying that certain market fundamentals may not have been clearly 
understood or addressed by the regulators. Just like in a food chain, there were 
dependencies with each layer dependent on those further down the chain for 
sustenance. Actions taken on one level could have drastic effects on the entire system 
because of the dependencies. A narrow or “patchy” regulatory focus could therefore 
either leave out key issues or lack coherence and coordination (‘lack of joined up 
thinking’), posing unintended risks in other parts of the system. The suggestion was 
that regulators needed to take a holistic, balanced and “level-headed” approach to 
implementing credit rating agency regulations.  
Participants were concerned that the stated market failure basis of the EC regulations 
was weak with “regulations founded on shaky ground” particularly as some alleged 
regulation drivers were said to have been unrealistically conceptualised, existing “only 
in the minds of politicians.” This suggested that the understanding of the problems by 
regulators was perceived to be divorced from reality and largely shaped by what 
participants perceived to be regulators’ limited understanding of how they thought 
the rating market worked. This was partly because regulators were viewed as being 
“out of touch” and divorced from the complex, practical credit rating issues on the 
ground, resulting in them devising regulations that were perceived to be so unrealistic 
such that they were “entirely for the birds.” This point was underscored by CR1 who 
said: 
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“I think there was…here I’ll pick on structured finance; I don’t think there 
was enough understanding at the regulatory level of what was going on. 
Here I speak more to the inputs to the rating analysis rather than the tools 
we used themselves. You look at the tools used, the Monte Carlo simulation 
models and such... In their own right, there is not a huge amount that is 
wrong with them but if you look at US RMBS, a key input to RMBS is, 
house prices were rising. The scenario that house prices might go down 
was inadequately addressed, so did the regulators do enough to look at 
scenario analysis to mitigate risks? I think the answer is No, they could 
have been stricter about scenarios you must analyse” 
It would be interesting to investigate whether regulators’ perceived grasp of the 
activities in the market after the crisis changes with time and to what effect. Other key 
issues cited by participants related to the fact that regulators, like market participants 
and other players were “passing the buck” or shirking responsibility. This was said to 
be manifested for example in the denial of any responsibility towards ever 
contributing to the 2007-8 crisis. Consequently, regulatory proposals were aimed at 
addressing issues out in the market, with very little focus on addressing internal 
regulatory failures. IS9 argued that failures leading to the 2007-8 crisis extended right 
up to Government level and summed up the argument as follows: 
 
“I think it probably is that governments have gone along very happily 
with the build-up of debt across both corporates and financial 
institutions and should have, I suppose ... set up a mechanism for 
regulation and none of them did. So it’s not regulators themselves that 
are to be blamed because the regulators were not given the mandate to 
go out and spot the build-up of debt that was actually needed. Their 
governments could have given that mandate to regulators and they 
didn’t. Because they were enjoying the growth that was coming from the 
build-up of debt without realising that at some point in the future, that 
debt has to be paid back” 
 
Governments and their regulators were therefore said to be partly to blame for the 
crisis and consequently, any meaningful proposals to address the problem should 
have been holistic rather than pick isolated players. There was an argument therefore 
that issues were allegedly viewed in isolation both before and after the crisis, with an 
endemic “failure to join up the dots” This allegedly clouded the systemic view of the 
securities market.  
As an example, OP2 described the myopic view that some market participants took in 
the ratings market leading up to the crisis: 
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“… So a lot of people who saw Iceland had a single A rating didn’t go on to 
notice that it had a negative outlook, and they didn’t go to read the 
BICRA12., ...they didn’t look at the way in which the local currency credit 
rating of the Icelandic government differed from the foreign currency rating 
of the Icelandic government because it had a lower rate for foreign currency 
obligations. That tells you something, it tells you a lot. They didn’t go and look 
at the BICRA which said they (the Gvt) couldn’t help anyway, they can’t meet 
foreign currency obligations and they are not going to help anyway. If you 
looked at the full set of ratings relevant to those Icelandic banks, you wouldn’t 
have put any significant amount of money with them. But people didn’t join 
up the dots, they just saw that it said single - A rating; that’s fine” 
 
There was thus a perceived “patchy” approach to viewing ratings market issues both 
by regulators and by market participants alike. This limited view of issues did not, and 
may not help solve market problems.  A holistic view was said to be necessary to 
evaluate problems in their contexts and consider solutions that fit within the broad 
market context. Notwithstanding the above evidence of poor practice, there were 
other practitioners who claimed to have proactively spotted the signs of trouble and 
did the right thing as evidenced by IN2’s statement below: 
“It’s Iceland, it’s got the population of Swindon, what credibility can it have 
as a country to support something, it’s a small country with this big 
structure on top of it, so we never lent to Icelandic banks. We always took a 
sceptical view of things” 
With regards to the issue of lack of competition among CRAs, regulators proposed 
encouraging more CRAs to enter the market. In response to this point, study 
participants argued that new CRAs faced a “chicken-and-egg situation / catch-22 
situation” particularly as they needed to demonstrate a credible track record prior to 
being accepted by rating users. On the other hand, rating users would not readily 
accept and use new CRAs without the afore-mentioned credibility. The conclusion was 
therefore that “new CRA entrants had to earn their spurs” first if they were to get 
customers. Study participants argued that regulators’ intentions of merely increasing 
the number of CRAs in the market would not address the problem of lack of 
competition but could instead cause problems related to ratings quality.  
If rating users did not use the new CRAs owing to lack of credibility and track record, 
such new CRA entrants could be driven out of business. Further, participants observed 
that the very nature of the new EC regulations imposed prohibitive compliance costs 
which could work against new CRA entrants.  
                                                     
12 Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment 
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Such compliance costs were said to be acting as barriers to entry. New CRA entrants 
would not have the resources to set up the structures required to meet the EC 
regulatory demands. This point was perhaps best articulated by CR5 who emphasized 
that: 
“…there’s no question about the compliance costs, they have increased 
substantially and the burden falls heavier on the smaller firms and on a 
proportionate basis, there’s no question about that” 
The fact that regulators did not seem to have envisaged the impact their actions could 
have on new CRA entrants further corroborated the claim that there was “failure to 
join up the dots” and understand regulatory implications holistically. This raised 
questions on the competence of regulators and their understanding of the complex 
operational issues on the ground in the ratings market. The role of regulators 
exogenously dictating regulations to regulated entities is challenged by the 
endogenous regulation theory perspective which this study seeks to make a 
contribution to. This issue is discussed in more detail in section 7.4. The central 
theme here emanates from shifting power balances where regulators propose a 
new dispensation, yet they do not clearly calibrate the exact role of key 
stakeholders such as CRAs in this new regulatory dispensation.  
Consequently, such stakeholders are actively challenging the regulatory approach 
as they fight for their future in an uncertain environment.   
7.2.2 Implications of positioning and structuring metaphors 
Three implications could be drawn from the positioning and structuring metaphors 
discussed above. The implications can be broken down into: (i) the understanding of 
ratings and their use; (ii) regulatory drivers, approach and associated implications as 
well as (iii) competition in the ratings market. These are discussed in more detail 
below. 
7.2.2.1 Understanding of ratings 
Participants in this study underscored the fact that market participants and regulators 
alike were perceived to lack an understanding of what credit ratings stood for. This 
was highlighted by IN2 who observed that: 
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“I don’t think there was a lot of understanding of the ratings, I’m not sure 
it’s that much wider now. It’s a hard thing to appreciate this difference 
between different structures and ratings. A bank is a bank for a bank to go 
bust is a hell of a big thing but for a structured product to lose its rate and 
default, it didn’t even make the bottom page of the financial press, yet 
someone has lost their money..”  
 
When issuing ratings, CRAs accompanied them with extensive disclaimers, suggesting 
that users should be cautious in basing any investment decisions on them (White, 
2001). Notwithstanding such disclaimers, there seemed to have been blind use of, and 
over-reliance on ratings not just by users, but by regulators as well (Papaikonomou, 
2010; White, 2010a). An investor, IN2 commented on the prevalent blind use of 
ratings prior to the global financial crisis: 
“I was involved at one point in getting a AAA money market fund rated 
and I was quite surprised how much they relied on information that we 
were giving them without doing any audit on it at all. I was really quite 
shocked, you would hand them information and it would have detailed 
questions on it and stuff, but they were relying all the time on you telling 
them and even during or once the stages got going, or reporting on the 
credit quality and things coming from us with no audit at all..” 
 
Coming from an investor, the above points to an inherent blind acceptance of ratings, 
coming at a time when such ratings were themselves disclaimed by CRAs who issued 
them. There is thus a paradox of disclaimed ratings that are generated in a loosely-
regulated context being blindly used as concrete investment guidelines (Partnoy, 
2001). There is a deeper theoretical debate about what ratings stand for; whether 
they are objective or subjective and to what extent they should be relied upon 
(Elkhoury, 2008; White, 2010a). The argument that ratings are opinions and should be 
taken merely as guidelines was underscored by OP6 who observed: 
 
“Obviously it’s only a rating agency’s opinion. It doesn’t have any 
special crystal ball into the future, and it’s a measure of the likelihood 
of default, which is partly a problem but it doesn’t give any measure of 
the loss given the default, and really as an investor you want to know 
what’s the chance of it going under” 
 
The above observations, together with the extensive disclaimers issued by CRAs to 
accompany ratings, raise interesting questions about the credit rating agency model, 
considering that users pay so much money for what turns out to be disclaimed 
opinions. If ratings are such subjective opinions, why do regulators and market 
participants place so much emphasis on them; is this in any way linked to the coercive 
nature of ratings as quasi-regulatory tools?  
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There are fundamental questions about the pervasive nature of ratings; juxtaposed to 
the questionable construct of ratings. This raises questions on whether users are now 
coercively bound to the ratings in a fashion best captured by DiMaggio & Powell 
(1983)’s iron cage metaphor depicting institutions as iron cages that despite being 
man’s creation, eventually take over and seem to contain and constrain man’s 
behaviour.  
The inadvertent endorsement of ratings by regulators did not seem to have helped the 
hyped-up position of ratings. This was done through the embedding of ratings in 
determining minimum capital adequacy requirements for depository institutions Hunt 
(2008), as well as under the BASEL II accord, (Claessens, 2003). Table 2 from Deb et al, 
(2011) offered a summary of some of the investment guidelines designed around 
credit ratings to show how pervasive ratings were in the investment community. 
Regulators discouraged market participants’ reliance on ratings on one hand but 
continued to leave ratings at the core of key capital market requirements and 
investment decisions on the other. Consequently, the position of regulators on ratings 
became conflicted and somewhat confused. This anomaly potentially undermined the 
credibility of regulatory claims on ratings as far as market participants perceived.  
This study’s participants argued that unless the reliance on ratings by regulators was 
removed, any attempts to dissuade users from relying on such ratings would be 
perceived as double standards and would likely bear little fruit. Regulators therefore 
need to find a way of reducing regulatory-reliance on ratings (FSB, 2010).  
7.2.2.2 Regulatory drivers, approaches and associated implications 
The perception that regulators lacked understanding of complex practicalities in the 
securities market did not inspire confidence among market participants. Further, the 
fact that the new regulator, (ESMA) was envisaged to have an arms-length 
relationship with regulated entities, was said to suggest further possible 
disconnections with the already disparate market. This questioned regulators’ 
understanding of securities and rating market issues on the ground, their efficacy and 
responsiveness to possible issues. These were not new issues. Commenting on the 
IOSCO code, Cinquegrana (2009) argued that the nature of the code made it 
unenforceable and rendered it ineffective.  
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An analysis of the EC regulations shows them to be too high-level, lacking the finer 
details that address the operational implementation issues of interest to market 
participants on a daily basis. Unless such details are filled in, the regulations remain 
fuzzy. Despite the setting up of ESMA as the new EU regulator, new concerns arose 
over the capability of ESMA to effectively regulate across the 27 EU member states. 
The argument was that ESMA was under-resourced, with a staff compliment of 75 
people out of which about 15 were dedicated to securities regulation (Rennison, 
2012). This further cast doubt over regulatory capabilities and competence to 
effectively address issues identified as having caused the 2007-8 crisis. At the time of 
writing this thesis, there had been three major revisions of the EC CRA regulations. 
These revisions resulted in CRA1, CRA2 and CRA3, each with slightly amended 
regulatory objectives and associated implications for implementing the regulations.  
While these adjustments indicated regulators’ responsiveness to dynamic 
developments in the market, participants in this study were sceptical that rapid 
amendments to the regulations indicated that regulations had not been well thought-
through in the first place and were therefore not future-proof.  
Further, there were political insinuations cited as possible drivers behind the 
regulations (Posner, 2010), suggesting that the whole regulatory exercise may have 
been a box-ticking and window-dressing political act. OP2 was very direct on this and 
commented:  
“ It’s mainly because the reason behind credit rating regulations is that the 
continental Europeans particularly the French and the Germans have always 
wanted to regulate the rating agencies, not for any reason, just that they ought 
to be regulated; they like regulation. When we said to some of the CESR people 
who were pushing for this, ‘what is the market failure which you are seeking to 
rectify, what is the justification for your regulation, they said ‘regulation does 
not need a justification!’It’s that sort of attitude I’m afraid…” 
 
The view above asserted that the EC regulations were an entrenchment of the 
European Union structures across EU market states and although this was presented 
as a response to the 2007-8 financial crisis, it would have happened regardless. There 
seems to be a view that the UK is generally opposed to encroachment of EU 
institutions into individual member states (Rennison, 2012). With that in mind, this 
study’s findings are therefore not surprising.  
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These conceptions of regulation corroborate claims in extant literature (see for 
example Benston 1998; Lee 1980) regarding the possible multi-faceted drivers for 
regulation. The implication here is that regulators need to clearly articulate the 
regulatory agenda much more effectively to get buy-in from all key stakeholders, 
otherwise conspiracy theories engulf and threaten to derail the regulatory 
implementation process. 
The use of positioning metaphors depicted the regulatory process as contested space, 
where regulations were not just handed down to the regulated (Selznick, 1985). The 
conceptualisation of regulators as “out of touch” positioned them away from market 
realities and suggested that the formulation of regulation happened rather remotely 
from the market. Participants reacted to this view and expressed an interest to engage 
with the regulatory process, advocating a regulatory approach that would be co-
determined, negotiated with active advocacy and influence from those regulated 
(Freeman & Langbein, 1998). The above keenness of participants to engage with the 
regulatory process could partly emanate from the lack of clearly calibrated roles and 
responsibilities of different players in the new regulatory landscape.  
By ushering in new regulations, regulators did not spell out what the future role of 
CRAs and other participants would be. Instead, there was evidence of powers being 
taken away from incumbent CRAs without any clarity on whether the CRA role would 
continue or disappear in future.  
Consequently, it is not surprising that CRAs and other market participants seemed 
anti-regulation as they fought to secure their own future, viewing regulation as an 
onslaught. In fact, CRAs and other participants could have been seeking to engage the 
regulators in a bid to influence regulations from within. This social constitution of 
regulation posited that there were shared responsibilities between the regulator and 
the regulated entities such that the resultant regulations were embedded in the 
regulated community, engendering better ownership and cooperation (Malloy, 2010).  
The point above touches on the question of whether regulation is exogenous or 
endogenous as well as the role and interaction of regulators and those regulated.  
  
217 
 Tabani Ndlovu  
It is one of the central contributions of this study, questioning seminal regulation 
literature (see for example Baldwin, 2008; Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Baldwin et al., 2012) 
which treated regulated entities as somewhat silent in the regulatory formulation 
process. Participants in this study expressed a desire to engage and influence the 
regulatory process rather than be victims of regulation. Further, the seeming lack of 
closer understanding of intricate market issues by regulators suggested that a better 
regulatory outcome could have been attained if regulators had engaged with those 
regulated. This concept is discussed in more detail in section 7.4. 
7.2.2.3 Implications of attempting to increase competition among CRAs 
While there is a consensus that the rating market lacks competition, (Brand, 2005; 
Deb et al., 2011; Partnoy, 2001) and that consequently, the big three CRAs (S&P, 
Moody’s and Fitch) pose an unfair competitive force against any new CRA entrants 
(Nazareth, 2003), participants expressed concerns at the proposed regulatory 
measures to increase the number of CRAs. The aim of increasing the number of CRAs 
in the market was perceived as naive by participants and not likely to work.  
The argument was that competitiveness in the ratings market was largely driven by 
reputation and track record (consistent with the reputational capital view of credit 
rating agencies – Bonewitz, 2010). Any new CRA entrants without the requisite track 
record and reputation would find it difficult to establish themselves as rating users 
would shun them in favour of the more trusted incumbent brands. Regulators 
therefore have to think about practical supportive measures of not only introducing 
more CRAs, but ensuring that such new CRAs got customers. The idea of increasing 
CRA competition was also challenged by some scholars (Becker, 2011; Becker & 
Lagace, 2009; Becker & Milbourn, 2011; Bolton et al., 2012; Camanho et al., 2010) who 
concurred that more competition could inversely affect ratings quality by fuelling 
ratings inflation. This owed to the fact that if the issuer-pays model persisted, issuers 
would still be driven by the need for more positive ratings as a way of lowering their 
cost of debt.  
If the market was extremely competitive with many CRAs vying for business, there 
would be no stopping CRAs to rate favourably so as to win more business and retain 
clients. This could erode the value of ratings and have a negative impact on ratings 
quality and in turn affect operations in the market.  
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Regulators therefore ought to seriously rethink their strategy of addressing 
competition problems in the ratings market in light of the above comments. The 
European Commission had originally mooted the idea of introducing an EU-sponsored 
CRA, perhaps as an attempt to weaken the perceived power of the US-based CRAs over 
the EU market. This idea was however shot down by participants who argued that one 
of the key challenges in the ratings market was that of conflicts of interest. If the new 
CRA was to be sponsored by the EU, it would suffer from similar conflicts of interest 
arising from its allegiance to its funders (the EU) and would therefore be a 
retrogressive step if on the other hand the EC wanted to tackle conflicts of interest 
among incumbent CRAs. Similar sentiments were raised in extant literature (see for 
example Paudyn, 2011). IN2 emphasised the challenges that could be associated with 
the establishment of an EU-sponsored CRA: 
“It’s independence of thought, independence of action. You would have to 
have some doubts that an EU-sponsored agency would look at the ratings 
of sovereign countries in Europe as critically as Moody’s or S&P might, 
because if you are being paid by Brussels, or whatever better term, you’re 
not gonna downgrade Belgium! I have a feeling you wouldn’t be in the job 
for very long” 
 
An EU-sponsored CRA would thus undermine the very principles that the new 
regulations were seeking to introduce. Notwithstanding the traditional view of 
conflicts of interest, there was a view that investors (or their agents) were conflicted 
as well in terms of whether they wanted genuine ratings that accurately reflected the 
true standing of their firms or they simply wanted higher yields and consequently the 
high ratings to bring about such yields. This point was underscored by IN2 who 
argued that: 
“I think one of the things that haven’t been appreciated or explored on the whole 
crisis is the pressure from investors to get the yield which drove fund managers 
and banks down the route of if its rated we’ll do it because if we don’t do it, 
somebody else will. I’m sure it this disappeared quickly in 2008-9 but even since 
then it’s come back again people keep popping their heads up now saying what 
can we do, no extra risk how could we get some more yield” 
The above point suggests that investigations on conflicts of interest need to be 
broadened if a holistic picture is to be developed. The insinuation above was that the 
financial incentives possibly overshadowed objectivity when it came to credit ratings. 
Market participants viewed the compliance requirements stipulated by the new EC 
regulations as being prohibitively burdensome, costly and likely to repel new CRA 
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entrants rather than encourage them. A similar observation was made by Jones (2004) 
who drew parallels with US regulations, arguing that the SEC in its attempt to increase 
competition, instead created a barrier to entry through its difficult-to-attain NRSRO 
designation. Regulators therefore need to carefully consider the uniqueness of the 
CRA landscape and reconsider the role of competition in this area. There could be 
detrimental issues of arbitrarily introducing droves of CRAs into the rating industry, 
notably, in the UK. The next section discusses voice metaphors and their implications 
for this study. 
7.2.3 Voice metaphors 
The voice metaphor was used here to denote the various and often polarised views or 
perspectives on credit rating agencies, credit ratings and the role of the EC regulations 
in the market. There were 12 metaphors in the voice category. These were further 
broken down into four sub-categories denoting (i) the communicative nature of credit 
ratings; (ii) the subjective nature of credit ratings; (iii) the mechanistic behaviour that 
characterised the rating process prior to the 2007-8 crisis, as well as (iv) the mystical 
view of the rating process. The four areas are all discussed below. Credit ratings were 
(and still are) perceived to be the default signifier of a rated entity’s viability. To that 
effect, participants particularly noted their prominence as “key parts of the 
communications channels.” Higher ratings suggested a well-governed company with 
sound structures and stable financial projections. Despite the traditional view of 
ratings, participants perceived both the rating process and the regulation thereof to 
“lack transparency.” It was felt that the rating process was not straightforward, and 
lacked clear guidelines of what went in; how it was processed and with what outcome. 
Similarly, the regulatory framework introduced by the EC was said to be high-level 
and vague in a lot of respects for example on how the local monitoring would be done 
and by whom among other questions. Participants felt that there were a lot of 
unknowns when dealing with both the CRAs and the regulators. As discussed earlier, 
the regulations did not exactly outline the future role of different players, particularly 
CRAs. This fuelled anxieties particularly when there were insinuations of reduced 
regulatory-reliance on ratings. With CRAs having built such huge empires, it felt as if 
their very survival was under threat. Their expressed interest in actively engaging 
with the regulatory process could therefore be attributed to a keen attempt to 
influence regulations endogenously. 
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The view of lack of transparency in credit ratings echoed conclusions reached by 
several studies in the area of ratings (see for example Delamaide, 2008; IOSCO 
Technical Committee, 2004; LaFrance, 2009; Manns, 2009) in which all concurred that 
the rating methodologies were opaque and made it difficult for market participants to 
judge the quality of rating outcomes. Further, ratings themselves were said to be 
difficult to understand as echoed by IN2 who asserted: 
“I think getting back to a clearer definition of what the ratings mean and 
the comparability of ratings and not giving this false impression that 
things which sound the same and the same and the risks associated on 
some scale” 
The suggestion from the above observation was for a clearer delineation of ratings. 
Linked to the “lack of transparency” in the rating process, participants argued that 
rating analysts tended to be less experienced compared to their issuer counterparts 
and consequently were “bamboozled” by the depth of knowledge that issuer staff 
possessed in relation to credit ratings and the rating process. This allegedly may have 
led CRA analysts to overlook certain loopholes in the issuing information presented to 
them, ostensibly because they may have lacked confidence to question their more 
experienced issuer counterparts. Despite ratings being a key indicator of the 
worthiness of the rated entity, participants argued that ratings were “not forward-
looking” as they were based on historical performance and lacked deeper predictive 
powers. This was particularly concerning as ratings were used to drive future 
investment decisions. 
Participants argued that ratings were “not the gospel truth” rather, that they were “just 
one part of the equation.” This reaffirmed the argument that ratings were only meant 
to be points of comparison, not an end in themselves. These sentiments were raised in 
the backdrop of over-reliance on ratings by market participants and regulators, 
raising questions on why ratings users had over-relied on ratings in light of the nature 
of such ratings. The above sentiments perhaps applied more to unsophisticated, 
smaller investors who may not have had the resources to conduct their own full scale 
due diligence. As discussed earlier, ratings are opinions, with significant subjective 
elements and should be carefully evaluated before decisions are made based on their 
contents. The treatment and usage of credit ratings in the period leading up to the 
2007-8 crisis does not evidence careful regard to the usage of ratings. Instead, users 
seem to have blindly used ratings. 
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The “mechanistic behaviour” of participants when using ratings denoted a rigid 
approach that only relied on the rating symbols and failed to apply human judgement 
to broader environmental issues in the market. As a result, ratings were said to have 
been used in a “production line” fashion with the focus on volumes where analysts 
adopted routine processes, almost treating the rating process as a mass market 
activity. The danger was that environmental influences were ignored, particularly as 
most rating users had ratings “hard-coded / hard-wired” into their investment 
guidelines. The driver behind the choice of CRAs was therefore complex, denoting the 
risk appetite of the different investors as IN1 asserted: 
“…some of them will have predetermined requirements, it can vary, some 
will give us full discretion, but many of them will prescribe what sort of 
ratings are required. So we are merely reflecting their risk appetite which 
can be different from our own risk appetite in reality…………. by and large, 
if that’s what the client wants, that’s what the client gets and there is no 
real incentive for us to persuade them to take something which might 
seem more risky and may not work out” 
Such hard-coded investment guidelines emphasised ratings from particular CRAs, 
ostensibly based on their reputations. What became key was to have the rating, rather 
than look deeper into what the rating actually meant. Consequently, ratings ceased to 
be meaningful, failing to indicate the underlying asset risks, particularly in structured 
products. 
Lastly, because of the perceived “lack of transparency” surrounding the rating process 
and associated methodologies, there was a mystical view of the rating process as a 
“black box.” Black boxes are considered to be functionally important although what 
happens in them remains a mystery. Likewise, participants felt that the rating 
methodologies were opaque and that there was no clearly defined process linking 
what went in, with what eventually came out the other end. The myriad of inputs fed 
into the rating process (incorporating quantitative and qualitative information) 
typified a “melting pot” that gave out an outcome which users felt they were not 
capable of judging.  
 
The lack of clarity on the regulatory process led participants to label it as “sheer bloody 
bureaucracy” denoting their exasperation on what they perceived to be ill-thought out 
regulations. OP2 summarised the frustrations as follows: 
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“I think that the form of regulation taking place is excessive and 
incompetent….. It seems to me that that is highly unnecessary. A rating 
agency is a seller of information and it is up to it to justify that its ratings 
are worth listening to. The additional benefits obtained by making them 
register and be approved and so forth seems to me to be unnecessary. The 
cost of doing all that seems to be high. The costs are only going to be borne 
by issuers because the investors are looking for a return after all their costs, 
the rating agencies need to be profitable in order to remain as rating 
agencies, the only person who is going to pay is the issuer either by coupon 
or by paying the issuer directly” 
The above sentiments asserted the reputational capital view of credit rating agencies 
whose main argument was that CRAs’ biggest assets were their reputations such that 
when these were compromised, such CRAs could lose business (Bunjevac, 2009; 
Mathis et al., 2009). If this was the case, the argument was that the market would 
judge CRAs and vote for more reputable ones. This would render external regulation 
unnecessary as CRAs would self-regulate. This point was emphasised by OP2 who 
argued against regulation: 
 
“It seems to me that that is highly unnecessary. A rating agency is a seller 
of information and it is up to it to justify that its ratings are worth 
listening to. The additional benefits obtained by making them register and 
be approved and so forth seems to me to be unnecessary. The cost of doing 
all that seems to be high” 
 
Following the above logic, there was therefore a feeling that the regulations were 
bureaucratic, excessive and unnecessary. The following sections discuss implications 
of the above observations.    
7.2.3.1 Implications of various opinions on the regulation of CRAs 
The perceived disconnection between the heavy reliance on ratings on one hand and 
their subjective nature on the other, suggested that users needed to be fully educated 
on the nature and value of ratings (White, 2001, 2010a). Ratings users may not have 
had a sufficiently detailed appreciation of what constituted a rating and to what extent 
they should have relied on them.  
The entrenchment of ratings into the securities market was partly explained by the 
“hard-coding / hardwiring” process (see for example Deb et al., 2011), and the 
resultant “production line” or “mechanistic behaviour” which suggested that ratings 
became so embedded in the securities market that users’ senses of judgement lapsed 
as the process became highly routinized and mechanistic.  
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Machines only act on coded instructions; they do not break away from coded routine, 
nor exercise judgement or discretion with regards to the tasks to be performed. This 
routinised approach to ratings was perceived to take away the moderating judgement 
of human logic which needed to be a key part of ratings. It can be argued therefore 
that the mechanised / routinized approach to both the generation and use of ratings 
may have been partly a result of regulatory reliance on ratings (Fennell & Medvedev, 
2012; Papaikonomou, 2010). Regulators need to address the mechanisation of ratings 
to avoid treatment of ratings as mass market products. 
Expectations of what CRAs should do are conflicted. On one hand, CRAs are expected 
to provide timely rating transitions through speedy updates after each rating 
migration. On the other hand, users expect market stability which would be negatively 
affected by frequent upgrades and downgrades. This was clearly captured by OP3 who 
argued that: 
 
“..one thing that I worry about at the moment is that there is a lot of criticism 
about how slow it has been for some rating agencies to downgrade private 
sector credit and that this has led to inflated asset valuations and so on. At the 
same time, some of the same people have criticised rating agencies for being so 
fast to downgrade sovereign states and I’m afraid that I don’t think it is easy to 
think that both sets of views are right..” 
To try and strike a balance, CRAs rate ‘through-the-cycle’ taking an average position in 
the long term (Altman & Rijken, 2005; Mizen & Tsoukas, 2009). This tension needs to 
be resolved as it may have ramifications on the approach taken by credit rating 
agencies in trying to balance between the two conflicting demands on their services. 
There have always been contentious views on whether to regulate CRAs on one hand, 
(Crawford, 2010; Hall, 2009) vs. those promoting less CRA regulation (Nichols et al., 
2011; White, 2010a). The various opinions and diverging guidelines on how to 
approach the ratings market particularly relating to regulation are consistent with the 
“depiction of the construction of law as succumbing to many voices” (Eldeman, Uggen, 
& Erlanger, 1999, pp.407) which invokes a social constitution of the regulatory 
process and suggests possible links with endogenisation of regulation.  
 
The social constitution of regulation (see for example Malloy 2010) portrays 
regulation as a negotiated and socially-constituted outcome. This is consistent with 
the endogenisation theory of regulation which argues that regulated entities are 
inherently interested in contributing to the regulation formulation process so that it 
becomes internalised.  
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Both the social constitution of regulation and the endogenisation theory are central to 
this study. They are a break from the traditional ‘top-down’ exogenous view of 
regulation where the regulated entities are treated as silent in the regulation 
formulation process (see for example Baldwin, 2008; Baldwin & Cave, 1999; Baldwin 
et al., 2012).  
 
The endogenisation approach is particularly poignant considering the fact that despite 
clear regulatory efforts to address alleged market failings and curb CRA powers, 
regulators did not articulate what the continued role of CRAs would be when the EC 
CRA regulations are fully implemented. This naturally raises concerns among CRAs on 
whether this process marks a beginning of the end for them or whether their current 
empires will be threatened by as yet an unclear new regime. Naturally CRAs would be 
keen to engage with the regulatory process so that they shape the new dispensation. 
The involvement of CRAs and other players in shaping the regulatory process 
culminates in a social construction of regulatory outcomes (see for example Malloy, 
2010). In the social constitution of regulation or the endogenous regulatory view, the 
regulated entities are active in co-determining the regulatory outcome (Becker, 1985; 
Ellig, 1991). This central theme will be discussed in more detail in sections 7.4. Section 
7.2.4 discusses the next category of metaphors depicting relationships, power and 
influence among different market participants in the rating industry. 
7.2.4 Relationship, power and influence metaphors 
There were 13 metaphors in this broad category, evoking strong animate and 
inanimate depictions of CRAs and the power dynamics in the rating industry. 
Metaphors in this category were further split into (i) CRAs as victims; (ii) CRAs as 
agents; (iii) CRAs as mechanistic agents and (iv) metaphors of power and domination.  
 
7.2.4.1 CRAs as victims 
The view of CRAs as victims of a systemic failure portrayed them as having played a 
small part leading up to the crisis but ostensibly inherited most of the blame. This 
view presented CRAs as “easy prey, usual suspects or scapegoats.” Arguably, this 
depiction stripped CRAs of any power and rendered them easily susceptible to blame 
and therefore convenient fronts to take the blame when things went wrong. The view 
of CRAs as vulnerable prey portrayed them as devoid of any meaningful power or 
responsibility for the messages they transmitted.   
It was interesting to note the contrast between the perceived unfettered power that 
CRAs were perceived to wield in determining the future direction of rated entities on 
one hand, (see for example Partnoy, 2001) and the view of them as “easy prey,” unable 
to defend themselves against vilification on the other hand. Scholars argued though 
that on balance, evidence placed CRAs as more of perpetrators than victims in the 
2007-8 debacle (Ryan, 2012). The balance of evidence is summarised in Figure 10 
below. 
 
 
Adapted from Bilaterals.Org (2012); Ryan (2012) 
 
As shown in the diagram above, more evidence suggested that the bulk of failures 
arising from credit ratings were within CRAs’ domains of control and therefore 
preventable. The view of CRAs as victims was therefore partly but not entirely true 
when viewed from the above angle. The view of CRAs as agents portrayed them as 
“messengers, watchdogs, eyes and ears, guard dogs, and gatekeepers” suggesting that 
they “slept on duty” and thus failed in their role as custodians of crucial market 
information (Kraakman, 1986; Lombard, 2008). This later depiction suggested that 
CRAs had power and influence to sanction the flow of information or to prevent wrong 
doing or unlawful access into the securities market. Interview participants also argued 
that CRAs failed in their information intermediary roles as OP2 argued: 
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“..I have some sympathy with the rating agencies but they are paid to be 
cynical and they weren’t” 
 
As agents paid to scrutinise information passed on to them, CRAs failed to do this 
diligently. As extant literature shows, CRAs were said to have failed the information 
intermediary role and contributed to the crisis (Alcubilla & Pozo, 2012; Fennell & 
Medvedev, 2012). Cassese and Casini (2012) portrayed CRAs as honey birds, actively 
signalling to bee hunters, the location of honey bees’ nests. Unlike Credit Rating 
Agencies, honey birds only get their reward if they successfully lead the bee hunters to 
the honey. CRAs seem to have been rewarded despite allegedly leading rating users 
astray. In both instances, CRAs played an active signalling role. There was a salient 
weakness of the depiction of CRAs as sentries of whatever kind. Sentries are usually 
posted at gates to control movement into or out of a controlled zone. If CRAs fit this 
bill and were expected to play such a role, then the fundamental weakness is that they 
could miss the errant behaviour of those already inside the controlled zone as their 
focus would be primarily on vetting new entrants into the controlled zone.  
A further loophole depicted in the sentries’ metaphor was that it placed too much 
responsibility on the sentries, striping the entrants of any responsibility or culpability 
as if they did not have free will. These metaphors therefore deserve further scrutiny as 
there could be multiple connotations from their use on CRAs. The agency metaphors 
still gave CRAs some leeway as messengers are not entirely to blame for the messages 
they convey, hence the adage “do not shoot the messenger.” If messengers distort the 
conveyed messages or misinform, then they bear some responsibility for the 
consequences of their inaccurate messages. This seems to have been the case with 
CRAs leading up to the crisis. Various scholars have previously depicted CRAs in a 
number of different ways such as information intermediaries (Miglionico, 2012) and 
information brokers (Leyens, 2011; Walker, 2010) among others.  
While the above views were slightly different, they reasserted the agency role of CRAs, 
acting on behalf of their principals, connoting the role of merely interpreting and 
clarifying the information in their charge. In reality, CRAs did (and still do) much more 
than simply convey messages and therefore the above depiction of them as mere 
messengers fails to succinctly capture what they do. Issuers pay CRAs not to merely 
convey messages (ratings). CRAs generate the ratings from information presented by 
issuers and are thus not mere messengers. Through their ratings, CRAs wield a lot of 
power as their ratings can make or break rated entities.  
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The description of CRAs as messengers therefore does not seem to accurately fit the 
real nature and role of CRAs (Friedman, 1996). In this same metaphor category of 
relationships and influences, CRAs were depicted as inanimate and mechanistic agents 
(“fire alarms”) whose function was to detect danger and sound the alarm. This 
depiction perhaps downplayed the role of CRAs in the causes of the 2007-8 crisis as 
their job would have been complete after sounding the alarm, on time. IS9 emphasised 
this point: 
“I don’t think you can blame rating agencies for it. I don’t think they 
have done a great job but I think it’s a bit like blaming your fire alarm 
for your house burning down when you have been having fires inside 
the house. Obviously it could have been reported earlier, but it’s not 
their fault” 
Several questions arose from the above argument. Firstly, whether the depiction of 
CRAs as “fire alarms” was an accurate one, and secondly, if the description fitted, 
whether CRAs sounded the alarm prior to the 2007-8 crisis, and if they did, whether 
this was timely enough for those protected to safely leave the scene soon enough. The 
implication here is that failure to sound the alarm on time signifies a malfunction on 
the intents and purposes of the fire alarm and therefore suggests that CRAs may not 
have worked as well as they were supposed to. Further, the depiction of CRAs as “eyes 
and ears” again reinforced their detection role, laying a responsibility on CRAs to keep 
vigil over securities market issues, a role that CRAs allegedly failed to carry out 
diligently as has been discussed earlier. On all accounts above, there was a perception 
that CRAs indeed failed to fulfil their mandate as connoted by the perceived roles 
discussed in this section. The issue of power dynamics in the securities market 
deserves further scrutiny. Just to touch on a few points within the remit of this study, 
the competitive landscape was perceived by participants to be in need of levelling as it 
was said to be currently “uneven”. This can be read from several viewpoints.  
Firstly, as one participant stated, CRAs competed on an uneven footing characterised 
by “Davids and Goliaths.” This suggested power imbalances possibly based on 
resources, market regulation and competitive advantages in favour of incumbent 
CRAs. This has direct links to the previously discussed “catch-22 situation” that 
disadvantaged new CRAs from accessing traditional markets owing to their alleged 
lack of credibility (Deb et al., 2011).  
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This problem was partly meant to be addressed by the regulations but as discussed in 
section 7.2.2.3 above, simply introducing more CRAs into the market would not 
address the lack of competition or the uneven playing field. Regulators therefore 
ought to rethink the problem of lack of competition and formulate much more 
targeted strategies. In an earlier study, Goshen (2006) argued that securities 
regulations played a pivotal role in creating a level playing field ensuring that there 
was fair competition. The challenge for regulators was to ensure that such regulations 
did not impose unnecessary costs to the regulated market.  
The second possible inference from the above “levelling” metaphor could be 
associated with the unchecked power that CRAs were said to have wielded over the 
market while at the same time lacking accountability to act as a check on such power 
(Partnoy, 2009; White, 2009). This suggested an uneasiness in the market regarding 
private, profit-making quasi-regulators wielding such influence but lacking 
democratic accountability mechanisms to hold them to account (Kerwer, 2002; 
Partnoy, 2001). 
The third inference to be drawn out of the metaphor above may relate to the 
perceived relationship between regulators and the regulated entities. The use of 
“Davids and Goliaths” and “uneven ground” in this instance could suggest the perceived 
inequalities in the regulator-regulated relationships and could ferment ill-feeling 
particularly if the regulated entities felt excluded from contributing to the regulation 
formation process. Unevenness in this case could take away consensus and usher in a 
dictatorial regime which seemingly was being resented by the participants in the 
study. Alternatively, the metaphor could connote the uneven competitive landscape 
characterised by bigger incumbent CRAs (the Goliaths) and the smaller entrants (the 
Davids). The next section discusses the implications of the relationships, power and 
influence metaphors to the regulation of CRAs.  
7.2.4.2 Implications of agency relationships, power and influence metaphors 
There were several poignant issues embedded in the metaphors in this category. 
Firstly, the fact that a lot of relationships in the securities market involved agents not 
acting on their own behalf, but on their principals’ interests was said to be a major 
weakness in the industry. This was highlighted by IN8 who observed that: 
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“..it’s still a fundamental weakness that lies in the financial markets. 
Too many of the people who make investment decisions are 
representing other people’s money and have short term interests..”  
The implication was that the traditional principal-agency problems apply to this 
market, questioning the commitment of the agents and how possible conflicts of 
interest were managed. Secondly, there was a perceived need for clarity on the role of 
CRAs as well as a delineation of the expectations from CRAs’ different stakeholders. 
During this study, participants and CRA representatives did not agree on the role of 
CRAs, suggesting a need for clarity in this area. Lack of clear role-definition and 
expected outputs meant that the market was not able to judge when CRAs failed to 
deliver as per their obligations. Cassese & Casini (2012) portrayed CRAs as ‘honey 
birds’ who signal the location of honey bees’ nests to honey hunters. In doing so, the 
honey birds neither represent the hunters nor the honey bees, but altruistically do so 
for the remnants of honey cobs left after the hunters’ harvests. This imagery raises 
questions on CRAs’ loyalty to investors as private profit-seeking commercial entities. 
Following the analogy in the honey birds metaphor, CRAs would naturally align with 
issuers since they pay for their services. Strictly speaking, CRAs are mandated to 
ensure the protection of investors, a mandate which causes conflicts particularly when 
the CRA funding model is considered. The implication here is that the fundamental 
problem in ratings lies in the funding model.  
The third point related to the uneven relationships amongst CRAs; (between 
incumbents and new entrants), as well as between regulators and those regulated. 
This last point is central to this thesis as it considered the traditional role of regulated 
entities in the formulation of regulations, considering more inclusive arguments that 
pitted the regulated as co-creators of new regulations. This is discussed in more detail 
in section 7.4.3. The next category of metaphors relate to movement. 
7.2.5 Movement metaphors 
Movement metaphors were used by participants to depict the “fluid and flux” state of 
the securities market regulatory environment. On one hand, participants perceived 
regulations to be swinging like “a pendulum” between extremes of no regulation on 
one end (as was typical of the ratings market prior to the 2007-8 global financial crisis 
- Lynch, 2009), to possible over-regulation on the other end (as is being alleged to be 
the case in the post 2007-8 crisis - Bruno & Claessens, 2007; Maris, 2009; Nichols et al., 
2011). IN2 emphasised this swing of regulatory reactions thus: 
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“I think like all these things there is always a flow between less and more 
and I think at the moment we are into the more mode. I’m sure given time 
we’ll ease back to a less mode as it were. It’s inevitable it happens to some 
extent. It’s tempting to think if we get things exactly right then we can 
maintain a proper balance” 
 
The implication here was that participants did not perceive a state of equilibrium in 
the regulatory process, but saw some “reactive” attempts by regulators to either 
heighten regulatory pressure or tone the regulations down, in response to market 
events. Typically, participants viewed regulatory efforts as reacting to market events 
with regulators said to be “closing the gate after the horses had bolted.” This somehow 
suggested that regulations were lagging market events, almost being late in 
addressing market problems.  
The perceived “fluidity” or state of “flux” referred to above, denoted a perceived lack of 
stability which caused anxiety among market participants. Participants perceived 
“ratings to be tighter since the crisis,” with CRAs said to be “more uptight” in their 
rating approach, a view that has been echoed by some researchers (Baghai et al., 2011; 
Blume et al., 1998). Extant literature on CRA responses to crises suggested that CRAs 
tended to over-compensate after crises, with ratings moving from a more optimistic 
regime towards a more conservative rating regime (Baghai et al., 2011; Blume et al., 
1998). 
A second strand of the movement metaphor captured the “reactive” nature of the EC 
regulatory process and regulators in general. Participants felt that regulators “weren’t 
up to speed” suggesting that they were not quick enough to react to market 
developments in a timely fashion. Consequently, their regulatory responses were said 
to be “reactive and kneejerk,” lagging behind “aftershocks” of the crisis (Becker, 2011; 
Coffee, 2010; Fisch, 2010; Pistor & Xu, 2005). Referring to the Glass-Steagall Act in the 
USA, Lightfoot (2003) lamented the fact that the regulations at the time were reactive 
and not well-thought through, resulting in burdensome effects on those regulated. 
Parallels can therefore be drawn between the American Glass-Steagall experiences 
with the EC regulations. This parallel triggers questions on whether the EC regulatory 
process may follow the same lines, if so, whether proactive measures can be taken to 
circumvent any negative impacts from the regulatory process. On a separate issue 
within this broad category of movement metaphors, participants opined that 
“regulators had run off with the headlines.”  
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This metaphor suggested that regulators were perceived to have taken a populist 
approach, shifting their perspectives and following media headlines as opposed to 
taking a long-term view of the problems in the market. The suggestion was that the 
regulations were “tick-box” in their approach, perceived to be driven by a desire to 
win votes more than a real interest to address the problems in the market. This view 
was said to be manifested by the many changes that had been made to the regulations 
since their inception in 2009 (see for example the amendments resulting in CRA2 and 
CRA3). The suspicion was that regulatory amendments were largely reactions to 
media issues and therefore populist in nature. Participants opined that a fundamental 
motivation for regulators to take a populist approach could have been the fact that the 
terms of office of the politicians behind the regulatory agenda were limited and 
consequently, such politicians tried to go for high media impact reforms during their 
limited terms of office.  
The definition of ‘high impact’ could be subjective and short term but as long as it left 
a legacy for the politicians and regulators concerned, they may not have carried out a 
detailed impact assessment on the long term impact of the resultant regulations. The 
section below considers some of the implications drawn from the movement 
metaphors above. 
7.2.5.1 Implications of movement metaphors 
The credit rating market is very dynamic and there is need for regulators (and 
regulations) to keep up with this dynamism (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2008). 
Further, regulators need to take a holistic and long term view of market issues to 
avoid short-term regulatory changes that may cause market instability. The 
perception that regulatory efforts seemed to be lagging rather than leading market 
activities suggested that regulators needed to regulate for the long term, not respond 
to short-term popular media issues. A balanced approach to regulation should see the 
formulation of stable regulatory provisions that seek to avoid extreme situations of 
under-regulation on one end or over-regulation on the other. Regulators therefore 
need to address the perceived “pendulum regulatory swings” which cause anxiety and 
market instability. The next category of metaphors depicted the perceived false 
realities in the ratings market and is discussed in more detail below.  
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7.2.6 Masks, appearances and pretence metaphors 
This category contained 8 individual metaphors which denoted participants’ 
perceptions of superficial activities in the ratings market which were said to be 
masking the true reality of issues on the ground and instead, portrayed a masked 
reality. The implication was that there were claims made in the market which were 
not real and needed to be explored in greater detail if one was to determine the true 
nature of events on the ground. Metaphors in this broad category were further divided 
into three sub groups: (i) perceived futile regulatory efforts; (ii) perceived masked 
realities and (iii) perceived superficial changes. These are individually discussed 
below. 
7.2.6.1 Perceived futile regulatory efforts 
There was a sense that regulators were (and still are) perceived to be “toothless 
bulldogs.” The insinuation was that despite the new regulatory structure promoting 
ESMA as the new CRA regulator covering the EU, ESMA was not perceived to possess 
enough legal or infrastructural clout to command compliance across the EU (see for 
example (Rennison, 2012). As an example, the Level 313 regulatory requirements 
compelled ESMA to develop market guidelines to be implemented by the various 
competent supervisors in each EU member state. The downside was that despite these 
guidelines offering a consistent approach across the EU, the guidelines were non-
binding to individual member states and operated on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis. 
ESMA still relied on individual market supervisors to carry out the ground-work and 
provide day-to-day oversight of market operations in their member state jurisdictions. 
ESMA’s relationship with individual market supervisors was not contractual, implying 
that such market supervisors could exercise their discretions, further weakening 
ESMA’s hold as a central EU securities regulator. This was the same situation that 
ESMA’s predecessor (CESR) faced hence there did not seem to be a perception of any 
meaningful change in this area. While there were broad high level regulatory 
stipulations, the finer details still left loopholes that could be exploited by errant 
market practitioners. 
                                                     
13  Level 3 guidelines are part of the four-level regulatory guidelines initially proposed by the Lamfalussy committee. The 
level 3 guidelines require ESMA to set up a consistent and efficient supervisory framework for financial supervision 
backed by Union Law to be implemented by competent authorities or financial market participants in each of the 
member states. The guidelines are not legally-binding but operate on a ‘comply or explain basis’ with Financial market 
participants required to report on whether they comply or not. (ESMA, 2012)  
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The fact that ESMA are a pan-European body with no direct representation in each of 
the EU market states made them unelected non-Majoritarian regulators (Kerwer, 
2005b) whose legitimacy within each market was questionable. As a pan-European 
Union regulator, ESMA were not directly accountable to any electorates in member 
states, further posing legitimacy challenges that could undermine their authority. The 
futility of some of the regulatory efforts were said to be exacerbated by a perceived 
misdiagnosis of the market problems in the first place. This meant that the resultant 
prescriptions would most likely fail to work, further engendering little trust among 
market participants on the ground. An example cited by participants was the futile 
objective of increasing competition among CRAs as noted by CR1: 
“..Clearly there are 3 major rating agencies but that’s the investors’ choice. You 
have to look at the model; the issuer-pays model. If the market was more 
fragmented, could the issuer-pays-model really work? I don’t know if it could 
because obviously it’s expensive to maintain the analysts, tools, procedures and 
all of that..”  
Participants did not seem averse to the introduction of more competitors in the 
ratings landscape per se; rather, they were sceptical about the approach taken to 
introduce such competition as highlighted in the “catch-22” metaphors earlier in this 
study. Commenting on the same issue of CRA competition, OP1 pointed out: 
“Investors need to choose a name that they are comfortable with, someone 
with a good reputation. I do believe that there needs to be more competition 
but you don’t just introduce a new player into this market and hope that they 
will be immediately accepted” 
Participants viewed the initiative of introducing more players into the ratings industry 
as “falling flat on its face” owing to the fact that the CRA market was not one amenable 
to the general laws of competition. This owed to the “catch-22 / chicken and egg” 
situation discussed earlier in section 7.2.1. To this end, participants argued that 
increasing competition was unnecessary and likely to affect ratings quality. The 
majority of participants in this study felt that there was no need for more competition 
as underscored by OP6 below: 
“I mean three agencies is enough, think of big banks in the UK, its 4, 
often the market won’t support that many more people. 4 or 5 tends to 
be optimal. I think you would have to give some proactive help a new 
entrant to the market or help the likes of DBRS or Egan Jones or JCR to 
have a more established European presence” 
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IN8 added to the above by saying: 
“I think at the moment there is sufficient competition for mandates to 
make sure that the rating agencies are kept on their toes...” 
 
It was felt that increasing the number of CRAs would most likely fail to achieve the 
desired effect. As CRAs competed for business from issuers, there was a concern that 
more competition could force CRAs to issue more favourable ratings as a way of 
competitively attracting issuer customers, a situation that could fuel ratings inflation 
and drive down ratings quality. IN9 put this clearly as: 
“I think quality would go down. I think it’s better to have higher quality. 
I think that’s what the pitch would be about. People will pay more to 
get good information. I think people have realised that they can’t cut 
corners” 
The issue of lack of competition among CRAs therefore needs careful review to 
determine the optimum level of competition that the market can sustain before 
ratings begin to be eroded as CRAs competitively vie for business (Ryan, 2012). 
Understandably, there were opposing views arguing that CRAs’ reputations were far 
more important and would act as safeguards against the temptation to offer more 
optimistic ratings as a way to win business (Bonewitz, 2010). Notwithstanding the 
above views, research evidence from studies conducted to determine whether CRAs’ 
ratings responded to competition suggested that CRAs did respond to competition by 
rating more favourably when under competitive pressure (Becker & Milbourn, 2011; 
Bolton et al., 2012; Camanho, Deb, & Liu, 2010b). This therefore means that the 
concern of increased competition fuelling ratings inflation is real, not imagined.  
Evidence from this study indicated that the decision on which CRA to use did not rest 
with issuers, but lay with investors and other rating users targeted by issuers. In some 
cases, investors had very clear investment mandates which stipulated what specific 
ratings were required as part of their prescriptive decision making criteria. An 
example was given by IN4 who said: 
“.. currently, this could be changed but currently you are only allowed 
to invest in investments that have counterparties that have certain 
ratings from S&P and Moody’s and on the issuance side we have to 
maintain specific ratings with Moody’s and S&P as well” 
The above sentiments suggested that despite having more CRAs in the market, some 
investors would not even consider them unless their investment guidelines changed 
to recognise these new entities.  
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This further underscored the fact that the current strategy of just adding more CRAs 
would probably not work. Regulators need to target their efforts at the real market 
drivers by addressing the prescriptive investment guidelines that seem to restrict CRA 
choice amongst investors.  
7.2.6.2 Masked realities 
While this category resonated across a number of other metaphors, participants were 
largely concerned that a lot of the benefits cited in the promulgation of the regulations 
were illusory. They argued that regulators were actually masking many unintended 
consequences, instead, promoting illusions of regulatory benefits. An example cited 
was the view that “regulatory compliance was gobbling up budgets” suggesting that 
compliance with the new regulations was perceived to be imposing prohibitive 
compliance costs which may not have been properly captured prior to 
commencement of the regulatory initiatives. An issuer representative, IS1 summed it 
up as follows:  
“..staffing and costs, it means I spend a lot of time with the rating agencies. 
Every summer with the ratings reviews I’m literally working on it for a 
good 2 months nonstop, which if you think about the simplicity around it, 
there is a fair amount of work there..” 
 
Specifically, the EC CRA regulations were said to be imposing costs on CRAs and 
consequently raising transaction costs across all participants as IS2 observed: 
“..it puts the costs up for the rating agencies, those costs are going to be 
passed on to the issuers...” 
 
There was a sense that a cost-benefit analysis was needed to evaluate the regulatory 
efforts and that regulators did not seem to have anticipated the full impact of the new 
regulations. It can be argued that an inclusive approach, involving regulated entities in 
the formulation of the regulations would have helped sense-check the proposed 
regulations, considering costs and benefits to arrive at an optimum regulatory 
proposal. Such an inclusive approach could take the form of an endogenous approach 
to regulation which is discussed in more detail in section 7.4. The next section 
considers the superficial changes alleged to be observed post the EC regulations.   
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7.2.6.3 Superficial changes 
This sub-category was the biggest within this metaphor category, comprising five 
different metaphor units. There was a very strong and recurring feeling of deceptive 
practices in the market, manifested through “box ticking” bureaucratic processes that 
in reality were not addressing the core problems in the market. OP2 emphasised this 
point adding that: 
“The advantages from the informational side aren’t as big as they could have 
been. The requirement for registration and all that seems to me to be entirely 
for the birds, it’s entirely a bureaucratic process if companies want to buy 
and pay attention to a rating agency’s ratings, that’s their lookout, you buy 
sensible ones that’s fine, you buy flaky ones you are not going to do as well, 
it’s up to you to make that judgement” 
 
Regulatory intervention was therefore viewed as an intrusion into the market. While 
there was a lot of rhetoric about concerted efforts to change practices in the market, 
participants felt that the market was “back to business as usual” and that the 2007-8 
crisis was slowly fading in people’s minds.  
This suggested that some of the practices that may have led to the crisis may have well 
been on their way back and because “regulation was window-dressing” it was not 
equipped to tackle such issues. Another metaphor used in this sub category was that 
of “packaging” suggesting the hiding of an object and presenting it in a new form. This 
was a practice prevalent in periods leading up to the crisis where issuers pooled 
different types of structured assets, masked the real risk and came up with something 
much more exciting and seemingly less risky. Questions can be raised as to whether 
packaging had taken a new form where perhaps different artefacts were being 
packaged.  
An underlying question can be raised concerning regulators’ competence to unmask 
any packaging currently being carried out in the market. Overall, this strand of 
metaphors suggested that things were not what they seemed in the market. The 
reason could be complexity which masked reality or it could be deliberate efforts by 
those concerned to operate in a veil of secrecy for their own ends, most likely to evade 
regulators. Whatever the reason, those who successfully evade detection through their 
masks could keep the bulk of regulatory efforts at bay, further questioning the 
effectiveness of the EC regulations.  
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7.2.7 Perimeter fence and boundary metaphors 
Under the perimeter, fences and boundaries metaphors, participants used metaphors 
that depicted barriers and boundaries denoting efforts to separate. CRAs were said to 
be employing “Chinese walls” to separate their analysis from commercial activities as a 
way of mitigating accusations of conflicts of interest. This was consistent with findings 
in extant literature investigating CRA compliance (Bai, 2010). This change in CRA 
operations was attested to by IN10, representing the investors’ view: 
“..rating agencies now actively separate their more business-oriented 
activities from the analysis activities. We are more and more only 
exposed to the analysis side while our other negotiating colleagues 
deal with contracts and such like” 
The “Chinese Wall” metaphor was derived from the Great Wall of China and became 
popular after the US stock market crash around 1929. Following the crash, there was 
insistence on the separation of investment banking from investment broking services.  
Participants also used the “overboard metaphor” suggesting that regulators were 
perceived to be overstepping their mandate, employing a “one size fits all” approach 
which was indiscriminate and less likely to be effective. The risk of regulators going 
overboard was that they could likely micro-manage market operations thereby taking 
away the ability of market participants to spontaneously respond to issues. The “one-
size-fits-all” metaphor alluded to the fact that regulators were indiscriminately 
applying a broad-brush approach to regulation, making broad assumptions about 
market operations. The background to the above was said to be the previous “blind use 
of ratings” where users indiscriminately used ratings as opposed to using them only as 
a “screen” to complement other sources of due diligence.  
 
The conception of a “screen” could be read ironically as masking or hiding reality with 
a false appearance. An example could be cited when ratings appeared to indicate that 
underlying rated assets were sound, when in reality they were not. This was 
particularly so for pooled, structured products leading up to the crisis. The 
containment metaphors used here connoted divided opinions over power and 
influence and reinforced the notion of contested regulatory boundaries discussed 
above. It can be inferred from the above that while regulators attempted to increase 
their scope, the regulated entities were seemingly pushing back, wanting to retain 
some freedoms.  
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Ordinarily, closer engagement between the parties would result in exchanges that 
would co-determine the regulatory outcomes, giving rise to the endogenous 
constitution of regulation discussed in more detail in section 7.4.  
 
7.2.8 Dependence and interlinkages metaphors 
This category of metaphors denoted the deeper and intertwined relationships 
inherent in the securities market. The view was that the securities market should be 
viewed as a holistic entity with different interlinked parts. This implied that when 
parts of the market were isolated and targeted for regulatory purposes, there could be 
unintended impacts on other areas of the system. The highlighted metaphors in this 
category indicated overreliance signified by the “blind use of ratings” and the resultant 
“herd-like” behaviour suggesting that market participants tended to band together for 
strength and support particularly in times of ambiguity. This banding together may 
have caused stronger bonds to form in the market as symbolised by “symbiotic 
relationships” forcing the market to act in unison (Deb et al, 2011), possibly impairing 
independence, objectivity and encouraging group think. Since this largely referred to 
the pre-crisis era, there were questions as to whether these practices had completely 
died away post the crisis. Some participants were adamant though that the market 
had since defaulted back to ‘business as usual.’ 
In light of the inherent conflicts of interest embedded in the ‘issuer-pays’ model, 
different alternative CRA revenue models were proposed. One of the commonly cited 
models was the investor-pays model which unfortunately seemed to have an endemic 
“free rider” problem (see also Fons, 2008). The “free rider” metaphor alluded to the 
fact that the adoption of the investor-pays model could see some entities easily 
benefiting from freely available ratings thereby disadvantaging those who would have 
paid for the ratings. OP2 added his weight against the investor-pays model and argued 
that: 
“You take the middle size company as opposed to the big companies, that’s new 
to the market, that’s in an industry that’s difficult to understand, that nobody’s 
heard of, no one will bother to rate them if they aren’t gonna be paid for them. 
The investors aren’t going to say oh yes, we want you to rate that one because 
we will pay you to rate it – they’ve never heard of it either. So the people who 
will suffer if you go from an issuer pays to a user pays model are the smaller and 
more difficult companies who are the very people probably in most need of help..” 
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The investor-pays model posed challenges for new and unknown issuers and was also 
said to be fraught with “free rider” problems where it would be difficult to ensure that 
only those who paid for ratings received them. Nevertheless, there were arguments 
that the different proposals deserved some consideration and that those responsible 
should “not throw away the baby with the bath water.” Overall, the problems in the 
securities market should not be taken at face value. The intricate nature of the 
relationships, dependencies and influences between market players suggested that a 
holistic approach ought to be taken to appraise the market prior to solutions being 
proffered.  
Approaching the issues simply from an economic theoretical perspective could be 
simplistic as this perspective could downplay the behavioural and sociological 
influences on / of market participants and impact on the market as a whole. Multiple 
perspectives should be considered, particularly sociological and behavioural 
theoretical approaches aimed at engendering an understanding of the motivational, 
institutional, sociological as well as individual forces at play together with requisite 
impact on the market. Different theoretical perspectives that help shed light on these 
issues will be evaluated in section 7.4.  
7.2.9 Celebration and crisis metaphors 
The last category of metaphors contained 4 individual metaphors depicting the pre-
crisis celebratory mood which culminated in the 2007-8 global financial crisis. The 
exuberance that was characteristic of the market in the period leading up to the crisis 
was visualised as a “party” where “none dared take the punch bowl away.” The 
connotation of market participants merrily urging each other raised worrying 
questions from a number of respects. Firstly, it suggested an over-optimistic attitude 
in the market where different participants were uncontrollably consumed in the asset 
bubbles, failing to see the possible downsides of the exuberance in the market. 
Secondly, the fact that all market participants did not raise any concerns about signs of 
a possible crisis which now appear to have been glaringly obvious suggests a possible 
herding culture that had some players’ “fingers burnt” when the “panic” set in.  
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Credit rating agencies allegedly played a role to encourage the “party” through their 
inflated ratings which further reinforced the optimistic market attitudes. The same 
CRAs are said to have also contributed to the subsequent downward spiral through 
sudden rating downgrades which precipitated the loss of confidence in the market 
resulting in the collapse of all but a few credit facilities (Duan & Van Laere, 2012). 
Perhaps the biggest question regarding the above metaphors is where the regulators 
were when everyone was celebrating as well as what role they played in the pre-crisis 
period. Thirdly, there are questions on whether things have changed significantly for 
such practices to have completely died away post the 2007-8 crisis. Having discussed 
the metaphors, the next section explores the implications drawn from the above 
analysis and discussion. 
7.3 Implications of the metaphor analysis 
From the metaphoric depictions discussed in the above sections, together with the 
inferences raised, a number of issues stand out: 
(i) Firstly, the frameworks used to investigate issues surrounding credit ratings have 
been largely based on economic models, possibly downplaying the behavioural 
and sociological issues shaping individual and institutional behaviours. 
(ii) The role of the regulated entities in the formulation of regulation has largely been 
passive, suggesting an exogenous, top down regulatory approach (Baldwin et al., 
2012). Exogenous regulatory approaches see regulations being dictated down to 
the market without much input coming the other way. In their defence, regulators 
claim to have consulted various stakeholders prior to the new EC CRA regulations. 
Notwithstanding the consultations, the idea of consultation may suggest that 
participants may have been asked for input on an already formulated regulatory 
agenda which may not have given them much scope for creative inputs outside 
the consultation terms of reference. This may have hampered participant 
contributions to the regulation formulation process. Increased participatory 
approaches suggest that regulated entities increasingly want to participate in 
shaping the regulatory agenda. Endogenous regulation approaches could 
potentially offer insightful frameworks for the evaluation of UK-based market 
participants’ reactions towards the European Union Credit Rating Agency 
regulations.  
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(iii) Thirdly, the combined effect of the economic perspective to regulation and the 
non-participation of the regulated entities can lead to a number of challenges 
when new regulations are implemented. Applying this logic to the EC regulatory 
environment helps to understand issues therein from a different light. 
(iv) Lastly, regulators have failed to clearly articulate the future role of CRAs in the 
new regulatory arrangements. This may lead to a number of outcomes; that CRAs 
still see themselves as legitimate gatekeepers and thus continue to exercise their 
quasi-regulatory powers hence the active engagement. Alternatively, CRAs may 
be unclear as to whether there is a future role for them particularly with the 
touted reduction in regulatory reliance on ratings. This may fuel anxiety and force 
CRAs to come out fighting for their survival. Either way, the active engagement by 
CRAs and other market players demonstrates a keen interest to engage and shape 
the regulatory formulation process in a way not akin to endogenous regulation. 
The above issues are discussed in more detail below, drawing from the endogenous 
regulation theory to better shed light on the EC CRA regulatory landscape.  
7.4 Endogenous regulation theory and the EC regulatory landscape 
At a distance, participants’ strong sentiments regarding the EC regulatory provisions 
could be interpreted as some form of anti-regulatory protest. However, considering 
the long history of alleged irregularities in the ratings market where previous 
attempts to self-regulate had not successfully restored market confidence, it is difficult 
to envisage that market participants would oppose regulation if it was meant to 
restore confidence in the market. In the backdrop of prolonged accusations of lack of 
competition among CRAs (Deb et al., 2011; Nazareth, 2003); over-reliance on ratings 
by both investors and regulators (Coffee, 2008; Papaikonomou, 2010; White, 2010a); 
opaque ratings methodologies (Iyengar, 2012; LaFrance, 2009; Rousseau, 2009) as 
well as CRA conflicts of interests (Bai, 2010) to name but a few, it is difficult to see 
why market participants would be against regulatory efforts which sought to restore 
market confidence and their own credibility. The failure by the market to address 
these problems resulted in the loss of confidence in the market. Self-regulation and 
other initiatives were perceived to have failed to correct the anomalies in the market. 
Consequently, external regulation would have been the only logical solution to restore 
market confidence. CRA1 underscored this point and asserted that: 
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“I think there wasn’t enough regulation. I think now it’s better that there 
is more regulation. At the same time I think it’s important for regulators 
not to be too reactionary..” 
 
Closer scrutiny suggested a keen interest by participants to influence the regulatory 
process possibly as a way to mitigate impact on their own operations. Such an interest 
was more akin to the endogenous regulation theory discussed in section 4.8.2 (see 
also Becker, 1985; Ellig, 1991). In the endogenous regulatory approach,  regulated 
entities become actively involved in the formulation of the regulations such that the 
regulatory outcomes are co-determined (Becker, 1985; Reiter, 1996; Sy, 2012). 
Analysis of the data from this study indicated strong sentiments by participants 
against some regulation provisions, arguing that the EC regulations took a narrow 
scope and potentially missed key issues. On the other hand, there were counter 
arguments labelling the EC regulations as taking a “one-size-fits-all” approach inferring 
that there were differing views among participants. Further, participants argued that 
regulators had not consulted in earnest and that they adopted a ‘tick-box’ approach. 
These sentiments indicated that the formulation of the EC regulations was perceived 
to have been exogenously carried out, with regulators doing this aloof from those 
regulated. If this was the case, such an approach poses several risks,  
(i) As the ratings industry is a highly dynamic and innovative one, regulators 
cannot possibly keep abreast of developments in the industry while working 
outside of it, they therefore can potentially miss out on key issues if they do 
not work closely with industry practitioners; 
(ii) By not including regulated entities in formulating the new regulations, this 
ferments ill-feeling and may cause mistrust which in turn may thwart support 
for the regulations by those regulated 
(iii) The ownership for the implementation of the different regulatory provisions 
remains foreign and those regulated view regulation as a bureaucratic 
burden unless they can be brought on board. 
 
There was a perception that the consultation by the regulators prior to enacting the 
EC regulations was a tick-box exercise. It was argued that regardless of market 
participants’ views as expressed during the pre-regulation consultation exercise, 
regulators would have gone ahead with their proposals regardless of the consultation 
outcomes. The seeming negative sentiments against regulation by participants 
therefore signified an interest to engage rather than be rid of the regulations.  
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Market participants were concerned that there was lack of clear calibration of what 
role CRAs and other market participants would play in the new regulatory order.  
Consequently, this lack of clarity could cause anxiety and trigger active engagement by 
CRAs and other players as they attempted to secure their future in the new regulatory 
arrangements. 
7.4.1 Implications of the endogenous regulation theory to the EC ratings industry 
While regulatory capture signifies the usurping of regulatory powers for private 
benefits, this thesis argues that there could be an equally detrimental effect brought 
about by the exclusion of regulators by a technically complex field characterised by 
innovative and dynamic development of new products and services of a high 
information content. The credit ratings industry is information-intensive, requiring 
regulators to work closely with those regulated, lest they fall behind in their 
understanding of the market and therefore fail to regulate effectively. This study 
therefore argues that the revisions of the EC regulations from CRA1 through CRA3 are 
testimony to the fact that regulators were not fully up to speed in developing the 
regulatory provisions. This corroborates participants’ claims that had they been 
consulted in earnest and comprehensively, they would have fed their inputs into the 
process resulting in a better outcome. The proposal therefore is that regulators ought 
to reconsider their position and adopt a more inclusive approach, particularly when 
regulating a specialist industry where those regulated know more about their 
products than the regulators. 
7.4.2 The Legitimacy of the European Commission as a regulator 
The regulation of CRAs by a pan-European entity (European Commission) across EU 
member states was perceived by UK-based market participants to raise pertinent 
questions of legitimacy (Bufacchi, 1994) particularly as the EC’s mandate did not 
emanate directly from grassroots political electorates. The European Commission by 
its nature is non-hierarchical (Richardson, 1996). Its powers are therefore not drawn 
directly from electorates in each of the member states, but from the collective 
contribution of resources by the European Union member states. The EC is not an 
elected body and therefore lacks the democratic mandate bestowed through the 
electoral process.  
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So in a way, the EC’s coercive ability can be said to be dependent on the collective will 
and endorsement of the subscribing member states, making it a rather shaky coalition 
where some members could pull out, possibly undermining the entire structure 
(Peters, 1994).  
Perhaps the coercive power of the EU and its law-making arm, the EC is based on the 
desire of member states to be members of the hegemonic EU. This internal 
constitution of the regulatory provisions within the EU further supports the social 
constitution of regulation as espoused in the endogenous regulation theory (see for 
example Becker, 1985; Ellig, 1991). The European Union by its nature is a consensus 
organ. It’s very foundations are built, not on legalistic mandates, but on consensus. It 
follows therefore that its law-making arm should be cognisant of the foundations on 
which it is built. In other words, the legitimacy of the EC is based on its continued 
observance of the will of the subscribing member states. This poses a challenge of how 
far the EC can assert itself without tipping the balance and rendering itself unwelcome 
among its constituents. 
 
Radaelli (1997, p.20) asserted that “the role of EU institutions is to catalyse 
isomorphic processes,” the implication is that they themselves are seemingly devoid of 
the requisite legitimacy to impose models on member states. Nevertheless, 
organisational theorists argued that legitimacy can still be realised even in the 
absence of the political electoral mandate. An example of a study investigating 
legitimacy without political mandates was carried out by Underhill (1995), who 
concluded that homogenisation of markets catalysed the legitimacy of the supra 
national system despite the absence of electoral mandates. This view perhaps explains 
the harmonisation of regulatory practices across the EU, as a way for the hegemonic 
body (the EU) to entrench itself over member states by replacing their individual 
structures with an overarching EU-wide regulatory hegemony. Institutional 
theoretical frameworks therefore help to view the interplay between CRAs, other 
market players as well as regulators.  
 
While endogenous regulation theory helped explain the strong desire for inclusion in 
the EC regulatory formulation process by UK-based market participants and CRAs in 
particular, there was an underlying question of legitimacy, given the nature of the EC 
as a pan European regulator.  
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This is an area requiring further investigation, preferably within the frameworks of 
the legitimacy theory, considering the specific tenets of this hegemonic regulator and 
how it can seek to sustain itself amid questions of legitimacy. Unfortunately, the 
limited nature of this study does not permit such an extensive investigation. There is 
however a close link between the endogenous regulation theory and the legitimacy 
theory when it comes to the construct of the European Commission as a regulator. 
Following the above discussions, there are further questions on whether the EC 
regulations can be judged as good or not. Baldwin et al (2012) and the BRTF (1998) 
argued that good regulations needed to address 5 key criteria incorporating 
transparency; accountability; fairness, accessibility & openness; regulatory 
competence and a sufficient regulatory scope. Further, Davies (2003) presented tools 
for managing financial crises and divided these into micro and macro level tools. The 
macro and micro level focus was aimed at ensuring a coordinated approach at both 
local and broader levels to avoid having loopholes that regulated entities could exploit. 
As this study identified endogenous involvement of regulated entities as key in 
formulating effective regulations, a model incorporating the Baldwin et al (2012) and 
BRTF (1998) tenets of good regulation; the Davies (2003) macro and micro regulatory 
scope as well as the Becker (1985) was initially presented in Figure 7. An updated 
version, including the 8 metaphor categories derived from the interview transcripts. Is 
presented in Figure 11 below and discussed in ensuing sections.     
7.5 Applying the tenets of good regulation test 
The following sections consider how the EC CRA regulations are perceived to be 
measuring up against the criteria in the adapted framework presented in Figure 11. 
The updated figure below has mapped the metaphor categories to each of the 
elements of the framework. From the left hand side of Figure 11, the dependence 
metaphors suggest an intricate linkage between local level (firm level) regulatory 
conceptions and requisite international arrangements. This ensures that there is a 
coordinated approach. Further, the perimeter / boundary fences metaphors suggest 
clear delimitations of the regulatory scope to ensure effective containment at local 
levels and clear touch points for coordination at international levels. 
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Figure 11: An updated model of the tenets of good regulation 
 
Adapted from (Baldwin et al, 2012; Davies 2003 and Becker 1983; 1985) 
 
 
The masks and appearance metaphors have been mapped to the tenet of 
accountability owing to numerous questions raised in the study about the nature of 
relationships and perceived power dimensions resulting in lack of clarity on who the 
CRAs were actually accountable to (see for example Partnoy, 2001). There are 
implications here for some of the regulatory proposals relating to additional 
disclosure to ensure CRAs account to the regulators. Such proposals assume that there 
is capacity to hold CRAs to account through monitoring mechanisms yet in reality, 
there does not seem to be such capacity on the ground. This further corroborates the 
mask metaphor; that on face value, regulators make regulatory threats which however 
lack the requisite backing on the ground. 
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The movement metaphors were mapped to the tenet of fairness, openness and 
accessibility of regulatory conceptions to symbolise the conciliatory approach 
espoused in the endogenous regulation theory espoused in this study. The suggestion 
was that there should be willingness to co-construct regulatory provisions and 
maintain an open flexibility to consider alternative regulatory proposals. The 
metaphor of positioning and structuring conjured images of polarisation between 
regulators who wanted to exert power over regulated entities yet lacked deeper 
market knowledge. On the other hand, there were knowledgeable, innovative market 
participants who seemingly knew more about the credit ratings industry than 
regulators and yet felt excluded in the regulation formation process. As long as the 
two groups remained polarised, the exogenous regulation approach would remain 
entrenched, further alienating regulators from those they regulate. Such a situation 
would not be too dissimilar to what study participants perceived to be prevailing in 
the regulation of credit rating agencies within the EU (see for example Lynch, 2008; 
Levine, 2010). The polarisation pits regulators against those they regulate; ferments 
mistrust and increases regulatory transaction costs (Ovin, 1998).  
 
The power and influence metaphors were mapped to the scope of the regulatory 
regime, touching on such issues as regulatory clout, mandate and reach. These 
attributes are essential for the regulator to assert themselves and exercise control, yet 
doing so in a way that balances their lack of detailed market knowledge.  
Such attributes have to be debated in the context of the legitimacy issues discussed in 
earlier in this thesis. The metaphor of voices was mapped to transparency, to highlight 
the complex and varied perspectives at play in the ratings debate plus the need for 
open dialogue driven by clear motives for the benefit of all in the market. There are 
deeper theoretical undertones connoted by voice metaphors. Some voices may be loud, 
drowning others; others may be empty, lacking the requisite backing to make effective 
representations. The voice metaphor therefore connotes opinions, advocacy and 
visibility, suggesting that the industry is characterised by diversity of approaches and 
opinions which need to be proactively harnessed. These issues will be discussed in 
more detail in the ensuing sections.  
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7.5.1 Ability to involve regulated entities in the regulatory formulation process 
As discussed in 7.4 and 7.5 above, there was a perception that the regulated entities 
felt excluded from negotiating the regulatory framework. Consequently, there was a 
perception that in coming up with the regulatory proposals, regulators may have 
missed out on key market issues. This was said to be partly because the market was 
dynamic and specialist in nature, requiring regulators to work with practitioners to 
keep abreast of developments in the market. On the contrary, regulators were said to 
have “run off with the headlines” devising regulatory proposals that were considered 
burdensome and out of touch. Braithwaite (2007) argued that when regulators lack 
detailed market knowledge, they may formulate regulatory proposals that go against 
market logic. This further endorses a more conciliatory approach to formulating 
regulations (see for example Malloy, 2010). The conciliatory approach advanced in 
this study is the endogenous regulation theory, encouraging regulators to work closely 
with those regulated to minimise transaction costs and increase payoffs (Reiter, 1996; 
Im, Kaserman & Melese, 1989). This study argues that on this account, the EC 
regulatory proposals therefore fell short of meeting the need for an inclusive 
regulatory formation as espoused in Figure 11. 
7.5.2 Transparency 
The depiction of some of the regulatory proposals as ‘entirely for the birds’ or ‘in the 
minds of politicians’ suggested that participants felt that the regulations were abstract, 
divorced from reality and perhaps not sufficiently open to scrutiny. The metaphoric 
depiction suggested that regulators were not sufficiently open regarding the real 
regulatory drivers, the proposed process as well as the proposed regulatory outcomes. 
This may have been because the regulatory process itself was opaque and evolving, 
with regulators dealing with a dynamic market that was difficult to bottom down. 
Consequently, there would be changes all the time as was evidenced by the numerous 
revisions to the original regulatory proposals (i.e. CRA1, CRA2 through to CRA3). It is 
somewhat ironic that one of the regulatory aims was to address the lack of 
transparency in the rating industry (Delamaide, 2008; Goshen, 2006; Sy, 2004) and 
yet the regulatory process meant to achieve that objective was itself said to lack 
transparency!  
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In Figure 11, the metaphor categories of voices were mapped to this area to denote 
the varying interpretations of agendas driving the regulatory process. Because of the 
diversity of opinions, it was deemed key that the process was open and transparent, 
allowing for different stakeholders to clearly understand proposals and how they 
could engage. More research still needs to be carried out to determine the nature and 
level of consultation undertaken by the EC prior to the enactment of the EC CRA 
regulations. More importantly, it would be key to find out to what extent, the 
regulators took notice of the views submitted by the different market participants in 
the consultations. 
7.5.3 Sufficiency of the regulatory regime 
Participants strongly criticised the regulatory regime. They depicted the EC 
regulations as ‘patchy’ and likened them to ‘closing the gate after the horses had bolted.’ 
These visualisations of regulations echoed the extant views of Lightfoot (2003)’s 
depiction of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1934 which was said to be reactive and 
potentially costly. Similar sentiments were raised more recently by Coffee, (2010) and 
Becker (2011) who both acknowledged the fact that regulations tend to be chasing 
market trends, questioning their ability to effectively prevent future crises.  
The sufficiency of the EC as a regulatory hegemony perhaps succumbed to the 
question of legitimacy as posited by Picciotto & Haines (1999) who specifically cited 
international regulators as vulnerable to legitimacy questions owing to their non-
Majoritarian nature and lack of electoral backing (Kerwer, 2005b). The supra national 
nature of the European Commission subjected its regulatory mandate to the 
questionable endurance of the European Union and in particular, to the continued 
subscription of member states.  
Its ability to effectively reach down to individual market particulars is questionable as 
other intra-market contractors may be engaged to effect local supervisions thus 
compromising the end-to-end regulatory visibility of issues across the regulated 
terrain. There is therefore a question on whether the EC (and ESMA) are a sufficient 
regulator for the EU credit rating landscape, and in particular, the UK.  
Behind the scenes, these questions centre on the power and influence of the regulator 
and the scope to drive real change without suffering from the legitimacy questions 
highlighted above. More research needs to be carried out in this area. 
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7.5.4 Sufficiently skilled regulator? 
Participants depicted regulators as ‘toothless bulldogs’ suggesting that they either 
lacked the means to enforce the regulations or were technically incapable of doing so. 
Consequently, the proposed regulations were said to be ‘founded on shaky ground’ 
insinuating that the regulatory basis was not firm. This could be a result of lack of 
grasp of the real issues in the market by a regulator who was perceived to be removed 
from the ground. Alternatively, it could be that the real regulatory drivers were 
perceived to be at odds with those perceived by the interviewed market participants. 
There was a feeling that the regulations were populist as ‘regulators had run off with 
the headlines.’ This suggested political motives as possible real drivers behind the EC 
regulatory proposals (Brand, 2005; Khademian, 1992).  
IN2 expressed concern on the EC regulations and the potential for interference by 
regulators: 
“I would be sceptical of regulations coming out of Europe as I’m 
sceptical of Basel III, Basel II or Basel I they didn’t really do anything. 
You either have more capital or less but as to the correct level, I don’t 
know. I think I would be more concerned that there is the potential for 
interference from regulatory bodies in the operations of rating 
agencies”  
 
The insinuation from the above sentiments were that in micro-regulating the 
operations of CRAs, regulators could compromise their independence and efficiency. 
Such effects could undermine the workings of the market with detrimental outcomes. 
The skills of regulators as relating to the specific EC regulatory environment were 
questioned by market participants who viewed such regulators as ‘out of touch’ and 
possibly ‘missing the point.’ It is therefore questionable whether the regulatory skills 
were appropriately matched to the regulatory task in the EU ratings industry and in 
particular, the UK securities market. 
  
  
251 
 Tabani Ndlovu  
7.5.5 Fair, accessible and open regulatory framework 
The depiction of the regulatory efforts as “box-ticking” and “window-dressing” 
suggested that market participants did not consider the regulatory efforts to be 
genuine. Perhaps more telling was the view that ‘regulators are out of touch’ or that 
some regulatory proposals were ‘entirely for the birds’ suggesting that the regulations 
were not perceived to be accessible as they were conceived in an abstract fashion, 
removed from the operational issues on the ground. By being ‘only in the minds of 
politicians’ participants were expressing an inaccessibility of the regulatory proposals, 
possibly disowning the alleged drivers and proposed benefits. This inaccessibility 
suggested that the EC regulations were perceived to be exogenous as opposed to being 
endogenous (Becker, 1985; Ellig, 1991). Regulations were perceived to be narrowly 
conceived and therefore inequitable and possibly unfair. Against this background 
therefore, the EC regulations were perceived to fail the fairness, accessibility and 
openness test. 
7.5.6 Accountability 
The concept of accountability portrays regulators as directly answerable to the bodies 
giving them the regulatory mandate. In democratic dispensations, this is usually the 
electorate. Elected legislators can therefore be voted in or out by their electorates 
based on how their policy-making is perceived by the electorates. The strong 
sentiments expressed by market participants suggested that perhaps the regulatory 
process was not sufficiently accountable to those regulated. This may have been 
exacerbated by the supra national nature of the EC as a policy-making organ of the 
European Union.  
 
Because of its non-hierarchical nature (Richardson, 1996), the EC is not directly 
elected by those it regulates. Consequently, there is no direct accountability of the 
regulator to those it regulates. Rather, the regulator is legitimised by a supra-national 
structure whose form is contested (Bufacchi, 1994; Radaelli, 1997). The 
characterisation of the regulations as ‘going overboard’ suggests that participants felt 
that the regulations were exceeding their previously understood mandate. In the case 
of such a hegemonic regulator, participants’ voices would be drowned in attempting to 
be heard across the 27 EU member states. On the basis of participants’ perceptions, 
the regulations therefore fail the accountability test.  
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7.5.7 Micro level reach 
According to the framework adapted from Baldwin et al. (2012) and Davies (2003) 
above, good regulations need a firm grasp of issues at a micro level. This covers firm-
specific prudential measures as well as corporate governance issues. One of the touted 
regulatory aims was to strengthen corporate governance of credit rating agencies as 
well as ensure the elimination of conflicts of interests.  
Seemingly, the drivers to enhance transparency through additional disclosure may go 
to some length in improving corporate governance but it is not as yet clear how firm-
specific supervision can be operationalized. Seemingly, the EC has concentrated on the 
big picture, leaving finer details to local market contracted regulatory agents to 
address. This is the point where the delivery of the new regulatory regime may face 
challenges as it may differ depending on what structures exist in individual markets to 
effectively handle this. More research will need to be carried out to review ESMA’s 
ability to effectively supervise at local levels.  
7.5.8 Macro level reach 
The macro level focus of the EC regulations is largely regional, concerning itself with 
issues in the EU. This has metaphorically been depicted by the boundaries and fences 
metaphors which symbolise containment and scope. This may both be a strength as 
well as a weakness. Focusing on the EU allows for containment of the regulatory 
issues within the region, allowing for the regulatory process to be localised and 
enforced in a harmonised way.  
The fact that a regional approach is carried out in a globalised world is perhaps a 
weakness as there may be loopholes in the international system allowing for 
regulatory arbitrage (Dothan, 2008; Lannoo, 2009). Such a situation may result in 
regulatory tourism and portray the EU as an unattractive investment destination with 
stringent securities regulations hampering free market operations. The lack of 
equivalent regulatory bodies across different global jurisdictions makes it difficult to 
ensure a co-ordinated regulatory approach internationally (IOSCO Technical 
Committee, 2004). The formation of regional regulatory bodies in an otherwise global 
market is a subject worthy of further investigation. In evaluating the EC regulations, a 
more pervasive question emerges on whether crises can in effect be prevented and if 
so, whether regulations are an appropriate tool for doing this. This is discussed below. 
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7.6 Can crises be prevented 
One of the aims of the EC regulations was to curb further escalation of the crisis by 
ensuring that there was a system holding CRAs to account in the EU. In attempting to 
achieve this, there was a view that regulators were trying to design a fool-proof 
regulatory system. A question may be proffered here on whether it is possible to 
completely prevent crises through proactive regulation (Davies, 2003; Eichengreen & 
Bordo, 2002). In their study, Eichengreen & Bordo (2002) argued that modern 
financial systems were twice as likely to fail as their pre-1914 counterparts. This 
suggested that by their design, modern financial architectures were prone to crises. 
Following on from this logic, regulators can minimise the impact of crises but cannot 
completely prevent them. Further, too prescriptive regulatory approaches may 
hamper creativity and innovation, which are cornerstones of modern financial 
markets. 
7.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter analysed data comprising metaphor and non-metaphor data sets 
encapsulating study participants’ perceptions of the impact of the EC CRA regulations 
on the operations of the UK securities market. Linkages were made to extant literature 
in credit ratings and regulation. The 25 non-metaphor groups and the 77 metaphors 
were streamlined resulting in 8 broad data categories summarising the study findings. 
The 8 categories were presented in metaphoric language following the metaphor 
analysis approach adopted in this study but they contained findings from the non-
metaphor data as well. The discussion highlighted pertinent issues related to the 
regulation of CRAs in the EU. Firstly, there were strong reactions towards the 
regulations with allegations that the regulations were ill-conceived and likely to cause 
further imbalances through unintended consequences. Some of the regulatory 
objectives were said to be self-defeating as they were not only unattainable but if 
implemented could deliver negative outcomes.  
A case in point was the objective of increasing competition which if achieved could 
fuel ratings inflation as CRAs competitively vied for business by providing optimistic 
ratings. Further, there were insinuations that regulators had not fully grasped the 
workings of the ratings market and did not evidence understanding the real drivers 
behind the choice of CRAs by issuers. This point was underscored by CRA1 who 
argued that: 
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“You look at governing documentation from a lot of funds, take the insurers 
for example, they have hard-coded into their investment guidelines ratings 
from S&P, Moody’s or Fitch and suddenly having a wealth of competitors 
would be difficult for those kinds of investors I think. I agree competition is 
good for investors, more choice for investors is better but then again is it 
better on price or quality, hopefully both, given a choice would they prefer 
price or quality? I don’t know, we have 100 years of history of this system 
working the way it has, if that sort of changes, that’s a big change” 
Despite laying out clear regulatory proposals, the future role of CRAs was not specified 
in the new regulatory order compelling CRAs to either fight for their survival or 
continue as normal assuming that their role had not changed. Analysis of data 
revealed insightful metaphoric conjectures of CRAs and how they related to other 
players in the ratings market. There were power issues at play between regulators 
and the regulated; between incumbent CRAs and new or prospective entrants as well 
as between CRAs as quasi-regulatory agents and the market. Regulation was aimed at 
curbing some of these powers and this could cause unease particularly if the end game 
was not made known. Various theoretical conceptions of credit ratings were reviewed. 
It was argued that traditional economic perspectives were rather too technical and 
potentially failed to highlight softer behavioural issues driving institutions and 
individuals in the ratings market. 
Overall, the study concluded that viewing issues in the rating industry from the 
traditional economic perspective was not sufficient to unpick the behavioural and 
sociological issues at play in the industry. Consequently, the study employed the 
endogenous regulation theory (Becker 1983; 1985) to explore the need for a more 
inclusive regulatory approach encompassing the needs of various market participants.  
The endogenous approach to regulation viewed regulation as a socially-constructed 
negotiation. 
This suggested that the strong sentiments coming from market participants with 
regards to the regulations may not have been necessarily negative, but rather, a keen 
interest to engage with the process and attempt to influence it from within. There 
were strong misgivings by study participants on the EC regulatory process, its aims 
and motivations. Participants were sceptical that the regulations would have adverse 
effects on the market, that regulators had not understood the market; that the 
regulatory approach was patchy on one hand and too broad on the other.  
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Regulations were said to be kneejerk and not particularly focused; too fluid and likely 
to cause instability as well as politically-motivated. To cap the discussion, the chapter 
evaluated the regulations against the adapted model featuring the tenets of good 
regulation. The EC regulations were deemed to fall short of the expectations 
characteristic of good regulations as espoused in the model. The next chapter offers 
concluding remarks, a review of the study objectives and suggested areas for possible 
future research. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Conclusion and recommendations 
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8.0 Introduction  
This chapter offers an overview of the study, covering key arguments presented in this 
thesis. Thereafter, a brief review of the study objectives is presented, evaluating the 
extent to which this study achieved each of the objectives before outlining the study 
contribution to knowledge. Recommendations for possible further research are 
offered before the study draws to a close. The section below begins the discussion by 
summarising the key arguments presented in the preceding chapters. 
8.1 Overview of key arguments 
Credit Rating Agencies play a crucial role in global securities markets, bridging the 
information asymmetry gaps between investors and issuers. This role sees CRAs 
providing credit-worthiness opinions to investors regarding investee companies. 
CRAs also provide a rating monitoring service, tracking the performance of rated 
entities and updating their ratings in line with changing prospects of rated entities. 
Because of information asymmetry, many investors have come to rely on CRAs for 
opinions on where to invest or pull out. Further, regulators have increasingly relied on, 
and embedded credit ratings into capital market adequacy guidelines. This role has 
seen CRAs’ influences grow to be regarded as quasi-regulatory agents and arbiters of 
investment information globally.  
As discussed in Section 1.1.6, notwithstanding the increased power of CRAs over both 
market participants and regulators, CRAs traditionally operated in a loosely-regulated 
environment in the EU. This fuelled concerns about CRAs’ lack of accountability and 
unchecked power (Partnoy, 2009; White, 2009). While the SEC provided regulatory 
oversight on CRA operations in the USA, there was no equivalent regulatory 
framework in the European Union and or the UK. Instead, three EU market directives 
provided a framework for the oversight of CRAs, alongside the IOSCO self-regulation 
code. Concerns over the lack of regulation on CRAs were heightened when CRAs were 
deemed to have contributed to various corporate collapses and market failures by 
either failing to provide timely rating adjustments or providing inaccurate ratings (in 
the case of structured products). These alleged CRA failures led to increased calls for 
CRAs to be regulated, particularly in the EU (Crotty, 2009; Gupta, Mittal, & Bhalla, 
2010; Pettit, Fitt, Orlov, & Kalsekar, 2004).  
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The aftermath of the 2007-8 global financial crisis triggered moves by the European 
Commission to initiate proceedings to regulate CRAs operating in the EU. Despite the 
introduction of regulation No. 1060/2009, new concerns emerged regarding the scope 
of the new regulations, their motivations, mandate as well as regulators’ competences. 
Some of the concerns centred on the fact that the regulatory approach would not work 
(Staikouras, 2012); that the regulatory scope was too narrow (Utzig, 2010); that the 
regulatory approach was a kneejerk reaction and not well-thought through (Fisch, 
2010), and that the new regulations could have adverse unintended effects on market 
operations (Avgouleas, 2009; White, 2010a). Notably, most of the concerns were 
highlighted at academic and policy levels, raising questions on whether those who 
worked with credit ratings shared similar concerns. To get an appreciation of the 
rating environment, a historical review of credit ratings was provided in Section 2.3. 
Key to the appraisal of credit ratings was the dynamic market environment within 
which CRAs operated. Initially, CRAs operated on an investor-pays model. 
Technological developments led to the easing of information exchanges which meant 
that credit ratings could easily be shared, compromising the CRA revenue model. CRAs 
subsequently moved to the issuer-pays model. The fact that CRAs were now 
commissioned and paid by the same organisations they rated raised questions of 
conflicts of interest, possible bias, threatening the quality and validity of credit ratings 
(Frost, 2007). At the centre of these concerns were CRAs’ abilities to maintain an 
objective rating service while at the same time bidding for more business from the 
rated entities. The fact that CRAs operated in an oligopolistic market, insulated from 
external competition limited choices and further entrenched the powers of incumbent 
CRAs.  
Various attempts to address lingering issues in the rating market proved futile as 
CRAs continued to be blamed for corporate collapses and market crises. Despite the 
increasing concerns about the role of CRAs’ role in providing ratings for both 
regulatory and investment decision-making, no definitive regulatory positions were 
taken in the EU to address the problem. On the contrary, ratings were further 
embedded into such regulatory requirements as Basel II, leading to a paradoxical view 
of regulatory reliance on ratings juxtaposed to the lack of regulatory oversight of the 
ratings process (Partnoy 2001; 2010). Debates ensued, with divided opinions 
regarding whether there should be more or less securities regulation in the EU. The 
form and scope of regulation was also debated, with different theoretical postulations 
on what could work.  
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Previous studies on credit ratings largely took an economic theoretical perspective, 
focusing mainly on the efficacy of ratings, their technical nature, ratings quality, 
causality between ratings and other variables (Cantor & Packer, 1996; Kerwer, 2002). 
While these approaches provided useful insights into technical aspects of ratings, they 
downplayed the sociological and behavioural influences in the ratings environment. 
Further, the mechanistic view of ratings downplayed the subjective and softer aspects 
of credit ratings linked to sociological and behavioural issues. An appraisal of the 
issuer-pays model highlighted inherent behavioural motivations which could 
potentially sway decision-making within the ratings market, further strengthening the 
view that there were behavioural and sociological drivers at play around credit 
ratings. In analysing causes of various financial crises, Kamalodin (2011) argued that 
human behaviour underpinned all causes of crises, suggesting that this should be 
investigated alongside the traditional economic studies.  
Attempting to fill the gap, this study argued that alternative perspectives on credit 
ratings and regulation would add richer insights into behavioural influences driving 
individual and institutional behaviours to explain the regulatory inertia that 
characterised the European credit rating landscape for such a long time. Consequently, 
a behavioural appraisal of the regulatory void in the EU raised pertinent questions 
around the motives of the different regulatory stakeholders and how such motives 
could have influenced the regulatory process and with what outcomes. A review of 
extant regulation theory literature highlighted a prevalent view of regulation as an 
exogenous force applied to rather passive regulated entities (Baldwin & Cave, 1999; 
Baldwin et al, 2012; Stigler, 1971). At the same time, the opposite view; the 
endogenous regulatory approach was reviewed (see for example Becker 1985), 
raising questions on whether such an approach could deliver different regulatory 
outcomes to the European Union credit rating landscape. 
Extant literature on credit ratings revealed polarised conceptions of credit ratings; as 
quantifiable objective measures of default probabilities on one hand, vs. subjective 
opinions highly disclaimed by their issuers on the other. Despite these polarised views, 
there was evidence that rating users (both at market and regulatory levels) had over-
relied on the use of credit ratings for investment decisions as well as regulatory policy 
formulation. This suggested possible lack of understanding of what ratings actually 
meant. The role of credit rating agencies was also contested.  
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Different conceptions of CRAs were reviewed; CRAs as gatekeepers; as information 
intermediaries; as quasi-regulators; as information brokers among others. At the core 
of these conceptions was the expectation of what different stakeholders had of CRAs, 
suggesting that there was no commonly agreed expectation. This lack of a clearly 
defined role of CRAs meant that stakeholders could not hold CRAs to account and 
neither could judge the quality of their work. Further, CRA methodologies were said to 
be complex and opaque, alienating stakeholders and remaining mystical and difficult 
to define. Consequently, despite growing criticisms of CRAs, they continued to operate 
without any regulatory oversight. Against this backdrop, the EC regulations were 
introduced following the 2007-8 crisis. The regulations however raised fresh concerns 
about their true motivations; their possible unintended consequences; whether they 
were thought-through; whether regulators were competent enough to address the 
issues identified in the market and whether regulation was in fact the optimal answer 
for the identified problems. 
This study sought market participants’ views on the perceived impact of the EC 
regulations in response to the questions raised above. Owing to the specialised nature 
of the ratings market, characterised by a few specialists operating in a closed 
professional environment, the study was qualitative and exploratory in nature, 
adopting an interpretivist approach to acknowledge the subjective impact that 
regulations could have on different groups of study participants. 
Semi-structured interviews were used on a purposive and snowballed sample of 
participants drawn from issuers, investors, Other Interested Parties and 
representatives of CRAs. Data was collected through audio-recorded one-to-one 
interviews which were later transcribed and subsequently analysed. A total of 30 
participants were interviewed.   
Analysis of qualitative data required an open and flexible approach catering for 
emerging themes from the data. Pursuant to the exploratory nature of the study, the 
adopted analysis approach allowed for deep immersion into the data, nurturing 
emerging themes.  
At the initial stages of the analysis process, a prevalent use of metaphors was detected, 
resulting in the analysis approach defaulting to metaphor analysis to uncover the 
underlying meanings behind participants’ language usage in articulating their views 
about the EC regulations.  
  
261 
 Tabani Ndlovu  
77 metaphors were identified from the interview transcripts. The metaphors were 
subsequently grouped into 8 thematic categories depicting various participants’ 
reactions towards the regulations. A further analysis of the non-metaphoric data was 
conducted, yielding 25 emerging themes. These were further streamlined to further 
corroborate the emerging 8 metaphoric themed categories.  
Overall, the study data suggested contested regulatory spaces, depicting power 
tensions between regulators and regulated entities. There was a view by participants 
that regulations were exogenously imposed, triggering resistance by market 
participants. Seemingly anti-regulation sentiments were raised by participants, 
suggesting that they felt insufficiently engaged at the regulatory conception stage. 
There were perceptions of masked changes in the market, suggesting that rather than 
address real market issues, there was a perception of false realities and illusory 
changes. Regulatory motives were questioned, with alleged political drivers suspected 
to be driving the regulatory process. Regulatory competence, legitimacy, regulatory 
form and scope were questioned, with suspicions that the regulations were reactive 
and not well-thought through. 
The sentiments above suggested that if market participants had been adequately 
engaged prior to the regulatory formulation process, some of the issues prompting 
regulatory revisions would have been identified and perhaps treated differently in the 
regulatory proposals. To corroborate this view, participants cited the frequent 
revisions in the regulatory clauses resulting in CRA1, CRA2 and CRA3. This, it was 
argued, further discredited regulators and questioned their competence in gauging 
market issues accurately. On this basis, regulatory proposals were said to be “founded 
on shaky ground” and likely to have unintended consequences instead of addressing 
legacy issues in the market.  
An endogenous regulatory framework was offered as a possible explanation for 
participants’ views, arguing that rather than being anti-regulation, participants were 
expressing a desire to endogenously engage regulators to maximise future regulatory 
payoffs and minimise future regulatory burdens. Endogenous regulation is a form of 
smart regulation fostering active engagement and communication between different 
stakeholders to the regulatory process resulting in shared responsibilities. Exogenous 
regulatory approaches were said to generate conflicts and friction while their opposite, 
endogenous regulatory approaches tended towards conciliatory outcomes.  
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It was further argued that the nature of the EC as a regulator raised pertinent 
questions consistent with a legitimacy theoretical approach. Due to limitations on time 
and resources, the legitimacy theoretical view was not explored in more depth in this 
study, suggesting that future research could be carried out to investigate the 
legitimacy issues around the European Commission as a pan-European regulator. The 
next section reviews the study objectives, appraising the extent to which the 
objectives have been met by the study. 
8.2 An overview of the study objective and questions 
This study set out to investigate the perceived impact of the EC Credit Rating Agency 
regulations on UK-based market participants. Specifically, the study sought to answer 
three research questions: 
1) How do market participants perceive EC regulations to be addressing legacy 
problems identified in the UK ratings industry? 
2) What is the UK market participants’ perceived impact of the EC regulatory 
changes on the UK securities market/UK Credit Ratings market?  
3) With CRA funding models alleged to be central to problems in the ratings industry, 
what are the perceived alternative approaches that could equally address the 
problems identified in the UK ratings market; which ones are most preferred by 
the UK-based market participants? 
Overall, participants felt that regulators were not in touch with a very dynamic and 
specialised market. Engagement with practitioners in this market was said to be 
crucial particularly as they knew more about this innovative and dynamic industry 
and therefore could offer meaningful contributions to the regulation formulating 
process. Participants were therefore critical of the exogenous regulatory approach 
allegedly adopted by the EC. 
It was argued that this approach alienated regulated entities from meaningfully 
participating in the formulation of the regulations, resulting in an ineffective and 
patchy regulatory formulation process as discussed earlier in this study. The following 
sections detail how each question was addressed by the study. 
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8.2.1 Question 1: Perceived adequacy of the EC regulations 
Participants largely felt that the regulations were reactive and did not seem to be well 
thought-through as evidenced by the constant revisions suggesting that the EC 
regulations were formulated in an ad hoc fashion. The regulatory agenda was viewed 
with suspicion, with participants arguing that the regulations were largely politically-
motivated, aimed at legitimising politicians in a “box-ticking” regulatory framework 
that would not address market issues (Benston, 1998). Regulators were said to have 
missed the point in the essence of the regulations. Their regulatory mandate was 
questioned, together with their competence particularly given the loose structure of 
diverse individual competent, market-based authorities to provide front line 
regulatory supervision services on behalf of ESMA. On this basis, it was felt that in 
their current form, the EC regulations were not adequate to address market problems. 
Further, the legal mandate of the regulator (ESMA) was said to be compromised by 
their non-Majoritarian nature and lack of a legitimate electoral mandate in each of the 
member states.   
There were divided opinions on the regulatory scope. On one hand, some participants 
argued that the regulatory scope was too broad, applying a “one size fits all” approach 
and missing out on the finer market details that were key. This, it was argued, would 
negatively impact the effectiveness of the regulations across the disparate EU member 
states. On the other hand, some participants argued that the EU-centric regulatory 
approach, and the fact that the focus was on CRAs, meant that the regulations were 
missing other key market players who were connected to CRAs in a systemic 
environment. These polarised views were in themselves symbolic of the hazy 
regulatory proposals which were said to ironically lack accountability. 
On the effectiveness of the regulations, there was a feeling that regulations in their 
current form could not increase competition as the competitive drivers lay outside 
rating agencies themselves. Regulators were therefore said to be missing the point on 
competition. On the question of investor protection, it was not immediately clear how 
additional disclosure would be operationalised to further enhance investor protection. 
In particular, participants were concerned about the possible resource requirements 
to deal with the additionally disclosed information.  
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There was a question as well on who would use the additional information – was the 
market assumed to be intelligent enough to consume and decipher the additional 
disclosures? CRA1 particularly queried this and argued: 
“…but on the other hand when you ask for vast amounts of data, does anyone 
really get through it? Even with the best will in the world I would say No!” 
Improving corporate governance of rating agencies was good in principle but 
seemingly lacked sufficient operational detail. It was not immediately clear how such 
an objective would be implemented and monitored effectively and to what effect. 
There were concerns raised that some suggested governance proposals could 
detrimentally affect the operation of CRAs, particularly new and smaller entrants. 
Examples of such proposals included the mandatory rotation of CRAs and / or analysts, 
disclosure requirements among others. These required significant resources and 
could work against the regulators’ attempts to encourage competition. The study 
therefore successfully addressed the objective of eliciting participants’ perceptions on 
the adequacy of the EC regulations. 
Analysis of the study data raised questions on why participants’ ideas were not used 
to inform the regulatory process seeing that they were clear about what they thought 
could or could not work. The study opted to adopt a behavioural approach in 
evaluating participants’ contributions. This was in contrast to the traditional economic 
theoretical perspectives largely adopted in previous studies. The behavioural and 
sociological approaches allowed for an evaluation of the motives and influences of the 
various players involved in the credit rating agency market. Participants’ reactions 
towards the EC regulations and in particular, the concerns raised prompted the study 
to investigate approaches that involve participants in formulating regulations 
(endogenous approaches) vs. approaches that treat regulation as externally imposed 
on those regulated.  
This analysis led the study to the endogenous vs. exogenous regulatory approaches. 
Further questions were raised regarding the legitimacy of the EC as a regulator, 
suggesting that further research could be carried out using legitimacy theory to 
investigate the mandate of the EC in different member states. The conclusion from the 
study findings was that the EC regulations had taken a narrow focus, were 
exogenously premised and thus had little buy-in from those regulated. The regulatory 
focus was perceived to be narrow as opposed to be holistic.  
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This question was thus comprehensively addressed by the study findings. The section 
below considers the second study question. 
8.2.2 Question 2: Perceived impact of the EC regulations 
Participants envisaged unintended consequences which could hamper market 
operations in the long term. There were fears of burdensome costs which could 
seriously compromise market efficiency and stifle competition, innovation and 
creativity. While the regulations sought to increase the number of CRAs and address 
lack of competition, participants perceived the current regulatory moves to be 
working against this regulatory objective. The prohibitive regulatory compliance costs 
were said to be acting as a barrier to entry, dissuading smaller would-be CRA entrants 
to consider registering to provide rating services in the EU. It was envisaged that such 
new and small agents would most likely not have the required resources to meet the 
regulatory requirements. The regulatory initiatives of increasing competition were 
thus perceived to be self-defeating as they were likely to induce a negative effect on 
competition by discouraging smaller new entrants. 
Further, more players were argued to induce competitive behaviour among CRAs, and 
would most likely fuel ratings inflation, negatively affecting ratings quality. The 
argument was that similar to banks, an oligopolistic rating market offered the optimal 
rating services that had so far adequately met market needs. There were concerns that 
adding any more players would induce CRAs to issue favourable ratings in a bid to win 
more business and that such an effect could detrimentally impact on ratings quality. 
The choice of which CRA issuers used was said to be driven mainly by investors. This 
suggested that by merely introducing more CRAs, there was no guarantee that such 
CRAs would get business as investors preferred established household rating names.  
There was therefore a “catch-22 situation” and unless there were specific regulatory 
sanctions compelling use of the new CRAs, participants did not envisage any such 
CRAs to get meaningful business unless they offered specialist niche services currently 
not offered by the incumbent CRAs. Participants questioned what they viewed to be 
simplistic proposals for example on analyst rotations which were aimed at addressing 
possible conflicts of interest. Participants argued that the proposals were impractical 
for smaller CRAs who could not have enough staff to rotate and would thus fall foul of 
the rules if they did not.  
  
  
266 
 Tabani Ndlovu  
The proposal to rotate analysts thus worked against the regulatory objective of 
increasing CRA competition; was self-defeating and impractical for smaller CRAs. This 
was highlighted as a further indication that the EC CRA regulations had not been well 
thought-through.  
The analysis of participants’ responses again suggested that if regulators had 
extensively involved market participants and taken on-board their reactions, a lot of 
the regulatory revisions and turnarounds would have possibly been avoided. This 
again pitted the inclusive regulatory formulation processes against the exogenous 
approaches currently pursued by the regulators. The endogenous regulatory approach 
seemed the most optimal approach particularly given the fact that the rating agency 
market is specialised with market participants who potentially know more about what 
goes on in the market than regulators. In such situations, the regulators can get better 
outcomes by involving those regulated hence the recommendation of an endogenous 
regulatory approach. The study therefore successfully addressed the requirements of 
the second question, looking at the perceived impact of the EC regulations. 
8.2.3 Question 3: Proposed alternative approaches 
The issuer-pays model was said to be conflicted, necessitating the exploration of other 
possible alternatives in its place. Asked for possible alternative funding models for 
CRAs, participants were divided between retaining the current issuer-pays model, 
adopting an investor-pays model or adopting a central, publicly-funded rating model. 
Questioned further, it was eventually agreed that the issuer-pays model was fraught 
with challenges as highlighted in this study and therefore needed to be improved or 
replaced by more viable models if these could be found. The investor-pays model was 
said to be equally conflicted and could result in problems such as free riding, problems 
in the identification and recognition of new start-up issuers who would be below 
investors’ radars and thus would struggle to get anyone to commission ratings on 
them if they were not known. It was argued that this was the original model in the first 
place and the fact that it was abandoned before was ample evidence that it could not 
be sustained in its original form. Improvements were therefore suggested but not 
specified.  
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The last model to be considered was the publicly-funded model. This was proposed to 
be a central, publicly-funded repository for all rating needs. Any issuers requiring 
rating services would register their interests with this body which would in turn 
allocate such ratings to CRAs on its list, ensuring an equitable distribution of business 
but also considering CRAs’ competences and geographic coverage. This way, CRAs 
would not have any allegiance to issuing entities or investors, eliminating conflicts of 
interest and promoting CRA independence. A similar model was proposed by Fennell 
& Medvedev (2012) who termed it the platform model.  Their proposal left questions 
though on the specific operational details of how such a central entity would run; the 
criteria for allocating rating bids; its supervision among other concerns. This proposed 
model is worthy of further research to test its viability. Based on the above, the study 
successfully explored the research aim and delivered on the research questions stated 
above. The section below reflects on the study contribution to knowledge. 
8.3 Study contribution to knowledge 
An investigation of the perceived impact of the European Commission credit rating 
agency regulations using more behavioural-oriented approaches brings new 
perspectives to an area traditionally viewed using more economic-oriented models. 
The study therefore makes several contributions as discussed below. 
 
Straddling the domains of economic regulation and credit rating agencies, the study 
expands literature in the two areas, presenting participants’ concerns about an 
alienating exogenous regulatory approach. The exogenous approach assumed a 
passive and somewhat inactive role of regulated entities resulting in the 
perceptions of regulations being imposed. The study argued that this approach did 
not work well in an area where the regulated entities were specialists, potentially 
possessing more knowledge of the market and products than the regulators. Any 
attempts to impose regulations in this case could result in ineffective regulations 
that could be subverted by the market. Instead, the study proposed an endogenous 
regulatory approach, placing regulated entities within the regulatory conception 
process and giving them a prominent voice to inform the process and minimise 
regulatory burdens. The approach took a social-constitution of regulation approach 
(Malloy, 2010), treating the regulation of credit rating agencies as an endogenous 
activity as opposed to the traditional exogenous view.  
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The second contribution related to the use of metaphor analysis as a method for 
analysing market participants’ reactions to the EC credit rating agency regulations. 
According to Oswick & Grant, (1996) and Cornelissen et al, (2008) the use of 
metaphors in organisational studies was said to be rather limited. The authors 
encouraged more studies in this area employing metaphors to give new 
perspectives to the field. This study responded to that call by employing the use of 
inductive analysis of metaphors, innovatively conceptualising perceived issues in 
the regulation of credit rating agencies in metaphoric terms and helping induce 
vivid conceptions of possible solutions using a new metaphoric approach.  
Theoretically, the study proposed an alternative view to the traditional economic 
oriented approach of investigating issues in credit ratings, instead, advocating the 
adopting of a behavioural and sociological perspective to better illuminate the 
individual and organisational influences shaping players in the credit ratings 
market. This approach employed the use of the endogenous regulation theory 
(Becker 1985; Ellig, 1991) to examine the motivations and reactions of market 
participants to the European Commission regulatory proposals. This approach 
allowed for new insights on the perceived impact of the EC regulations and was a 
break from the typically economic-oriented and technical approaches used in the 
past in investigating credit rating agencies and their ratings.    
At a practical level, the study offered insights on issues said to have been 
overlooked by regulators in formulating the new EC regulations. The study 
therefore contributed to on-going debates about practical issues that need to be 
taken into consideration in revised future versions of regulations. Further, the 
study highlighted the need to involve and embrace market participants’ views as 
they are the experts with a closer understanding of the practicalities of the 
regulatory issues in a dynamic and specialist area. This contributed to an enhanced 
understanding of the relationships between regulatory initiatives at policy level 
and the practical understanding of market participants.  
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8.4 Study Limitations 
This study had four main limitations which offered scope for possible future 
research. Firstly, the study findings did not delineate between CRAs’ performance 
in issuing initial ratings and subsequent rating adjustments. In reality, CRA 
performance on the two areas has been different hence in retrospect, a clear 
delineation should have been sought in respect of the two areas. Secondly, while the 
study provided an empirical account of UK-based market participants’ perceptions 
of the impact of the EC regulations on the UK securities market, the study only 
provided a snapshot view at a point in time, spanning the three year duration of the 
study. The fluid nature of the CRA regulations may see the rating landscape 
changing quickly. Already, at the time of writing this thesis, the EC CRA regulations 
had seen three major revisions since their inception in 2009. This evidenced the 
evolving nature of the regulatory issues, the volatile climate and changing 
regulatory drivers. This meant that by the time the study was concluded, issues in 
the rating industry may have changed significantly. Notwithstanding the dynamic 
nature of the rating market issues, the insights drawn from the study regarding 
participants’ overall views of regulation remain helpful even though the regulatory 
landscape may have changed. Such views will help inform future regulatory 
considerations in the credit rating market. It would be interesting if a follow up 
study was conducted later to see whether participants’ views would have changed 
significantly. 
The third study limitation emanated from the nature of the study participants, who 
were mostly members of the Association of Corporate Treasurers. The 
contributions expressed may have been guarded, representing the official line of 
their membership body. Non-members of the ACT were excluded from the sample 
and this may skew results somewhat. The purposive sampling approach and the 
subsequent snowball sampling potentially limited participants to a small circle, 
further limiting the potential sample. Notwithstanding this, the ratings market is 
relatively small and there is no evidence that widening the sampling frame would 
have yielded significantly diverse participants with sufficient knowledge of the 
credit rating industry.  
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Further, as the study came not long after the financial crisis where CRAs had been 
vilified for their alleged contribution to the crisis, views expressed may have been 
influenced by the heightened attention to both CRAs and the regulation thereof. 
Future studies could investigate views of broader groups beyond members of the 
ACT to see if such views resonate across different participant groups. 
Lastly, the focus on UK-based market participants’ views, while dealing with pan 
European Union regulations made it difficult to isolate the UK from the broader EU 
market and delineate regulatory effects. Consequently, some concerns expressed 
may apply to both the UK as well as the broader EU market. While the UK-centric 
approach to the study allowed for a contained, manageable sample, further 
research could be conducted on other EU countries to determine if participants 
share the same views expressed by UK-based participants in this study or whether 
market differences may give different outcomes. 
8.5 Possible areas for future research 
In addition to some of the possible research areas highlighted in 8.4 above, a number 
of areas emerged which however lay outside the scope of this study and hence could 
not be explored further. As discussed above, CRAs performed differently in issuing 
initial ratings versus providing on-going rating adjustments. As this study did not 
consider these two areas individually, future research could be carried out to 
investigate participants’ views on the two areas.  
The sentiments raised by participants concerning engagement with the regulatory 
process present an area that needs to be investigated further. In particular, the nature 
of consultation by the European Commission ahead of the enactment of the 
regulations, the scope of the consultation, the level of engagement (responses) by the 
market participants as well as the responsiveness of the regulator to the submitted 
participants’ responses deserve further scrutiny, in light of this study’s findings. This 
would validate or disprove potential claims of regulators consulting when decisions 
had already been taken.  
The proposed alternative revenue models for CRAs need further investigation to test 
the viability of the proposed models and ensure that whatever is proposed, does not 
pose further unintended consequences to the market. As this was outside the scope of 
this study, the proposed model was not explored in depth.  
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Lastly, the effectiveness of the proposed regulations and the regulation framework 
need review to gauge how well they work considering the fact that the regulatory 
environment is evolving and it is difficult to fully evaluate the effectiveness of the 
regulations owing to the constant revisions. Further reviews of the effectiveness of the 
regulations can be done once the regulations have been allowed ample time to work. 
8.6 Concluding remarks and recommendations 
The study of UK-based market participants’ perceptions of the regulatory impact of 
the EC CRA regulations revealed strong reactions of market participants towards the 
regulations. There are significant implications towards future regulatory amendments. 
If participants who are directly affected by the regulations do not perceive the 
regulator to be doing a good job, this erodes market confidence and potentially 
undermines the regulators’ mandate in the market. Further, the sentiments raise 
questions on how well the consultation exercise was carried out prior to the 
regulations being enacted. Without cooperation from the regulated entities, the 
regulator will find it difficult to effectively regulate. 
The regulatory efforts were visualised as fluid and swinging like a pendulum, 
suggesting about-turns in the regulation formulation process. While this may 
demonstrate responsiveness to changes in the market, it does not inspire confidence 
among the regulated entities.  
The constant regulatory about-turns suggest a trial-and-error approach where 
perhaps things may not have been sufficiently scoped out before the enactment of the 
requisite regulations. At practice level, the study therefore makes recommendations 
as follows: 
 
1) That regulators revisit the original / revised objectives to test these with market 
participants to ensure all possible impacts are anticipated and catered for, 
2) That the market level regulatory remit be re-considered to ensure there are 
adequate structures and sufficient resources at local levels to allow for the 
effective delivery of regulatory tasks on behalf of the central regulator, (ESMA).  
At a theoretical level, the study recognised that the attempt to analyse regulatory 
issues from an economic perspective was rather limited within the scope of this study.  
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The recommendation therefore is that the theoretical approach to investigating 
regulation be broadened to encompass not just the economic aspects of regulation, 
but the behavioural and sociological aspects as well. The use of metaphor analysis on 
issues in the regulation of credit rating agencies allowed for a visualisation of market 
participants’ views in vivid imagery that allowed for new approaches to investigating 
phenomena in this area and hopefully this trend will continue particularly as the 
regulations are embedded and continue to evolve. The recommendation is that further 
studies using metaphor analysis be conducted in the evolving CRA regulatory 
landscape and in broader securities studies.  
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Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet 
Study title 
Credit Rating Agencies: Regulatory changes and market participants’ perspectives 
You have been selected to take part in a research study to capture your views on the 
recently gazetted European Union, (EU) regulatory reforms targeted at regulating Credit 
Rating Agencies, (CRAs). The information below gives you details of the proposed study 
to enable you to decide whether after going through the information you want to proceed 
and take part in the interview or not. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being carried out and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following sections carefully. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This study is being carried out to find out what different market participants think of the 
new EU regulations aimed at Credit Rating Agencies. Key to the questions to be asked is 
the need to establish what effect the regulations will have in addressing previously 
identified problems in the credit rating market. Some questions will elicit views on how 
CRAs are run and regulated to find out whether this meets the needs of today’s global 
market. The study is being carried out as part of the researcher’s 3-year PhD research 
project.   
Why have I been invited to participate? 
Participants to this study are drawn from people who work in and with Credit Rating 
Agencies. You have been chosen to participate because of your close association with this 
area. It is believed you may be able to share some important views about the proposed 
regulatory reforms and implications thereof.   
Do I have to take part? 
Participation is entirely voluntary. This information sheet is designed to give you an 
overview of what the study is about and what it will involve so that you can decide 
whether to take part or not. If you do decide to take part, please sign the attached 
Consent Form. Preferably, the interview will be audio-recorded for accuracy, speed and 
to facilitate a smoother interviewee-interviewer interaction. If you are uncomfortable 
with the interview being audio-recorded, please indicate on the Consent Form and the 
interviewer will take brief notes instead. If for any reason, you change your mind after 
agreeing to participate, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason. 
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What will happen to me if I take part? 
The interview will involve responding to questions posed to you by the researcher. There 
are no wrong or correct answers. What is important are your views. The entire interview 
will last between 30 minutes to an hour.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
Participating in the interview will involve about an hour of your time. Your identity and 
contribution will be anonymised and all data kept confidential within the limitations of 
the law. Although reference to you or your organisation will be anonymised but there is a 
possibility that certain assertions may be identifiable with certain institutions as the 
breadth of participants is limited.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
The area of Credit Rating Agencies has been mired in controversy, particularly 
regarding the role of CRAs in the recent financial crisis. The new EU regulations have 
been introduced to restore confidence in the market and address previously identified 
problems. This study will help shed light on the reactions of market participants to 
these regulations. Results of the study will help inform future policy developments. 
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
The study is being conducted on a confidential basis and none of the study’s findings will 
be attributed to an individual or their companies. The interview files will be password-
protected and kept safe at university computers in accordance to the Oxford Brookes 
University’s Policy on Academic Integrity. In line with the University’s policy, the data 
generated in the course of the research must be kept securely in electronic form for a 
period of up to five years after the completion of a research project.  
What should I do if I want to take part? 
Attached to your letter of invitation is this Information sheet and the Consent Form. After 
reading the Information Sheet, please indicate whether or not you want to participate in 
the interview by completing and signing the attached Consent Form. If you are happy to 
continue, you also need to indicate (on the Consent Form) whether you are happy for the 
interview to be audio-recorded or not. Please send the signed Consent Form in the 
enclosed self-addressed envelope and post it back to the researcher who will contact you 
to arrange interview dates and times. Alternatively, if you have received the invitation by 
email, please send your response by return email, indicating whether or not you want to 
take part in the study by completing and sending back the attached Consent Form.  
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What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the interview will be used for the researcher’s PhD thesis and some parts 
may be used for publishing papers in this area. Either way, no reference will be made to 
you or your company. You can request to receive an electronic copy of the thesis or 
publications when these become available.   
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research is being carried out as part of a PhD studentship in the Accounting, 
Governance & Information Management, (AGIM) Department at Oxford Brookes 
University Business School.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
This research has been approved by the Oxford Brookes University Research Ethics 
Committee. 
Contact details for Further Information 
For further information about this study, please contact Tabani Ndlovu,  
xxxxxxx@brookes.ac.uk, Tel. xxxxxxxxxxx or alternatively, if you have any concerns about 
the way in which the study has been conducted, please contact the Chair of the University 
Research Ethics Committee on ethics@brookes.ac.uk.  
Thank you 
Your participation in this study is greatly appreciated 
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Appendix 2: Consent Form 
 
Full title of Project: Credit Rating Agencies: Regulatory changes and market 
participants’ perspectives 
 
Researcher:  Tabani Ndlovu, PhD Student, Oxford Brookes University    Business 
School  
Email:            tndlovu@brookes.ac.uk     
 Please tick box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for 
the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I  
 am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  
 
 Please tick box 
Yes            No 
 
4. I agree to the interview being audio recorded 
 
   
5. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications  
 
  
6. I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it 
has been anonymised) in a specialist data centre and may be used 
for future research. 
 
  
 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
Tabani Ndlovu 
 
Name of Researcher    Date    Signature  
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Appendix 3: Broad interview themes / guide 
As the interviews will be semi-structured, specific questions will vary depending 
on whether the interviewee is an issuer, regulator, CRA representative. Questions 
will evolve to reflect the responses of the different interviewees in a semi-
structured setting but will be based on the following themes: 
 
1. Preliminary Questions 
 Background and role within organisation 
 Experience of working with CRAs / ratings 
 Role of Credit Rating Agencies 
 Opinions on CRAs / establish if CRAs linked to crisis and whether this 
justifies regulation, regulatory approach etc 
 
2. Perceived impact of regulation  
 
3. Perceived role of regulation in the securities market 
 Perceived triggers of the EC regulations 
 Perceptions on the EC CRA regulations and their impact 
 Extent to which EC regulations perceived to address causes of the 2007-
8 crisis 
 
4. Proposed remedies to address ratings market issues  
 Potential alternative CRA funding models 
 Views on alternative regulatory approaches 
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Appendix 4: Typical interview questions 
The following were the typical questions posed to interview participants. As the study 
followed a semi-structured approach, the questions were flexibly presented, not 
necessarily following the same order. The questions were tailored to suit participants’ 
backgrounds. 
 
Typical questions for investors - Objectives 
1. To determine if the new regulations will change investors’ perceptions of / relationships with CRAs 
2. To find out investors’ perceptions of the effects of the new regulations in the ratings market and their 
confidence on how well the regulations address legacy problems in the industry 
3. To elicit investors’ preferences and rationale on the choice between regulation and self-regulation 
4. To find out if there have been any behavioural changes among market participants post the crisis or as a 
result of the new regulations 
 
No. Question Objective 
1 What is your role / involvement with Credit Rating Agencies? Intro 
2 
Have there been any ratings-related regulatory challenges affecting your role? What are they? 
If not, do you foresee any ratings-related regulatory challenges which may affect your role moving forward? 
What is likely to trigger this? 
Intro 
3 
What use do you (does your organisation) make of ratings?  
a. Are credit ratings part of your investment guidelines?  
b. Have the guidelines changed since the crisis?  
c. How does your organisation treat structured finance ratings? 
d. Does it matter which CRA provides the ratings?   
e. Has your use of ratings changed since the crisis, e.g. more reliance on internal analysis?    
f. Would you consider using ratings from smaller (investor-funded) agencies?   
Intro  
1/ 2/4 
4 
Have you come across any unsolicited ratings recently? If yes, have they been marked as unsolicited? How 
do you perceive unsolicited ratings? 
1/4 
5 Are you aware of the new EC regulations for Credit Rating Agencies? Intro 
6 How effective has been the regulation / supervision of CRAs prior to the crisis / new EC rules? 2/3/4 
7 
What is your reaction to the new European Commission CRA regulatory reforms? 
a. Is formal regulation necessary or would a code of conduct be better?  
b. Is the new EU regulation of CRAs the right way to regulate them? 
2/3 
8 
What is likely to change in the way you relate with CRAs as a result of the new regulations? 
a. Will you continue to use ratings? 
b. Will you continue to use the same rating agencies? 
c. Have the new regulations hampered the way you and your industry work? If so, what exactly has 
changed and what are the implications for your industry? 
d. Have the new regulations enhanced the way your company / industry work? If so what exactly has 
changed and what will it mean to your company/ industry? 
1/2/4 
9 
Are CRAs the appropriate vehicle for providing ratings? If not, what alternative do you think could fulfil 
ratings requirements?  
10 Are there any areas that remain unaddressed by the new regulations? What more should be done? 2/4 
11 
In your view, what is the likely impact of the new EC regulations on the ratings market both locally and 
globally? 
1/2/3/4 
12 
Is the current funding model for CRAs appropriate, i.e. that the issuer pays? If not, who should pay? 
Advantages/disadvantages of other funding models? 
1 /4 
13 
Do you think CRAs have changed since the crisis? In what ways? Is this positive change? What has 
necessitated the change? What more should they do? 
1/4 
14 
The EU Commission is considering the creation of a European CRA. Do you think this is a good idea? Would 
you like to see a rating from them? Could it replace a rating from S&P /Moody’s/Fitch? 
2/4 
15 Should there be more competition in the ratings market? Why? 2/4 
16 
The new CRA regulations aim to increase transparency. How will you use additional information to achieve 
this? What are the implications of the additional disclosed information in terms of costs, skills, time etc? and 
how will this impact your decision making / due diligence? 
1/2/4 
17 
One of the aims of the CRA regulations is improved investor protection, do you feel safer under the new 
regulations? What makes you feel safer? If not, why not? 
1/2 
18 
The new regulations aim to improve CRA supervision. In your view, do they provide a sufficient supervisory 
framework for CRAs in the EU? Globally? – why / why not? 
2 
19 Who else would you recommend for further information on CRA operations and the ratings market? 
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Typical questions for CRAs – objectives  
1. To find out CRAs’ perceptions of how the new regulations will impact CRAs and other market 
participants 
2. To find out whether or not CRAs have changed their practices post the crisis and why 
3. To elicit CRAs’ preferences between regulation and self-regulation and their rationale 
4. To gauge CRAs’ confidence on whether the new regulations address any legacy problems in the ratings 
market 
 
No. Question Objective 
1 What is your role / what do you do? Intro 
2 How do you see the function of CRAs post the crisis and following the new EC regulations? Intro 
3 
What are the issues / challenges in the ratings market?  
a. How have these evolved since the crisis? Intro 
4 How effective has been the regulation / supervision of CRAs prior to crisis? Is this likely to change? Intro /4 
5 What would you like to see changed in the governance/regulation of CRAs and why? Intro /4 
6 Are you aware of the new EC regulations for Credit Rating Agencies? Intro 
7 
What is your reaction to the new EC CRA regulatory reforms? 
a. Is formal regulation necessary or would a code of conduct be better?  
b. Is the regulation prescriptive or does it allow for flexibility? 
c. Is the new EU regulation of CRAs the right way to regulate them? 
1/3 
8 
How are the regulations likely to change in the way your company / industry operates? 
a. Will ratings continue to be used as before? 
b. Will your company’s market share / customer base change? 
c. Have the new regulations hampered the way you and your industry work? If so, what exactly has 
changed & what are the implications for your company/ industry? 
d. Have the new regulations enhanced the way your company / industry work? If so what exactly 
has changed and what will it mean to your company/ industry? 
e. What specific changes have been made (/ may be made) in your company as a result of the new 
regulations? And with what effect? 
1/2 
9 In your view, what specific issues do the regulations address?  1/2/4 
10 Are there any areas that remain unaddressed by the new regulations? 4 
11 
Are CRAs the appropriate vehicle for providing ratings? If not, what alternative do you think could fulfil 
the same need? 
1/2/3 
12 
What problems do you think the new regulations may pose in 
a. The ratings market in general 
b. The operations of other market participants 
c. The global workings of the ratings market 
4 
13 
Is the current funding model for CRAs appropriate, i.e. that the issuer pays? If not, who should pay? 
Advantages/disadvantages of other funding models? 
1/2/4 
14 
Have you as CRAs changed the way you work since the crisis? In what ways? What has necessitated the 
change? Is there more that you feel CRAs should be doing? 
2/4 
15 
The European Commission is considering the creation of a European CRA. Do you think this is a good 
idea? What chance do you think the CRA stands in winning business away from S&P / Moody’s/Fitch? 
1/2/4 
16 
The new regulations aim to increase competition in the ratings market. Should there be more 
competition in the ratings market? Why? 
1/2/4 
17 
The new regulations aim to increase investor protection, through transparency and disclosure, how 
well do you think this will protect investors? 
1/4 
18 
Do the new EC regulations provide any tensions between your global / US operations and your EU 
work? If so, what are the tensions/conflicts 
1/4 
19 How will the additional disclosure requirements affect your business? 1/2/4 
20 
What will be the costs associated with implementing the new regulatory requirements in the EU? What 
impacts do these have on the viability of the EU market? 
1/2/4 
21 
One of the new regulations’ aim is to provide a single regulatory authority in the EU. Is this a better 
option for your organisation/industry or would you have preferred country-based supervision?  
1/4 
22 
What are the implications of the obligation for issuers of structured finance instruments to provide 
access to information not only to the CRA they appoint, but to all other interested CRAs? 
1/2/4 
23 Do you think European and international legislation rely too heavily on ratings by CRAs? 1/4 
24 
The new EC regulations also aim to improve corporate governance within CRAs. What changes will this 
bring to your organisation and what will be the impact? 
1/2/4 
25 What are the implications of the EU registration requirements? Are these welcome? Why / why not? 1/2/4 
26 Who else would you recommend for further information on CRA operations and the ratings market? 
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Typical questions for OIPs – objectives  
1. To determine if the new regulations will change the way in which CRAs are perceived 
2. To find out OIPs’ perceptions of how the new regulations will impact different market participants and 
whether they effectively address legacy issues in the ratings market 
3. To elicit OIPs’ preferences between regulation and self-regulation 
4. To find out if OIPs believe there have been / will be behavioural/practice changes in the ratings market 
No. Question Objective 
1 What is your role / involvement with Credit Rating Agencies? Intro 
2 
Have there been any ratings-related regulatory challenges affecting the ratings market? If so, what 
are they? If not, do you foresee any ratings-related regulatory challenges which may affect the 
market moving forward? What is likely to trigger this? 
Intro 
3 What use do you (does your organisation) make of ratings?   
Intro 
1/4 
4 
What are the issues / challenges in the ratings market and what is their cause?  
a. How have these evolved since the crisis? Intro 
5 How effective has been CRA regulation / supervision prior to crisis? Is this likely to change? Intro 
6 What would you like to see changed in the governance/regulation of CRAs and why? Intro 
7 Are you aware of the new EC regulations for Credit Rating Agencies? Intro 
8 
What is your reaction to the new EC CRA regulatory reforms? 
a. Is formal regulation necessary or would a code of conduct be better?  
b. Is the new EU regulation of CRAs the right way to regulate them? 
a. How well do you think the regulations will sit alongside global / international regulations? 
1/2/3 
9 
What is likely to change in market participants’ relationships with CRAs due to the new 
regulations? 
a. Will ratings continue to be used? 
b. Will the same rating agencies continue to dominate the market? 
c. Have the new regulations hampered the way the ratings industry works? If so, what exactly has 
deteriorated and what are the implications for the industry? 
d. Have the new regulations enhanced the way the industry works? If so what exactly has changed 
and what will this mean to the industry? 
1/2/3/4 
10 
In your view, what specific issues do the regulations address? E.g. conflict of interest, 
transparency, CRA funding model or Competition 
2/4 
11 Are there any areas that remain unaddressed by the new regulations? 2/4 
12 
What do you think are the likely impacts of the new regulations on: 
a. The ratings market in general 
b. The operations of other market participants 
c. The global workings and coordination of regulations in the ratings market 
1/2/4 
13 
Is the current funding model for CRAs appropriate, i.e. that the issuer pays? If not, who should 
pay? Advantages/disadvantages of other funding models? 
1/2/4 
14 Do you think CRAs have changed since the crisis? In what ways? Should they be doing more? 1/4 
15 
Have you come across any unsolicited ratings recently? If yes, have they been marked as 
unsolicited? How do you perceive unsolicited ratings? 
1/2/4 
16 The EU Commission is considering the creation of a European CRA. What is your reaction to that?  1/4 
17 
Are CRAs the appropriate vehicle for providing ratings? If not, what alternative would you 
suggest? 
1/2/3 
18 
The new regulations aim to increase competition in the ratings market. Is there need for more 
competition in the ratings market? Why? 
2/3 
19 
How well do you think the single EU regulatory authority will work in supervising CRAs across EU 
member states. Do you think a country-by country supervisory framework would have been 
better or not? 
1/2/4 
20 
What do you think of the additional information that CRAs have to disclose? Will this increase 
transparency and improve competition as intended? 
1/2/4 
21 
The new regulations forbid CRAs from carrying out certain consultancy services to issuers they 
rate (as well as other measures to eradicate conflicts of interests) How well do you think this will 
work? 
1/2/4 
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Typical questions for OIPs – objectives  
1. To determine if the new regulations will affect the use of ratings together with issuers’ relationships with 
CRAs 
2. To find out issuers’ perceptions of how the new regulations will impact them and other market 
participants and how well the new regulations address legacy problems in the market 
3. To elicit issuers’ preferences between regulation and self-regulation 
4. To find out if there have been any behavioural changes or practices as a result of the reforms / crisis 
 
No. Question Objective 
1 What is your role / involvement with Credit Rating Agencies? Intro 
2 
Have there been any ratings-related regulatory challenges affecting the ratings market? If so, what 
are they? If not, do you foresee any ratings-related regulatory challenges which may affect the market 
moving forward? What is likely to trigger this? 
Intro 
3 
What use do you (does your organisation) make of ratings?  
a. Who among the CRAs are you dealing with?  
b. Does it matter which CRA you commission for your ratings? 
c. Would you consider using ratings from smaller (investor-funded) agencies?   
d. Is there a special business manager dealing with fee negotiations or is the analyst dealing with 
these? 
e. Have you noticed any changes in the CRAs’ relationship management post the crisis? 
1/4 
4 Are you aware of the new EC regulations for Credit Rating Agencies? Intro 
5 How effective has been the regulation / supervision of CRAs prior to the new EC rules? 2 
6 What would you like to see changed in the governance/regulation of CRAs and why? 4 
7 
What is your reaction to the new EU CRA regulatory reforms? 
c. Is formal regulation necessary or would a code of conduct be better?  
d. Is the new EU regulation of CRAs the right way to regulate them? 
e. How enforceable are the new regulations, in the UK, EU, and Globally – by whom? 
f. Are you issuing more or less debt since the crisis? / since the new regulations? 
g. How important is the rating for the success of the issue? (before and after the crisis)? 
h. Has the importance of ratings changed since the crisis? 
1/2/3/4 
8 
What is likely to change in the way you relate to CRAs as a result of the new regulations? 
a. Will you continue to use ratings? 
b. Will you continue to use the same ratings agencies? 
c. Have the new regulations hampered the way you and your industry work? If so, what exactly has 
deteriorated and what is the implication for your industry? 
d. Have the new regulations enhanced the way your company / industry works? If so what exactly 
has changed and what will it mean to your company/ industry? 
1/2/4 
9 What specific issues do the regulations address e.g. conflict of interest, transparency? 2/4 
10 Are there any areas that remain unaddressed by the new regulations? 2/4 
11 
What problems do you think the new regulations may pose in 
a. The ratings market in general (locally, regionally and globally) 
b. The operations of other market participants 
1/2/4 
12 
Is the current funding model for CRAs appropriate, i.e. that the issuer pays? If not, who should pay? 
Advantages/disadvantages of other funding models? 
1/2/4  
13 
Do you think CRAs have changed since the crisis? In what ways? Is this positive change? What has 
necessitated the change? What more should they do? 
4 
14 
Have you come across any unsolicited ratings recently? If yes, have they been marked as unsolicited? 
How do you perceive unsolicited ratings? 
2/4 
15 
The EU Commission is considering the creation of a European CRA. Do you think this is a good idea? 
Would you commission a rating from them? If no, what would they have to do that you would 
consider it? 
1/2/4 
16 
One of the new regulation’s aims is to increase competition. Is there need for more competition? 
Would you commission a new CRA if new ones came in the market?   
1/2/4 
17 Are CRAs the appropriate vehicle for providing ratings? If not, what alternative would you suggest? 1/2/3 
18 
To improve transparency, the new regulations call for more disclosure, what use will your 
organisation make of the additional CRA disclosure? What are the resource implications for 
processing this? 
1/2/4 
19 Who else would you recommend for further information on CRA operations and the ratings market? 
 
 
Thank you for your participation 
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Appendix 5: Sample of an interview transcript 
The following is a sample of an interview transcript from the study 
 
TN: Thank you very much for agreeing to help out with my study. Just to 
mention that my study is being carried out on an anonymous basis, 
so my final report won’t mention either your name or that of your 
organisation. 
IS9: That’s ok, I have no problem with that.   
TN: Firstly, do you mind giving me an overview of how your role 
interfaces with rating agencies?  
IS9: I am group treasure of xxx and one of my responsibilities is managing the 
relationship with rating agencies. So the two that effectively cover us and 
who we have a relationship with and where we pay for the rating are 
Moody’s and S&P but also Fitch. 
TN: Is there any reason why you use the two mainly? 
IS9: They are in my opinion and I think in the opinion of the market, the two 
main credit rating agencies. I’ve made this comment before to several 
people, we only use rating agencies because our bond investors who we 
access funding from, will demand a credit rating from S&P and Moody’s. 
TN: Do you have any specific guidelines that stipulate these two?   
IS9: No, we don’t, we could change, there is no policy. It is just that we believe 
that it’s best to have two ratings which in order to optimise funding costs 
and the best two rating agencies we have in the market are S&P and 
Moody’s at the moment. Once again, I think if our bond investors and 
creditors came back and said that they value the opinion of another rating 
agency in favour of Moody’s and or S&P, then I think there would be a 
good chance for us to move to that rating agency. It’s all driven by what 
our creditors and bond investors demand in terms of providing us with 
funding and credit.     
TN: That’s understandable. I’m not sure whether you are aware of the 
European Commission rating agency regulations?   
IS9: Sort of, you may want to remind me of any particular points you want to 
discuss.   
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TN: One of the EC regulatory objectives is to encourage competition in 
the ratings market. To what extent do you think regulation can 
effectively achieve that particularly when players like yourselves 
seem to be guided by bond holders in terms of the choice of rating 
agencies?   
IS9: I don’t think it can. I don’t think this is a market where regulation can 
work, it is driven by the market and what is valued and what isn’t valued. 
As I said, I think if our investors were sufficiently confident in their own 
credit analysis that they saw little value of official credit ratings from 
Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch or whoever, then we wouldn’t want a credit rating, 
for us it only serves a purpose which is to reduce our funding costs and 
allow other counterparties in the industry to provide us credit by 
entering into agreements, and that’s all it is and if other entities entered 
the market, maybe a rating agency that’s established by the banks that 
would be good but only to the point where investors are sufficiently 
confident in that new entity that they effectively demand of us that we 
have that rating.   
TN: On that point, the EC has mooted on an idea of introducing an EC-
sponsored agency. If such an agency came to be, would you use it?   
IS9: Well, in many ways it’s the same answer I have given previously, if the 
investing institutions had sufficient confidence in that rating agency that 
they valued the opinions of that agency and therefore by valuing the 
opinions of the agency they would ask us to use that agency to reduce our 
funding costs then yes, but it’s all driven by what the investor perceives to 
be some value in terms of the opinions given. If it was deemed to be a 
politically-driven sort of institution where they weren’t prepared to give 
arms-length, independent ratings analysis on things like sovereign credits 
or large banks because of the potential economic fallouts of that, then 
there would be no confidence in that agency and therefore it would be of 
little value. So it would have to be completely independent and arm’s 
length. If there was any interference from the EU in terms of the analysis 
or opinions given on companies, banks or sovereigns, then that agency 
would have no credibility and therefore wouldn’t have sufficient value.   
TN: It sounds like new agencies need a bit of track record to attract 
customers but to get that track record, they need customers..   
 
IS9: Yes, that’s a catch-22 situation! I think the only way it might work was if 
there was some regulation in position of the ratings such that all bonds 
that were issued must have a rating from that agency and therefore that 
might lead to a position where it could over time establish sufficient 
credibility that that requirement could fall away and the value of that 
rating could stand in its own right.  
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TN: But would that be interpreted by the market that such a rating 
agency would be the mouthpiece of the regulatory authorities?   
IS9: Oh to begin with, it certainly would, but over a period of maybe 3-5 years, 
you could get the EU moving away from that agency in terms of putting in 
place various features that show that the agency is independent and 
therefore by breaking away and displaying independence then they may 
come to a point that that institution would be valued in its own right 
rather than being seen as the mouthpiece of the EU.   
TN: One of the issues highlighted in the new regulations relates to 
conflicts of interest between issuers and rating agencies. Would you 
have any comments on that?   
IS9: It’s an obvious concern but I actually do think that the rating agencies 
handle that quite well, we never ever speak to, we are not allowed to, the 
analysts would never have a conversation with us regarding fees and 
that’s always dealt with by a separate part of the rating agency. I do have 
quite a degree of confidence that there are strict barriers between those 
two parts of the organisation, the organisation that’s dealing with the 
invoicing and fee structure and the analysts is completely separate. So yes, 
in practice I do think the Chinese walls and the barriers that the rating 
agencies establish internally do to me appear to be working quite well.   
TN: What would your response be to a statement that says that perhaps 
the Chinese walls may work relatively well at lower levels of the 
organisation but perhaps taller people at higher levels may be able 
to peep through?   
IS9: Yes, I think that’s always a concern. I think that’s a concern in banking as 
well regarding Chinese walls. I’ve actually more confidence of that 
working within credit rating agencies than I have within the banks to be 
quite honest.   
 
TN: The regulations aim to foster some behavioural changes in the 
market and I wondered whether you have observed any changes?   
 
IS9: No   
 
TN: Is it business as usual then?   
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IS9: It is, I don’t see how introducing regulations can change anything. It’s a 
service that’s either valued or it isn’t when it comes down to it. If the 
rating agencies aren’t doing their job, then the investors will not demand 
a rating of the company or the bond and therefore it will fall away 
naturally. So therefore I think, I don’t see how regulations can actually 
change that. If anything, the EU coming out and dismissing the 
downgrading of peripheral European countries, dismissing it as if it 
doesn’t matter, the rating agencies basically don’t know what they are 
doing, then that really undermines the EU established agency.   
TN: Except if they are insinuating that perhaps the incumbent CRAs have 
some biases?   
IS9: Yes, I don’t think that’s necessarily the case, the fact that S&P has 
downgraded the US, I don’t think there is any significant bias towards the 
US or against EU corporations or the EU sovereign credits. I actually think 
the American or US view of the Euro is fairly sound and that there it is a 
sound experiment. It’s just a question of when it breaks up rather than if, 
so I think in the EU there is a determination, a will, to keep the Euro 
together which isn’t backed up by evidence and the facts and it takes the 
US are seeing this more clearly than European countries to be quite 
honest.    
TN: There is an idea of a possible skills issue from a regulatory 
perspective in terms of understanding what’s happening in the 
ratings market. How skilled do you thing the regulators are in 
grappling with the issues in the ratings market?   
IS9: No, I couldn’t really comment on that   
TN: Just a follow-on point on that. Some previous participants talked of a 
revolving door principle where skills flow from industry to the 
regulators and vice versa, do you see that happening in the ratings 
market?   
IS9: No, personally, once again, I have not seen it. It doesn’t mean that it isn’t 
happening.   
TN: I just wanted to pick your brains, what is a rating?  This question 
arises from the allegation that perhaps there was over reliance on 
ratings by investors who may not have done enough due diligence of 
their own 
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IS9: I think that’s probably true, yes, I think that’s why rating agencies exist 
because some institutions and corporates haven’t got the resources to 
actually do a thorough enough due diligence on the credit of the 
institutions they have exposures to. We are in that position, xxx as a 
company relies very much on the ratings of banks and other large 
corporates that we do business with in order to establish credit ratings. I 
also think that is true but I also think that if you are going to do credit 
analysis yourself as an institution, then you need substantial resources to 
actually do that. There is no point in giving that to people within your 
organisation who are doing it on a part-time basis when they haven’t got 
the required skills and experience to actually do it. So I think that’s why 
rating agencies exist because a lot of companies haven’t got the resources 
to do that due diligence.   
TN: In your view, do you think rating agencies do an effective job in that 
area?   
IS9: I think they do, but I also think that they have the position in the market 
to do a much better job. I actually think the better analysts exist within 
banks and the investing community but that the rating agencies are in a 
much stronger position because certainly for most institutions they rate, 
they get access to forward-looking information and access to senior 
management that can discuss strategy with them and that’s something we 
wouldn’t do with our banking analysts. With banking analysts, we would 
only give them historic information, we would not give them any 
forward-looking information. With rating agencies they get access to that, 
we share our three year projections with rating agencies which is 
extremely valuable information for analysts to have but I don’t think they 
use that information as effectively as they should.   
TN: Is that incompetence or deliberate?   
IS9: I think its incompetence, it can’t be deliberate, they,… can’t deliberately 
ignore that. I think incompetence is too strong a word but I don’t think 
they are as good as a typical analyst that exists within banks. I think that’s 
down to their salary structure. I think you would find in terms of the 
revolving door, from an analyst point of view, it’s a one-way door, you 
know, if analysts come into the rating agency are trained up, then if they 
are good analysts, they are poached by banks, that’s certainly my 
experience that the better analysts do tend to go to banks who are willing 
to pay more. But you know, ultimately it’s still the rating or the opinion of 
the rating agency that I would still value more than from a bank because 
of this access to forward looking projections that rating agencies get.   
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TN: When you look at a historical rating itself, wouldn’t you say it’s a 
lagging indicator rather than a forward-looking indicator?   
IS9: It should be forward-looking, it obviously won’t, if you look at a rating 
opinion, they will focus on historical factors because obviously they can’
t publish the forward-looking projections we’ve given them, one of the 
things we say to them is that we’ll let you see our forward-looking 
projections but for obvious reasons we can’t allow you to publish them. 
They can’t publish the fact that may believe that the cash to debt ratio will 
increase or decrease in the next 12-24 months that would be publishing 
inside information effectively to all the market. So for understandable 
reasons that a rating agency opinion will focus in terms of what it reports 
on, on historic information but reading between the lines and the actual 
opinion will be more related to and more determined by those forward-
looking projections than rating agencies are aware of from regular annual 
meetings or even more regular than that, meetings with management. 
TN: One of the regulatory aims is to increase investor protection. Do you 
see any evidence of that in the market after the introduction of the 
regulations?   
IS9: I see no real evidence of that, but once again if it’s something that 
investors should be demanding, then again investors have a requirement 
from a rating agency they should be discussing that requirement, 
effectively demanding that rating agencies carry out certain criteria, 
certain processes when they do a credit rating opinion. I see no evidence 
of that really. I see the rating agencies changing and over the years they 
have become a lot more transparent in terms of what we have to do as a 
company or to maintaining a rating, they are displaying exactly ratios, 
what financial ratios we need to maintain at a given rating level but I’m 
not sure whether that’s driven by regulation or driven by the fact that 
over the last 10 years or so, they haven’t done a great job and are trying 
to improve because of market pressure rather than regulatory pressure. 
TN: But isn’t there an anomaly there in the sense that investors don’t 
have a formal direct relationship with rating agencies; it is the 
issuers who do?   
IS9: No, they don’t but I think the rating agencies understand. It is a very 
strange relationship here. Obviously you’ve mentioned it. In terms of 
rating a corporate, the corporate pays for the rating, there is something 
there for the benefit of the investor, so I think the rating agency 
understand that it’s vital that they give the investor what the investor 
wants because if the investor does decide that it’s of no value, then 
business between the corporate and the rating agency would dry up. So 
where there is no formal relationship, I’m pretty sure that there is an 
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input into the rating agencies that investors have in terms of demanding 
certain practices, if there isn’t, then rating agencies are certainly missing a 
trick there.   
TN: One would have expected though that perhaps such an input would 
be more effective if it came through whoever pays the rating 
agencies don’t you think?   
IS9: Sorry, I didn’t quite understand that, what was that point again?   
TN: if you look at the flow of the money in this industry, it flows from 
investors to issuers and from issuers to rating agencies, it would be 
logical to assume that influence and power flows in a commensurate 
direction such that the influence on rating agencies would come 
from investors but through issuers as they have the lever to tighten 
should things don’t work?   
IS9: I don’t think it works that way. I have never had any investor come to me 
and say can you help we really need the rating agencies to amend their 
reporting or include in their reporting any particular features or make 
any discussion I’ve never had a conversation with an investor regarding 
the reporting from a rating agency   
TN: That’s interesting, I don’t want to labour on the point too much but I 
just wondered that since investors do not pay the rating agencies, 
what forum would they have to articulate their requirements and 
how effective would that be?   
IS9: I think, I’m not sure but I think the rating agencies do have relationships 
with investors through various seminars that they hold, I do think they 
meet up with the investing community on quite a regular basis having 
discussions, having meetings, I don’t think, well, maybe I don’t know 
enough about it but I’d be surprised if there isn’t communication between 
investors and rating agencies regarding how they see the ratings and how 
the ratings could be improved. I would think all the pressure in terms of 
updating amending ratings is coming from investors from some forum. 
There must be some mechanism whereby the rating agencies can pick up 
feedback from investors even though there isn’t that fiduciary 
relationship between the investor and the rating agency. 
TN: I’ll certainly follow that point further, it sounds interesting   
IS9: Yes, I think there must be, there must be ways, there must be some 
communication, interfaces there between rating agencies and investors. 
I’d be amazed if there isn’t.  
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TN: What is your view on the regional approach of the EC regulations at a 
time when everything tends to be global?   
IS9: In what respect, are we talking about the rating agency regulations?   
TN: Yes, the EC rating agency regulations focusing   
IS9: I think there has to be global coordination the world is far too global now 
to have the EU establishing a regulatory set up that isn’t consistent with 
the rest of the world. I think there has to be consistency here.   
TN: I know you list across different markets, have you come across any 
challenges associated with different regulatory requirements when 
it comes to the use of ratings?   
IS9: No, not from a ratings point of view, no.   
TN: What do you think of the use of the same symbols to rate sovereigns, 
corporates and bonds when the underlying asset structure 
implications are different?   
IS9: I don’t have a problem with it, I think it works quite well and the market 
understands that that’s the denomination, the way they symbolise the 
credit ratings. It’s ok to then compare a financial institution with a 
sovereign and  a corporate if the rating symbols are the same, so I don’t 
have a problem with that, I think it’s quite useful.   
TN: In terms of the way you work, have you seen any changes post the 
crisis?   
IS9: No, I’m certainly aware that the rating agencies are more systematic in 
their approach now, that they obviously have internal guidelines and 
some regulations to make sure that they seeing corporates on a more 
regular basis and also performing their analysis within certain timescales 
and they have obviously improved their act in terms of making sure that 
there is more discipline on the ratings in terms of how its carried out, 
how regularly they see management, how quickly they produce their 
reports, what the reports contain etc. So I see quite a bit more discipline 
from the rating agencies that has been introduced over the last 3 years. 
For us, we have continued largely as before, volumes continue to 
experience the normal fluctuations but no major changes as a result of the 
crisis.  
TN: Has that change brought about any impact on resources from your 
end?   
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IS9: Not really, no, it’s obviously a bit more rigorous, they require more 
information and perhaps more time to go through things but we haven’t 
had to introduce any special extra resources for that. We have coped with 
the existing resources.   
TN: What do you think is the motive behind the EC regulations on credit 
ratings?   
IS9: I think it’s not really holding any value existing rating system. I think 
within Europe there is maybe some value there value held from a 
rating....excuse me, can I just take my other phone, I won’t be a sec.   
TN: Sure, not a problem   
IS9: .....I just think it doesn’t like the ratings process and I wonder whether 
that is perhaps to do with the fact that Moody’s and S&P are US agencies 
rather than European agencies, I’m not sure about that. They clearly don’t 
have a great deal of regard for the existing, for the current rating agencies. 
I’m sure they did a terrible job during the 2008 crisis which to some 
extent is true, they didn’t do a great job so they probably want to see 
some improvements in the process, which everybody wants, I don’t think 
the rating agencies were doing a particularly great job but I don’t think 
you improve that by introducing regulation. You improve that probably 
by getting investors to demand a better service.    
TN: Would you do that by regulating the investors themselves?   
IS9: Well, I don’t think you do need to regulate the information the investors 
get. At the end of the day, it’s a pretty sophisticated market, the investing 
community. I just think you need to explain to that market that they have 
got some powers to actually demand that rating agencies improve. If 
anything, I think there is a case for the investors to set up a separate, an 
independent agency that can compete with Moody’s and S&P if they don’t 
value the... and investors clearly have concerns over the existing structure 
and the credibility and value of the existing rating agencies. They claim 
that they criticised the rating agencies consistently since 2008 and they 
clearly need to do something if they are not satisfied with them.   
TN: If you were to place the blame for the 2008 financial crisis, where 
would you place it – rating agencies, issuers, investors?   
IS9: Interesting, none of those, I don’t think you can blame rating agencies for 
it. I don’t think they have done a great job but I think it’s a bit like blaming 
your fire alarm for your house burning down when you have been having 
fires inside the house. Obviously it could have been reported earlier, but 
it’s not their fault. It’s not issuers, all they have done is borrowed money 
when they have needed it. I think the blame actually; I know a lot of 
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people place the blame on banks. I think its government; governments 
across the developed world are to blame for the crisis we got ourselves in 
by taking on and allowing their nations to take on too much debt. 
TN: Is that the regulatory side?   
IS9: Yes, regulatory side but its governments rather than the.... I think it’s not 
just a question of the government should have ensured there was more 
regulation on banks and more regulation on issuers and rating agencies. I 
think it probably is that governments have gone along very happily with 
the build-up of debt across both corporates and financial institutions and 
should have, I suppose introduced, set up a mechanism for regulation and 
none of them did. So it’s not regulators themselves that are to be blamed 
because the regulators were not given the mandate to go out and spot the 
build-up of debt that was actually needed. Their governments could have 
given that mandate to regulators and they didn’t. Because they were 
enjoying the growth that was coming from the build-up of debt without 
realising that at some point in the future, that debt has to be paid back. So 
I think governments are mainly.., even banks in this country, in the UK, 
only a year before this crisis happened, you had Gordon Brown standing 
up saying what a wonderful job the banks in the UK had been doing and 
what a national asset they were, less than 12 months before the crisis 
came! 
TN: Which probably goes back to the point we discussed earlier that 
perhaps at government levels, there is perhaps less understanding 
of what is actually happening in the industry   
IS9: yes   
TN: If you were to change anything in this industry moving forward, 
what would you change?   
IS9: I would like to see a new agency set up by the investing community, 
initially financed and supported by the investing community, whereby the 
investing community paid for the rating service. I’d like to see that set up. 
I don’t necessarily think that the existing institutions are doing a great job 
I think there should be competition but that needs to be driven by the 
investors not by government so I would like to see a new competitor set 
up by the investors whereby the investors have that fiduciary 
relationship with the rating agency. 
TN: Is that because you don’t believe the current issuer-pays model is 
working effectively?  
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IS9: I don’t think it’s working as effectively as it could. Clearly there are still 
concerns over the quality of the ratings so I think it could certainly be 
improved.  
TN: Is that linked in any way to the alleged conflicts of interest?   
IS9: It could be, I’m not sure, but it could be one of the problems why the 
quality of ratings isn’t higher   
TN: Well, that was my last question, thank you very much for your time. 
If you like, I can circulate a copy of my final report to you.   
IS9: Yes, I’d like to see that if possible   
 
